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Differential Paths to Parity: A Study of the Contemporary Arms Race

MICHAEL DON WARD
University of Colorado

This article presents a model of arms expenditures and arms accumulation for the Soviet Union and United States from 1952 through 1978. It argues that contemporary superpowers do not react solely to the military budgets of one another in assessing the potential threat against which they must allocate military resources, i.e., in deciding upon the military budget. Rather, they respond primarily to the relative balance of strategic and conventional military forces. A continuous time model of this process is developed and estimated. If one examines only the budgets of these two nations, it would appear that no race is occurring; rather, the Soviets are simply increasing their arms expenditures irrespective of what the United States does. However, when one examines the relative stocks of military capabilities, it appears that the USSR is racing to catch up to the United States. Finally, the dynamics governing arms competition between the United States and the USSR appear to be undergoing marked change.

Richardson's pioneering work on arms races (1919/1960) has been the basis for analytical and quantitative studies of how nations spend money on the military. Richardson's perspective is not only well known, but is also quite compelling; he argues that nations increase arms expenditures when they perceive that a rival nation is in a position to pose a significant military threat to their security. The vicious "we are arming because they are arming" cycle was expressed by Richardson as a set of differential equations to describe the growth of arms expenditures which led to World War I.

Today, some 60 years later, we are presented with a situation in which both the United States and the Soviet Union are involved in significant programs to increase their military capabilities. The expressed motivation of each set of decision makers has been to counter the threat posed by the increasing arms expenditures and accumulations of the other. Two recent documents, one prepared by the U.S. Department of Defense (1981) and the other by the Soviet Defense Ministry (1982), underscore the official doctrines. Among Europeans in particular, the arms race doctrine frequently provides the framework for understanding, as well as either supporting or attacking, the current armaments policies of the United States and the USSR.

What has scholarship in the past 60 years contributed to the understanding of this phenomenon? Although Richardson's efforts have had a marked effect on how arms expenditures are viewed as well as studied, the subsequent theoretical development, although significant, has been concerned largely with relatively minor modifications to the original Richardson equations.

Many of those who followed Richardson have done so with an empirical bent. Notable examples include Abolfathi (1978), Chatterji (1969), Gillespie et al. (1977), Gregory (1974), Hamblin et al. (1977), Hollist (1977a, b), Hollist and Guetzkow (1978), Lambelet (1973), Luterbacher (1974, 1975), Lambelet and Luterbacher with Allan (1979), Majeski and Jones (1980), Milstein (1972), Rattinger (1976), Saris and Middendorp (1980), Shisko (1977), Strauss (1972, 1978), Taagepera et al. (1975), Wagner et al. (1973), Wallace (1979, 1980a, b), and Zinnes and Gillespie (1973). (See Luterbacher, 1975, and Moll & Luebbert, 1980, for more systematic surveys.) What is striking about most arms-race studies is that although they often find evidence for an arms race in some pairs of nations (e.g., Israel and Egypt or Pakistan and India), there is rarely any evidence to suggest that the United States and the USSR are involved in

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what analytically and empirically can be termed an escalatory arms process.

Cusack and Ward (1981, p. 429) concluded "the arms race formulation is empirically deficient in accounting for the spending patterns of the United States, Soviet Union, and People's Republic of China in the period from 1949 to 1978."

Another group of scholars studying the same problem from a slightly different perspective cited even stronger conclusions against the existence of an arms race:

> According to our data, then, the presence of a nuclear arms race, far from constituting a given of international politics, proves to be a chimera. We have tried again and again to test for the presence of arms competition or arms racing, and we have failed to find anything each time. It is obvious that the United States and the USSR are building nuclear arms, but are not doing so, as they allege, because they are racing or competing with one another (Kugler, Organski, & Fox, 1980, p. 238).

In spite of such strong published conclusions, the arms-race notion nevertheless persists. One leading scholar of Soviet defense expenditures has remarked "[W]e don't need an econometric study to prove that U.S. defense expenditures are geared to Soviet expenditures—our Congressional debates are sufficient evidence" (Holzman, 1980, p. 103). With the conventional wisdom so firmly entrenched, why are the results often so contradictory and so frequently at odds with the arms-race argument?

Taagepera (1979-1980) has recently argued that the Richardson arms-race framework suffers from a basic conceptual inadequacy; namely, materiel as well as budgets should be included as influences in determining how nations decide upon arms spending and accumulation. Taagepera notes that "[t]he conceptual problem [with the arms race formulation] deals with the confusion between total accumulated arms stockpile and the current military budget" (1979/1980, p. 67). He further posits that differential equations can "easily" be formulated to include these oft-ignored, but rather obvious components of military competition among and between nations —stocks of weapons and the military budgets with which they are purchased. To date there are only two empirically based studies which make use of stocks and budgets: Kugler, Organski, and Fox (1980; see also Organski & Kugler, 1980) and Luterbacher, Allan, and Imhoff (1979).

This study, which builds upon the conceptual and substantive framework proposed by Taagepera, demonstrates that continuous stock-flow models can be implemented and statistically estimated in order to analyze the arms race paradigm. The coupling of a simulation language with a general estimation package, a constellation pioneered by Luterbacher, Allan, and Imhoff (1979), provides an intriguing vehicle for examining the stock-flow problem in a continuous time framework. In stark contrast to the earlier work in modeling arms expenditures, this study concludes that the empirical evidence supports the presence of a competitive arms accumulation process between the United States and the USSR.

Theory

It is fundamental to the stock-flow interaction formulation that during an escalatory arms buildup, one or both parties will be interested not only in what the other is spending, but also in what their opponent is buying. This idea bears considerable merit, although it has received little attention in the literature.[1] A recent publication (U.S. Department of Defense, 1981) depicted the Soviet threat by looking not only at military expenditure patterns and manpower requirements, but also at the scope and structure of both conventional and strategic weaponry. Simply put, weapon stockpiles are too important to be ignored in evaluating a rival's potential threat and should be included in any attempt to understand arms races. The Soviet rejoinder (Soviet Ministry of Defense, 1982) also evaluated stocks of weapons, although from a recognizably different perspective on the source of the threat. Both documents, however, seek to justify increased military acquisitions and expenditures in terms of the implicit and explicit threat posed to national security by the military expansion of the opponent. The U.S. document, for example, was initially used to persuade the NATO Defense Ministers of the importance of increased defense spending.

One oft-cited study of U.S. and British defense budgeting processes stresses the role of force levels in the United States in terms of continuously informing the planning of the U.S. budget decisions:

> Since 1962 . . . military requirements and the resources necessary to support them have been considered within the framework of a five-year programme for defense spending—known appropriately enough, as the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP). . . . [This] "masterplan" contains the approved programmes and manpower levels

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[1] For analyses of the accumulation of weapons stocks see Lambelet and Luterbacher with Allan (1979), Lambelet (1973), Luterbacher et al. (1979), and Allan and Luterbacher (1981), McGuire (1977), Desai and Blake (1981), and Squires (1982).

> of the department [of defense] with their estimated annual costs projected five years in advance (equipment levels are now projected eight years in advance). It is therefore a rolling programme, and the point of departure for each new budgeting cycle is the [FYDP] programme inherited from the previous year (Burt, 1975, p. 9).

Thus it would appear that a realistic model of U.S. defense spending would focus on changes, be brought up to date continuously, and stem from the estimated force requirements developed by those involved in the planning process. The recent debate in the United States on equivalent megatonage levels held by the U.S. and Soviet military establishments underscores the impact of strategic stockpile levels on defense policy-making;[2] this supports using the evolution of weapons stocks as one major causal mechanism of the model being developed.

The framework in this article builds explicitly upon both Richardson and Taagepera, as well as much other previous work. The model is expressed in a system of four differential equations:

$$dx/dt = \alpha_{11}(Y - X) - \alpha_{12}x' + \alpha_{13}ATP + \alpha_{14}KOR + \alpha_{15}VN \qquad (1)$$

$$dy/dt = \alpha_{21}(X - Y) - \alpha_{22}ySOVPL + \alpha_{23}RPT \qquad (2)$$

$$d\ln X/dt = \alpha_{33}(\ln X^* - \ln X) \quad \text{where } \ln X^* = -\alpha_{31}X + \alpha_{32}\ln x \qquad (3)$$

$$d\ln Y/dt = \alpha_{43}(\ln Y^* - \ln Y) \quad \text{where } \ln Y^* = -\alpha_{41}\ln Y + \alpha_{42}\ln y. \qquad (4)$$

In these equations,

x and *y* are respective defense expenditures of the United States and USSR in 1970 constant U.S. dollars.

x' is that portion of the defense budget not spent on war, i.e., $x' = x - VN - KOR$.

X and *Y* are the respective military stocks of the United States and USSR defined in terms of an index of conventional and strategic forces.

APT is the perceived tension of the United States with respect to the USSR, indicated in event-interaction flows and measured as the log of cooperation minus the log of conflict received from the USSR.

RPT is the perceived tension of the USSR in relation to the United States defined similarly to the above index.

VN is the Department of Defense estimate of the yearly cost of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, measured in 1970 constant U.S. dollars.

KOR is an estimate of the yearly costs of the U.S. defense effort in the Korean conflict.

SOVPL is an index of the state of completion of the Soviet economic plan.

d/dt is the differential operator.

ln is the natural log function.

(See Appendix 1 for further definitions.)

These four equations encompass the basic argument of Richardson and clarify the interaction of flows (budgets) with stocks. The reactive components of this framework are several. First, nations react to the perceived difference between their stocks of military goods and those being accumulated by their rival. This stock-flow interaction argues that if the perceived difference is either too large or too small, a nation will alter its decisions accordingly. This adaptation and the budget constraint or bureaucratic momentum are portrayed in parameters α_{11} and α_{21}. A nation that is behind in the race will attempt to allocate more resources to the defense budget in an effort to accumulate more weapon stocks and thus reduce, if not totally eliminate, its disadvantage. Such stock-flow interactions work for both nations, capturing the essence of the circular escalation patterns predicted by the Richardson framework.

Nations also react to the threat posed by other nations; this is reflected in the flows of information about the cooperative and conflictual interactions between them. High levels of conflict in the absence of correspondingly high levels of cooperation would, on the surface, suggest an increased as opposed to decreased level of potential threat or hostility from the rival nation. Coefficients α_{13} and α_{23} represent this linkage.

Earlier work (Cusack & Ward, 1981; Nincic & Cusack, 1979) demonstrate that the U.S. involvement in Korea and in Vietnam is significant to the explanations of the evolution of U.S. defense expenditures after World War II. Although in previous studies these components have been measured simply by dummy variables constructed to capture statistically the escalation and deescalation of the military during and after these international conflicts, the wartime expenditures are included explicitly in the equations, as are coefficients to measure the strength of these associations (α_{14} and α_{15}).

The two other terms in the budget equations (1) and (2) relay information about the budget constraints as do coefficients α_{12} and α_{22}. That is, what is the general trend in expenditures? In some situations this may be seen as budget constraint when high levels of expenditures in one period tend to drive down the tendency to increase expenditures in subsequent ones. On the other hand, high levels of expenditures may actually accelerate arms expenditures as many in the framework of incremental budgeting have argued (e.g., Fischer & Crecine, 1979, as well as Ostrom, 1977, 1978).

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[2] See *Science* (1982, p. 32) for a discussion of several of the issues in the recent controversy and thought about this problem. Richelson (1980, 1982) provides an excellent analysis of the substantive and measurement issues involved.

For the Soviet Union, the budget constraint is modified by a variable that captures the evolution of economic plans in the Soviet economy. Following Green and Higgins (1977), Hutchings (1973), and Nincic (1982), it is hypothesized that at the end of an official plan period (i.e., the last two years of each five-year plan) there is an additional constraint placed upon the allocation of the total budget, namely, the military suffers in order to allow a greater investment in the nonmilitary industrial sectors so as to help ensure the achievement of the stated goals of the five-year plans. Further, the first year of a new plan is argued to constrain the military versus nonmilitary split in favor of the industrial and consumption sectors insofar as there is an emphasis on getting the new plan off to a good start. The first year of a new plan is also often a catch-up year, important in meeting the goals of the previous plan. For these reasons, the so-called completion years provide an additional constraint on growth in the Soviet defense budget. In other years, the military may be expected to make up their foregone investments, thus introducing a cycle into the evolution of Soviet military spending.

In recapitulating the general ideas behind the two equations for the evolution of military expenditures, two aspects merit mention. First, the major causal component is a monitoring of the absolute difference of force structures between the superpowers to which the decision makers of concern react. Budgets are driven, in part, by an attempt to maintain a rough parity in military force structures. Under such logic, nations will attempt to catch up with their main rival. This is the crux of the race. Nations also alter their military budgets in relation to involvements in hostile conflict, the perceived level of tension between them and their principal rival, and the internal constraints that may be in effect.

An examination of stock equations (3) and (4) underscores two components fundamental to any evaluation of the evolution of capital stocks, be it military or nonmilitary: depreciation and investment. Depreciation results in a decrease in the value of stocks over time owing to normal wear and tear as well as obsolescence. As such, depreciation is itself proportional to the level of stocks. Investment comes through the mechanism of the budget, usually with some lag. Defense expenditures are made to maintain the weapon stockpile as well as to extend it.

Equations (3) and (4) portray four aspects of the evolution of military stockpiles. First, the expected or desired changes in the level of stocks are specified to influence the actual change in the proportional rate at which the stocks are evolving in time.[3] Stated differently, the actual change in stocks adapts to the desired change. The speed of this adjustment process (Koyck, 1954), a Koyck-type of lag structure, is given by parameters α_{33} and α_{43}. The desired proportional change in the stocks is tied to depreciation in that it is proportional to the level of stocks (in logs). It is also directly related to investment via the budget expenditures (also in logs). The parameters α_{31} and α_{41} represent the elasticities of stock changes in relation to the level of stocks, whereas α_{32} and α_{42} are the elasticities of stock changes with respect to the budgets. Thus, stocks evolve with a declining geometric lag to the desired proportional change in stocks.[4] These desired rate changes are themselves affected by the decision maker's evaluation of how depreciation and investment rates will affect the stock levels.

Such equations are designed to capture the continuous evolution of the process being modeled; this implies that the competition applies, if at all, at every point in time. Most empirical work within the Richardsonian tradition has adopted a discrete approximation for analysis which uses a relatively coarse temporal granule: one year. Both the discreteness and the granularity are problematic. International competition in terms of military security between the major powers is not likely to be portrayed accurately in terms of yearly time slices. Thus, a smaller and more continuous perspective is required; difference equation systems with yearly dt's are a poor approximation to dynamic systems such as the one expressed above.

The crucial distinction between stock and flow

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[3] The change in the natural logarithm of a variable is the change in the variable itself proportional to its level. Mathematically, $d\ln y/dt = (1/y)(dy/dt)$.

[4] As shown in Gandolfo (1981, pp. 10-14) the partial adjustment equation is equivalent to a Koyck-type distributed lag. In continuous form it is given by:

$$y(t) = \int_0^\infty (f(\tau)x(t-\tau))d\tau, \ s.t. \int_0^\infty (\tau)d\tau = 1.0$$

$$\lim_{\tau \to \infty} f(\tau) = 0.0$$

where $f(\tau)$ is the time form of the weighting factor.

variables is often obscured in difference equation models (Turnovsky, 1977, pp. 43-44). Discrete formulations also assume that all decisions and changes in variables are synchronized. This is not the case, for although decisions may be made in discrete time, they overlap in some (probably stochastic) fashion. This fact implies a continuous lag, which is better approximated in the continuous as opposed to discrete time framework. Further, there is no natural time interval to use for discrete time representations.

Unlike their discrete counterparts, continuous models do not assume independence of errors in the time domain that is synchronized. As Wymer (1975, p. 173) points out, in discrete models the distinction between lagged endogenous and exogenous variables is largely a matter of degree. This fact leads directly to several theoretical advantages for the continuous framework. The ideas behind the model can be expressed independently from the interval at which relevant data are available. Since models are continuous, response occurs instantaneously, which allows such models to be recursive, a major advantage in that it permits a straightforward causal interpretation. More important, as the quotation from Burt (1975) illustrates, political decisions are made and revised continuously. Laws and statutes may be issued discontinuously, but they are amended, interpreted, implemented, and revised without respect to a fixed, discrete time domain.

Two additional advantages of continuous time models may exist in the policy realm, apart from their advantages in the methodological and theoretical arenas. First and foremost, it may be that we can derive better models of the world and consequently enhance our understanding. More certainly, these models will be able to generate dynamic forecasts for shorter time intervals than were necessarily used in their empirical estimation and evaluation. A macropolitical or macroeconomic model based on yearly difference equations, for example, can show little about the dynamics operating within any single year; a continuous model, however, can in principle generate monthly or weekly forecasts. Such an advantage in the policy realm where short time horizons are legion may ultimately enhance the utility of models in the planning and policy process as well as sharpen the need for less aggregated, better quality data.[5]

Recent methodological developments have promoted the exploration of dynamic, continuous models which can be estimated through numerical techniques. Such techniques have been creatively fostered in political science by Luterbacher et al. (1979). In economics theory there has been considerable promotion of the use of continuous time techniques (e.g., Bergstrom, 1966, 1976, 1983, as well as Gandolfo, 1980, 1981, and for an especially thorough treatment, Aoki, 1981). However, to date Wymer (1972, 1975) and Phillips (1973, 1975) have most extensively explored the practical problems of how one estimates econometrically the coefficients of a dynamic model written in a continuous framework. The technique used here is called dynamic, nonlinear, trajectory fitting and is discussed in some detail in Appendix 2.

Data: Elaborating the Choices

Cusack and Ward (1981) have described and analyzed some of the important differences among various measurements of military expenditures. The problems are well known and will not be repeated here (Holzman, 1980, 1982). Of note is that the indicators of defense expenditures chosen here are those widely employed. For the United States, U.S. national defense expenditures given in constant 1970 U.S. dollars were taken from the *U.S. Defense Budget for Fiscal Year, 1979.* These data were originally presented in current prices per fiscal year, but have been converted into calendar year approximations with price fluctuations removed via a GNP deflator taken from the *1979 Report of the Council of Economic Advisors.*[6] They are available in the Appendix to Cusack and Ward (1981).

The debate over using constant versus current dollar amounts in studying arms expenditures is long standing and will not be resolved here. However, the decision to utilize constant dollar amounts was based on several factors. In his Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1984 (1983, p. 20) Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger has emphasized that "no serious observer can dispute the widely documented evidence on the size and scope of the Soviet [military] buildup [during the last two decades]. In his argument about the comparison of U.S. and Soviet investment levels (i.e., military spending), he emphasizes that Soviet figures were nearly double those of the United States by the early 1980s. This assertion is documented (1983, Chart I.B.1) by comparing military spending from 1960 to 1981 in terms of 1984 constant dollars. Thus it would appear that constant dollars are one salient metric for comparison, especially vis-à-vis the U.S. Congress and public. However, Ostrom (1977, p. 252) notes that Secretary of Defense Schlesinger was reprimanded by a congressman for not presenting comparisons in terms of current dollars, the type of dollars that the Congress is empowered to allocate.

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[5] Those who remained unconvinced of the important differences between discrete and continuous representations of the same ideas should consult Kohfeld and Salert (1982) for an excellent tutorial discussion which provides several examples, including the Richardson arms race equations.

[6] Alternative models may, and often have, assumed the contrary; namely, that comparative evaluations are most commonly made in terms of current, not constant, dollars.

It is interesting to note further that nowhere in the report to the Congress (1983) does Weinberger compare U.S. and Soviet expenditure levels in current dollars. However, when looking at the relative position of defense within the total U.S. federal budget, current and constant dollar figures are highlighted, presumably to show how the defense budget was actually going down during the 1970s, owing to inflation (see pp. 66 and Chart II.A.1 and Chart II.A.2). Thus, regarding the relative "bang for the buck," inflation is very important in the calculations of U.S. national security decision makers. One can only speculate that a similar dynamic may be at work in the Soviet decision-making process.

The data for Soviet expenditures are even more problematic. There are three main sources for information on Soviet expenditures: Lee (1977), a noted defense analyst; IISS estimates; and SIPRI estimates. In recent years, these as well as the CIA estimates have undergone considerable (upward) revision. The IISS series is used here because these data exist for the longest running series and are likely to continue to be available in the future. Second, these estimates for Soviet spending generally fall between the lower estimates of the SIPRI group and the higher estimates of Lee or of the CIA and thus are a medium ground on which to assess Soviet expenditures. Finally, the IISS has a quasi-official status in both the Western and Eastern blocs.[7]

Data on military stockpiles are more difficult to acquire and describe. The present procedure has been to construct a multiplicative index of both conventional and strategic weapons stocks. With regard to the U.S. and USSR, it is almost meaningless to evaluate conventional military capabilities without assessing nuclear and strategic capabilities. On the other hand, despite the long-standing mutual assured destruction-type policies, assessments of strategic capabilities without evaluating conventional forces, also portray incompletely the strengths of one's adversaries and allies. A multiplicative index not only answers the argument that both elements of the force structure are important, but also stresses that strategic and conventional forces are at some level substitutes for one another.

The assessment of conventional stocks uses measures that build upon the work of Lambelet (1973), who developed a two-theater model of the East-West arms race. Lambelet's conventional indexes were structured as manpower × firepower × mobility. Manpower in the East was determined by the number of Soviet troops, whereas the figure for the West represented the combined forces of the United States and West Germany. U.S. forces stationed in Europe were given a mobility score of 1.0 to account for their relative ease of deployment in response to a confrontation in the European theater, whereas those U.S. forces stationed elsewhere received a mobility score of 0.5. Lambelet's third component, firepower, was simply indexed by assuming that firepower had increased linearly by a factor of three over the period of his initial study, 1950-1971. Lambelet's data themselves were taken from the IISS's annual *The Military Balance* volumes.

In this study Lambelet's indexes were replicated and then extended in order to foster comparability of this study with others. The manpower measure for the East was modified to include the forces of both the Soviets and the East Germans. To accommodate the longer time period of concern, a 1.5 increase in firepower was assumed for 1971-1979.

The strategic forces stock index was not taken from the early work of Lambelet (1973), but was adapted from recent developments promoted by Tsipis (1975) and built upon by Allan and Luterbacher (1981). Conceptually, the strategic forces index is constructed by aggregating the total numbers of strategic weapons weighted by their lethality (measured in terms of their precision in reaching and destroying targets). The final score measuring the stock of military capabilities is then given by the product of the conventional and strategic indexes divided by 1000 (for scaling purposes).[8] It must be stressed that such an aggregation of conventional and strategic weapons stocks merely approximates a more complicated and elaborate mix of weapons. This study concentrates on a (one good) defense product that includes both conventional and strategic components. Accordingly, it is not possible to discuss the relative mix of weapons purchased either by the United States or Soviet Union nor the possible variety of interactions, such as a purely strategic race.

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[7] However, it should be pointed out that the choice of data series will affect the results (Cusack & Ward, 1981).

[8] It is possible to find fault with almost any index construction procedure concerned with military weaponry. There is no simple, widely agreed upon metric for comparison. Arguments for and against every measurement attempt can be made. The decisions involved in the stockpile index rests upon the cumulation of the efforts of others. Where they have been added to, the decision rules for so doing are made explicit in order to foster discussion as well as subsequent investigation and replication.

U.S. military expenditures are measured in current dollars spent during the U.S. military involvement in Korea and Vietnam. For Vietnam, U.S. Defense Department estimates of actual costs are used. The yearly costs of the Korean war were estimated by the author based upon a total cost figure of $54 billion. (See Appendix 1 for a description of estimation technique.)

Two additional indicators required by this model should reflect the flows of conflictual and cooperative events between the United States and the USSR. The two major sources of this information are the event-interaction data from the World Event Interaction Study (WEIS) beginning in 1966, and those from the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), beginning in 1948 (Azar, 1980a, b). The longer period and easier accessibility favored use of the COPDAB data bank. Four indicators were constructed to reflect bilateral flows of conflict and cooperation (Ward, 1982):

U.S. verbal conflict → USSR
U.S. verbal cooperation → USSR
USSR verbal conflict → United States
USSR verbal cooperation → United States

For the present study it is important to note that conflictual and cooperative interactions were included as distinct bilateral flows. Moreover, only verbal as opposed to nonverbal events were considered. This decision was based upon the finding of Hopple, Rossa, and Wilkenfeld (1980) that force and nonforce related events contribute to quite distinct dimensions of international behavior.[9] From these indicators, summary scores were calculated to reflect the balance (or net flow) of conflict and cooperation during a given period (in this case a year).

Empirical Results

Table 1 presents the empirical estimations for the four stock-flow equations for the United States and the USSR, based upon data from 1952 through 1978. A brief overview of the logic of estimation and the procedure used in its implementation is given in Appendix 2. In general, the model portrays accurately the evolution of U.S. and Soviet military budgets as well as their aggregate weapons stockpiles. Given that the R^2 for each equation is greater than .80, it is not surprising that the overall variance in the linked system approaches unity, not that the chi square statistic is highly significant ($\chi^2 = 982.9$ with 18 degrees of freedom).[10] Additionally, the variance

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[9] Explicit force events are likely to increase the threat as well, although this is a separate component of the arms acquisition process not included in this study. Were the United States and USSR actually at war with one another, for example, a very different model from the one posed here would be required. The model investigated here presumes the existence of tension, but the absence of force-related hostilities between the United States and the Soviet Union.

[10] There are two generally available descriptors of the amount of total variance explained in a system of simultaneous equations. One of these is the Carter-Nagar R^2_w (Carter & Nagar, 1977) which is given by the following formula:

$$1.0 - R^2_w = 1.0/[(1.0/G)tr[Y'Y(^{-1}(E'E]^{-1}],$$

where G is the number of equations, Y is a matrix of observations on the G endogenous variables, E is a matrix of $G \times N$ errors, and *tr* is the trace operator. This measure is bounded by 0.0 and 1.0 and has an interpretation similar to the standard coefficient of determination, R^2. It does, however, take into account the over identifying restrictions which may exist on coefficients, and under full information maximum likelihood assumptions is distributed chi-square. Thus, a χ^2 may be calculated which allows one to test the null hypothesis that the model and the data are inconsistent with one another:

$$\chi^2 = NGR^2_w/(1.0 - R^2_w) \text{ with degrees of freedom equal to the number of estimated parameters.}$$

An alternative system descriptor is available, which unlike the Carter-Nagar R^2_w does not ignore the off diagonal elements of the matrices representing the systematic and random components of the variance. This measure, R^2_{sys}, is based on the generalized variance matrix (i.e., on the multivariate analogue to the univariate variance). A general treatment of this may be found in Anderson (1958, pp. 166-169). This generalized variance matrix is given by the *det*($Y'Y$) for the total variance in the system and by *det*($E'E$) for the random variance not explained by the model. Thus:

$$R^2_{sys} = 1.0 - det(E'E)/det(Y'Y).$$

Note that these system descriptors are not averages of the individual system R^2s. It should also be pointed out that the standard parabolic errors are reported for this nonlinear model, even though it is not statistically clear against what underlying distributions they should be tested. What they do tend to indicate is what type of surface surrounds the minimum (which is what they in-

Table 1. Estimated Coefficients of United States-Soviet Union Stock-Budget Interactions, 1951-1978

Equation	Right-hand side variables		Estimated coefficients	Standard parabolic error
U.S. Budget (1)	Stock-budget effect	(α_{11})	−.0004076	.00001323
$R^2 = .824$	Budget constraint	(α_{12})	7.7514	.00013330
$SER = 3.6$	Perceived hostility	(α_{13})	8.4694	.00013230
	Korea	(α_{14})	−.27176	.00013230
	Vietnam	(α_{15})	−.29716	.00016538
	Initial value		76.865	
USSR Budget (2)	Stock-budget effect	(α_{21})	.0001957	.00000343
$R^2 = .900$	Budget constraint	(α_{22})	.023003	.00036599
$SER = 5.08$	Perceived hostility	(α_{23})	−2.0878	.00039435
	Initial value		45.82	
U.S. Stocks (3)	Depreciation	(α_{31})	−.31692	.00401320
$R^2 = .983$	Investment	(α_{32})	1.6987	.00301420
$SER = .176$	Adjustment speed	(α_{33})	.15877	.00661520
	Initial value, in logs		5.6351	
USSR Stocks (4)	Depreciation	(α_{41})	−.25204	.00330760
$R^2 = .970$	Investment	(α_{42})	1.9180	.01653800
$SER = .388$	Adjustment speed	(α_{43})	.13142	.00132300
	Initial value, in logs		2.1726	

Carter-Nagar $R^2_w = .901$
System descriptor $R^2_{sys} = .999$
$\chi^2 = 982.9$ with 18 degrees of freedom

Note: All data are described in Appendix 1; estimation technique is described in Appendix 2. Note 11 describes the two systems R^2 statistics. The standard error of the residual (*SER*) and the initial values for equations (3) and (4) are given in log form, i.e., the estimated form.

explained in the entire system is high for both the Carter-Nagar and System Descriptor (respectively, .901 and .999). Not only do these results allow the null hypothesis that the data are inconsistent with the model to be rejected, but more important, they show that the estimated differential equation system is a robust representation of the arms processes being modeled.

In Equation (1), the U.S. budget equation, all estimated parameters are highly significant and, in the main, in the predicted direction. The exception is the stock-budget interaction term α_{11}, which indicates that the reaction of the United States to the stock differences is slight and negative. By way of explanation it can be noted that during the entire period of observation, U.S. stocks were greater than Soviet stocks. The negative coefficient may indicate something about U.S. strategic doctrine, discounting stock comparisons if the United States is ahead or roughly at parity. One could further argue that the United States does not seek decreased stock levels, even when it has a relative advantage over the USSR. Rather, it could be interpreted that the United States is striving to maintain some proportion of its lead over the USSR.

Also in equation (1), the coefficient (α_{13}) for the perceived hostility variable *APT* is positive and statistically significant. A net flow of cooperative over conflictual interaction from the Soviet Union will in general lead to a reduction in defense spending. The estimated budget constraint (α_{12}) describes the general trend in U.S. defense expenditures. It indicates a decline of approximately 8% per annum in defense spending over the 1952-1978 period, holding other factors constant.[11]

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dicate for a linear model as well). That they are so small indicates that only slight perturbations of the estimated parameters would move the model away from the minimum error point, i.e., would decrease the explained variance.

[11] Russett has suggested an alternative explanation for this formulation. Organizational momentum, he

Figure 1. Actual and Estimated U.S. Military Budget



Note: Values are billion 1970 U.S. dollars, solid line is actual data and dashed line is the estimated budget.

The variables included to capture the effect of the Korean and Vietnamese wars illustrate that each has played an influential role in the evolution of U.S. defense spending. If the two war involvements had no independent effects, their respective coefficients (α_{14} and α_{15}) would be equal, since they are measured in equal units. The estimated coefficients show roughly equal negative impacts on the overall trend to reduce defense expenditures. Figure 1 presents the fit of the actual data on U.S. defense expenditures and the comparable output from the estimated equation. In addition to the close fit suggested in Table 1, the visual congruence between the actual and predicted data is quite striking.

Equation (2) describes the evolution of Soviet military spending. Although as formulated it contains no variables to capture war involvement, a logical extension of this work might include a variable that captured the cost of protracted troop deployments, such as that experienced by the USSR in post-1980 Afghanistan. The overall fit of this equation is quite good—greater than that for the U.S. budget equation. The adaptation coefficient (α_{21}) represents the speed at which the Soviets attempt to make up the perceived difference in their stock of weapons and those held by the United States. Table 1 shows this parameter to be highly significant and, as predicted by the model, positive, suggesting that the perceived position of inferiority in terms of weapons stocks plays an important role in the Soviet budgeting process. Unlike the U.S. case, the budget constraint (α_{22}) is relatively small (2%), indicating that high levels of spending do not necessarily work to reduce defense expenditures, especially when the ebb and flow of economic plans are taken into account. It would appear that the Soviets evidence no strong, immediate budget constraint apart from that dictated by the plan-

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argues, is captured in the coefficients α_{12} and α_{22}. Under this interpretation there has been a bureaucratic force operating in the post-World War II American government to drive down military expenditures.

Figure 2. Actual and Estimated Soviet Military Budget



Note: Values are 1970 billion U.S. dollars, solid line is actual data and dashed line is the estimated budget.

ning cycles. This cyclical variation appears strong in the Soviet case (Figure 2). One would nevertheless argue that a constraint exists, and although it may not have been felt during the historical period of concern, it may be quite strong in the future.

As in the case of the United States, the level of amicability or hostility between the United States and Soviet Union that is perceived by the Soviets (RPT), is important in the evolution of USSR expenditures. The sign of the coefficient α_{23}, however, indicates that increased amicability tends to be associated with growth rather than decline in Soviet military expenditures, in contrast to the U.S. case, this finding implies that increased cooperation does little to reduce the rate at which the Soviets are arming, demonstrating an interesting asymmetrical response. Figure 2 illustrates that the estimated equation captures the general trend in Soviet military expenditures, but a considerable number of cyclical movements away from the trend are not captured by this formulation. One might postulate that since the data themselves are of notoriously bad quality (see Cusack & Ward, 1981) and are freauently revised (Holzman, 1982), the estimated expenditures may be as reliable as the data. At a more substantive level, the weapons stocks of the People's Republic of China should probably appear in addition to those of the United States, when ascertaining the gap in Soviet stocks. Moreover, there is a need to incorporate a more dynamic formulation of the Soviet planning process.

Equations (3) and (4), which describe the evolution of U.S. and USSR stocks of conventional and strategic weapons, also present strong and intriguing results. First, all parameters are statistically significant, and most are in the expected direction. Depreciation of military capital, however, does not appear to be captured in equations (3) and (4). On the contrary, quite apart from what else is occurring, military stocks appear to be appreciating in value in both the USSR and United States, which indicates that, most probably, the stock indicators should be disaggregated into strategic, conventional, and personal components. The elasticity of the stock depreciation is approximately $-.32$ for the United States (α_{31}) and approximately $-.25$ for the Soviet Union

Figure 3. Actual and Estimated U.S. Military Stocks



Note: Values are the Conventional and Strategic Index, solid line is the actual data and dashed line is the estimated military stocks.

(α_{41}), which indicates that Soviet weapon stocks do not appreciate as rapidly as U.S. stocks. This finding is consistent with the observation that in the USSR old weapon systems are maintained, not phased out. The Soviet elasticity of investment (α_{42}) is approximately 1.9 compared to 1.7 for the United States (α_{32}), indicating a slightly greater Soviet efficiency of investment in regard to producing increments in military stocks. Finally, the speed with which stocks adjust to their desired levels (α_{33}) and (α_{43}) is slightly faster for the United States than for the USSR. Were the United States behind in a race, it could catch up more quickly to differences in weapons stocks than could the Soviets in a similar position; i.e., Soviet investments in building their military force structure are slightly more efficient than those in the United States, but are more slowly realized.

Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the military stock variables as they evolve both in the estimated and actual data series from 1952 through 1979. The visual fit is quite good, although the buildup and subsequent demobilization attendant to the Vietnamese war is not captured particularly well.

The simulated U.S. and USSR defense expenditures based upon equations (1) through (4) and the estimated parameters of Table 1, are shown in Figure 5. It is noteworthy that the general movement of these two series is virtually isomorphic to the actual data. This graph suggests a striking conclusion: It is apparent that no simple, Richardson reaction process is controlling the evolution of defense spending. The Soviet expenditures grow without much reaction to or from the U.S. expenditures, which themselves show periods of both growth and decline. Scholarly and policy studies of these data and their evolution over time have concluded repeatedly that there is no arms race.

When one examines the evolution of military stockpiles, however, as shown in Figure 6, the apparent finding of no arms race seems questionable. The Soviet Union has been increasing its military stockpiles either to bring them into rough parity with the U.S. stockpiles or to surpass them.

The USSR had military stocks which were below those of the United States throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. The increases in their defense budget may properly be viewed as an effort to catch up to or to surpass the leader in this race.

Returning to the estimated coefficients from Table 1, it should be reemphasized that the Soviets have more rapid appreciation but slightly more efficient investment with respect to military stocks. They also have an investment lag that is greater than that of the United States. Thus, in attempting to match U.S. stocks, Soviet decision makers would have to invest quite intensively within the defense sector, most likely to the detriment of other sectors of production. These investments would tend to be efficient in increasing the stock of military goods, but the goods themselves would come on line with a much greater lag. The United States, on the other hand, has continued to have a growing level of military stocks owing to a high level of efficiency in terms of investment and a small investment lag. Tables 2 and 3 present the actual and predicted values for the U.S. and USSR military expenditures and weapons stockpiles.

Conclusions

This article began with a simple question: Is there an arms race between the United States and USSR? In part, this question was suggested by Taagepera's assertion that much of the arms race literature had neglected or confused the role of expenditures and weapons, and by the long, accumulating stream of statistical evidence that such an arms race does not exist. The persistence of the myth of the arms race in spite of impressive evidence to the contrary presented an intriguing puzzle. Both the United States and the USSR are involved in massive arms buildup programs. Can it be that these programs are unrelated to one another, when each nation would appear to view the other as its major threat?

I formulated and empirically tested a model of the theoretical argument that the United States and the Soviet Union do react to one another

Figure 4. Actual and Estimated Soviet Military Stocks



Note: Values are the Conventional and Strategic Index, solid line is the actual data and dashed line is the estimated military stocks.

Figure 5. Simulated U.S. and Soviet Military Budgets



Note: Values are 1970 billion U.S. dollars, solid line is the United States and dashed line is the Soviet Union.

when formulating policy on military spending and arms stockpiles. The empirical results show that the model specified has considerable validity and interpretability. The United States and the USSR do appear to be reactive to one another, yet not through budgets alone. Rather they each try to achieve or maintain a lead over the other in terms of the stocks of weapons, both strategic and conventional, for which the budget is spent. Additionally, the United States seems able to increase its military stockpiles more efficiently and more quickly than the USSR. However, the model does not adequately capture the important depreciation that occurs, albeit differently, in both the U.S. and Soviet weapon stockpiles. Moreover, whereas the United States decreases its expenditures in relation to a friendlier diplomatic climate with the USSR, the reaction of the USSR is in the opposite direction: increased investment in the face of a more cooperative international political climate.

The results presented here point toward the importance of both external and internal influences upon arms spending patterns. The threat that is posed by a rival's weapons stockpiles and aggressive posturing are two recognizable international components which exert pressure upon the growth of military expenditures and stockpiles. Beyond that, actual involvement in armed hostilities accelerates the perceived need for increased military spending.[12]

Internal constraints upon the dynamics of arms races also play an important role. Notably, the budget constraint generally means that the pressure for incremental increases in spending patterns is played down and that a large increase in one year will offset the tendencies for another large increase in subsequent years. Such a constraint is strongly evident in the United States but is absent in the Soviet Union. Further, the efficiency with which investment decisions lead to weapon systems actually coming on-line, as well as the general capital-output ratio, regulates how stockpiles may increase or decrease in relation to the internal economic and political constraints. Depreciation and investment are both related to the domestic political-economic environment. Finally, a set of internally formulated economic and social goals related to consumption and industrial productivity provides an internal economic cycle to Soviet military spending patterns.

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[12] At present there is no dynamic feedback between either the weapon stockpiles or the budget and the level of tension.

In summary, the theory expounded and tested here is neither an external nor an internal model of the arms acquisition process, but rather incorporates internal and external elements that are the primary influences upon national decisions about military spending.

The regime that is modeled in this article and that has governed the arms acquisition behavior of the two major powers for the last three decades is one in which the United States has enjoyed a relatively sizable lead vis-à-vis the Soviets' overall military capabilities. The findings of this study suggest, however, that the present and near-term future is not likely to be so characterized. In the face of relative parity, can we rely on the behavior of the old regime as a good predictor of the new?

Although the catchup speed of the United States is quite fast, won't this acceleration lead to additional pressures on the USSR for increased military spending? The Soviets are likely to encounter some severe difficulties in maintaining consumption levels in the face of even greater military expenditures. Given the general level of discontent within Eastern Europe, these difficulties may carry quite high political costs domestically as well as internationally. The United States, on the other hand, also faces considerable difficulties in convincing the relevant mass and elite groups that in the face of both high inflation and unemployment social programs must be pared down to allow for increased defense budgets to finance an arms buildup. Having built a foreign policy upon being in a position of relative superiority, the United States seems unlikely to view the approaching parity sanguinely. This view serves not only to aggravate relations within the Western Alliance, but is also likely to further fuel the Soviet thrust toward establishing parity with or surpassing U.S. military capabilities.

The regime through which the arms race has

Figure 6. Simulated U.S. and Soviet Military Stocks



Note: Values are the Conventional and Strategic Index, solid line is the United States and dashed line the Soviet Union.

Table 2. Estimated and Actual Military Expenditures of the United States and USSR in Constant 1970 Billion U.S. Dollars, 1951-1978

	United States			Soviet Union		
	Estimated	Actual	%Error	Estimated	Actual	%Error
1951	77	52	48	46	44	3
1952	74	73	1	45	49	8
1953	69	75	7	46	49	7
1954	68	66	2	46	44	4
1955	64	60	8	45	49	7
1956	59	60	0	44	43	2
1957	62	61	2	42	39	7
1958	62	62	0	42	37	12
1959	60	62	3	43	38	15
1960	62	61	1	44	36	21
1961	64	64	0	42	47	10
1962	64	66	3	42	50	16
1963	64	67	5	44	51	14
1964	65	64	2	47	48	3
1965	71	64	10	48	45	6
1966	77	74	3	49	46	7
1967	80	86	7	50	48	4
1968	83	88	6	52	53	3
1969	82	84	3	54	54	1
1970	78	78	0	59	54	9
1971	77	74	4	63	52	20
1972	75	70	8	68	77	12
1973	69	66	5	72	77	7
1974	63	65	4	75	76	1
1975	58	63	8	81	75	8
1976	61	63	3	85	87	2
1977	65	64	2	88	86	3
1978	66	66	0	88	89	1

Note. Percent error is defined as the absolute value of the actual minus the predicted, divided by the actual. Entries in the table have been rounded to either the nearest billion 1970 U.S. dollars or to the nearest percent.

been occurring is undergoing marked change as a consequence of the arms race itself. The dynamic of arms competition illustrated in this study ultimately leads to a necessary change in the mechanisms that generate the dynamic. Unfortunately, the most probable change would accentuate the arms race, which in all probability will lead the U.S. to increased spending and military stocks. The enacted and proposed budgets of the Reagan administration certainly do not refute this speculation.

Although adjustment speeds and the mechanisms generating desired levels of military stocks are likely to be different in the 1980s from what they were during the last 30 years, they are nonetheless likely to involve a high degree of reactivity of one superpower to another, if the results of this study may be extended into the near future. What is required, but difficult to achieve, are models and frameworks that allow the investigation of changing regimes of behavior, i.e., governmental learning, in which the adjustment mechanism and the desired stock levels are themselves endogenous.

Having followed different paths, the United States and the USSR have arrived at a position of relative parity. The irony is that reaching that goal may well bring about an increase rather than a decrease in the perceived threat. New paths must be chosen; the old paths are unlikely to serve well in the terrain of the future.

Appendix 1. Data Definitions[13]

Incremental, yearly war costs for the United States vis-à-vis the Korean and Vietnam wars were taken from U.S. Defense Department estimates. Data on the total incremental costs of the Korean war were not available in yearly form. Rather, the total cost of 54 billion U.S. current dollars is reported in the *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1979: 100th Edition* (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1979, Table 593, p. 368). This total cost figure was factored out into yearly increments under the assumption that the time profile followed the form proposed in Cusack and Ward (1981, p. 463). This profile captured a general up-then-down swing which begins with the start of the conflict and lasts one year beyond its duration (i.e., 1950-1953). The specific formula is $.5^{(t-2)}$, where t is an increment of the duration of the conflict. The sum of this increment over the four years in question was assumed to be equal to the total of 54 billion dollars; this implies yearly expenditures of 3.6, 14.4, 28.8, and 7.2 billion dollars for the four years. The yearly increments for the Vietnam war, fortunately, were available directly from Defense Department estimates which were reported in *China: U.S. Policy since 1945* (Congressional Quarterly, 1980, p. 217). Both series were assumed to be dated at the end of the calendar year, as they are cumulative yearly expenditures, and have been transformed into 1970 U.S. constant dollars with the standard deflator for Gross National Income reported widely and taken from the U.S. Council of Economic Advisor's Economic Report of the President, 1979.

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[13] All data not available elsewhere may be obtained directly from the author.

United States Military Expenditures (USDX), are taken from the *U.S. Defense Budget for Fiscal Year 1979.* The data were originally presented in current prices on a fiscal year basis. They were converted to calendar year approximations and deflated with the GNP deflator. These data, as well as the Soviet military spending data, are analyzed and reported in Cusack and Ward (1981).

Soviet Union Military Expenditures (SUDX) were taken from the International Institute for Strategic Studies' annual publications, *The Military Balance, 1972-1973, 1975-1976, 1978-1979, and 1979-1980.* The least discontinuous series of data from these sources were collated and transformed into constant 1970 dollar estimatess via the GNP deflator.

United States Strategic Index (USST) was taken

Table 3. Estimated and Actual Military Stockpiles of the United States and USSR

	United States			Soviet Union		
	Estimated	Actual	%Error	Estimated	Actual	%Error
1951	280	352	4	9	15	19
1952	472	525	2	18	16	4
1953	741	663	2	34	18	22
1954	1,102	808	5	62	20	38
1955	1,553	1,154	4	105	162	9
1956	2,074	1,709	3	168	309	11
1957	2,711	2,805	0	255	432	9
1958	3,453	3,787	1	372	533	6
1959	4,255	4,845	2	528	650	3
1960	5,172	5,041	0	727	824	2
1961	6,223	7,452	2	965	1,002	1
1962	7,337	9,317	3	1,245	1,037	3
1963	8,492	9,904	2	1,586	1,072	6
1964	9,731	11,480	2	2,001	1,252	7
1965	11,253	12,730	1	2,493	2,014	3
1966	13,098	15,490	2	3,054	2,439	3
1967	15,162	17,228	1	3,691	3,838	0
1968	17,446	19,263	1	4,410	4,790	1
1969	19,692	19,726	0	5,244	5,857	1
1970	21,695	17,492	2	6,248	7,028	1
1971	23,599	17,950	3	7,453	8,471	1
1972	25,304	19,774	2	8,913	9,200	0
1973	26,371	23,418	1	10,608	9,851	1
1974	26,662	26,467	0	12,572	10,976	1
1975	26,412	27,352	0	14,905	13,235	1
1976	26,499	27,685	0	17,603	16,494	1
1977	27,079	29,102	1	20,677	20,317	0
1978	27,711	30,076	1	23,916	26,594	1

Note. Percent error is defined as the absolute value of the actual minus the predicted, divided by the actual. The % error in this table refers to the logs of stocks, i.e., to the dependent variable in the estimation of equations (3) and (4). All entries have been rounded to the nearest integer.

directly from Allan and Luterbacher (1981) and provides an estimate of the diversity, lethality, and precision of U.S. strategic weapons systems.

Soviet Union Strategic Index (SUST) was taken directly from Allan and Luterbacher (1981) and provides an estimate of the diversity, lethality, and precision of Soviet strategic weapons systems.

United States Conventional Index (USCN) was taken directly from Lambelet (1973) for the years 1950-1970. The basic index represents a multiplicative combination of firepower, manpower, and mobility. These data were replicated and extended for the period from 1971 to 1981, using Lambelet's methodology and assuming a 1.5 increase in firepower over the 1971-1981 period. Data on manpower and mobility were taken from *The Military Balance,* various years.

Soviet Conventional Index (SUCN) was taken from Lambelet (1973) for the years 1950-1970. The basic index represents a multiplicative combination of firepower, manpower, and mobility. These data were replicated and extended for the 1971-1981 period, using Lambelet's methodology and assuming a 1.5 increase in firepower over the 1971-1981 period. Data on manpower and mobility were taken from *The Military Balance,* various years. Unlike Lambelet, the manpower of East Germany was included in the manpower estimates of the Soviet Union, to preserve rough comparability with the U.S. case wherein the forces of the *Bundeswehr* are included.

The conflict and cooperation variables, from which the tension scores *APT* (U.S. perceived tension) and *RPT* (USSR perceived tension) are calculated have been taken from event interaction collected and made available by Azar (1980a, b) as part of the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB). The specific coding rules are described in detail in Ward (1982). Both conflict and cooperation between the United States and USSR in terms of yearly aggregations (i.e., number of events per year), are included separately. Based on Hopple, Rossa, and Wilkenfeld (1980), however, verbal and nonverbal events were separately coded and collated. Four basic variable kernels are collated: verbal and nonverbal conflict and verbal and nonverbal cooperation. Nonverbal conflict includes event interactions ranging from extensive war acts causing deaths (Azar's event type 15), limited war acts (type 14), small scale military acts (type 13), political-military hostile actions (type 12), to diplomatic-economic hostile actions (type 11). Verbal conflict encompasses strong verbal expressions of hostility (type 10) and mild verbal expressions of hostility (type 9). Event type 8, reserved for neutral or nonsignificant acts, was excluded. Verbal cooperation was indexed by event types 7, 6, and 5, which included minor official exchanges and expressions of mild verbal support, official verbal support of goals, values and regimes, and cultural and scientific agreement and support in non-strategic realms. Nonverbal cooperation was indicated by event types 4, 3, 2 and 1. These events range from nonmilitary economic, technological and industrial agreement such as economic loans, through military economic and strategic support, and major strategic alliance actions such as fighting a war jointly, to the voluntary unification into a single nation-state. The final indexes of perceived tension (*APT* and *RPT*) are calculated as the natural log of cooperation received from the rival minus the natural log of conflict received from the rival.

The Price Deflator for GNP (USGNPD) was taken from the *Economic Report of the President, 1979* and has a value of 1.0 in 1972.

The dominant five-year plan pattern for the Soviet Union (SOVPLN) was coded after Green and Higgins (1977, Appendix A). It is a dummy variable set equal to -1.0 during the last two years of each successive plan and also set to -1.0 during the first (carryover) year of the subsequent plan. The Seven-Year Plan (1959-1965) has a value of -1.0 in 1962-1964. Otherwise, the variable is coded 1.0. This dummy variable coding is given to reflect the relative priority given to nonmilitary investments during the periods in which planned project completions are expected vis-à-vis the national economic plan of the Soviet Union.

Appendix 2. Dynamic Trajectory Fitting

Given that the model developed is expressed explicitly in terms of a system of differential equations having a nonlinear solution, the method used to estimate it should seek to take advantage of that form. Linearization and transformation into difference equations, although common practice, is not a highly desirable approach. When faced with a system of differential equations, one is required by the nature of the problem to solve them. In general, this is done analytically as, for example, in Richardson's original work. The major difficulty with this approach is that once there are more than a few equations with a few variables, analytical solution becomes difficult if not intractible. Nonlinearity further complicates the issue.

Numerical analysis techniques have been used to provide the trajectory of the system described in equations (1) through (4). The interested reader is referred to Korn and Wait (1977) for a relatively up-to-date survey of the characteristics and behaviors of such techniques. A currently available software package, known as DAREP 5.0, created by Wait and Clarke (1979) at the University of Arizona permits the convenient solution of such systems.

It then remains to estimate the initial conditions and parameters. Ordinary regression techniques will not necessarily be appropriate for the estimation of systems such as those studied here. A growing literature is available on this topic, and the interested reader is referred to Wymer (1975) and Bergstrom (1976), and more recently Bailey, Hall, and Phillips (1980), for some of the seminal ideas on econometric estimation of such systems. The approach pursued here is different from this line of attack, although it does build upon the econometric tradition.

Estimation is a three-step conceptual problem. First, one must determine the criteria that one chooses to meet. Ordinary least squares, for example, has a simple, straightforward, well-known, and ignored criterion, or goal function: minimizing the sum of the squared standardized residuals. A discussion of alternative single equation goal functions is found in Schrodt, Gillespie, and Zinnes (1978). Some obvious examples of alternative criteria include, for example, minimizing the absolute difference between the actual and the estimated, or minimizing the percentage error. The second conceptual step in estimation is deriving a set of preliminary parameter estimates and calculating the predictions of the model with them. The third step is to perturb the preliminary parameter guesses and to return to step one. When conceptualized in such a fashion, this strategy is an unconstrained, nonlinear optimization problem.

In a sense, optimal control is being turned on its head in order to derive—through iteration—the best estimates of the parameter vector (a process called optimal identification), given some specified goal function. This was accomplished through a generalized triplet of programs, available through the Center for European Nuclear Research (CERN) in Geneva, known as MINUIT (James & Roos, 1975), designed to solve problems where one is estimating the value of a set of unknown parameters in order to minimize the difference between the predictions of theory (i.e., the model) and some available experimental or nonexperimental data. Programs are available which use the simplex method based on a switching version of the Davidon (1959), Fletcher (1965), Powell (1964) technique. The basic strategy assumes that the goal function is interpretationally similar to a classic chi-square function. Thus, to the above conceptual strategy MINUIT provides the optimal controller, or optimizer.

Specifically, the DAREP/MINUIT constellation provides the opportunity to estimate directly coefficients of a differential equation system by utilizing a powerful simulation framework to express a system of recursive differential equations which are solved by numerical analysis. Powell (1981) provides a useful and current survey of recent advances in numerical integration techniques. Once initial guesses of parameters and initial conditions are made, the solution trajectory for the system of equations is generated. The interface of these solution trajectories with the MINUIT package offers the possibility of specifying a goal function and comparing the predicted solution trajectories with actual data. Based upon these comparisons, the parameters are modified until the goal criteria are met.

The Dennis, Gay, and Welsh (1981a, b) algorithms have been designed to be more reliable than either Gauss-Newton or Levenberg-Marquardt methods, and more efficient than the variable metric algorithms such as the Fletcher-Powell-Davidon methods. In particular they are designed to be powerful on problems which may have large residuals, such as often characterize social as opposed to physical sciences. In addition to the MINUIT interface, parameters were also estimated via the NL2SOL algorithms available through a preliminary version of STARPAC (Donaldson & Tryon, 1983a, b). Both efforts converged to the same minimum and yielded identical parameter estimates, as have runs that utilize a variety of initial values for the parameters. Although the results reported here appear robust, given the nature of the problem, one cannot guarantee the presence of a global minimum.

Several caveats are in order. Systems such as equations (1) through (4) should, of course, be estimated simultaneously. However, it may be that the single equation estimates are good (or even perfect) approximations of the system estimates. The present approach has been to use an ordinary least squares criterion on each separate equation in order to derive initial estimates for the system estimation procedure. The estimates reported here are system estimates derived with a system criterion which is the minimum variance for the entire system of equations. Second, although the model and its solution trajectories are expressed in continuous time, data are not so abundant. It is possible to compare the trajectory (fitted values) and real data at every time point, providing one is willing to make a number of strong assumptions, the strongest of which is that one can validly interpolate in some fashion from one observed data point to the next. In stock-flow models this seems especially suspect, given that a linear interpolation rule will tend to distort the series against which the trajectory is being compared. Thus, although it is possible to evaluate the criteria at every point in time (by writing a differential equation for it), it makes little statistical sense to do so, for it involves a great deal of (linear) interpolation, exaggerates the fit of the model, and renders difficult if not impossible the statistical testing of the parameter estimates. The technique adopted here only evaluates the criteria at the points at which actual empirical data exist.

Since the model contains both stock and flow variables, care must be given to their representation in the evaluation function as well as in the interpretation of the predictions of the model. Stock variables are a measured stock level at a given point in time. Flow variables are the flow or rate of a variable at an instant in time. The budget figures observed for the United States or USSR in 1960, for example, for which data may be found in the appropriate sources, are integrals (summations) of the flow of defense spending over the year in question. Thus, flow variables in stock-flow models must be integrated over the comparison period(s) in order to permit comparison to actual data.

Since completion of the analysis in this article, it has come to my attention that similar strategies for estimating the coefficients of differential equation models have also been developed in other disciplines. Ralston et al. (1979) report the results of a simplified version of the strategy implemented herein. Their application was initially stimulated by pharmacological research questions and has been incorporated into the BMDP (Dixon et al., 1981) statistical package.

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The Political Reliability of Italian Governments: An Exponential Survival Model

CLAUDIO CIOFFI-REVILLA
The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

*Italian cabinets (*governi*) fall from power in a seemingly haphazard pattern, thus defying most deterministic analyses of their durability. This analysis views Italian government longevity as essentially indeterminate, or stochastic, and it applies the theory of "political reliability" to explain the probability that an Italian government will be in power at time* t *after it was formed. An exponential survival model* $R = e^{-kt}$, with constant government breakdown rate k = *.021 per week, is developed, estimated, tested, and discussed. It is shown that Italian governments have a half-life* (τ) *of approximately 32.8 weeks, after which their political reliability drops below .50, and their mean duration is 47.7 weeks, so the probability that an Italian government will survive as long as the average is only 36.8%. Theoretical aspects of the model are also discussed, together with characteristic features of exponential political reliability, such as lifetime density, political mortality, and government downfall rate, as well as the systems reliability and crisis process characteristic of Italian governments.*

Italian cabinet governments (*governi*) seem to fall from power in a haphazard, unpredictable manner, rendering almost impossible any attempt to examine the process systematically. Although recent comparative research on the causes of government durability in modern parliamentary systems yields new insights and theories, the political dynamics of cabinet decay in the Italian system are still largely incomprehensible.

This article reports findings of research aimed at discovering a well-defined, systematic pattern in the downfall process of Italian government. It approaches the problem from the perspective of political reliability theory, previously developed and applied in international relations (Cioffi-Revilla, 1983a, b). One salient feature of this approach is that, unlike most other previous research in this area, it approaches government durability from a probabilistic and dynamic perspective.

In the first section some significant aspects of government durability, the role of government in the Italian system, and the "causes" of cabinet collapse will be briefly reviewed. The second section describes the political reliability approach used here, with an emphasis on model-building, data, and analysis. The third section reports basic findings supportive of the proposed model, and the fourth section discusses the model.

Background

Government durability has been recognized as a central variable in the analysis of democratic party systems (Riker, 1962). It not only relates to the theory of cabinet government formation (Blondel, 1968; de Swaan, 1973; Dodd, 1976; Laver, 1974), but it also plays a central role in the analysis of political stability (Hurwitz, 1971, 1972; Taylor & Laver, 1973). In this latter case, Taylor and Herman (1971) first used the duration of cabinet governments as an indicator of political stability, and Hurwitz (1971, p. 64) reported a strong positive relationships (ϱ = .82, N = 17) between durability and his index of "democratic political stability." Recently, Warwick (1979, pp. 465-466) has even argued that "what matters most in terms of these polities [multiparty democratic systems] is not predicting which coalitions will form, but predicting which coalitions will last long enough to implement policies." Naturally, government durability also relates to the "governability" of advanced, modern polities (Crozier, Huntington, & Watanuki, 1975; Rose, 1980). In this study, government durability plays a fundamental role in an empirical theory of political reliability.

Among contemporary multiparty democratic systems, Italy's government duration process is probably best known for its high downfall rate. After a national referendum on 2 June 1946, the

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Italian political system adopted a republican parliamentary form of constitution with a cabinet executive. Since then, an extraordinary succession of governments has been a distinctive feature of the Italian political system. In Blondel's (1968, pp. 190-191) classification of 17 Western democracies, Italy is in the highest turnover category, with a rate of 0.9 governments per year (gpy), between Finland (1.0 gpy) and France (0.7 gpy).[1] Similarly, in Hurwitz's (1971, p. 56) study of 20 democracies, Italy ranks 18th in "raw government persistence score," a direct consequence of its high cabinet turnover rate. However, in spite of this well-established empirical feature, to date the pattern of Italy's extraordinary turnover remains largely unscrutinized. In particular, the high turnover rate raises two sets of questions: What is the political reliability of Italian governments? And, more generally, what is the reliability of the Italian political system as a whole, given the key role played by the cabinet? This study provides an answer to the first question, while contributing a framework for answering the second.

As in other parliamentary cabinet systems, at any given time Italy's cabinet government (*Consiglio dei ministri*) is either enjoying political support in Parliament, or it is not. However, whereas in most other similar political systems (e.g., United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, or Canada) the duration of governments in power is fairly long relative to the prescribed length of time between elections, in Italy cabinet governments seem to manifest a much higher and variable turnover pattern. In Italy *some* government is always in charge, even if only as caretaker, but after a prime minister (*Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri*) has resigned, his government is politically dead until the next government is inaugurated.[2]

It should be noted that the analysis of government reliability is of interest not only on its own merits; but it is also important for an improved understanding of the Italian political system as a whole. Sartori (1966, p. 153) has described this system as suffering from "extreme polarization," and de Swaan (1973, p. 192) has observed that "among Sartori's [extremely] polarized pluralist systems, Italy is the only one that has survived to the present." More recently, a transformation of the system as a result of persistent, multisector crises has been suggested (Pridham, 1981; Tarrow, 1980), but Italy's high government turnover remains salient.

From a comparative perspective, in the Italian system the cabinet is far more important than in other democratic systems of the same type. Germino and Passigli (1968, pp. 70-71) note that "one of the shortest sections of the Italian Constitution (Title III, Articles 92-96) concerns the Government. [However,] the importance of this organ in the actual operation of the Italian political system varies inversely with the amount of space devoted to it." As they explain:

> The Government . . . performs three major functions: arbitration, initiation, and coordination. Arbitration refers to the settling of disputes . . . between conflicting social forces.
>
> [In] its innovative capacity it can, if it chooses, . . . initiate programs that ultimately affect this very balance of social forces.
>
> Finally, [as a coordinator,] the Government is the directing committee of a vast administrative empire and is inevitably preoccupied with settling jurisdictional disputes that occur within that empire. Persistent conflicts between ministries are ultimately resolved by the Cabinet or through machinery such as a system of interministerial committees which it has established.

Quite clearly, in the Italian political system the reliability of the cabinet affects not only the executive function of political power in the system, but several other major processes as well.

Finally, as will be shown in the discussion of the proposed model, analysis of the Italian case can also advance the broader theory of government durability and governability in multiparty democratic systems. The type of model developed in this study lends itself naturally to comparative analysis.

By taking the political reliability approach, this study departs in two important ways from previous analyses of multiparty cabinet systems in general, and of the Italian cabinet process in particular. First, from a theoretical perspective, it develops a set of concepts, models, and hypotheses from the theory of political reliability not previously applied to internal political phenomena. As explained in greater detail below, in this application of political reliability theory, the political reliability of Italian governments refers to the probability that a government will be in power as a function of time. Since in the Italian system the government is much more than an executive, it follows that the political reliability of the cabinet duration process is essential to the reliability of the entire political system. In the Italian case, cabinet longevity affects the political reliability of the system as a whole. Although other governing processes are also quite essential for the entire system to function, the cabinet process acts like a "bottleneck," such that in the absence of a cabinet (i.e., during a *crisi di governo*), the Italian political system loses a significant amount of governability.

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[1] The higher French turnover rate should be interpreted with caution, since it includes governments of the extinct Fourth Republic, and unlike the Italian case, the French executive rests primarily on the presidency, rather than on the government.

[2] The next government, of course, can in turn be headed by the same PM, so long as the necessary political support exists in Parliament.

Second, from a methodological perspective, this study departs from previous analyses by taking a probabilistic, or stochastic approach to explaining the causes of government duration. Taylor and Herman (1971, pp. 28-29) noted that "a lot of variation in cabinet stability is due to 'random disturbances from the environment.' " However, in spite of this insight, research on the causes of government durability has generated only deterministic theories. Taylor and Herman took the a priori view that such "random disturbances" would be "very difficult to account for in a systematic way," and their ontological position, together with the methods in use at that time, probably contributed to the identification of the deterministic approach as the only one available. In this area of political research, systematic inquiry as a whole has been equated with determinism. Both approaches, deterministic and stochastic, are causally oriented, but whereas previous studies have taken the a priori ontological view that such causes are deterministic, the political reliability approach views the causes of duration in power as essentially indeterminate or random, in the specific sense specified below. This does not mean ruling out a pattern in the durability of Italian governments. In spite of the seemingly haphazard nature customarily ascribed to the turnover of Italian governments, the political reliability approach demonstrates the existence of a well-defined underlying order. However, such a pattern, or regularity, is probabilistic rather than deterministic. In sum, the political reliability approach provides a systematic mode of inquiry for the analysis of intrinsically indeterminate processes, such as the duration of a government in power, where the "causes" of breakdown (or "downfall" in this case) can be many and varied. Rather than trying to impose a set of determinant causes, this approach views the durability of cabinets as a probabilistic variable, i.e. dependent upon the aggregate effect of numerous political factors, each acting with different intensity and from different directions, some increasing, others decreasing its duration.

Using the concepts, models, and methods of political reliability theory, this article presents an analysis of the government duration process in the Italian political system. Although by no means definitive, an "exponential" model for the political reliability of Italian governments is first built and then found to be empirically well supported. Subsequent models, some of which are suggested, can then be developed, and the theory advanced. The proposed theory assumes that Italian governments collapse with a constant downfall rate and, it is estimated, with a half-life of approximately 33 weeks.

Method

A political reliability model of the Italian government process is proposed, the necessary data for testing this model will be described, and the required analytic procedures will be explained. Technical aspects of previously developed methods and results are omitted, and the reader is referred to the standard political, mathematical, or statistical sources cited in the pertinent sections.

Theory and Model

The thrust of this section is to introduce some necessary definitions and assumptions of theory in order to build a model from which a testable deduction is derived. After the results of testing have been presented and discussed, subsequent discussion (see *Discussion*) expands the theoretical model.

At any given time during its stay in power an Italian cabinet is subject to political stress and pressure, both from within and without the cabinet coalition. As a result, governments can therefore be in only one of two possible states: either in power (*al potere*), or fallen.[3] Viewed from this perspective, the Italian government resembles a binary (Bernoulli) system, in which a government is either ruling or *in crisi.* A model for the reliability of Italian governments in power is now developed.

Suppose a coalition begins to rule at time $t_0 = 0$, and it is observed until it falls. The duration T, or lifetime of a government, can be considered a random variable. As such, T has a probability density function (*pdf*) $f(t)$ and a cumulative density function (*cdf*) $\Phi(t)$.

Viewing T as a stochastic variable assumes that the value of T cannot be exactly predicted by any known deterministic model; it supposes that the same governments, subject to the same political stress and system pressure, would probably fall at different and unpredictable times. Some cabinets seem to last longer than others; moreover, the process leading to their fall may vary from case to case, and such a process may originate either inside or outside the cabinet. Further, a large multitude of causes can bring about the loss of pivotal votes in Parliament: for example, support may vanish as a result of anticipated gains from an upcoming election, calculations based on pure political expediency may render it advantageous to defect the coalition, or defection may ensue from failure to reach consensus on the next stage of government policy.

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[3] For model-building purposes, and without loss of essential detail, the present analysis ignores the interim period of *crisi di governo.*

If T, the duration-in-power or lifetime of a cabinet, is a random variable, then the political reliability $R(t)$ of an Italian government at time t can be defined as the probability that a cabinet will be in power at time t. More precisely,

Definition 1. The political reliability $R(t)$ of an Italian government at time t is

$$R(t) = p(T > t) \tag{1}$$

$$= 1 - p(T \leqslant t) = 1 - \Phi(t). \tag{2}$$

$R(t)$ can also be interpreted as a survival function, or survival law, since it describes the probability of a government surviving in power until time t; alternatively, $R(t)$ also describes the probability that the government will not collapse during the interval $(0, t]$. Conversely, $\Phi(t)$ describes the "mortality" $M(t)$ of cabinets, an important aspect which is discussed below.[4]

Related to $R(t)$, a government downfall rate $D(t)$ can also be defined, as the ratio between T's *pdf* and $R(t)$.

Definition 2. The (instantaneous) downfall rate $D(t)$ of governments is

$$D(t) = f(t)/[1 - \Phi(t)] \tag{3}$$

$$= f(t)/R(t). \tag{4}$$

$D(t)$ can be interpreted as the propensity of governments to fall at time t, or the political stress acting on government at time t. This important interpretation is discussed below. In addition, from a systems perspective, $D(t)$ can be more generally interpreted as a political breakdown rate.

The downfall rate $D(t)$ plays a central role in this model, because it can be shown (e.g., Meyer, 1970, pp. 226-227) that such a function uniquely determines the *pdf* $f(t)$ of T, and therefore it uniquely determines $R(t)$ as well. Specifically,

$$f(t) = D(t)\exp[-\int_0^t D(s)ds], \tag{5}$$

where D can have various forms, such as constant, increasing, decreasing, or fluctuating.[5] Equation (5) is an important theoretical principle, since specific forms of $f(t)$ can be derived from different assumptions about the form of the downfall rate $D(t)$.

This political reliability model assumes that, throughout its lifetime, the net result of political forces acting on an Italian government remains constant or stationary (i.e., the net of forces acting to bring down a government and forces that regenerate the government's longevity neither build up nor decline, but remain constant throughout the government's lifetime). Formally, this means that the breakdown rate or downfall rate of Italian governments is constant, or

$$D(t) = k. \tag{6}$$

The consequences of this central assumption, as well as several important deductions from it, will be tested and discussed below. A testable deduction from this theory is now needed.

Assuming their downfall rate is constant (equation 6), what can be expected about the political reliability $R(t)$ of Italian governments? Two steps are necessary to answer this question. Substituting equation (6) into equation (5) yields

$$f(t) = ke^{-kt} \tag{7}$$

as the *pdf* of T; solving equation (4) for $R(t)$ and substituting equation (7), it then follows that

$$R(t) = e^{-kt} \tag{8}$$

describes the political reliability of Italian governments. This last result (which is a hypothesis that can be tested directly) is very important because it says that, if the downfall rate of Italian governments is constant, then their predicted political reliability must be exponential.

Significant properties of this model, as well as a number of other interesting derivations, are discussed later on.

Data

The main observational variable of a political reliability model (equation 8) is the duration T in power, or lifetime of governments. The process of government collapse and reconstitution is well documented for the Italian political system, and duration data were compiled from Mammarella (1972), *Presidenza del Consiglio dei ministri*

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[4] The notation $(t_i, t_j]$ denotes the interval $t_i \leqslant t < t_j$. A complete list of symbols appears in the Appendix.

[5] Mixed modes of political pressure are also of interest.

(1951-1980), and *Corriere della Sera* (1980).

Operationally, the time frame of this study extends from the first *dopoguerra* government of F. Parri (21 June 1945) to the second Cossiga government (4 April 1980), which lasted until 27 September 1980, for a total of 39 governments. This group excludes only the two Badoglio governments (27 July 1944 to 18 June 1944) and the two Bonomi governments (18 June 1944 to 21 June 1945), which ruled Italy during the period of Allied military occupation. Since these four governments existed under extreme political conditions, the *Consulta* not having even been elected yet, their durations cannot be regarded as genuine observations on systems performance and political reliability.[6]

The initial time t_0 was operationally defined as the day in which the *Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri* (Premier) designate obtains, by vote of Parliament, a vote of confidence. The final day of his rule was operationally defined as that in which he presents his resignation to the President of the Republic (which in the Italian system is the Head of State), and the President accepts it.

Several inconsistencies were found to exist in the basic data sources (Mammarella, 1972; *Corriere della Sera,* 1980), corrections were made,[7] and from the corrected basic sources a master list (1945-1980) of cabinet durations, t_1, t_2, t_3, . . . , t_{39}, was then compiled.

This study includes both types of government cabinets: *coalizioni* and *monocolori* (DC-only governments). The decision to include both types was made on the basis of the following important feature of the Italian cabinet process. In the Italian system the same process of multi-actor support which maintains a coalition in power is also necessary in order for a *monocolore* government to survive; the only difference between the two situations is that in the case of a *monocolore,* the political support comes from groups *within* the DC itself (e.g., *fanfaniani, dorotei*), as well as from parliamentary groups outside government. Because of the size and internal diversity of the DC, a *monocolore* government remains in power only when there exists a political agreement between the various groups within the DC. (See, e.g., Pasquino, 1975, 1980; Zuckerman, 1979.) This political situation is not very different from that which maintains a regular multiparty coalition government in power, an important theoretical aspect discussed below.

In addition, *monocolori* still require non-DC support in Parliament. As Germino and Passigli (1968, p. 72) point out, "even with regard to monocolor governments the support of other parties is essential; it is simply the difference between a parliamentary and a governmental alliance." The concept of political reliability is therefore applicable to both types.

Analysis

Analytic procedures employed in this study are standard for lifetime data.[8] More generally, these methods are useful for the estimation of stochastic models of political lifetime, survival, or duration data.

Data on durations of Italian governments were transformed from days into weeks (wk) and rounded off to the nearest figure because in the Italian system a week is a more meaningful unit of measurement, given that political consulations, which either bring down or generate a new government, generally take more than one day, but usually less than a week. By describing the process in weeks it is therefore possible to give a clear-cut binary description, whereas if days are used as units, many durations are "fuzzy" (Cioffi-Revilla, 1981), because either collapse or formation take more than one day. However, the use of a week as the basic unit of measurement in no way affects the theoretical aspects of this analysis nor the validity of the empirical test.

Two preliminary graphic tests were used for assessing the advisability of fitting an exponential model (equation 8) to the data. In the first test (Gross & Clark, 1975, pp. 80-84), the statistic $-\ln[(n - i + 1)/(n + 1)]$, with $n = 39$, $i = 1, 2, 3, \ldots, 39$, was calculated and plotted versus the durations t_i.[9] If the central portion of the distribution (~ 80%) falls approximately on a straight line, then the exponential distribution is probably a good model of the data and should be tested.

In the second graphic test (Nelson, 1972), the durations were first ranked from smallest (Andreotti I and V, or $t_{29} = t_{37} = 1$ wk, respectively) to largest (Moro III, or $t_{23} = 119$ wk). The downfall rate of each individual government was then calculated as $100/i^*$, where i^* is the reverse rank. Downfall rates were then cumulated and plotted versus durations t_i. Again, as in the Gross-Clark test, if the central portion of the distribution (80%) falls close to a straight line, it is reasonable to proceed with a statistical test of the exponential model. Standard graphic examples of when the central portion of the distribution is accepted as falling "close to a straight line" are provided in Gross and Clark (1975, pp. 83-84) and Nelson (1972).

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[6] The September 1945 *Consulta* represents a landmark event because, as Germino and Passigli (1968, p. 44) point out, "It was the *Consulta* that decreed that Italy's first free elections since the March on Rome were to be by the method of proportional representation (PR) and multi-member districts," a structural arrangement of significant consequence for voting patterns and cabinet support.

[7] A list of these corrections is available from the author.

[8] Mann, Shafer, and Singpurwalla (1974, pp. 350-352), Elandt-Johnson & Johnson (1980, pp. 181-222), and Gross & Clark (1975, pp. 49-96).

[9] An equivalent test consists of plotting the quantity between brackets on semi-log axes.

Statistical estimation and testing of the stochastic model proceeded by fitting the predicted exponential reliability function (equation 8) to the observed data on Italian government durations. The maximum likelihood estimate of the constant k in the exponential distribution is the inverse of the mean $\hat{t}$ of the observed durations t_i, or $\hat{k} = 1/\hat{t}$. Since the mean can be calculated in two ways (Mann et al., 1974, p. 351), either from interval frequencies or from raw frequencies, this procedure yields two MLEs of k, or $\hat{k}_1 = 1/\hat{t}_1$ and $\hat{k}_2 = 1/\hat{t}_2$, respectively.[10] Both estimates are used to test the model, so as not to depend on the method of calculating $\hat{t}$ for the empirical validity of the theory being tested.

From each estimate of k, a set of theoretical values of $R(t)$ was then calculated. Each set was then compared with the observed *cdf* and tested for goodness of fit. As a measure of goodness of fit between theoretically expected E_i (equation 8) and observed O_i data, the statistic $w = \sum_{i=1}^{n} [(O_i - E_i)^2/E_i]$, asymptotic to χ^2, was calculated for each set of theoretical data ($n = 6$ for $\hat{k}_1$ and $n = 39$ for $\hat{k}_2$).

The following statistical test was used (Mann, Shaefer, & Singpurwalla, 1974, p. 351): The hypothesis that $R(t)$ is exponential is rejected at the α level of significance, if $\hat{w}$, as calculated from the observed data and the exponential distribution, exceeds the $100(1 - \alpha)$th percentile of the χ^2 distribution. Conversely, if $\hat{w} < \chi^2_{.05}$, then the hypothesis that the distribution is exponential will be accepted.[11]

Since the two estimates $\hat{k}_1$ and $\hat{k}_2$ yield two different statistical situations, the respective degrees of freedom were established as follows. In the first case, data were sorted into six intervals, and one parameter was estimated. Hence, $df(\hat{k}_1) = 6 - 1 - 1 = 4$. In the second case, following Mann et al. (1974, p. 351), $df(\hat{k}_2) = 4 + \delta$, and $0 < \delta < 1$. Hence, $4 < df(\hat{k}_2) < 5$.

Findings

Results from both graphic analyses are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.[12] Figure 1 shows the durations versus Nelson's statistic, whereas Figure 2 shows the Gross-Clark statistic versus the durations. In both plots a line passing through the origin and the central portion of the distribution gives an approximate fit. (This "visual fit" is comparable to standard examples of visual acceptability reported in Gross and Clark (1975, pp. 83-84) and Nelson (1972).) Therefore both graphic tests provide a basis for proceeding with the statistical test of the exponential model.

The central empirical findings of this study are reported in Tables 1 and 2 and in Figure 3. Table 1 reports the two estimates of k. The first, $\hat{k}_1$, obtains from interval data, as described in the previous section. The second, $\hat{k}_2$, obtains from raw frequencies. Both are valid MLEs of k, and they are expressed in wk^{-1} units.

Both estimates were substituted into equation (8) to obtain predicted, theoretical values E_i of $R(t)$. The results are illustrated in Table 2, which contains both observed and theoretical values of political reliability. Figure 3 shows the two estimated political reliability curves and the empirical durations. For both curves the fit is good.

The results of the goodness-of-fit test are summarized in Table 3. Since for both estimates $\hat{w} < \chi^2_{.95}$, the hypothesis that $R(t)$ is an exponential reliability function is not rejected, and the model is therefore supported by the findings.

For practical purposes, a single value of the government downfall rate can be obtained from the two estimates of k. Viewing the two estimates *as if* each were an independent measurement of k, a single value can be obtained as $k \cong \hat{k} = \frac{1}{2}(\hat{k}_1 + \hat{k}_2) = .021\,107\ wk^{-1} \cong .021\ wk^{-1}$. All subsequent discussion will use this single value of k.

In sum, both graphic analyses and both statistical analyses of the observed durations of Italian governments support the exponential model of their political reliability. The residual of fit is not significant at the .05 level, which is the customary level of acceptance for this type of analysis.

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[10] For the former estimate the set of durations was sorted into six intervals $a_1, a_2, a_3, \ldots, a_6$, the range of each chosen so as to contain at least six observations.

[11] As is discussed below, this does not imply that other models are *ipso facto* excluded (Elandt-Johnson, 1980, p. 220); it simply means that the exponential model is acceptable. See footnote 24.

[12] Basic and derived data used for both graphic analyses are available from the author.

Figure 1. Nelson's Cumulative Hazard Plot for Italian Government Durations



Source: Computer-drawn by the author.

Figure 2. Gross-Clark Statistic Plot for Italian Government Durations



Figure 3. Exponential Political Reliability of Italian Governments



Source: Computer-drawn by the author.
Key: ◇ = observations.

Table 1. Maximum Likelihood Estimates (MLE) of the Downfall Rate *k* of Italian Governments, 1945-1980

Data Base	$\hat{k}$ (wks^{-1})
Interval data ($\hat{k}_1$)	0.019 231
Raw frequencies ($\hat{k}_2$)	0.022 983

Source: Compiled by the author.

Table 2. Observed and (MLE) Predicted Political Reliability of Italian Governments (1945-1980), Using an Exponential Model $R(t) = e^{-kt}$

Duration (wks)	Political Reliability $R(t)$		
	Observed	Predicted[a]	
		$\hat{k}_1 = .019$	$\hat{k}_2 = .023$
0- 12	0.871795	0.793923	0.758966
12- 24	0.692308	0.630313	0.576029
24- 40	0.435897	0.463369	0.398787
40- 58	0.307692	0.327789	0.263678
58- 77	0.179487	0.227463	0.170383
77-200	0.000000	0.021362	0.010086
	Normalized Values of R[b]		
0- 12	.35	.32	.35
12- 24	.28	.26	.26
24- 40	.18	.19	.18
40- 58	.12	.13	.12
58- 77	.07	.09	.08
77-200	.00	.01	.00

Source: Compiled by the author.

[a] Units of $\hat{k}$ are in wk^{-1}.

[b] I am grateful to M. Midlarsky for suggesting the inclusion of normalized values of R in this table. Values were normalized by multiplying each by the reciprocal of the sum of each respective column. These normalized values should not be confused with the political lifetime density ke^{-kt}.

Table 3. Goodness of Fit Between Observed and Exponential Political Reliability of Italian Governments, 1945-1980

MLE	$\hat{w}$	df	$\chi^2_{.95}$
$\hat{k}_1$	3.539 401	4	9.487 73
$\hat{k}_2$	4.054 256	$4 < df < 5$	11.070 50

Source: Compiled by the author.

Discussion

The exponential reliability model of Italian governments has a number of interesting properties, consequences, and deductions. The first two parts of the following discussion focus on several important measures and properties characteristic of exponential political reliability. The third part discusses a theoretical support structure and a political mechanism governing the downfall process. Several remarks pertinent to stochastic models, the political reliability approach, and their contrast with deterministic models of political behavior are discussed in the fourth part. Finally, some aspects of further research are outlined. It should be stressed that the present discussion provides a theoretical analysis of an empirically supported model. Having built the theory from first assumptions and developed an empirically grounded model, a theoretical analysis is now presented, thereby providing further deductions.

Aside from the preceding empirical tests, analysis of the theory is interesting because it demonstrates aspects of the Italian government process which are not apparent from plain observation. However, it must be stressed that the exponential model of political reliability is an approximation useful for describing the aggregate, statistical behavior of the set of governments. One cannot expect to derive from this, nor from any other model, exactly when a specific government will fall. Such a prediction is impossible to make, given the indeterminate nature of government lifetime. Nonetheless, as will be shown, a remarkably large number of features and information about Italian governments and their collapse can still be learned from this exponential theory of their political reliability.

Characteristic Survival Times

Several indices related to the form of the exponential model are useful for a better understanding of Italian government reliability. These will be called "mean time to downfall," "median time to downfall," and "government half-life," denoted by $\bar{t}$, $\tilde{t}$ and τ, respectively, as shown in Figure 4. To last for as long as each of these characteristic survival times is an important landmark for the duration of governments, as well as for the deterioration of their political reliability.

Median and Mean Lifetimes

The survival time, time-to-downfall, or lifetime of Italian governments can be described by both the mean and the median of the observed durations t_i. Accordingly, $\bar{t} = 47.619$ wk $= .913$ yr, $\tilde{t} = 30.000$ wk $= .575$ yr.[13] These quantities can be called "mean-time-to-downfall" and "median-time-to-downfall," respectively.

That $\bar{t} \gg \tilde{t}$ is not entirely surprising, owing to the three long-term surviving governments of Segni, De Gasperi VII, and Moro III, lasting 97, 101, and 119 wk, respectively; this implies that $\bar{t}$ is not as good an estimate of the central tendency of lifetime as is the case for normal distributions. In fact, $\tilde{t}$ is closer to the point in time when $R = .5$, because the distribution is exponential. However, in the interest of clarity, the discussion will use $\bar{t}$. (See Figure 4 for the comparative location of these estimates of government lifetime.)

The survival time of Italian governments is relevant both on its own terms, as well as in relation to other measures and functions characteristic of the exponential survival model. For example, Maki and Thompson (1973, p. 325) have shown that

$$\bar{t} = \sum_{j=1}^{n} [\exp(-kt_j)] \cdot [t_j - t_{j-1}], \qquad (9)$$

the t_j having been ordered increasing size. Now, from equation (9), it follows that

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} t = \int_0^\infty e^{-kt}\, dt = 1/k.$$

Hence, $1/k$ is a reasonable approximation of $\bar{t}$, the mean-time-to-downfall for Italian governments with downfall constant k.

In addition, an important result from the exponential model of political reliability is that the probability $R(t)$ of governments surviving up to the mean lifetime $\bar{t}$ is *not* .50, as in a normal distribution model, but only about .37. More generally,

Theorem 1. Hyporeliability. In political systems with breakdown, durability or survival governed by an exponential law of the form $R(t) = e^{-kt}$, the political reliability $R(t)$ of the system at average duration $\bar{t}$, or at average lifetime, is always 0.368, or less than 0.500. Formally, if $R(t) = e^{-kt}$, then $R(\bar{t}) = .368 < .5$ always.

[*Proof:* Let $R(t) = e^{-kt}$. Then $R(\bar{t}) = e^{-\hat{k}\bar{t}} = \exp[-(1/\bar{t}) \cdot (\bar{t})] = 1/e = .368 < .5$. Q.E.D.]

In the specific case of Italian governments, from observation $\bar{t} = 47.619$ wk, but nonetheless $R(\bar{t}) = .368$. In other words, by the time an Italian government gets to be as old as the average government, its political reliability has already dropped to less than half, or about 37%. This less-than-50% level in political reliability at the average time-to-downfall means that the average Italian government is hyporeliable when it falls, or that Italian governments are already hyporeliable at their average age. Theorem 1 in fact guarantees that all governments having exponential reliability are politically hyporeliable.

By extension, political reliability at time $t = 2\bar{t}$, or the probability of surviving for twice as long as the average, is only .159. In general, political reliability to a time $t = m\bar{t}$ ($m = 1, 2, 3, \ldots$) is

$$R(m\bar{t}) = \exp(-\bar{t}m) = (.401)^m. \qquad (10)$$

Equation (10) is the formula for the probability of a government surviving m times as long as the average government. Clearly, as m grows, $R(mt)$ quickly approaches zero.

With respect to the median survival time, the situation is different. In this case, $R(\tilde{t}) = .533$, and therefore the probability of governments surviving up to the median time $\tilde{t}$ is slightly better than 50%.

Finally, suppose an interval of time l passes by before a new cabinet assumes power after one has fallen. A measure of the availability of government A in the political system can be defined as $A = \bar{t}/(\bar{t} + l)$. Suppose $l = 2$ wk as a reasonable estimate. Then $A = .959$ for the Italian system, or about 96%. For the sake of rough comparison, consider the American system with a new government starting every 4 yr, or $\bar{t} + l = 4$ yr $= 208.57$ wk. Here $l = 2.68$ wk, since 10.71 wk are lost every four years between election day (4 November) and Inauguration Day (20 January); hence, $A = .987$, or less than a 3% difference with respect

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[13] Gross and Clark (1975, pp. 41-48) discuss special procedures for estimating $\bar{t}$ and $\tilde{t}$, including the Kaplan-Meier (1958) product-limit approach. However, for the present purpose the standard estimates are sufficient.

Figure 4. Characteristic Survival Times of Italian Governments



Source: Drawn by the author.

to the Italian system. This result disproves the popular belief ascribing to Italian governments a very low availability.

Government Half-Life

Important properties of exponential political reliability also follow from a study of its half-life, defined as follows.

Definition 3. The *half-life* of a government is the length of time τ at which its political reliability, or probability of staying in power, is .50. Formally, $\tau \in T$ such that $R(t) = .50$ and $R(t > \tau) < .50$.

From equation (8), solving first for t, letting $R = .50$, and simplifying the result, it follows that

$$\tau = (\ln 2)/k, \tag{11}$$

or, in the Italian case, $\tau = 33.007$ wk $\cong 33$ wk. Hence, after approximately 33 wk, the political reliability of Italian governments is worse than 2 in 1. Anytime thereafter their political reliability drops below .50 (at a rate to be analyzed below).

Note that this is a different property from that which is derived for the mean lifetime $\bar{t}$, and τ

Table 4. Half-life τ of Italian Governments, 1945-1980

τ	Weeks	$R(\tau)$	Frequency
1	33.01	.5000	21
2	66.01	.250	8
3	99.02	.125	8
4	132.03	.063	2

Source: Compiled by author.

arrives well ahead (10 wk) of $\bar{t}$, and as a result, $\bar{t}$ can be a poor estimate of government reliability. In particular, τ has a "dynamic probability" dimension that the other survival times lack.

From a statistical perspective, τ refers to the time during which, on the average, one half of a given sample of governments will have fallen and one half will have not. ("Statistical" here means associated with large numbers, as the term is used in probability theory.) Note that $\bar{t}$ does not have this property (Maki & Thompson, 1973, p. 324). In addition, two significant aspects of τ should be noted. First, like k, the value of τ is also a unique constant of Italian governments; as argued below, other political systems probably have a different value of τ, to be determined empirically. Second, by knowing either k or τ the other can be computed (equation 11).

It is possible to transform the observed durations t_i from weeks into units multiple of τ. The result is a reinterpretation of the government survival process in terms of half-lives, as in Table 4 and Figure 4. Using 33 wk as a practical estimate of τ, this means that every 33 wk the political reliability of an Italian government drops by half of what it was. From Table 4 it can be seen that slightly over half the governments (or 21) have fallen within one half-life of duration. Of the remaining, 41% have survived up to 3τ, but only two governments (De Gasperi VII and Moro III) ever lasted more than 3τ. None has ever reached 4τ.

Because of its theoretical basis, τ is a useful characteristic for the classification and study of past governments. In this sense, the half-life characteristic is more meaningful than either of the two previous measures. In particular, τ is characteristic of exponential political reliability.[14]

In spite of the general nature of this theory, something can be said about specific governments. For example, Italy's fortieth government, Forlani's quadripartite coalition (Dc-Psi-Pri-Psdi), fell on 26 May 1981. (The "cause" of its downfall, the so-called P2 scandal, is probably an excellent example of indeterminacy and evidence of the stochastic nature of government lifetime!) Having been formed on 18 November 1980, Forlani's government would have reached one half-life in the week of 1 June 1981, at which time $R = .50$. It therefore fell one week earlier than its half-life, at $R(T = 32) = .511$, having survived until $.969\tau$, or approximately one half-life.[15]

Characteristic Survival Functions

In addition to the preceding statistics of survival time, there are also five complementary theoretical aspects, or characteristic functions, of exponential political reliability.[16] These characteristic functions, of which political reliability $R(t)$ is the first, are the following: political reliability "lifetime density" $L(t)$, political mortality $M(t)$, downfall rate $D(t)$, and its cumulative $C(t)$. Both $M(t)$ and $D(t)$ were already briefly mentioned vis-à-vis model-building; $L(t)$ and $C(t)$ are now introduced. Any one of the five characteristic survival functions uniquely defines the exponential model of political reliability, and all five are consistent with each other. However, each should be considered separately, since each in its own way provides a unique and different view of the model. Table 5 illustrates these five functions. Finally, several important remarks on the systems reliability of Italian governments are also made with a view toward expanding the theory.

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[14] A table of characteristic survival times for Italian governments ($k = .021$ wk^{-1}) is available from the author upon request. It can be used to evaluate the political reliability characteristics of governments at their specific downfall time.

[15] The recent Spadolini government, inaugurated the third week of July 1981, reached its half-life the week of 31 March 1982, after which its political reliability dropped below 50%. It could, of course, have fallen earlier.

[16] Excellent technical discussions include Elandt-Johnson & Johnson (1980), Gross & Clark (1975), Meyer (1970), Kaufman, Grouchko & Cruon (1977), and Mann et al. (1974).

Political Reliability $R(t)$ and Lifetime Density $L(t)$

The basic political reliability function $R(t) = e^{-kt}$ has already been defined (see Definition 1). Together with the lifetime density function $L(t)$, the two have significant theoretical importance and are now analyzed.

$R(t)$ decreases as time passes and tends to zero, passing by $\tilde{t}$, τ, $\bar{t}$, . . . , as $t \to \infty$. Without proof (see, e.g., Thomas, 1968, p. 248), it will be recalled that (a) the exponential function is its own derivative, and (b) it is the only function with property (a).

Property (a) implies that $R(t)$ can also be expressed in differential form

$$\dot{R}(t) = -kR, \qquad (12)$$
$$\dot{R} + kR = 0,$$

where k is the government downfall constant.[17] In other words, the government's rate of deterioration at time t is proportional to the political reliability it has at that time. Put differently, Italian governments lose political reliability at a rate proportional to the political reliability they have: the more the faster, the less the slower. Their political reliability erodes at a decreasingly rapid rate.

Property (b) practically guarantees that any other model of the political reliability of Italian governments *must* be more complex than equation (8). In particular, it guarantees that dR/dt, the rate at which their political reliability deteri-

Table 5. Characteristic Functions of the Exponential Model of Political Reliability for Italian Governments

Function	Equations	$f(R)$	Graph
1. Political reliability	$R(t) = e^{-kt}$	R	
2. Political mortality	$M(t) = 1 - e^{-kt}$	$1 - R$	
3. Lifetime density	$L(t) = ke^{-kt}$	$-\dot{R}$	
4. Downfall rate	$D(t) = k$	$-\dot{R}/R$	
5. Cumulative breakdown	$C(t) = kt$	$\ln R$	

Source: Compiled by the author.

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[17] Technically, equation 12 is a first-order stochastic differential equation.

orates, will be more complex than just $-kR$.

Associated to $R(t)$ is a second characteristic function.

Definition 4. The political reliability lifetime density $L(t)$ is the rate at which governments lose their political reliability (or the rate at which their political mortality M rises; see Table 5). Formally,

$$L(t) = -\dot{R}(t) = ke^{-kt} = kR. \tag{13}$$

The lifetime density describes the peak period of governments falling. Since $R(t)$ can also be interpreted as the propensity to stay in power, $L(t)$ also describes the rate at which such a propensity declines. In this case, $k \ll 1.0$, and therefore, even when t is small, $L(t)$ is small. By $t = \tau$, $L(\tau) \cong .01$, and since $L(0) \ll R(0)$, $L(t) < R(t)$ so both L and R approach zero at t increases. In sum, L starts out very low, and it decreases very slowly. From equation (13) note that $L/R = k$ for the entire duration in power.

It will be recalled that $R(t)$ describes the probability of a cabinet surviving in power until time t. $L(t)$ views the process somewhat differently. Note that, from definition 4, $R(t) = \int_0^t L(u)\,du$. Hence, $L(u)\,du$ is the a priori probability that the government will fall in the interval $(t, t + du]$. This result will be compared with a similar one below.

Political Mortality $M(t)$

The third characteristic survival function of theoretical importance is the political mortality function $M(t)$ (see Table 5).

Definition 5. The political mortality $M(t)$ of a government is the compliment of its political reliability, or the probability that it will fall in the interval $(0, t]$. Formally,

$$\begin{aligned} M(t) &= 1 - R(t) = \Phi(t) \\ &= 1 - e^{kt} \end{aligned} \tag{14}$$

Note that, as $R(t) \rightarrow 0$, $M(t) \rightarrow 1$, or equivalently, as $t \rightarrow \infty$, $M(t) \rightarrow 1$.

Three aspects of $M(t)$ in relation to $R(t)$ are worth noting. First, just as $R(t)$ drops by half every $\tau = 33$ wk, political mortality obeys the complementary law: every τ it grows by half the previous level. Hence, $M(\tau) = .50$, $M(2\tau) = .75$, $M(3\tau) = .88, \ldots$ and, in general, $M(m\tau) = 1 - R(m\tau) = 1 - (.5)^m = 1 - \frac{1}{2}^m$, where $m = 1, 2, 3, \ldots.$

Second, since $\int_0^t R(t)\,dt = \int_0^t e^{-kt}\,dt = 1 - e^{-kt} = M(t)$, political mortality has the geometrical property of being equal to the area under the political reliability curve (see Figures 3 and 4).

Third, from equation (14), $\dot{M}(t) = kR(t)$, and therefore the political mortality of a government increases at a rate proportional to its reliability. Since the latter drops for large t, it also follows that $M(t)$ increases mostly during the first weeks of being in power.

Government Downfall Fate $D(t)$ and Its Cumulative $C(t)$

In this model of Italian government longevity, $D(t)$ refers to the propensity of governments to fall, or the "political stress" on them, or the "forces of downfall" acting on governments.[18] As noted earlier, $D(t)$ uniquely determines the *pdf* $f(t)$ of T, and it can have various forms. When $D(t) = k$, then $R(t) = e^{-kt}$. This has been supported by observation, with $k = .021 \pm .002$ wk^{-1}.

The significance of $D(t)$ stems from this powerful substantive interpretation. Specifically, a constant downfall rate means that Italian governments do not age; they do not suffer political wear, or the wear they suffer is empirically trivial. This seemingly unnatural aspect can be explained as follows by the theory of political reliability.

Consider for $\Delta t > 0$ the probability $P(\cdot)$ of downfall during the next Δt weeks, given that the government has not fallen by time t. From the definition of conditional probability,

$$\begin{aligned} &P(t \leqslant T \leqslant t + \Delta t \mid T > t) \\ &\quad = [e^{-kt} - e^{-k(t+\Delta t)}]/e^{-kt} \\ &\quad = 1 - e^{-k\Delta t}. \end{aligned} \tag{15}$$

But note that equation (15) does not contain t, and therefore $P(\cdot)$ is independent of t (see also Parzen, 1960, p. 262). Substantively, this result means that the probability of a government falling is independent of its past history. Hence, unnatural as it might seem, so long as an Italian government is in power, it is as good as new (or *buono come nuovo*). This is yet another aspect of the political stability of Italian government systems.

Finally, the cumulative downfall rate is defined as follows.

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[18] In other empirical applications (see Bartholomew, 1973; Kaufmann et al., 1977; Mann et al., 1974) the function defined by equations (3) and (4) has also been called "hazard function," "hazard rate," "force of mortality," "mortality rate," "exit force," "breakdown rate," etc.

Definition 6. The cumulative downfall rate $C(t)$ of a government is the accumulated propensity to fall as a function of time, or the build-up of political stress on it. Formally,

$$C(t) = \int_0^t D(u)\,du = kt. \tag{16}$$

Since for Italian governments $k \cong .021$, clearly $C(t)$ is a very slowly rising linear function of time.[19] C is also a pure number, without dimensions, since $[C(t)] = [T^{-1}] \cdot [T]$.

It will be recalled that an important relationship exists between τ and $R(t)$. In particular, $R(\tau) = .50$. An equally interesting relation exists this time between $\bar{t}$ and $C(t)$. In fact, from equation (16), $C(\bar{t}) = k\bar{t}$, but $\bar{t} = 1/k$. Hence, $C(\bar{t}) = 1.0$ exactly, which means that every mean survival time, $C(t)$ charges up exactly by one unit. As a result, the average Italian government falls having accumulated, or built up, exactly one unit of political stress. However, such an accumulation does not cause the government to fall, since from equation (15) it turns out that Italian governments suffer no wear. Italian governments, in a sense, then seem to topple intact, a view supported also by the fact that the turnover of cabinet ministers and *sottosegretari* is effectively very small. The small turnover of ministerial posts, from one government to the next, is indeed consistent with the lack of political wear.

Support and Collapse of Italian Governments

Several other aspects of the political reliability of Italian governments can be investigated with the exponential model; among these, the support system and the mechanism triggering their collapse assume particular importance. Both aspects shed light on the reliability of the Italian political system as a whole, although the emphasis here is on the political reliability of the government process.

Systems Reliability of Governments

The exponential model is also consistent with the following two hypotheses about the political support system that maintains Italian governments in power: (a) the government is supported by a number of key, pivotal actors in the sense of Riker (1962);[20] and (b) the political reliability of the jth pivotal actor, denoted by $r_j(t)$, or the probability that it will support the government at time t, is also exponential.

To prove that both of these hypotheses about the intragovernmental, or systems reliability of Italian cabinets are consistent with the model, consider the following argument (Cioffi-Revilla, 1983b). First, from (a), $R(t) = r_1(t) \cdot r_2(t) \cdot r_3(t) \cdot \ldots \cdot r_\nu(t) = \prod_{j=1}^{\nu} r_j(t)$. Second, from (b), $r_j(t) = e^{-x_j t}$. Substituting this last expression into the first, $R(t) = \exp(-\sum_{j=1}^{\nu} x_j t)$. Letting $k = \sum_{j=1}^{\nu} x_j$, it then follows that $R(t) = e^{-kt}$, which is equation (8).

At least two aspects of the systems reliability of Italian governments should be mentioned. First, when k is small, the various defection rates x_j of the individual pivotal supporters must be even smaller. This is particularly true as ν increases.

Second, it has been shown (Cioffi-Revilla, 1983a) that a drop in the political reliability of any one pivotal actor induces an amplified, more-than-proportional drop in the systems reliability of the government as a whole. This phenomenon, known as the hyper-weakening effect, can be seen in the following example. Let $\nu = 4$, and $r_1 = r_2 = r_3 = r_4 = .99$. Then $R = (.99)^4 = .96$. But suppose the reliability of, say, the third actor drops to $r'_3 = .95$, or by just 4%. Now, $R' = .92$, which is a systems drop of 8%, or twice as much!

The Poisson Crisis Process

That the political reliability of Italian governments obeys an exponential law is an important clue for explaining the triggering mechanism that might cause them to fall. Such a mechanism can be a Poisson process, occurring under the following conditions:[21] there are many opportunities (weeks) during which governments can fall; there is a very small probability that a government will fall on any given week; and from one week to the next the chances that the government will fall remain the same.

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[19] In other empirical applications this function is also known as the "log-survival" function, since $\int_0^t D du = -\ln R(t)$. Kaufmann et al. (1977) also define a "hazard rate average," but this is not used here.

[20] These coalition members can be either parties (e.g., PRI, PSI, PLI) or intraparty groups (e.g., *fanfaniani, "Iniziativa Socialista," dorotei*).

[21] Feller (1957, p. 156) remarks that "there exist a few distributions of great universality which occur in a surprisingly great variety of problems. The three principal distributions, with ramifications throughout probability theory, are the binomial distribution, the normal distribution, and the Poisson distribution." (See also Midlarski, 1981.) Numerous standard references (e.g., Feller, 1957; Parzen, 1960; Thomas, 1968) provide the mathematical derivation of the Poisson distribution.

It can be shown (e.g., Thomas, 1968, pp. 706-709) that, from these three assumptions, the number γ of governments falling in the interval $(0, t]$ obeys the general Poisson probability law $P_\gamma(kt) = p\{\gamma \text{ governments fall in } (0, t]\} = p(\gamma; kt) = e^{-kt}[(kt)^\gamma/\gamma!]$. Now, for the special case of *no* government falling ($\gamma = 0$) during $(0, t]$, $P_0(kt) = p(0; kt) = e^{-kt} = R(t)$. The exponential distribution is therefore the zero-term distribution of the general Poisson distribution.

In sum, from these three conditions a Poisson distribution obtains, and from it follows the exponential distribution of government durations t_i. Since the exponential distribution fits the observed survival times, the assumptions are empirically supported, so the probability of an Italian cabinet crisis in any given week is small, constant, and independent of any other week. This model of *crisi di governo* is therefore in full agreement with the idea that Italian governments are subject to random political shocks and crises, having numerous manifestations, such as scandals, parliamentary defeats, pivotal defections, and other occurrences. These, in turn, probably come from the characteristics of the Italian political system as a whole.

Ontology and Models of Italian Government Durability

In political science, the concepts of cause, randomness, determinism, and related ideas are often surrounded by confusion. Although these ontological categories cannot be discussed here (see Bronowski, 1978; Sutherland, 1973), two clarifications are in order.

Randomness and Italian Governments

The key dependent variable in this model is the duration T of governments in power, and two approaches exist to describe its causes: deterministic and stochastic. The former views T as dependent upon a small, identifiable, and determinate number of factors (i.e., conditions which cause T if and only if they arise), and the essential task is to determine a function $T(x_1, x_2, x_3, \ldots)$ making T entirely determined and exactly predictable from independent variables $x_1, x_2, x_3, \ldots$.[22] However, as Warwick (1979, p. 482) points out, "one could find numerous other factors; . . . any of [which] might be the true cause."

In the stochastic situation two cases exist: either T is totally haphazard or chaotic (trivial case) or analysis of the set of durations can yield a probability law governing T. In the former case nothing else can be said about the duration of Italian governments, since chaos has no form or pattern to it, and the matter remains outside the realm of scientific investigation. But in the latter case (political reliability theory) T is seen as caused by a large number of factors, each contributing differently in every observation of T.

The causes of government downfall in the Italian political system have been numerous, varied, and essentially unpredictable. Ferruccio Parri's government fell as a result of a DC-PLI withdrawal of support; De Gasperi I fell when the results from the election just held became known; De Gasperi II fell because of the Saragat-Matteotti socialist scission; De Gasperi III fell when De Gasperi resigned after numerous attacks from the socialist press; De Gasperi IV fell after the crucial election of 1948. Three governments later, De Gasperi VII fell when it lost the confidence of Parliament; Pella fell because the DC political secretariat withdrew its support; Fanfani I fell because the DC did not trust him; Scelba fell when the PRI withdrew pivotal support; Segni I fell when the PSDI withdrew its support anticipating electoral gains; like De Gasperi III, Andreotti III resigned because of criticism. These unpredictable characteristics of the downfall process in a multitude of governments are at the basis of the stochastic approach. Factors such as elite memory and renewal (Cotta, 1981) play a role in that the same (constant) rate of government breakdown carries over from one government to the next. But it is important to note that the model proposed here is synchronic or stationary; i.e., it does not deform or evolve through recent decades. Such a time-varying model, however, can be built in subsequent research from principles developed here.

The stochastic approach of political reliability theory recognizes the variety and complexity of the causes of downfall, but rather than trying to establish them in an exact way (which seems impossible!), it constructs a stochastic model of the set of observed durations. The difference between this approach and a nonstochastic treatment is that this approach takes an indeterminate view of the process of duration in power, whereas other treatments take a deterministic view. Both approaches consider causes, but the political reliability approach views these as probabilistic rather than deterministic.

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[22] Viz. Hurwitz (1972), de Swaan (1973), Laver (1974), or Warwick (1979, p. 478).

Randomness and Political Reliability

Thus far, most analyses using stochastic models in political science have used them primarily as descriptors of observed data (Cioffi-Revilla, 1979; Zinnes, 1976).[23] By drawing more extensively upon both the assumptions and deductions associated to various stochastic models (e.g., exponential, Weibull, and Rayleigh), the political reliability approach makes greater theoretical use of stochastic models.

Theoretical and substantive parsimony, as well as empirical correspondence, are important criteria for using these models. In this study assumptions were made concerning the behavior of *T;* from such assumptions a model was developed. A crucial and observable deduction of the model was then derived and empirically tested. The test succeeded, and additional properties of the model were then investigated in order to gain insights on the duration of Italian governments. What is the ontological status of such insights?

The logic of sociopolitical modeling is well explained elsewhere.[24] Following Zinnes (1976), it can be argued that, having found agreement between the function $R(t) = e^{-kt}$ and the set of observed durations, it cannot logically be argued that the assumption $D(t) = k$ is in fact a true statement about the way Italian governments fall. However, it can be argued that the exponential reliability model is a good explanation of the duration of Italian governments, because it led to a deduction which was supported by data. "Until a more parsimonious or more powerful set of assumptions is found to explain [the] observed $f(x)$, we can argue that we are content with the explanation provided" (Zinnes, 1976, p. 252).

In sum, the political reliability approach demonstrates that 1) not all models of empirical behavior need be deterministic in order to say something interesting about political nature; 2) stochastic models are not haphazard descriptions; 3) deterministic models are not the only vehicles for saying something concrete, empirical, and testable about significant political phenomenon.

Further Research

Several distinctive features of the political reliability approach suggest a number of directions for further research, most of which can be pursued either separately or in combination. To begin, political assumptions different from those used here may yield other useful stochastic models of Italian government reliability. For example, the exponential model is a good starting point for investigating models with variable, rather than constant, political downfall rates. However, parsimony should be kept in mind because in this type of model complexity increases quickly as realism is added. Moreover, estimation methods are not always easily available for models having more than moderate complexity, although methods other than maximum likelihood can be used and compared (Gehan & Siddiqui, 1973; Menon, 1963).

Among the set of more complex models which could be investigated, time-varying, nonstationary models of Italian government reliability might prove particularly interesting. As the number of observations increases in the future, reanalysis of government lifetime data might demonstrate significant structural transformations, such as argued recently by Pridham (1981) and Tarrow (1980). Systems transformations might correlate with widely recognized periods, such as *l'apertura a sinistra, il centrismo,* or *il dopoguerra;* or analysis might open the way to a reinterpretation of how the Italian system evolved to its present state of "provisional that lasts" (Hughes, 1979).

Beyond the Italian system, this approach lends itself to replication, extension, and comparison in other political systems. Probably no two political systems have the same downfall constant *k,* so *k* might be a unique, idiographic quality of governments, particularly since it results from the combined defection rates of many different pivotal supporters. What will the range of variation be between the highest and lowest empirical values of *k* within the same class of political systems? Do all political systems in such a class obey the same characteristic survival law? Are parameters the only differences, or are other laws also observable in this part of the political universe? Can political systems be re-classified according to the characteristic form and parameter(s) of their respective reliability functions? Would such future taxonomies conform to standing accepted theories?

Finally, given the overlap between democratic systems and cabinet governments, what can this approach contribute to democratic theory? Is there a relationship between types of political reliability models and democratic regimes? Are democratic transitions accompanied by transformation of the political reliability model of the systems? If so, how can successful democratic transitions be described, or maybe predicted, using such model transformations? These and other problems might benefit from application of political reliability theory.

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[23] Midlarski (1981) presents an excellent overview of this research.

[24] See Zinnes (1976, pp. 252-253), Bartholomew (1973), Maki & Thompson (1973, pp. 1-23), Lave & March (1975, pp. 1-84).

Conclusions

On the basis of this study, we can conclude that previous research on cabinet durability in parliamentary democracies has favored a deterministic approach. Although such an approach might be justified for many other political systems, in the case of Italian governments their history seems to indicate that the causes of downfall are quite indeterminate.

The theory of political reliability (Cioffi-Revilla, 1983b) is able to model political indeterminacy, and in this article an exponential model of Italian government reliability (durability) is proposed. The model, which provides a good fit of the observed durations, has exponential form $R = e^{-kt}$, with government downfall constant $k \cong .021$ per week.

From this model, the following implications obtain:

1. The political half-life of Italian governments is approximately 33 weeks. This is the length of time after which their political reliability (defined as their probability of staying in power) drops below 50%. (The recent Forlani government fell 3% short of this time, one week too soon.) Their average duration is 43.5 weeks.
2. The probability of an Italian government surviving as long as the average is not 50%, but only 36.8% (hyporeliability).
3. The political reliability of Italian governments declines at a decreasingly rapid rate.
4. The peak period of Italian governments falling is just after they are formed, but this is only slightly higher than at any time thereafter.
5. Unnatural as it might seem, Italian cabinet governments do not age, and they do not suffer political wear; so long as they are in power they are as good as new.
6. The average government falls when it has accumulated exactly one unit of political stress.
7. This model is consistent with a multi-actor, pivotal support system sustaining Italian governments, the political reliability of which can also be analyzed using this approach.
8. A drop in the political reliability of any one single pivotal supporter induces a more-than-proportional drop (hyper-weakening effect) in the political reliability of the entire government.
9. Pivotal actors in Italian governments must have a much lower rate of defection than the downfall rate of the government as a whole.
10. Overall, the probability of an Italian government falling in any given week is small, constant, and independent of any other week.

The political reliability approach can be extended to more complex models, other systems, and different political processes, thereby supplementing deterministic analyses. It is hoped that the political reliability approach will thereby prove helpful in advancing our understanding of political systems.

Appendix: List of Symbols

T	durability or lifetime of government
t	time
$f(t)$	probability density function (*pdf*) of T
$\Phi(t)$	cumulative density function (*cdf*) of T
$R(t)$	political reliability
p	probability
$D(t)$	government downfall rate
e	base of natural (Napierian) logarithms
k	government downfall constant
n	number of Italian governments
$\bar{t}$	average government duration
$\hat{k}_1$	first estimate of k
$\hat{k}_2$	second estimate of k
W	asymptotic χ^2
O_i	ith observation
E_i	ith expected value
Θ_1	first estimated parameter
Θ_2	second estimated parameter
MLE	maximum likelihood estimate
$\bar{k}$	mean of estimated k
$\tilde{t}$	median government duration
τ	half-life of government duration
m	number of time intervals
A	availability of government
l	duration of government crisis
$L(t)$	political reliability lifetime density
$M(t)$	political mortality
$C(t)$	cumulative downfall rate
Δt	interval of time
$r_i(t)$	political reliability of the ith pivotal actor
x_i	breakdown (defection) constant of the ith pivotal actor
ν	number of pivotal actors supporting the government
$i*$	reverse rank of the durations t_i

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Reagan and the Russians: Crisis Bargaining Beliefs and the Historical Record

RUSSELL J. LENG
Middlebury College

Reagan's view of how to deal with the Soviet Union is compared to the U.S. performance record in three Soviet-American crises: Berlin, 1948-1949, Berlin, 1961, and Cuba, 1962. Reagan's public statements indicate that he views the Soviets as incorrigibly hostile, so that conflict bargaining with the Soviets is a zero-sum game requiring a coercive U.S. bargaining strategy. This is characterized as a "bullying" strategy and contrasted with a "reciprocating" approach. The two approaches provide competing hypotheses for an examination of Soviet responses to U.S. influence attempts. The study tests the association between types of U.S. influence attempts and initial Soviet reactions and then proceeds to an interrupted time series analysis of the longer effects of U.S. threats of force on the mix of coercion-accommodation in Soviet crisis bargaining. The author finds a positive association between specific U.S. threats of force and initial Soviet responses in kind, and between carrot-and-stick inducements that use less specific threats and more accommodative Soviet responses. With the exception of the Cuban crisis, U.S. threats of force have not been associated with significant extended shifts in the level of Soviet hostility. The article concludes that, on balance, the performance record of the United States is more supportive of the efficacy of a reciprocating strategy than the coercive bargaining strategy implied by Reagan's beliefs.

Ronald Reagan has changed the American approach to dealing with the Soviet Union. Behind the change lie the president's beliefs regarding the nature of Soviet foreign policy and, more particularly, how to deal with the Soviets in future disputes. Should we find ourselves in another crisis with the Soviet Union, the validity of those beliefs could determine whether or not we are faced with a nuclear war.

Although it is not possible to test conclusively the validity of Reagan's beliefs short of such a confrontation, we can reach tentative judgments by examining those beliefs against the performance record of American bargaining during the three major Soviet-American crises since World War II: the Berlin crises of 1948 and 1961, and the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962.

Recent studies (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981; Leng, 1980) suggest a positive relationship between the risk acceptance of national leaders and the likelihood that crises involving their states lead to war. Several factors can account for variations in risk-taking, but, as Ellsberg (1968) has argued, a policymaker's estimate of the other party's intentions is likely to be a critical ingredient. The higher the perception of aggressive intentions, the greater the critical risk he is likely to accept to discourage attempts at coercion (see also Kaplowitz, 1982, pp. 8-9; Snyder & Diesing, 1977, pp. 298-300). Thus Reagan's beliefs regarding the Soviet leadership's intentions are likely to influence the risks that he will accept in a confrontation with the Soviets.

Reagan's Belief System

A widely used approach to analyzing the relationship between beliefs and actions in international politics is that generalized by George (1969, 1979), from Leites' (1951) study of the belief system, or "Operational Code," of the Politburo. There are two basic components to the Operational Code: The first is what George (1979, pp. 100-101) refers to as the "master belief," or philosophical component, the policymaker's notion of the "fundamental nature of politics and political conflict, and his image of the opponent." The second component is instrumental; it represents the policymaker's notion of how to deal with the opponent, i.e., "How goals and objectives can be pursued most effectively, the best approach to calculation, control, . . . and acceptance of the risks of political action, and the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests." Thus George (1979, p. 101) argues how national leaders view each other is of "fundamental importance in determining what happens in relations among states."

Although I do not follow the standard ap-

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proach to operational code analysis, which is based on a set of ten specific questions, I use the notions presented above as a framework for a description of Reagan's beliefs about the Soviets and how to deal with them. I begin with a review of the president's beliefs about the nature of international politics in our time and then turn to his image of the Soviet Union in particular, drawn from his statements on international affairs from the 1980 presidential campaign through March, 1983, which in turn provide a basis for his views on how to bargain with the Soviets.

The Nature of International Politics

Reagan's beliefs regarding the fundamental issues facing American foreign policy have been consistent. He views international politics in the modern era as a struggle between democracy and totalitarianism, "between right and wrong, good and evil" (March 8, 1983),[1] with today's totalitarian challenge coming from the Soviet Union, a revolutionary state ideologically driven to attempt world conquest. Perhaps the most forthright statements of this view appear in his address to the British Parliament on June 9, 1982 and in a speech to American evangelists on March 8, 1983.

Image of the Soviet Union

Reagan argues that Soviet bargaining behavior is different from that of Western states. The Soviets cannot be trusted to negotiate on the basis of reciprocity; they do not keep their word. A dramatic statement of this view came in his first presidential press conference (January 29, 1981). Responding to a question about detente, the new president accused the Soviets of a willingness "to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat" to attain world communism. These convictions were forcefully restated two years later (March 8, 1983) in the address to Christian evangelists.

Bargaining with the Soviets

The instrumental component of Reagan's political belief system—how to bargain with the Soviets—follows logically from his beliefs about Soviet motivations and behavior. With the exception of a mutual recognition of the need to avoid nuclear war, Reagan views bargaining with the Soviets as a zero-sum game. This perspective leads to a strong emphasis on coercive bargaining: we must negotiate from strength and credibly demonstrate our willingness to use our power to protect and to further American interests. Increasing America's military strength vis-à-vis the Soviets has been a major goal of Reagan's since the beginning of his campaign and throughout his presidency.

The imperative to negotiate from strength is coupled with an emphasis on credibly demonstrating determination to use American military power to achieve national objectives. Throughout the presidential campaign Reagan attacked Carter for risking "our national security—our credibility" by sending "timid" signals to the Soviet Union (February 15, 1980). He argued that "More nations can back themselves into trouble through retreat and appeasement than by standing up for what they believe" (January 29, 1980). An unwanted war, in candidate Reagan's view, was more likely through vacillation and weakness, than from a strong demonstration of the willingness to use our military strength (TV advertisement, October 19, 1980). Too often we have been caught reacting to Soviet moves, he argued; the time has come for the United States to seize the initiative, to "give them some problems to worry about" (January 29, 1980).

In short, bargaining with the Soviet Union is a zero-sum game; therefore the American bargaining strategy must be to take the initiative and credibly demonstrate our determination to achieve our objectives. In a confrontation with the Soviets, with American security interests at stake, this view translates into using credible threats with the military capability to back them up. In earlier studies, I have referred to this as a "bullying" strategy (Leng, 1982; Leng & Wheeler, 1979).[2] Behind this strategy is the assumption that a credible demonstration of our willingness to accept a high risk of war to achieve our objectives will cause the Soviets to submit to our will, whereas efforts to reach a compromise through positive inducements will be perceived as indications of weakness and encourage more coercive Soviet bargaining.

Reagan's beliefs about the nature of Soviet foreign policy are consistent with a school of thought that dominated American thinking at the outset of the Cold War and that has continued to represent one side of the continuing debate about how to deal with the Soviets (see Conquest, 1979; Pipes, 1980). What Yergin (1977, p. 11) has called the "Riga axiom" sees the Soviet Union as "a world revolutionary state, denying the possibilities of coexistence, committed to unrelenting ideological warfare, powered by a messianic drive for world mastery." Yergin (1977, pp. 42-68) contrasts this image with what he calls the "Yalta axiom." Proponents of this view (Kennan, 1981; Kissinger, 1979) see the Soviet Union as a traditional great power operating to achieve its objectives within the context of the international system rather than trying to overthrow it.

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[1] Quotations from Reagan's statements have been taken from the text reprinted in the *New York Times.*

[2] The term "bullying" may have unintended negative connotations to some readers; however, it was chosen to obtain consistency with game theoretic studies of conflict bargaining (see Snyder & Diesing, 1977).

If Reagan's assumptions are correct, that is, if the Riga axiom provides an accurate picture of Soviet foreign policy, then the bullying strategy that he has advocated is not a radical approach, although it carries high risks. In a confrontation where compromise is unthinkable, relative bargaining power is a function of what Snyder and Diesing (1977, p. 190) call "perceived comparative resolve," that is, each side's perception of the credibility of the other's willingness to accept the risk of war. But if Reagan is wrong, if the Yalta axiom is closer to reality, if *each* of the Superpowers acts primarily out of a concern for its security and a perception of implacable hostility on the part of the other, and if *each* is willing to accept a high level of critical risk to protect its interests, then such a strategy promotes the very dangers it is designed to deter. An effective coercive bargaining strategy ultimately depends on an asymmetry in the resolve of the two sides. If the parties are equally intent on demonstrating their resolve, the result can be a dangerous escalation of the conflict that stems from each side's determination to make its commitment to winning more credible. In game theoretic terms, this is the classic confrontation of a game of chicken.

Questions regarding the effectiveness of different bargaining strategies have been at the center of research on crisis behavior for the past two decades. The bullying strategy advocated by Reagan is representative of a perspective (Schelling, 1960, 1966) that views conflict bargaining as a game in which the key to success lies in credibly demonstrating one's resolve and commitment to winning through a coercive strategy. (See Kaplowitz, 1982, pp. 8-10; Leng & Wheeler, 1979, pp. 658-659; Snyder & Diesing, 1977, Chap. 3 for a fuller discussion.)

A bullying approach, and the assumptions behind it, can be contrasted with the "reciprocating," or "firm-but-fair," strategy described by Leng and Wheeler (1979), a bargaining strategy combining a firm stand against bullying by the other side with positive initiatives to obtain a compromise settlement. The difference in orientation is in encouraging cooperating rather than attemptin to coerce it. This approach is also emphasized by George, Hall, and Simons (1971, pp. 25-30), George and Smoke (1974, pp. 604-613), Kaplowitz (1982, pp. 10-13), Snyder and Diesing (1977, pp. 218-221), and in the interpersonal bargaining experiments of Esser and Komorita (1975). The approach is consistent with the image of Soviet foreign policy represented by the Yalta axiom; it assumes that one is dealing with an adversary possessing traditional great-power security concerns, rather than a revolutionary power for whom compromise has only tactical meaning.

Leng and Wheeler (1979) have offered evidence of the effectiveness of a reciprocating approach to crisis bargaining, and several studies have noted the prevalence of reciprocating or tit-for-tat patterns of crisis behavior in general (Leng & Wheeler, 1979; North, Brody, & Holsti, 1964; Ward, 1982), and in Soviet-American bargaining in particular (Gamson & Modigliani, 1971; Hopmann & Smith, 1977; Triska & Findley, 1968).

The following analysis offers a historical comparison of the relative effectiveness of bullying and reciprocating approaches in three American post-World-War-II crises with the Soviet Union.[3] The presumption is that Reagan's views, which I have associated with the bullying approach, are based on his understanding of past Soviet behavior, and that he believes that there have been no significant changes in that behavior over the past several decades. Given Reagan's statements and actions since assuming office, these appear to be safe presumptions. Although our discussion also implies that Reagan's instrumental beliefs will be reflected in any crisis bargaining with the Soviets, a test of that proposition obviously is not possible. Nevertheless, given the positive associations found between the instrumental beliefs and the conflict bargaining of previous American policy makers (Hoagland & Walker, 1979; Starr, 1980; Stuart, 1980; Walker, 1977) as well as the consistency between Reagan's public views and his actions regarding other policy matters, this would not be an unreasonable forecast.

Hypotheses

If Reagan's views are correct, and a bullying strategy offers the best approach to crisis bargaining with the Soviets, then we should observe the Soviets responding most positively to influence attempts that contain strong and highly credible threats. Less severe or less credible threats are likely to produce defiant Soviet responses owing to Soviet efforts to demonstrate resolve when the risks are not as high. Positive inducements would be interpreted as a sign of weakness and would promote more coercive Soviet behavior. These assumptions can be stated as three hypotheses.

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[3] Each of the crises has been examined at length by others (Allison, 1971; Gamson & Modigliani, 1971; Hoagland & Walker, 1979; Snyder & Diesing, 1977; Tanter, 1974), but the questions that we ask are new ones, and the analytic approach is different.

> *Hypothesis B1.* The Soviet Union is most likely to respond positively to negative inducements employing threats of force whose credibility is supported by a specific U.S. commitment to carry them out.
>
> *Hypothesis B2.* The Soviet Union is likely to respond to non-military threats or warnings, or threats of force where the U.S. commitment to carry them out is ambiguous, by issuing counterthreats.
>
> *Hypothesis B3.* The Soviet Union is likely to respond with more coercive bargaining to positive inducements that are not backed up by accompanying threats.

The seeming inconsistency between hypotheses B1 and B2 results from the assumption that, although the Soviets are incorrigibly hostile and therefore react defiantly to lesser warnings and threats, they become cautious when there are high risks. Although this view is implied by the logic of Reagan's statements, i.e., that a tough stand provides the best means of avoiding war with the Soviets, it is stated explicitly by Leites (1951).

On the other hand, if the assumptions underlying a reciprocating bargaining strategy are more correct, that is, if the superpowers each react out of a concern for their security, and a determination to resist the presumed hostility of the other, then purely coercive threats should be counterproductive. The most effective influence attempts would combine less provocative threats or warnings with positive inducements. The objective would be to indicate firmness without unnecessarily threatening the security, prestige, or reputation for resolve of the other party. This is assumed to be especially important in crisis bargaining between status equals (see Leng, 1980, pp. 155-157; Snyder & Diesing, 1977, pp. 218-219). At the same time one would offer positive inducements to indicate a willingness to achieve a compromise settlement, or at least provide a facesaving concession for the adversary. With both sides acting from a desire to protect security interests, we would expect to find considerable reciprocity in American and Soviet conflict behavior; each side would be likely to respond in kind to the inducements of the other. These propositions also can be stated as three hypotheses.

> *Hypothesis R1.* The Soviet Union is likely to respond in kind to negative inducements that use threats of force whose credibility is supported by a specific commitment to carry them out.
>
> *Hypothesis R2.* The Soviet Union is most likely to respond positively to carrot-and-stick influence attempts that combine positive inducements with less provocative threats or warnings.
>
> *Hypothesis R3.* In crises with the United States, the Soviet Union is likely to respond to American influence attempts in a reciprocating, or tit-for-tat manner.

Research Design

Each of the cold war crises presented a major test of American resolve. Although the United States enjoyed strategic military superiority in all three, the balance of conventional force was in the United States' favor only during the Cuban missile crisis. In each case the United States reacted to a Soviet challenge (the blockade in 1948, the ultimatum to recognize East Germany in 1961, and the missiles in 1962) with firmness, and the Soviets dropped their initial demands. The outcomes of the 1948 and 1962 crises were political victories for the United States, whereas the Berlin crisis of 1961 ended in a stalemate. War was avoided in all three crises.

But both the bullying and reciprocating approaches recognize the need to respond with firmness when vital interests are at stake; the question is just how the United States displayed its firmness and how the Soviet Union reacted to particular American influence attempts. Was the United States most successful in achieving Soviet compliance with its demands when it adopted the purely coercive tactics of a bullying bargaining strategy, or when it used the tactics suggested by a reciprocating bargaining strategy? Answering that question requires a closer look at the behavior of the two countries over the course of the crises.

To obtain as complete a picture as possible, I examine the actions of the two countries from three perspectives. First, I examine the initial Soviet responses to American influence attempts, particularly threats of force. Then I consider the extended effect, if any, that these threats had on the mix of cooperative and conflictive Soviet acts over the remainder of the crisis. Finally, I take a broader look at the overall pattern of behavior for the two countries.

Data

I have used the accounts of diplomatic historians to determine the beginning and ending

Table 1. Soviet-American Crises

Berlin blockade	Begin:	March 6, 1948. Allied powers agree to merge the three western zones.
	End:	May 12, 1949. Blockade lifted.
Berlin Wall	Begin:	June 4, 1961. Khrushchev threatens separate peace treaty with East Germany by the end of the year.
	End:	October 28, 1961. U.S. and Soviet forces moved back from confrontation at the Wall.
Cuban missiles	Begin:	September 4, 1962. Kennedy warns Soviets against introduction of offensive missiles in Cuba.
	End:	November 20, 1962. U.S. ends "quarantine" blockade of Cuba.

dates of the three crises.[4] These are listed in Table 1. Events data tracing the behavior and interactions of the disputants were generated from the written accounts of journalists and historians; 1,500 events were identified from 9 sources. A single verbal chronology of events was constructed for each case and then coded into machine-readable form using the Behavioral Correlates of War (BCOW) typology designed by Leng and Singer (1977). The coded events serve as the raw data for our indicators of influence attempts and responses, and for the level of hostility in aggregate American or Soviet actions observed at daily intervals.

Operational Measures

The method used to identify and classify Soviet responses to American influence attempts is described in an earlier study (Leng, 1980, pp. 134-141), so only a brief discussion is presented here. I begin by assuming that each party to the dispute signals its desires and intentions to the other through *influence attempts* composed of demands and inducements.

Inducements. These fall into three broad categories: negative (threats and warnings), positive (promises), and carrot-and-stick (a combination of positive and negative inducements). A fourth possibility is that there is no overt inducement accompanying the demand, i.e., one side simply attempts to persuade the other than the action is in their interest. Since we are primarily interested in the effectiveness of threats, we make further distinctions according to the *degree* and *specificity* of negative inducements. Because of President Reagan's emphasis on the importance of demonstrating America's willingness to use its military power in dealing with the Soviets, we dichotomize all negative inducements according to whether or not the use of military force is threatened.

Commitment to act. To measure the extent to which the United States attempts to make credible its commitments to carry out its threats, I distinguish between threats of a specific action and the circumstances under which it will be undertaken, and "warnings" that are less specific about the action to be taken or the conditions under which it would be carried out. Thus the *degree* of inducement provides a measure of the power the actor is willing to exercise to achieve its demands; the *specificity* of the inducement provides a measure of the commitment to carry out the threat. These two distinctions also provide rough indicators of the provocativeness of individual threats, as specified in Hypothesis R2.[5]

Responses. The initial Soviet responses to American influence attempts are categorized according to five response types: to comply with the demand, to placate the actor with an alternative positive response, to ignore the demand by taking no action beyond an evaluative comment, to defy the actor with a threat or warning, and to send a mixed response combining a threat or warning with a positive action. A full discussion of the procedure for linking influence attempts and responses appears in Leng (1980, pp. 141-143). Briefly, we identify the initial response as consisting of overt actions directed by the Soviets to the United States in the first two weeks after the influence attempt or until the United States issues its next influence attempt, whichever comes first. The identification of the initial Soviet response is not an attempt to link a particular Soviet act to a particular U.S. act, but to ask, "What effect, if any, does the influence attempt have on the succeeding behavior of the Soviets toward the United States?"

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[4] The three crises are treated as dyadic disputes; however, in the two Berlin crises, U.S. actions taken in concert with its allies have been identified as U.S. actions. By the same token, actions that the Soviet Union directs toward the allied governments (United States, Britain, France) are identified as directed at the United States.

[5] Another dimension to the provocativeness of a threat would be whether it was offensive or defensive, that is, whether it demanded a change in, or defended, the precrisis status quo. In a confrontation between two global powers, any change in the status quo in favor of one side is likely to be perceived by the other as a threat to its security interests. In the three crises at hand, however, all of the U.S. threats of force could be considered in defense of the status quo, so the distinction is not useful for our purposes.

The design of the BCOW coding scheme permits a fine-grained examination of the conditions attached to requests (demands) and accompanying inducements, as well as the action demanded or threatened, which enables us to observe whether or not the target of the request complies with the demand, and whether or not the actor delivers the threatened punishment or promised reward.[6]

Extended Effects. Beyond the initial Soviet response to American influence attempts, we are interested in the extended effect, if any, that particular influence attempts have on the mix of cooperative and conflictive Soviet actions. Here too we use a measure employed in an earlier study (Leng & Gochman, 1982): the hostility score, a measure of the level of coercive behavior in aggregate events measured at daily intervals. Each action is classified as cooperative or conflictive and then assigned a weighted score according to its placement on continuum of coercion-accommodation developed by Rubin and Hill (1973) and modified by the author to fit the BCOW typology. The six categories on the continuum weight each act from −3 (most hostile or coercive) to + 3 (most accommodative).[7] This method enables us to generate a time series of the level of coerciveness in Soviet behavior over the course of the crisis, so that any significant changes associated with particular U.S. influence attempts can be observed.

Analysis and Findings

Initial Soviet Responses to U.S. Influence Attempts

We will begin the analysis by examining contingency tables of initial Soviet responses to U.S. influence attempts. Table 2 presents the frequencies and percentages of Soviet responses based on the types of inducements used by the United States; Table 3 presents the frequencies and percentages of Soviet responses based on the U.S. commitment to act, as measured by the specificity of inducements. Although the data in Tables 2 and 3 do not represent samples from which we are attempting to draw inferences to a larger population, tests of statistical significance are included to

Table 2. U.S. Inducement Types and Soviet Responses in Three Crises

	Response					
Inducement	Comply	Placate	Mixed	Ignore	Defy	Total
Threat only						
Military force	0 (0.0)[a]	3 (27.3)	2 (18.2)	1 (9.1)	5 (45.5)	11 (100.0)
Other	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	7 (77.8)	2 (22.2)	9 (100.0)
Carrot and stick						
Military force	3 (50.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (16.7)	1 (15.7)	1 (16.7)	6 (100.0)
Other	1 (100.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (100.0)
Promise	2 (25.0)	1 (12.5)	2 (25.0)	2 (25.0)	1 (12.5)	8 (100.0)
No inducement	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	3 (75.0)	1 (25.0)	4 (100.0)
Total	6 (15.4)	4 (10.3)	5 (12.8)	14 (35.9)	10 (25.6)	39 (100.0)

[a] Row percentages. Chi square: $p < .05$.

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[6] For a full discussion of this property of the coding scheme, as well as the procedures for identifying influence attempts and responses, see Leng (1980, pp. 134-141).

[7] Ongoing events, such as a military alert, or ongoing negotiations are coded for each day until the event is over, as opposed to other coding schemes (WEIS, COPDAB), which code such events only on the beginning day. The coding scheme also allows for measurement of increases or decreases in the intensity of such events, such as movement from one level of alert to another.

give a sense of the extent to which we can be confident that we have found systematic patterns stronger than those that might be found by mere chance (see Winch & Campbell, 1969, pp. 140-143).

Bullying Hypotheses. The data in Tables 2 and 3 run counter to the three bullying hypotheses. Table 2 indicates that threats of force alone do not lead to compliance, but are most likely to lead to defiant responses (counter-threats). Table 3 suggests that the more specific the threat, the greater the likelihood of a defiant response. These results not only contradict the first of the bullying hypotheses, they are consistent with the counter-hypothesis (Hypothesis R1) of the reciprocating approach, which predicts that the Soviets are most likely to respond in kind to highly credible U.S. threats of force. Hypotheses B2 and B3 do no better. Table 2 indicates that, rather than evoking defiant Soviet responses, the U.S.'s nonmilitary threats tend to be ignored, whereas positive inducements actually produced a better record of attaining positive Soviet responses than did threats.

Reciprocating Hypotheses. The findings in Tables 2 and 3 are more supportive of the reciprocating hypotheses. Besides producing the predicted negative effects of attempting to use coercive threats alone (Hypothesis R1), Table 2 indicates that the most effective U.S. influence attempts used carrot-and-stick inducements combining threats of force with positive inducements. Although the number of these cases is small, the high percentage of positive responses, against only one instance of a defiant response to a carrot-and-stick inducement, is consistent with Hypothesis R2. At the very least, the refusal of the Soviets to comply with U.S. demands when threats of force alone were employed, suggests the importance of a facesaving gesture to allow the other side to retreat gracefully.

The distribution of responses in Table 3 is particularly suggestive. As the U.S. commitment to carry out its threats becomes more precise, the threats are more likely to be met with defiance, whereas less precise warnings are likely to be ignored. By comparing Table 3 with Table 2, we can see that the most successful carrot-and-stick inducements are those accompanied by warnings rather than specific threats. This finding, which is consistent with the emphasis on less provocative threats in Hypothesis R2, suggests that a degree of vagueness may promote compliance by allowing the other side to avoid the appearance of being bullied. Although the chi square tests for both tables are statistically significant ($p = .05$ for Table 2; $p = .01$ for Table 3), the small cell entries could affect the stability of this statistic, so these scores should be treated with caution.

Threats and Defiance. The most striking finding in Tables 2 and 3 is the association between specific threats of force and defiant Soviet responses. Table 4 collapses both measures into a two-by-two table showing the frequency with which specific threats of force, whether issued alone or as part of a carrot-and-stick inducement, evoke defiant responses.

The entries in Table 4 indicate that the Soviet Union responded defiantly to specific U.S. threats of force 75% of the time, whereas other inducements elicited defiant responses only 12.9% of the time. We have used a Fisher's exact test to gain a sense of the likelihood of finding such a relationship by chance. The $p = .0014$ score indicates that the probability of that is quite low, even with fairly small cell entries. An indication of the strength of the relationship can be obtained by simply calculating the percentage difference, which in this

Table 3. Specificity of U.S. Inducements and Soviet Responses in Three Crises

Specificity of Inducement	Response					
	Comply	Placate	Mixed	Ignore	Defy	Total
Threats alone						
Action specified	0 (0.0)[a]	1 (10.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (10.0)	8 (80.0)	10 (100.0)
Unspecified	0 (0.0)	2 (20.0)	2 (20.0)	6 (60.0)	0 (0.0)	10 (100.0)
Carrot and stick						
Action specified	1 (33.3)	0 (0.0)	1 (33.3)	0 (0.0)	1 (33.3)	3 (100.0)
Unspecified	3 (75.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (25.0)	0 (0.0)	4 (100.0)
No threat						
Promise	2 (25.0)	1 (12.5)	2 (25.0)	2 (25.0)	1 (12.5)	8 (100.0)
No inducement	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	3 (75.0)	1 (25.0)	4 (100.0)
Totals	6 (15.4)	4 (10.3)	5 (12.8)	13 (33.3)	11 (28.2)	39 (100.0)

[a]Row percentage. Chi square: $p < .01$.

Table 4. Specific U.S. Threats of Force and Defiant Soviet Responses

Inducement	Response		
	Defy	Other	Total
Specific threat of force	6 (75.0)[a]	2 (25.0)	8 (100.0)
Other inducement	4 (12.9)	27 (87.1)	31 (100.0)
Total	10	29	39

[a]Row percent. Fisher's Exact: .0014. Percentage difference: .62.

case is .62, indicating a strong relationship between the two variables.[8]

Comparison with Other Crises. Although our investigation is concerned primarily with the relationship between the president's belief system and the three previous Soviet-American crises, these findings can be placed in a larger context by comparing them with the results of an earlier study (Leng, 1980) of influence attempts and responses in a stratified random sample of 14 interstate crises occurring between 1850 and 1965. In most respects the findings were quite similar to what we have observed in the Soviet responses to American threats. There was a statistically significant association between the specificity of threats and defiant responses among all pairs in the study and between threats of force and defiant responses in disputes between states evenly matched in power.[9]

Extended Effects of Threats of Force

The results of our examination of the initial Soviet responses to specific U.S. threats of force favor the reciprocating over the bullying hypotheses, but they present only part of the picture. Perhaps a concern for their reputation for resolve encourages Soviet leaders to issue immediate counterthreats, but, once convinced of the credibility of the U.S. commitment to carry out its threats, they are likely to follow the facesaving gesture of defiance by moving to more accommodative actions. If this is the case, their behavior would be more consistent with the president's instrumental beliefs than the initial Soviet responses indicate.

If we observe this pattern as part of a time series of Soviet hostility scores over the course of the crisis, the initially defiant response should appear as a temporary upward pulse in the magnitude of Soviet hostility scores. Then there should be an abrupt or (more likely) gradual, and continuing shift downward toward more accommodative bargaining. Borrowing a term from an earlier study of crisis behavior (Leng & Gochman, 1982, pp. 669-673), we will refer to this pattern as evidence of a "put-down"; wherein one disputant begins yielding to the coercive demands of the other after only token resistance.[10]

On the other hand, if the hostile Soviet reaction to the threat is more lasting, we can conceive of two likely patterns. The Soviets could respond in kind to the U.S. threat of force, for example, by matching a U.S. show-of-strength with one of their own, and the crisis could remain at the new level of hostility for an extended period. Or, the immediately hostile Soviet response could set off a chain of threats and counterthreats causing the level of mutual coercion to spiral upward. Borrowing again from Leng and Gochman (1982), we will refer to the first of these two behavior patterns as "resistance," and to the second as a "fight" (see also Rapoport, 1960).[11] Both patterns are consistent with the negative effects predicted by Hypothesis R1, but it is the fight that exhibits the classic pattern of escalation described by spiral theorists of crisis behavior (see Jervis, 1976, chap. 3).

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[8] The value of phi, a measure of association based on chi square = .85. Phi^2 = .73.

[9] Highly specific threats of force also were found to be associated with compliance in the larger sample, but these cases were accounted for by the crises in which the power relationship was significantly asymmetric.

[10] Leng and Gochman (1982) constructed a typology of militarized disputes based on three behavioral characteristics: the level of military activity, escalation in coercive actions, and the degree of reciprocity in the interactions of the two disputants. A put-down is characterized by high militarization, but low escalation and low reciprocity. After reaching a fairly high level of military preparation on both sides, B but moves to more accommodative bargaining in the face of continuing pressure from A.

[11] Leng and Gochman's (1982) resistance dispute type is characterized by high militarization, high escalation, and low reciprocity. B resists A's attempts at coercion with deterrent threats, but the dispute does not become locked into a pattern of increasingly severe threats and counterthreats, as in a fight, which has high scores on all three behavioral measures.

Still, a fourth possibility is that U.S. threats have no lasting effect—in either direction—on the level of Soviet coercive behavior. The Soviets could accept the threats as part of what Snyder and Diesing (1977, pp. 98-102) describe as the normal probing and testing that comes with the confrontation phase of a crisis. The Soviets respond with a counterthreat to indicate that they will not be bullied, but their overall behavior remains unchanged. The initially defiant Soviet response would appear as an upward pulse in the time series, but the level of hostility would soon return to its prethreat level. This pattern is consistent with what Leng and Gochman (1982, pp. 669-673) refer to as a "stand-off."[12] One can think of a number of other interesting variations; however, these four basic types should be sufficient to provide benchmarks for our consideration of the extended effects, if any, of U.S. threats of force on Soviet behavior in the three crises under consideration.

I begin the analysis with a time series plot of the hostility scores for both sides for each of three crises, which will provide a good visual sense of the interaction, including any shifts in the level of coercive Soviet actions in response to American threats of force. Then I perform a statistical analysis of the Soviet scores with a Box-Jenkins (1976) approach to modelling an interrupted time series.

The Box-Jenkins (1976) methodology was developed to overcome the problem of unmodelled autocorrelation in time series by constructing an explicit model of the autocorrelation ("noise" component) in the series, and then fitting it to the data. Without going into detail (see Box & Jenkins, 1976 for a full discussion), the technique is to fit an autoregressive, moving average, or mixed autoregressive-moving average (ARIMA) model to the data series. The first step is to difference the series so that it is stationary, that is, free of cyclical and secular trends. In our three crises, this step required taking first differences for the 1948 Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile crisis, and taking second differences for the 1961 Berlin crisis. The second step is to model any remaining autoregressive or moving average component in the differenced series; this led to a first order autoregressive model for the 1948 Berlin crisis, a second order moving average model for the 1961 Berlin crisis, and a first order moving average model for the Cuban missile crisis.

With the estimation and diagnostic checking of the ARIMA model completed, the next step is to test for any significant changes in the modelled series following interruptions, in this case, U.S. threats of force. Of the our hypothetical intervention effects that we mentioned above, the simplest would be the "resistance" pattern, an abrupt and lasting shift upward in the level of coercive Soviet behavior immediately following an American threat of force. The Soviet hostility score Y at time t would be described by the step function $Y_t = wI_t$ + noise, where w is a parameter interpreted as the magnitude of the abrupt change, with the sign of w indicating whether the shift is upward or downward. I_t refers to the intervention at time t expressed as a dummy variable where $I_t = 0$ before the intervention, and $I_t = 1$ after the intervention. The noise component is the ARIMA model.

By adding another independent value to the intervention function, the continuing constant upward change of a "fight" can be modelled. This model would take the form of $Y_t = \delta Y_{t-1} + wI_t$ + noise, where δ describes the continuing upward movement after the initial shift. The model for a put-down, wherein the Soviets move to more accommodative actions after a token counterthreat, would be of the same form, except that the value of δ would be negative, indicating a shift downward, which would continue to below the prethreat level. The abrupt, temporary, effect of threats of force in a stand-off would be generated by the same equation, except that I_t would be defined as a pulse function, that is, its value would be 1 immediately after the threat of force was issued, and $I_t = 0$ for the preceding and succeeding observations. (See Cook & Campbell, 1979, or Box & Tiao, 1975, for a more complete discussion.)

The adequacy of the resultant model may be judged by the statistical significance of the model parameters and the observation of a white noise or random distribution to the model residuals. An overall statistical test of the latter may be obtained with a Q-statistic, which is essentially a chi square test for goodness-of-fit for the residuals. If the Q-statistic is significant, there is reason to question the adequacy of the model (see Box & Jenkins, 1976, pp. 290-293). Having described the approach, we now can turn to a consideration of the overall Soviet behavior patterns in each of the three crises.

Berlin blockade. Figure 1 plots the U.S. and Soviet hostility scores over the course of the Berlin crisis of 1948-1949.[13] The Berlin blockade crisis began in March of 1948 with the Allied plan to merge the three western zones. Publication of the plan on June 7th was followed, on the 18th, by the introduction of a new currency in the western zones. The Soviets responded with their own currency reform in the eastern zone three days later and, on June 24, with a blockade of access routes to the city. The only U.S. threat of force, on June 30, stated the U.S.'s resolve to defend the city and to increase the airlift as much as necessary until the blockade was lifted. The crisis ended nearly a year later when Stalin lifted the blockade in the face of the dramatically successful airlift.

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[12] Leng and Gochman (1982) describe a stand-off as characterized by high militarization, low escalation, and high reciprocity. B matches A's coercive actions, but both sides act cautiously to keep the dispute from escalating beyond a certain point.

[13] Owing to space considerations, Figure 1 does not extend through the full eleven months of the crisis, but is

As Figure 1 suggests, the initial Soviet response to the June 30 threat was defiant. The Soviets withdrew from the unified command on July 1st, and Stalin announced on July 3rd that the blockade of the city would continue until the West abandoned its plans for a West German state. But Figure 1 indicates that there was no lasting change in Soviet behavior, and certainly not in the direction of the greater accommodation predicted by Hypothesis B1. An analysis of the time series for the Soviet scores adds statistical confirmation to what the visual inspection of Figure 1 suggests. The June 30th intervention provides no significant improvement in the differenced ARIMA model. The only significant interruption in the time series for Soviet hostility scores occurs on June 24th, when the Soviets complete the blockade of the city. This interruption comes shortly after the West introduced its new currency, but the currency change was not a threat of force, even if it was seen by the Soviets as threatening the security of their position in Berlin.

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cut off in January 1949. If the plot were continued, it would remain at the same level until it dropped downward in May when Stalin lifted the blockade.

Figure 1. Berlin, 1948



The Box-Jenkins analysis identifies the Soviet blockade as a constant step function in the time series, that is, an abrupt upward shift in hostility scores that remains at roughly the same level until Stalin lifts the blockade nearly a year later; this can be seen in Table 5, which presents the parameter estimates and significance tests for the best models of the time series that we were able to obtain for each of the three crises. In all three of the models presented in Table 5 the model parameters are statistically significant. The Q-statistics, none of which is significant at the $p = .10$ level, indicate the presence of a white noise process among the model residuals. Thus, we conclude that each of these models adequately represents the time series.

In the case of the first Berlin crisis, the ARIMA model in Table 5 indicates a gradual decline in Soviet coercive actions over the course of the crisis (with a parameter estimate of .547), but with an abrupt upward shift (4.84) representing the Soviet actions accompanying the blockade on the 24th of June. Since we did not find a significant shift in the level of Soviet hostility after the explicit U.S. threat of fore on June 30th, we have classified the time series as a stand-off. The U.S. threat of force had no significant effect (in either direction) on the mix of coercion and accommodation in Soviet behavior.

Berlin Wall. Figure 2 presents the time series plot for the Berlin crisis of 1961. The dispute began in November of 1958 when Khrushchev made his initial threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany, but it did not reach crisis proportions until the summer of 1961. On June 4th, Khrushchev reissued his threat as an ultimatum, with a deadline of December 31, 1961, for an Allied settlement recognizing the post-World War II borders in Central Europe and an end to the occupation of Berlin. The crisis reached its peak in mid-August with the erection of the Berlin Wall. Then it tapered off gradually, except for a brief flare-up at the Wall in October. Shortly thereafter, Khrushchev tacitly accepted Kennedy's offer of de facto recognition of the division of Germany and withdrew the ultimatum.

There are eight American threats of force during the summer and fall of 1961. The three most salient occur on June 28, seven days after Khrushchev's ultimatum, on July 25 when Kennedy issued a major policy statement, and on August 17, four days after the beginning of the erection of the Wall. The June 28 and July 25 statements are carrot-and-stick influence attempts, which mixed warnings expressing the United States's determination to defend Berlin with offers to negotiate. Kennedy's July 25 speech also included an announcement of a buildup in conventional forces. The threat of force on August 17 was in the form of a show of strength—an alert of U.S. forces and maneuvers around Berlin. All three influence attempts were followed by an immediate,

Table 5. ARIMA Models of Shifts in Coercive Behavior by the USSR during Three U.S.-Soviet Crises

Model components	Estimates of model parameters: Order	Parameter estimate	Standard error	T-ratio	Goodness of fit Q^f
Berlin, 1948					
Noise component	AR 1[a]	−.547	.051	−10.83	32.0
Intervention (June 24)	0[b]	4.843	.937	5.17	
Berlin, 1961					
Noise component	MA 2[c]	.557	.069	8.02	30.0
Intervention (Aug. 13)	0	2.332	.752	3.10	
Intervention (Sept. 7)	0	−3.802	1.128	−3.37	
Cuba, 1962					
Noise component	MA 1[d]	1.006	.010	104.68	21.0
Intervention (Oct. 23)	0	6.628	.412	16.09	
Intervention (Oct. 27)	1[e]	−3.742	.405	−9.23	

[a] First order, first difference, autoregressive process.

[b] Zero order. An abrupt upward shift.

[c] Second order, second difference, moving average process.

[d] First order, first difference, moving average process.

[e] First order. A more gradual shift, in this case, it is downward.

[f] Q score after 25 lags. None is significant at the $p = .10$ level.

but temporary, Soviet response in kind.

None of the U.S. threats of force has a significant effect on the differenced time series. Brief dips in the Soviet hostility scores in September reflect Soviet offers to negotiate, but these follow positive initiatives from Kennedy in late August and early September.

Parameter estimates for the ARIMA model of the differenced time series providing the best fit appear in Table 5. The model includes a step function upward on August 13, with the erection of the Wall, then a temporary pulse downward, toward more accommodative behavior, on September 7 when there is a conditional Soviet offer to negotiate a settlement. The latter follows positive U.S. initiatives in late August, i.e., statements indicating a willingness to negotiate a settlement. Since these initiatives are backed by an ongoing military show of strength, the Soviet response is consistent with Hypothesis R2. But, as

Figure 2. Berlin, 1961



we noted above, none of the four explicit U.S. threats of force appears to have had a significant extended effect on the mix of coercion and accommodation in Soviet behavior. Therefore we will classify this crisis as another stand-off.

Cuban missile crisis. The Cuban missile crisis began with the discovery, on October 14, 1962, of the Soviet construction of IRBM and MRBM sites. It reached its peak after President Kennedy's "quarantine" speech of October 22, in which he announced the American blockade of Cuba, and it began to de-escalate following Robert Kennedy's carrot-and-stick ultimatum of October 27th. The stick was American military action if the missiles were not removed the next day; the carrot contained pledges not to invade Cuba and to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey as rewards for Soviet compliance. Thus there were two strong American threats of force in the Cuban missile crisis: the quarantine speech of Oc-

Figure 3. Cuba, 1962



tober 22nd, and the carrot-and-stick ultimatum on the 27th. As Figure 3 shows, the initial Soviet response to the first threat was defiant, but beginning with mixed responses from Khrushchev on the 26th, which the United States followed with its carrot-and-stick ultimatum on the 27th, the Soviet behavior moves fitfully toward greater accommodation.

The model parameters in Table 5 indicate that each of these events is associated with a significant shift in the level of Soviet coercion. Kennedy's October 22 threat is followed by an abrupt step function upward in Soviet hostility, from which the series does not completely recover until the end of the crisis. October 26, however, marks the beginning of a gradual downward trend that ultimately leads to the Soviet agreement to remove the missiles. At first glance, the Soviet behavior appears to fit the put-down model remarkably well. There is a strong U.S. threat, an immediate Soviet counterthreat, and then a gradual move toward more accommodative Soviet behavior. But the downward shift in the level of coercive behavior does not come until there has been a pronounced escalation of the crisis and a second—carrot-and-stick—ultimatum from the United States. On its face, this is not necessarily inconsistent with a put-down, but there clearly are indications of the beginning of a fight as well.

Discussion. What are we to make of the three patterns of Soviet behavior? In the first Berlin crisis, the United States limited its display of force to deterrent threats and warnings—to which the Soviets responded in kind—and successfully met the Soviet challenge with a "circumventing" bargaining strategy (see Lockhart, 1979, pp. 101-102). Once the blockade was in place, the level of Soviet hostility remained virtually unchanged until Stalin realized the futility of his strategy and lifted the blockade. The United States demonstrated its resolve, but in a way that minimized the risk of Soviet miscalculation or an uncontrollable escalation of the crisis.

Soviet behavior during the Berlin Wall crisis of 1961 exhibits a similar pattern. U.S. threats of force are matched in kind—as are the positive initiatives—but the crisis does not escalate out of control. The level of hostility jumps to a new level with the construction of the Wall, but it does not continue to rise, except for a brief military confrontation at the Wall at the end of October.[14] The overall level of hostility remains relatively constant until the U.S.'s positive initiatives of late August are followed by reciprocal Soviet actions.

The observed patterns of the two Berlin crises are consistent with the interpretations of George and Smoke (1974, pp. 134-136), who describe the two crises as examples of "controlled pressure," that is, bargaining strategies based on limited probes of the other side's resolve and an avoidance of excessive risks. As we noted above, the patterns also are consistent with Leng and Gochman's (1982) description of a stand-off, with its low level of escalation, but relatively high reciprocity, a dispute in which "neither party is willing to back down, yet neither is willing to increase significantly the level of hostilities."

The Cuban missile crisis presents a different picture. Kennedy's quarantine speech is a compellent[15] threat demanding that Khrushchev undo his attempted *fait accompli.* And it is backed up by force—the naval quarantine. The risk of war is higher than in the other two crises, and the Soviet response is more bellicose. But, with the help of the U.S. promises to refrain from any more attacks on Cuba and to dismantle its missiles in Turkey, Khrushchev submits to Kennedy's demand. In this respect, the Soviet behavior pattern supports the modified version of the first bullying hypothesis represented by the put-down model.

On the other hand, the initial effect of Kennedy's October 22nd quarantine speech is a dramatic escalation of the level of Soviet hostility that could be associated with a fight process. Thus the Cuban crisis falls on the border between a put-down, in which one side acquiesces before the crisis has a chance to escalate, and the spiralling escalation of a fight. The pattern is intriguing because, although it is seemingly supportive of our modified version of Hypothesis B1 of the bullying approach, it contains elements of the dangers suggested by Hypothesis R1 of the reciprocating approach. Moreover, the move to more accommodative behavior on the part of the Soviets follows Robert Kennedy's carrot-and-stick ultimatum, as opposed to purely coercive threats. Viewed from this perspective, the Soviet actions are consistent with the first two hypotheses of the reciprocating approach. President Kennedy's compellent threat on October 22 leads to defiance and escalation (Hypothesis R1). It is only after the trade-offs offered by Robert Kennedy on October 27 that Khrushchev agrees to remove the missiles (Hypothesis R2).

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[14] The decision to construct the Wall appears to have been related partially to Kennedy's July 25th statement, but more because of the implication that the United States was less concerned with free movement within Berlin than because of a reaction to a perceived American threat (see Schick, 1971, pp. 148-150, 154).

[15] Schelling (1960, p. 72) distinguishes between deterrent threats, which demand that the target stop what it is doing or refrain from some anticipated action, and compellent threats that demand that the target undo or reverse what it has already done. The meaning is different from our distinction between offensive v. defensive threats, which refers to whether the actor is demanding a change from the precrisis status quo or a restoration of it. Thus the U.S. threats of force in all three crises were defensive, but in the 1961 Berlin and 1962 Cuban crises, they were compellent as well.

This returns us to the question that distinguishes between the assumptions that underlie the hypotheses. Do the Soviets, as an incorrigibly hostile, but cautious, adversary respond positively only to a demonstration of superior power and resolve, or are they inclined to respond in kind to attempts at coercion—even when the risks of war are high—unless reciprocal concessions are offered by the United States?

The earlier examination of initial Soviet responses to U.S. influence attempts supports the latter view. There is a positive association between U.S. threats of force without accompanying promises and defiant Soviet responses, whereas all six instances of Soviet compliance with U.S. demands followed promises or carrot-and-stick inducements. In fact, only 2 of 15 carrot-and-stick inducements led to defiant responses.

Overall Patterns and Reciprocity

This observation suggests support for the third of the reciprocating hypotheses (R3), which predicts that American-Soviet crisis bargaining will follow a tit-for-tat pattern. We can get a fuller picture if we take a closer look at all Soviet-American actions over the course of the crises. One way of doing this is through a visual inspection of the time series plotted in Figures 1-3, which suggest considerable reciprocity in all three crises.

We can obtain a statistical measure by computing a product moment correlation between differenced hostility scores of the two sides.[16] These scores can be viewed in a wider context by comparing them to a mean reciprocity score computed in the same manner from the randomly drawn sample of interstate crises used in Leng and Gochman (1982). This provides a rough sense of the level of reciprocal action in U.S.-Soviet crises relative to that of other interstate crises. The correlation coefficients for the three crises in the present study are: Berlin blockade = .55, Berlin Wall = .49, and Cuban missiles = .96, whereas the mean correlation for the 28 crises appearing in Leng and Gochman (1983, p. 677) equals .30.[17] Thus, both the immediate Soviet responses to American influence attempts and the overall pattern of interaction between the two sides are consistent with the tit-for-tat pattern predicted by Hypothesis R3 of the reciprocating approach.

Summary of Findings. In the three crises investigated, the Soviets tended initially to respond in kind to American threats of force as predicted by Hypothesis R1. The more positive Soviet responses to carrot-and-stick inducements, and to positive inducements alone, suggest the greater efficacy of a reciprocating approach combining defensive threats with cooperative initiatives (Hypothesis R2). These findings are consistent with those found by Leng and Wheeler (1979) for a randomly selected sample of 20 crises occurring in this century. At this point, the findings support the first two reciprocating hypotheses, as well as suggesting that Soviet crisis bargaining is not significantly different from that of other states.

An interrupted time series analysis of each of the three crises has provided a sense of whether the initial Soviet responses were the beginning of an extended pattern or temporary in nature. Did the level of Soviet hostility continue to rise or stay at the new level (Hypothesis R1)? Or did it represent merely a token gesture of defiance to be followed by movement toward greater accommodation (Hypothesis B1)? The results of the interrupted time series analysis for the two Berlin crises indicates that American threats of force, in fact, had no significant extended effect on the level of Soviet hostility. In this respect Soviet behavior is more consistent with the rational bargaining models of deterrence theorists than either a spiralling pattern of escalation, or acquiescence to American threats of force. As such, it offers no direct support for either of the competing hypotheses, although the downturn in the level of Soviet hostility following the United States's positive initiatives in late August is consistent with Hypothesis R2.

The Cuban crisis presents a provocatively different pattern. On the one hand, the compellent American threats of force lead ultimately to Soviet compliance with American demands (Hypothesis B1). On the other hand, it is the one case where an American threat of force results in a significant escalation of Soviet hostility (Hypothesis R1), and the eventual move toward greater accommodation follows a carrot-and-stick ultimatum (Hypothesis R2). It also is the crisis exhibiting the strongest tit-for-tat pattern of the three cases (Hypothesis R3). We found, in fact, that the reciprocity scores for the three crises were above the mean for a randomly selected sample of 28 crises, a finding particularly supportive of Hypothesis R3 of the reciprocating approach.

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[16] Before computing the statistic, we differenced the time series to remove serial correlations in the data. The observations were taken at one week instead of daily intervals to provide a greater opportunity for reciprocal actions and responses to appear within the same interval.

[17] The Cuban crisis and the Berlin crisis of 1961 also appeared in the random sample of 30 disputes used in Leng and Gochman (1982). These disputes were removed in calculating the mean score for comparative purposes, so 28 cases were used, and the mean dropped from .35 to .30.

Conclusion

Overall, the findings from our examination of the performance record of the United States in the three Cold War crises do not support the bullying hypotheses derived from the image of the Soviet Union held by Reagan and other proponents of the Riga axiom, or their notions of how to bargain with the Soviets. Moreover, the high level of critical risk associated with a bullying strategy can be seen in the darker side of the tit-for-tat pattern that we have observed. In all three crises we found the Soviets responding in kind to American attempts at coercion, and although the Soviets reacted in a measured manner to the less provocative American threats of force in the two Berlin crises, the sudden escalation of the Cuban crisis suggests the dangers of uncontrollable escalation.

In the two Berlin crises the United States responded with firmness to protect the status quo, but with a sense of proportion and patience to avoid unnecessary provocation. Patience paid off in the first Berlin crisis when Stalin abandoned the blockade in return for an allied promise to negotiate. In the second Berlin crisis, while Kennedy's military moves were met in kind, his offer of late August to negotiate a settlement was reciprocated and followed by Khrushchev's decision to drop his ill-fated ultimatum.

If the urgency of the Cuban Missile crisis illustrates the limits of a strategy of patience and proportion, the sudden escalation after President Kennedy's dramatic challenge to the Soviets illustrates the dangers of uncontrollable escalation. As Averell Harriman warned after the October 22 speech, "If we do nothing but get tougher and tougher, we will force him [Khrushchev] into counter-measures . . . if we deny him an out, then we will escalate this business to nuclear war" (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 821).

Was Harriman correct? Would the Cuban missile crisis have exploded in nuclear war if the United States had not balanced its threats with positive concessions? What are the likely consequences of adopting a purely coercive bargaining strategy in a future Soviet-American crisis with greater parity in usable military options, more comparable security interests at stake for the Soviets, and Soviet memories of the cost to its reputation for resolve that resulted from its retreat over Cuba? The answer turns on whether, as Reagan's beliefs imply, and others have stated more explicitly (Leites, 1951), it is somehow the nature of the Soviet leadership to retreat when the risks of war become high, or whether the United States's success over Cuba was dependent on a combination of bargaining advantages unlikely to occur in a future crisis with the Soviets, coupled to a willingness to offer positive concessions to match its firm stand. At the very least, our analysis of Soviet actions in the three post-World War II crises indicates that the United States would have to be willing to raise the level of risk—for both sides—very high indeed before it could hope to achieve Soviet compliance through a bullying bargaining strategy.

The other side of this question is whether the Soviets may be more willing to reciprocate cooperative initiatives than President Reagan credits. Even in the three Cold War crises our findings indicate considerable reciprocity in the mix of accommodative and coercive actions by the two sides. Kennedy's positive initiatives in late August of 1961 led to the turning point in the Berlin Wall crisis and, as we suggested above, the trade-offs offered in conjunction with the ultimatum of October 27th may have been as important as Kennedy's firmness in reversing Khrushchev's attempted *fait accompli* in the Cuban crisis. On the other hand, in none of the three crises is there any indication that the Soviets were willing to move to a compromise before becoming convinced of the U.S.'s willingness to defend the status quo. The most effective U.S. influence attempts were carrot-and-stick inducements combining a demonstration of resolve with cooperative initiatives. A reciprocating bargaining strategy does assume the possibility of eliciting cooperative behavior by mixing firmness with flexibility. Such an approach implies that bargaining in a confrontation between equals demands a sense of proportion, an understanding of the limits of coercion.

In an earlier study (Leng, 1980) I speculated that there is an unspoken "equity norm" in relations among states of equal rank that promotes responses in kind to attempts by one side to bully the other with threats of force. Strong states sometimes can afford to ignore the threats of weaker states; weaker powers often must accept the reality of an overwhelming military disadvantage.[18] But among status equals, yielding before a threat of force, particularly in public view, exacts an unacceptable cost to the government's reputation for resolve. This is consistent with a finding by Wilkenfeld and Brecher (1982, p. 205) who found across a wide range of crises that the United States enjoyed a certain amount of success when using violence as a crisis management technique, *except* in direct confrontations with the Soviet Union. In those crises, the authors found the United States was most successful when less violence was used. Kennedy understood the need to allow Khrushchev to save face in the Cuban crisis, when he noted that "every setback has the seeds of its own reprisal, if the country is powerful enough" (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 841). Nevertheless, the popular perception was that the Soviets were stared down—they blinked—with the rest of the world watching. Some empirical support for Kennedy's intuition appears in a historical study of six pairs of states, where each pair became embroiled in three successive crises (Leng, 1983). The findings indicate that the diplomatic loser in one crisis was likely to adopt a more coercive bargaining strategy in its next confrontation with the same adversary,[19] which suggests that the Cuban missile crisis experience has created a dangerous legacy for any American attempts to coerce the Soviets in a future crisis.

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[18] One has to add a caveat to this assumption in the current era where all international actions become the center of public attention, as the recent Falklands War has so dramatically demonstrated. In that instance, the

President Reagan has argued that the United States' approach to the American-Soviet competition has been too defensive, that we should seize the initiative in the global political and ideological competition (January 29, 1980; June 9, 1982). Such challenges could promote new crises with the Soviets. If they do, the president would be unwise to rely on a bargaining strategy stemming from his political beliefs. Henry Kissinger (1982, p. 594) sounded an appropriate warning when he announced publicly the American alert in the near confrontation with the Soviets during the Arab-Israeli war of 1973: "It is easy to start confrontations, but in this age we have to know where we will be at the end and not only what pose to strike at the beginning."

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reputation for resolve of the stronger power (Britain) was perceived to be at stake, despite the obvious British military superiority. By the same token, once having seized the islands, the Argentine government found itself publicly committed to stand firm before the British threats.

[19] The study compares the levels of hostility exhibited by six pairs of states that are each involved in three successive crises.

[20] It is interesting to note that in the "alert crisis" of October 24-25, 1973, the United States deterred Brezhnev's warning of unilateral Soviet intervention in Egypt with a carrot-and-stick influence attempt combining the alert, a private warning of *unspecified* "incalculable consequences" (Kissinger, 1982, p. 591), and a threat to detente, with a hint of meeting a part of Brezhnev's demands and a promise of future cooperation if the Soviets would rescind their demand for joint U.S.-Soviet military policing of the ceasefire. Brezhnev accepted the facesaver (nonmilitary observers from both countries) after Kissinger's conciliatory public statements of October 25. The 24-hour crisis was too short to qualify for the quantitative analysis performed on the other three crises, but the U.S. strategy fits the type found most successful in those cases: a carrot-and-stick inducement with an ambiguous threat of force.

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Explaining Presidential Priorities: The Competing Aspiration Levels Model of Macrobudgetary Decision Making

GREGORY W. FISCHER
MARK S. KAMLET
Carnegie-Mellon University

This article develops a new statistical model of trade-offs among defense, nondefense, and fiscal policy concerns as they are reflected in the presidential budgetary process. The Competing Aspiration Levels Model (CALM) builds on Crecine's (1971) "Great Identity" argument. Unlike most previous attempts to model presidential budgeting, CALM explicitly represents the interdependence of decisions about defense, nondefense, and total federal expenditures. CALM models this interdependence as the result of the interaction of minimal aspirations for defense and nondefense expenditures with a maximum acceptable level of expenditures from a fiscal policy standpoint. Statistical analyses of presidential budgets for the fiscal years from 1955 through 1980 provide strong support for the CALM formulation. Substantively, the results indicate that fiscal constraints on total expenditures have progressively weakened, that the maximum acceptable expenditure level has generally exceeded the minimal expenditure aspiration level, and that when a potential "fiscal surplus" has existed, the nondefense sector has been more successful in capturing a share of this surplus than the defense sector. In keeping with traditional incrementalist arguments, the results indicate that previous year expenditure levels provide a relatively secure "budgetary base" for both the defense and nondefense sectors. Both sectors tend to receive their minimal aspiration levels plus a share of whatever fiscal surplus exists. The analysis also indicates that the executive branch has not been as strong a direct force for budgetary growth as Congress.

When President Reagan took office, he and the spokesmen of his administration declared that the federal budget was out of control. Further, they claimed, the runaway federal budget was to blame for most of the nation's economic woes, ranging from inflation and tight credit, on the one hand, to sluggish economic growth and high unemployment, on the other. Administration spokesmen also suggested that uncontrollable growth in domestic outlays imperiled the nation's security by diverting resources from urgently needed defense programs.[1] These claims raise questions that have attracted substantial academic interest over the past 25 years. How should society decide how much is enough in the areas of defense and domestic programs? What is the "proper" trade-off between defense and domestic program objectives, on the one hand, and macroeconomic policy objectives on the other? Finally, how are these conflicts resolved in fact? This article focuses on the last of these three questions. Our goal is to gain insight into how these great budgeting trade-offs actually were resolved over the 25-year period that began with the first Eisenhower budget (FY1955) and ended just before the 1980 presidential campaign (FY1980). Our emphasis is on presidential budgets. Our approach is to develop a structural model that permits inferences concerning both the factors that determine desired defense budgetary policy, domestic budgetary policy, and fiscal policy, and the trade-offs among these objectives.

Explaining Presidential Budgets: A Brief Review

Independent Process Models

Most previous attempts to model formally presidential budgeting have assumed, implicitly or explicitly, that decisions about a given budgetary

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[1] See, e.g., "The State of the Nation's Economy: We Are Out of Time," presidential address from the White House, February 5, 1981. *Vital Speeches of the Day,* Vol. 47, no. 9.

category are statistically independent of decisions about all other budgetary categories. Consider, for example, the agency request rule that Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky (1966) found gave the best fit to most of the domestic agencies and subagencies that they studied.

$$PA_t = \beta C_{t-1} + \epsilon_t \qquad (1)$$

Here, PA_t denotes the presidential budget request for the agency in question in fiscal year (FY) t, C_{t-1} is the congressional appropriation for that agency in FY $t-1$, β is "a fixed mean percentage of the congressional appropriation for that agency in the previous year," and ϵ_t is "a random variable (normally distributed with mean 0 and unknown but finite variance) for that year." For present purposes the critical aspect of this agency decision rule is that it contains information concerning only the agency in question. (The same is true of the more complex decision rules considered by Davis et al., 1966.) Further, the estimation procedures used by Davis et al. assumed that the ϵ_t were independently distributed across agencies. In effect, then, Davis et al. asserted that the president's budget is the product of a set of parallel independent processes concerning agency or subagency budgets. Any possible influences of defense and fiscal policies on the executive branch's determination of domestic agency budgets are ignored. As we will argue below, in its extreme form this is implausible. Nonetheless, the Davis et al. parallel independent processes model has been shown to provide a relatively precise statistical account of presidential decisions concerning both domestic (Davis et al., 1966) and defense agencies (Stromberg, 1970).

Attempts to investigate arms race effects in defense budgeting have taken a similar approach. Applying a discrete time version of Richardson's (1960) action-reaction model to presidential defense budgeting gives

$$PD_t = \alpha + \beta_1 \hat{D}_{t-1} + \beta_2 \hat{S}_{t-1} + \epsilon_t \qquad (2)$$

where PD_t is the president's proposed level of defense outlays (expenditures) in FY t, $\hat{D}_{t-1}$ is the estimated level of defense outlays in FY $t-1$, $\hat{S}_{t-1}$ is the estimated level of Soviet defense expenditures in FY $t-1$, the constant α is interpreted as a grievance term, and ϵ_t is a random disturbance term.[2] The critical point to be made here is that this model of defense budgeting contains no information concerning nondefense spending; it implicitly assumes that defense budgeting proceeds independently of domestic and fiscal policy planning and decision making. Variants of the Richardson action-reaction formulation have been shown to give a good statistical account of presidential defense budgets over the past 25 years (Fischer & Crecine, 1981; Ostrom, 1978).

The Great Identity Argument

Both Crecine (1971) and Huntington (1961) have noted that presidential budgeting can only be understood in the larger context of revenues and fiscal policy objectives. This point is clearly illustrated by an accounting relation that Crecine (1971) termed "the Great Identity":

$$PD_t + PN_t = \tilde{R}_t - \widetilde{GAP}_t. \qquad (3)$$

Here PD_t and PN_t are the planned levels of defense and nondefense spending, respectively. $\tilde{R}_t$ is the anticipated level of total federal tax revenues, and $\widetilde{GAP}_t$ is the anticipated budget deficit (if $\tilde{R}_t < PD_t + PN_t$) or surplus (if $\tilde{R}_t > PD_t + PN_t$). As Crecine (1971, 1975) has argued, each of the four terms of the Great Identity is politically or economically significant in its own right. Interest groups, congressmen, agency personnel, and past legislation all generate pressures leading to higher levels of PD_t and PN_t. On the other hand, the size of the planned deficit (or surplus) is the principal macroeconomic tool at the disposal of the president. There is a relatively narrow range within which $\widetilde{GAP}_t$ must be maintained if the president hopes to see a healthy state of the nation's economy. Also, the size of the planned deficit has assumed great political interest in its own right. Finally, $\tilde{R}_t$ is also highly constrained. Major changes in tax laws are difficult to achieve, and presidents are much more apt to try to solve their budget problems for a given fiscal year through altering defense or nondefense expenditures or fiscal policy than by raising taxes. Tax reductions are much more politically palatable, but they have seldom been sought by presidents desiring to keep the deficit from becoming too large. The Reagan tax cut is an exception whose consequences may reinforce the historical aversion to tax cuts. These observations question the plausibility of the independent processes formulation of executive budgeting; they point instead to the necessity of trade-offs among fiscal, defense budgetary, and domestic budgetary priorities.

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[2] We use the symbol ^ to indicate an estimate of a past level of expenditure, such as last year's defense outlays or last year's level of Soviet defense expenditures. We use the symbol ˜ to indicate estimated levels of future budgetary quantities, such as anticipated revenues for the budget year currently being planned.

How might an administration resolve the difficult trade-offs implied by the Great Identity? Assume for the moment that political constraints rule out changes in tax policy: the administration will simply live with the revenue level that will be generated by existing tax codes. The independent processes formulation represents one extreme solution to this problem. The deficit is simply an incidental byproduct of independent decision processes concerning PD_t and PN_t. Fiscal policy considerations receive no weight whatsoever. To our knowledge, no one has seriously suggested that presidential budgeting should proceed in this fashion, although most statistical models of executive budgeting implicitly assume that it does.

The "defense requirements" approach provides a second extreme solution to the macrobudgetary problem. This approach holds that essential "defense requirements" must be met without regard for other national priorities. Former Defense Secretary McNamara has argued that this approach was actually followed during the 1960s: "[M]y instructions from both President Kennedy and President Johnson were simple: to determine and provide what we needed to safeguard our security *without regard to arbitrary budget limits,* but to do so as economically as possible" (McNamara, 1968, p. 87, emphasis added). With this approach, any trade-offs that must be made will be between nondefense and fiscal policy objectives. If fiscal responsibility is viewed as essential as well, nondefense programs will get whatever is left over after defense needs have been subtracted from a fiscally responsible level of total expenditures.

A third extreme solution is to give total priority to nondefense and fiscal requirements, with defense receiving whatever is left over after nondefense requirements are subtracted from the desired level of total expenditures. Huntington (1961, p. 221) claimed that this approach was used by the Truman administration, before the outbreak of Korean hostilities, and by the Eisenhower administration after the end of the Korean conflict.

From a normative perspective, the requirements concept is untenable. As Enthoven and Smith (1971) repeatedly argued, what is worth doing in one sector depends on what one must give up in another. Nonetheless, the possibility exists that the actual budgetary process gives total priority to two of the three macrobudgetary policy objectives, with the third receiving what is left over after the first two sets of political demands have been satisfied. It seems more likely, however, that the actual process is one of compromise between those advocating either defense or nondefense programs on the one hand, and those advocating fiscal policy objectives on the other. Matters become more complex when we introduce the option of seeking tax law change to alter anticipated revenue levels. But the logic is fundamentally the same. Although we can imagine extreme solutions which eliminate compromise or trade-offs, such solutions lack normative appeal and appear less likely to arise, in fact, than a process of mutual compromise or trade-off. The econometric approach taken below will permit us to make inferences about how the conflicts embodied in the Great Identity actually have been resolved by the presidential budgetary process during the past quarter century.

The Competing Aspiration Levels Model of Macrobudgetary Trade-offs

In this section we develop a new model of presidential budgeting. The model focuses on what we term "macrobudgetary decisions," that is, highly aggregate decisions about the terms of the Great Identity. We call this new model the *Competing Aspiration Levels Model* (CALM). CALM posits the existence of unobserved aspiration levels for defense outlays, nondefense outlays, and total outlays. CALM represents the presidential budgetary process as resulting from the reconciliation of minimum acceptable aspiration levels for defense and nondefense expenditures with a maximum acceptable level for total expenditures.

Aspiration Levels in Macrobudgetary Decisions

The simplest interpretation of an aspiration level is that it is a level of an outcome variable (e.g., profits earned, or the amount spent on a given program) that partitions the set of possible outcomes into two classes, those that are acceptable and those that are not (Simon, 1955). Alternatively, an aspiration level may be thought of as the inflection point of an S-shaped intensity of preference function, with preferences falling off steeply on the bad side, and rising, although more gradually, on the good side (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Simon, 1955). In a budgetary context, the aspiration level concept can be expanded to include legal and political constraints; that is, previous obligations and commitments that are very costly (if not impossible) to reverse. Although it may not always be possible to devise satisfying alternatives that simultaneously meet all subunits' aspirations levels, when such alternatives exist, the incentive to choose one is strong.

Aspiration levels presumably arise at every level in the budgetary process, from the lowest subagencies of the government to the highest policymaking bodies. Our concern is only with the highest level executive branch decisions concerning the size of total federal expenditures (in relation to revenues) and decisions concerning the allocation of that total between defense and nondefense uses. Recent research on executive branch budgeting suggests the existence of three largely separate policy streams involving different actors and different institutions, each concerned with one of the three elements in the macrobudgetary equation: defense spending, nondefense spending, and the level of total federal expenditures (Crecine, 1971; Crecine & Fischer, 1973; Mowery, Kamlet, & Crecine, 1980). The principal advocates of defense programs are typically the secretary of defense and his principal assistants, the president's national security adviser, and a few key congressmen. The main advocates of nondefense programs include top OMB officials, the principal domestic agency heads, a variety of special interest groups, and again key members of Congress. The principal advocates of fiscal restraint (i.e., keeping total spending under control) typically include members of the Council of Economic Advisers, top officials from OMB, and select members of the Cabinet and Congress.

The CALM model (described in detail below) posits the existence of distinct aspiration levels for defense, nondefense, and total federal expenditures. Aspirations for each of these three macrobudgetary components are determined primarily by parochial environmental and organizational considerations pertaining only to the policy area in question. Pressures from other components of the Great Identity only operate indirectly in the sense that over time compromises that have been worked out among the demands of the components may shape each component's aspirations (Manns & March, 1978; March & Simon, 1958). The composition of the sets of actors involved in the three policy streams will vary from year to year, as will their priorities. For our purposes, though, the key observation is that high level decisions about the president's budget result from the reconciliation of pressures or desires generated by these three largely separate policy streams.

The aspiration levels for defense and nondefense expenditures are assumed to be *minimal acceptable levels*. We denote them by $DMIN_t$ and $NMIN_t$, respectively. In the presence of $DMIN_t$ and $NMIN_t$, we can define a level of total expenditures, $TMAX_t$, such that minimal levels of defense and nondefense expenditures will be met unless the implied total level of expenditures exceeds $TMAX_t$. Total expenditure levels above $TMAX_t$ are as undesirable from a fiscal policy perspective as expenditures below $DMIN_t$ and $NMIN_t$ are from a defense and nondefense policy perspective, respectively. $TMAX_t$ is thus the *maximum acceptable level* of total expenditures.[3]

There are two complementary interpretations to $DMIN_t$, $NMIN_t$, and $TMAX_t$. They may be thought of as being the aspirations held by the policymakers most directly involved; for instance, $DMIN_t$ would be the minimal aspiration for defense spending held by the secretary of defense or the national security adviser. These minimal aspirations would then give rise to political actions directed toward the president or whoever plays a key role in reconciling conflicting budgetary demands. Alternatively, the aspirations may be thought of as being held by the policymakers doing the reconciling, principally the president, from whose perspective cutting expenditures below certain levels is likely to be politically costly and organizationally difficult when such actions require personnel layoffs and program contractions. The resulting political fallout may well be viewed as unacceptable by the president. Similarly, excessively high levels of total expenditures may result in deficits so large as to cause severe economic disruption and political reaction. This, too, may well be viewed as unacceptable from the point of view of a president. These two interpretations of aspiration levels are really complementary notions. If a president has a sense of what is acceptable and what is not in the defense, domestic, and fiscal domains, in all likelihood that conception has been heavily influenced by the arguments and information provided by the highest officials whose primary concern is with the sector in question.

Construed as minimal acceptable levels, $DMIN_t$ and $NMIN_t$ are similar to the notion of the "budgetary base" (Davis et al., 1966, 1971; Kamlet & Mowery, 1980; Wildavsky, 1964), although, unlike the base notion, minimal acceptable levels need not be equal to last year's level of expenditure. In the CALM formulation, it becomes an empirical question whether $DMIN_t$ and $NMIN_t$ assume this particular form. Finally, in defining the aspiration levels, it is important to keep in mind that the aspiration levels as posited in the CALM model are not observed. They should not be thought of as publicly stated bargaining demands. Rather, they are privately held convictions concerning what is acceptable and what is not.

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[3] Presumably, there is also a lower acceptable bound on total expenditures from a fiscal policy perspective. But in the presence of constant growth in agency budgets, we assume that the problem of planning to spend too little rarely if ever arises. Thus, $TMAX_t$ is the relevant constraint. We sometimes will refer to $TMAX_t$ as well as $DMIN_t$ and $NMIN_t$, as a minimal aspiration level. We do this for expositional convenience and because $TMAX_t$, in being the maximal allowable level of total expenditures, is also the level that is minimally acceptable from a fiscal policy perspective.

The CALM Equations

CALM represents the presidential budgetary process as a competition among the advocates of defense, nondefense, and fiscal policy priorities, which involves, first, a reconciliation of the minimum aspiration levels for defense and nondefense spending with the maximum acceptable level for total expenditures, and, second, the allocation of any funds that remain once these minimal requirements are satisfied. Algebraically, the *allocation equations* are as follows:

$$PD_t = DMIN_t + \beta_1[TMAX_t - DMIN_t - NMIN_t] + \mu_{1,t} \tag{4}$$

$$PN_t = NMIN_t + \beta_2[TMAX_t - DMIN_t - NMIN_t] + \mu_{2,t} \tag{5}$$

$$PT_t = [DMIN_t + NMIN_t] + \beta_3[TMAX_t - DMIN_t - NMIN_t] + \mu_{3,t} \tag{6}$$

$$PT_t = PD_t + PN_t \tag{7}$$

Here PD_t, PN_t, and PT_t denote the levels of defense, nondefense, and total outlays in the president's budget message to the Congress. $DMIN_t$, $NMIN_t$, and $TMAX_t$ are as defined above. The central constraint in this allocation process is that PT_t, which must be justified in fiscal policy terms, must equal the sum of PD_t and PN_t, which have to be justified on programmatic, legal, or political grounds. This constraint is simply an accounting identity and must be satisfied exactly (see Equation 7). The $\mu_{i,t}$'s are error terms, assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and uncorrelated over time. $\mu_{1,t}$, $\mu_{2,t}$, and $\mu_{3,t}$ are not independent of one another at any given time, however. Substituting Equations (4-6) into equation (7) demonstrates that $\mu_{1,t} - \mu_{2,t} + \mu_{3,t} = 0$ for all t. Thus, deviations from the standard allocation pattern are necessarily interdependent. This dependence, linking the macrobudgetary components, is central to executive branch budgetary decision making.

As specified in Equations (4-7), the CALM allocation equations can represent two rather distinct types of allocation problems, depending on whether $DMIN_t + NMIN_t$ is greater or less than $TMAX_t$. Consider first the case where $DMIN_t + NMIN_t < TMAX_t$. Under these circumstances, the minimal aspirations of all three sets of policymakers involved in the macrobudgetary process can be satisfied. In this case, CALM posits that all three aspirations are satisfied and that controversy over allocation decisions concerns the allocation of $TMAX_t - (DMIN_t + NMIN_t) > 0$. This positive quantity may be thought of as slack, a fiscal dividend, or a zone of contention to be allocated among defense, nondefense, and fiscal policy priorities.

In such instances, β_1 and β_2 represent the proportion of this zone of contention that are allocated to defense and nondefense expenditures, respectively. If $\beta_1 = 0$, for instance, $PD_t = DMIN_t$ (plus error), and defense receives only its minimal aspiration level.[4] If $\beta_1 = 1$, on the other hand, $PD_t = TMAX_t - NMIN_t$, and defense receives all of the zone of contention, leaving both the nondefense and fiscal sectors with only their minimal aspirations. A similar interpretation applies to β_2. So under conditions where $DMIN_t + NMIN_t < TMAX_t$, large values of β_1 result in favorable outcomes for defense, and large values of β_2 in favorable outcomes for nondefense. β_3 represents the total proportion of the zone of contention that is allocated to either defense or nondefense. If $\beta_3 = 0$, then $PT_t = DMIN_t + NMIN_t$, and defense and nondefense are held to their minimal aspirations levels. All of the slack is used to reduce the size of total expenditures. On the other hand, if $\beta_3 = 1$, $PT_t = TMAX_t$, and defense and nondefense consume all of the potential slack. Thus, when $DMIN_t + NMIN_t < TMAX_t$, large values of β_3 indicate that the proponents of fiscal restraint fare poorly relative to the proponents of defense and nondefense spending. Small values of β_3 indicate the opposite.

The budgetary problem is different for years when $DMIN_t + NMIN_t > TMAX_t$. In this case there is no budgetary allocation that does not violate at least one of the minimal aspiration levels. Equations (4-7) remain valid, but the parameters assume a somewhat different interpretation and carry with them rather different implications for whose priorities are satisfied to what extent. The problem now is one of deciding allocation levels that fail to meet the minimal aspiration levels. $TMAX_t - (DMIN_t + NMIN_t) < 0$ now represents a shortfall that must be divided among the three policy sectors. Each would like to bear as little of this shortfall as possible. Under these circumstances, values of β_3 near 1 indicate that defense and nondefense programs bear most of the burden, with minimal fiscal aspirations being basically satisfied. (Recall that when $\beta_3 = 1$, Equation (6) becomes $PT_t = TMAX_t$.) Values of β_1 and β_2 near 0, on the other hand, indicate that defense and nondefense programs receive close to their minimal aspirations, with fiscal policy aspirations being forced to give in the face of the shortfall. Thus, the magnitudes of the β_i's have very different implications concerning which sectors do well and which do not, depending on whether $DMIN_t + NMIN_t$ is greater or less than $TMAX_t$. If both types of years occurred relatively frequently, one might reasonably conjecture that the β_i allocation parameters would be different for the two types of years. As seen below, however, the vast majority of the years we analyze appear to be cases where $DMIN_t + NMIN_t < TMAX_t$, so we do not consider two separate sets of allocation parameters.

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[4] Here, and throughout the next two paragraphs, we omit the error terms to simplify the discussion. The statements made can be interpreted as expected values, e.g., $E(PD_t) = DMIN_t$ when $\beta_1 = 0$.

From the above discussion it is clear that the β_i's are not independent; in fact, it is easily shown that Equation (7) implies that $\beta_1 + \beta_2 = \beta_3$, which simply reflects the fact that the proportion of the zone of contention going to defense plus nondefense must equal the total that is allocated. The above interpretation of the β_i's also implies that each must lie in the interval [0,1], and that $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ must not exceed 1. Thus, the validity of the CALM formulation can be partially tested by examining the extent to which (unconstrained) estimates of the β_i's lie within these theoretically justifiable ranges.

Finally, as we have developed the CALM model, Equations 4-7 represent the interaction of three sets of actors with different policy concerns. From this organizational politics perspective, the β coefficients are naturally interpreted as temporally stable indicators of the relative power of the proponents of defense, nondefense, and fiscal objectives during disputes concerning division of the zone of contention. It can be shown, though, that Equations (4-7) also result from maximizing a utility function of the form $U_t = (PD_t - DMIN_t)^{\beta_1} (PN_t - NMIN_t)^{\beta_2} (TMAX_t - PT_t)^{(1-\beta_1-\beta_2)}$ subject to the constraint that $PT_t = PD_t + PN_t$. Thus, although the CALM model was developed to represent stable conflicts between competing groups of policy advocates, it is formally interpretable as reflecting the "revealed allocation preferences" of the executive branch acting as a single rational decision maker. On the surface, this interpretation appears to differ significantly from the organizational politics interpretation offered above. This need not be the case, however. For instance, in both the utility maximization and organizational politics interpretations, the president can be viewed as reconciling disputes between the conflicting aspirations of the proponents of defense, nondefense, and fiscal policy objectives.

To use Equations (4-7) to estimate trade-offs between defense, nondefense, and fiscal aspirations, it is first necessary to specify the determinants of these aspirations. The present specification of CALM incorporates the following set of *aspiration level equations:*

$$DMIN_t = \delta_1 \hat{D}_{t-1} + \delta_2 \hat{S}_{t-1} + \delta_3 \Delta \tilde{W}_t + \epsilon_{a,t} \quad (8)$$

$$NMIN_t = \alpha_1 \hat{N}_{t-1} + \epsilon_{b,t} \quad (9)$$

$$TMAX_t = \gamma_1 \tilde{R}_t + \gamma_2 TIME_t * \tilde{R}_t + \gamma_3 REC_{t-1} * \tilde{R}_t + \epsilon_{c,t} \quad (10)$$

These specifications are admittedly simple, but they include as determinants those factors most frequently mentioned in the budgeting literature.

Equation (8) views defense aspirations as the result of a Richardson-type action-reaction process (without a constant grievance term), modified by the addition of a variable reflecting changes in the anticipated level of intensity of U.S. combat involvement. In this equation, $DMIN_t$ denotes the (unobservable) aspiration level for U.S. defense expenditures in FY t, $\hat{D}_{t-1}$ the estimated level of actual U.S. defense expenditures in FY $t-1$, $\hat{S}_{t-1}$ an estimate of the dollar-equivalent value of Soviet military expenditures in the year preceding submission of the budget, $\Delta \tilde{W}_t$ the anticipated change in the level of active U.S. combat involvement, and $\epsilon_{a,t}$ an error term representing the impact of other influences on $DMIN_t$. The logic of the modified action-reaction model implies δ_1, δ_2, and δ_3 should all be positive in sign. Further, if minimal aspiration levels correspond to the traditional notions of a budgetary base, then δ_1 should be close to 1.0 in magnitude. $\delta_2 = 0$ would indicate that U.S. defense aspirations are not influenced by Soviet defense expenditures, whereas $\delta_2 = 1$ would indicate that U.S. aspirations match Soviet expenditures on a dollar-for-dollar basis. Finally, $\delta_3 > 0$ indicates that defense expenditure aspirations rise during periods of escalating combat involvement and fall during periods of combat deescalation.

Equation (9) represents aspiration levels for nondefense outlays as arising from a simple growth process. The sources of pressure for growth include the steady growth of domestic uncontrollables (primarily trust fund and entitlement programs), along with bureaucratic and political pressures for agency and program growth. We do not model these pressures in detail, but rather assume that they are proportional to the size of the existing expenditure base. We assume that the appropriate expenditure base is the estimate of outlays for fiscal year $t-1$ at the time fiscal year t's budget is presented to Congress. We denote this estimate by $\hat{N}_{t-1}$. This expenditure base is the result not only of the president's budget proposal for fiscal year $t-1$, but also accounts for exogenous influences that have occurred over the 12 months since fiscal year $t-1$'s budget was presented to Congress,[5] most important, the impact of congressional action on fiscal year $t-1$'s budget. Again, if minimal aspiration levels are analogous to the budgetary base, α_1 should be near 1.

Equation (10) models the aspiration level for total outlays from a fiscal policy perspective. This representation includes three right-hand variables, apart from the error term, ϵ_c. The first is $\tilde{R}_t$, the revenue forecast. If economic policy planners seek to avoid excessively large budget deficits or surpluses, then γ_1 should be close to 1. The second right-hand variable is the time-indexed variable, *TIME*, interacting multiplicatively with $\tilde{R}_t$. *TIME* is indexed such that it assumes a value of 0 for the midpoint of our time period, FY 1967, increasing by one for every subsequent year and decreasing by one for every prior year. Many analysts have contended that there has been a loosening of fiscal policy constraints on federal expenditure levels as a result of increased reliance on discretionary fiscal policy for macroeconomic stabilization objectives. Similarly, many have felt that pressures for expenditure growth have increased over the period from 1955 to 1980, which also resulted in a loosening of minimally acceptable fiscal policy standards. This expenditure pressure has been variously attributed to uncontrollable programs, transfer programs, trust fund expenditures, the rise of special interest groups, and Great Society programs. This was one of the central themes of Carter's farewell address.[6] Any such loosening of fiscal policy constraints over time will be picked up by γ_2, which should then be greater than 0. The third right-hand variable is REC_{t-1}, a dummy variable for recession during the preceding fiscal year. If recession leads to countercyclical expenditure goals, then $\gamma_3 > 0$.

Finally, $\epsilon_{a,t}$, $\epsilon_{b,t}$, and $\epsilon_{c,t}$ denote disturbance terms in Equations (8-10). These disturbances are assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero, and also to be uncorrelated over time. We do not assume, however, that ϵ_a, ϵ_b, and ϵ_c are independent in any given time period.

Together, Equations (4-10) define the Competing Aspiration Levels Model of presidential macrobudgetary decision making. There are three key assumptions of this model. The first is the existence of three separate aspiration levels—$DMIN_t$, $NMIN_t$, and $TMAX_t$—generated by parallel but separate policy-making streams concerned with defense, nondefense, and fiscal policy objectives, respectively. The second is that actual presidential budgetary proposals result from the direct interaction among these aspiration levels. The third is that revenues and the tax structure generating revenues can be taken as exogenous to the model. We believe this to be a reasonable approximation for the time period under consideration.[7] The model does not prejudge the relative strength of fiscal, defense budgetary, and domestic budgetary priorities, nor the importance of different factors on the associated aspirations. These considerations are determined by the statistically estimated parameters of the model.

Relationships to Other Models of Presidential Budgeting

CALM provides a very general representation of the executive branch budgetary process, one that can encompass a broad range of types of behavior. Many of the different theories of the budgetary process found in the literature can be seen as special cases of CALM, each implying certain values for the parameters of Equations (4-10). As noted earlier, incrementalist and other independent process models of defense and nondefense budgeting implicitly assume that fiscal policy concerns play no direct role in the budgetary process. Total federal spending is simply the byproduct of independent decisions about defense and nondefense budgetary categories. In terms of CALM, these independent process models assume that $\beta_1 = \beta_2 = 0$. The incrementalist independent process models further posit that $DMIN_t$ and $NMIN_t$ are functions of last year's expenditures, $\hat{D}_{t-1}$ and $\hat{N}_{t-1}$, respectively. In this case, we add to the above hypotheses that δ_1 and α_1 should be near to or slightly greater than 1.

We can also use CALM to test the defense-requirement model, which holds that defense needs come off the top, with any necessary tradeoffs made between fiscal and domestic policy considerations. (Traditional Richardsonian action-reaction models of defense budgeting might be viewed as compatible with this view, as well as with the independent processes view, because they do not explicitly preclude trade-offs between domestic and fiscal concerns, although they do assume defense needs are fully accommodated.) The defense requirements hypothesis implies that $\beta_1 = 0$, and that $\beta_2 = \beta_3 \geqslant 0$. Whatever the zone of contention, defense spending is unaffected. Basic defense needs are met. The zone of contention is divided between domestic and fiscal claims. Through a parallel line of reasoning, the nondefense-requirements hypothesis (i.e., nondefense needs come off the top) implies that $\beta_2 = 0$, and that $\beta_1 = \beta_3 \geqslant 0$.

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[5] For example, weather effects on crop yields which influence price support payments or changes in unemployment affecting unemployment compensation payments.

[6] "Farewell Address: Major Issues Facing the Nation," Jimmy Carter, January 14, 1981. *Vital Speeches of the Day*, Vol. 47, No. 8.

[7] See Schick (1980) for a discussion of the extent to which tax policy, as opposed to budgetary policy, was a "nondecisional" process during much of the 1960s and 1970s.

CALM can also be used to evaluate the "shares-of-the-planned-change" model proposed by Fischer and Crecine (1981). This model assumes that presidential budgeting is a two-stage process in which total spending, PT_t, is determined in the first stage, then divided into its defense and nondefense components, PD_t and PN_t. Previous year expenditure levels are assumed to provide a secure base. Planned total expenditures, PT_t, are a function of anticipated revenues, whether the economy is in recession, and past total expenditures. The planned change in the total $PT_t - (\hat{D}_{t-1} + \hat{N}_{t-1})$, which is assumed normally to be positive, is totally allocated in some fixed proportion to defense and nondefense. Each sector receives its previous year's base level of expenditures, plus a share-of-the-planned-change. (Larkey, 1978, and Stolp, 1983, have used similar formulations to explain municipal budgeting.) In the context of CALM, the shares-of-the-planned-change model implies the following: first, $\beta_3 = 1$; the fiscal constraint is exactly satisfied. If there is any slack to be absorbed, the defense and nondefense sectors receive it. But if expenditure aspirations exceed the fiscal constraint, the fiscal constraint takes total precedence. Second, $DMIN_t$ and $NMIN_t$ are equal to $\hat{D}_{t-1}$ and $\hat{N}_{t-1}$ respectively. Finally, the ratio β_1/β_3 in CALM corresponds to the defense share-of-the-planned-change and β_2/β_3 the nondefense share-of-the-planned-change in the Fischer-Crecine formulation. The Fischer and Crecine (1981) estimation results indicate that (apart from the effects of actual combat), the defense share has been 23% during the post-Korean period.

Finally, CALM can be used to interpret recent criticisms of the presidential budgetary process. Buchanen and Wagner (1977), for instance, have argued that the problem with Keynesian economics is not economic but political. It opens the door to budgetary deficits under certain conditions, then succumbs to political temptation and fails to close the door when the circumstances no longer hold. Thus, chronic budget deficits become built into the system. In this view, $TMAX_t$ usually exceeds available revenues, the zone of contention $TMAX_t - (DMIN_t + NMIN_t)$ is usually large and positive, and β_3 is greater than 0. The strength of the CALM formulation is that all of these theories of federal budgeting can be viewed as special cases of the more general specification. None of the interpretations is presupposed, and each can be tested empirically.

Estimation Procedure and Results

This section describes the results we obtained by substituting the aspiration level models of Equations (8-10) into the trade-off structure of Equations (4-7). First, however, it will be useful to describe the data we used in the estimation process.

Data Considerations

There are two versions of the president's budget, one expressed in present-year *outlays* (actual expenditures), the other expressed in new *budget authority* for the present and future years. Because the need for fiscal restraint is most apparent in current year outlays, we have based our analysis on this version of the president's budget. We have also included trust-fund receipts (e.g., FICA) and trust-fund outlays (e.g., Social Security) for all the years in our sample, namely FY 1955-1980. (Before FY 1968, trust-fund activities were separately recorded.)

Data for most of the variables of interest were taken from *The Budget of the United States Government,* prepared each year for submission to Congress. This document records the president's budget, The variables coded directly from it were R_t, PD_t, PN_t, PT_t, $\hat{D}_{t-1}$, and $\hat{N}_{t-1}$. The latter two variables are estimates for fiscal $t-1$ outlays, rather than final figures, since fiscal year $t-1$ is less than four months old at the time when the president submits his fiscal year t budget to Congress.

The other variables in our model were based on other sources. We defined a recession year as any year in which there were at least two quarters marked by the absence of real growth in GNP. The $\hat{S}_{t-1}$ and $\Delta\hat{W}_t$ variables posed the greatest difficulties. Ideally, $\hat{S}_{t-1}$ should represent U.S. policymakers' perceptions of the degree of Soviet threat, not necessarily measured in monetary terms. In practice, there is no widely accepted measure of the magnitude of the Soviet threat. Here we use a time series taken from estimates presented by the International Institute of Strategic Studies in its yearly publication, *The Military Balance.* These figures provide at best a crude proxy to the threat perceived by various U.S. officials.[8]

The $\Delta\tilde{W}_t$ variable is intended to reflect anticipated changes in the level of U.S. combat activity. Again, this is an unobservable factor. As a proxy for these expectations we used $\Delta\tilde{W}_t = KIA_{t-1} - KIA_{t-2}$, where KIA_t denotes the number of U.S. servicemen killed in action in calendar year t. For a detailed justification of this index, see Fischer and Crecine (1981).

The final data issue concerns the use of real versus nominal (current year) dollars. The budget is prepared in terms of nominal dollars. So behavioral realism suggests that the models be formulated in the nominal units actually considered by decision makers. (Only in the late 1970s were defense budgets "indexed" to inflation.) But budget models formulated in nominal terms can be criticized on the grounds that much of their apparent explanatory power arises from the inevitably high correlations between variables subject to the same underlying rate of inflation. Worse, estimates based on nominal dollars suffer from the high degree of multicollinearity present in undeflated time series. Our solution has been to obtain two sets of parameter estimates, one based on real dollar data and the other based on nominal dollar data. In deflating our data to obtain real dollar time series, we assumed that policymakers simply extrapolate the inflation rate that prevails in calendar year $t-2$, the year in which the fiscal year t budget is prepared. The price deflator series we used for this purpose was for "Federal government purchases of goods and services," using 1972 as a base year.[9]

Estimation Method

One can substitute equations (8-10) into Equations (4-7) yielding the following:

$$\begin{aligned} PD_t = {} & -\alpha_1\beta_1\hat{N}_{t-1} + \delta_1(1-\beta_1)\hat{D}_{t-1} \\ & + \delta_2(1-\beta_1)\hat{S}_{t-1} + \delta_3(1-\beta_1)\Delta\tilde{W}_t \\ & + \gamma_1\beta_1\tilde{R}_t + \gamma_2\beta_1 TIME_t * \tilde{R}_t \\ & + \gamma_3\beta_1 REC_t * \tilde{R}_t + \pi_{a,t} \end{aligned} \tag{11}$$

$$\begin{aligned} PN_t = {} & \alpha_1(1-\beta_2)\hat{N}_{t-1} + \delta_1(-\beta_2)\hat{D}_{t-1} \\ & + \delta_2(-\beta_2)\hat{S}_{t-1} + \delta_3(-\beta_2)\Delta\tilde{W}_t \\ & + \gamma_1\beta_2\tilde{R}_t + \gamma_2\beta_2 TIME_t * \tilde{R}_t \\ & + \gamma_3\beta_2 REC_t * \tilde{R}_t + \pi_{b,t} \end{aligned} \tag{12}$$

$$\begin{aligned} PT_t = {} & \alpha_1(1-\beta_3)\hat{N}_{t-1} + \delta_1(1-\beta_3)\hat{D}_{t-1} \\ & + \delta_2(1-\beta_3)\hat{S}_{t-1} + \delta_3(1-\beta_3)\Delta\tilde{W}_t \\ & + \gamma_1\beta_3\tilde{R}_t + \gamma_2\beta_3 TIME_t * \tilde{R}_t \\ & + \gamma_3\beta_3 REC_t * \tilde{R}_t + \pi_{c,t} \end{aligned} \tag{13}$$

$$PT_t = PD_t + PN_t \tag{14}$$

where

$$\pi_{a,t} = (1-\beta_1)\epsilon_{a,t} - \beta_1\epsilon_{b,t} + \beta_1\epsilon_{c,t} + \mu_{1,t} \tag{15}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_{b,t} = {} & -\beta_2\epsilon_{a,t} + (1-\beta_2)\epsilon_{b,t} + \beta_2\epsilon_{c,t} \\ & + \mu_{2,t} \end{aligned} \tag{16}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_{c,t} = {} & (1-\beta_3)\epsilon_{a,t} + (1-\beta_3)\epsilon_{b,t} + \beta_3\epsilon_{c,t} \\ & + \mu_{3,t}. \end{aligned} \tag{17}$$

Equation system (11-14) is a simultaneous equation system without any unobserved variables. It is nonlinear in its parameters and, as Equation (14) indicates, the dependent variables are constrained. All of the β, α, δ, and γ parameters are identifiable.[10] As shown in McGuire et al. (1968), one can efficiently estimate the parameters of such an equation system by dropping any one of Equations (11), (12), or (13) and performing simultaneous equation system maximum likelihood estimation. (Equation (14) makes one of the first three equations superfluous, derivable in its entirety from the other two.) Maximization was done with respect to the α_i, β_i, γ_i, and δ_i parameters and the components of the variance-covariance matrix of the π's.[11] Asymptotic standard errors for the parameter estimates were based on the inverse of the information matrix.[12]

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[8] See Fischer and Crecine (1979, 1981). Note that although there are great difficulties in transforming Soviet outlays to dollar figures due to (among other things) different relative prices for items of expenditure and different definitions of what constitutes the Soviet military, all that is really required here is that the yearly *changes* in overall expenditures be adequately captured.

[9] *The Economic Report of the President,* 1980, Table B-3.

[10] For proof of identifiability in Equations (11-14), as well as for the CALM model in general, see Frank and Kamlet (1983).

[11] Although β_i parameters are in the variance-covariance matrix of the π's, they are underidentified. As such, their presence in the variance-covariance matrix does not add information in the estimation either of themselves or the variance-covariance components, and the asymptotic consistency and efficiency of maximum likelihood remains unaltered.

[12] Estimation was performed using LSQ, a nonlinear least squares procedure in the *Time Series Processor* package, Version 3.4.

Estimation Results

The Allocation Model Parameters. The parameters of Equations (11-14) were estimated using both real and nominal dollar data for the time period fiscal year 1955 to fiscal year 1980. Although the two sets of estimates are generally quite similar (they never differ significantly from one another), the estimates based on real dollars are (as anticipated) slightly more precise in the sense that the ratios of coefficients to their asymptotic standard errors tend to be larger for the real estimates. Thus, the discussion and analysis that follow focus on the real dollar estimates in Table 1.

In interpreting the CALM coefficients, it is first important to determine whether $TMAX_t$, the upper bound of fiscally acceptable expenditures, is greater or less than the sum of the minimum expenditure aspirations, $DMIN_t + NMIN_t$. In fact, the coefficients in Table 1 imply that $TMAX_t$ exceeded $DMIN_t + NMIN_t$ in 22 of the 26 years considered (and in 18 of the 19 non-Eisenhower years). So 85% of the time the estimated zone of contention is positive and in all four exceptions, the estimate of $(DMIN_t + NMIN_t) - TMAX_t$ is small (less than \$2 billion twice, \$6 billion and \$7 billion the other two times). Thus, our discussion of the estimation results assumes that the zone of contention involves a positive surplus.

The estimates of β_1, β_2, and β_3 all differ significantly from 0.[13] The estimate of β_3 is .31, indicating that approximately 30% of the zone of contention is allocated to expenditures beyond the minimal aspiration levels for defense and nondefense outlays. The remaining 70% is in effect used to reduce the size of the deficit from what it would be if PT_t were to equal $TMAX_t$. On the one hand this would seem to suggest that the executive branch has displayed a strong degree of fiscal restraint. Yet we estimate the sum of defense and nondefense aspirations to come close to available revenues. On average, $DMIN_t + NMIN_t$ is estimated to be within \$1 billion of R_t (all measured in 1972 dollars). When $TMAX_t - DMIN_t - NMIN_t$ is large, substantial deficits can result even though β_3 is only .31.

β_1 and β_2 are estimated at .083 and .229, respec-

Table 1. Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results

	Real estimates			Nominal estimates		
Parameter	Estimate	*SE*	*t*	Estimate	*SE*	*t*
Trade-offs						
β_1	.083	.039	2.12	.045	.033	1.37
β_2	.229	.065	3.51	.164	.080	2.05
β_3	.312	.092	3.37	.208	.106	1.96
Defense						
δ_1	.964	.019	50.8	.954	.017	56.9
δ_2	.059	.042	1.39	.053	.040	1.32
δ_3	1.322	.206	6.40	1.220	.198	6.16
Nondefense						
α_1	1.024	.053	19.4	.983	.072	13.6
Total						
γ_1	1.060	.099	10.7	1.214	.274	4.44
γ_2	.013	.004	2.98	.018	.011	1.62
γ_3	.090	.036	2.46	.119	.065	1.83
Statistics	R^2	*SER*	*d*	R^2	*SER*	*d*
Defense	.942	2.18	2.07	.996	1.63	2.44
Nondefense	.996	3.93	2.18	.999	3.90	2.19
Total	.994	5.01	2.46	.999	4.65	2.50

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[13] Throughout the following discussion, we will refer to a parameter as statistically significant if it is significantly different from 0 at a 95% confidence level based on the asymptotic standard error and the corresponding t-statistic. (Note that this discussion refers to our estimates of $TMAX_t$, $DMIN_t$; and $NMIN_t$.

tively. These estimates indicate that defense and nondefense each receive their minimal aspirations plus a share of the zone of contention of 8% and 23%, respectively. Or, equivalently, of the 31% of the zone of contention that is allocated to defense and nondefense, defense receives 27% and nondefense 73%.

The Aspiration Level Model Parameters. Consider first the defense aspiration level model (Equation 8). The estimated value of δ_1 is .964, which indicates that, controlling for Soviet actions and the effects of active combat involvement, defense expenditure aspirations are almost equal to previous year outlays, a result quite consistent with the notion that previous year expenditures serve as the budgetary base. The action-reaction coefficient, δ_2, is estimated to be .059, which does not differ significantly from 0 at the 95% confidence level. Nonetheless, the sign of δ_2 is consistent with the action-reaction hypothesis, and the estimated magnitude of δ_2 is not substantially different from estimated reaction coefficients in Richardson models of actual presidential defense budget requests (Fischer & Crecine, 1981; Ostrom, 1978). Moreover, although a reaction coefficient of .059 may appear small, it should be kept in mind that once an adjustment is made, it becomes built into the defense base and is carried over into future years. Also, in recent years, when Soviet expenditures have been estimated to be much greater than U.S. expenditures, the stimulus on U.S. defense spending could be substantial. Although the present findings do not constitute strong support for the action-reaction hypothesis, they are compatible with it. The estimated value of δ_3 is 1.322 which indicates that each incremental anticipated combat death produces roughly a \$1.3 million response in proposed defense expenditures. This estimate is similar to that obtained by Fischer and Crecine (1981).

Turning next to the nondefense aspiration model, the estimated value of α_1 is 1.024, which does not differ significantly from 1. This estimate indicates that nondefense aspirations have been quite modest. Again, the result is also consistent with the notion that the previous year's actual expenditure level serves as the base in the presidential budgeting process.

Turning finally to the fiscal aspiration model, the estimated values of γ_1 and γ_2 together indicate the extent to which maximum acceptable total expenditures are permitted to exceed the anticipated level of revenues. The estimated value of γ_1 is 1.06, implying an expenditure level 6% in excess of anticipated revenues in FY 1967 when the *TIME* variable has a value of 0. The estimated value of γ_2 is .013, and differs significantly from 0 at the 95% confidence level. This finding indicates a significant relaxation in the fiscal constraint between FY 1955 and 1980, at an annual rate of approximately 1.3% of (real) revenues. Combined with our estimate of γ_1, this indicates that modest surpluses were aspired to during the Eisenhower years, which served to constrain tightly expenditure aspirations. In fact, the estimates of $DMIN_t + NMIN_t$ exceeded $TMAX_t$ in three of the eight Eisenhower years, and all four years of our sample in which surpluses were aspired to (years in which $TMAX_t < R_t$) were during the Eisenhower administration. By the end of our sample period, however, large deficits were viewed as at least minimally acceptable. In FY 1980, $\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 TIME = 1.23$, indicating that $TMAX_t$ exceeded available revenues by roughly 23%. Finally, γ_3 is estimated to be .090, implying that recessions provoke greater-than-normal acceptable expenditure levels, with the increment being roughly equal to 9% of anticipated revenues. Again this effect is significantly different from 0.

Taken as a whole, a coherent and plausible story emerges concerning the nature of macrobudgetary decision making in the executive branch over the postwar period. Minimal aspiration levels for defense and nondefense expenditures were closely related to the previous year's levels of expenditure, being modified for defense by the level of active combat and, possibly, by Soviet defense spending. In general, these minimal aspirations were fully met.[14] In addition to base levels of expenditure, defense and nondefense received a proportion of the zone of contention, nondefense receiving substantially more than defense. The zone of contention grew over the period as a result of an increasingly lax maximum allowable expenditure total. This may have been the result of greater reliance on discretionary fiscal policy or of greater pressures for domestic spending. Fiscal policy was clearly expansionary in the aftermath of recessions.

Evaluation of Model Fit. One criterion for assessing the validity of CALM is the reasonableness of the resulting parameter estimates. As the above discussion indicates, the estimates actually obtained were well within the theoretically permissible range and have meaningful substantive interpretations that are compatible with previous theoretical and empirical work in the budgeting area. Thus, CALM performs well in this respect. Goodness-of-fit provides a second criterion for evaluating CALM. As the R^2 and standard error statistics at the bottom of Table 1 show, CALM provides an excellent fit to the data. Good fits are not uncommon in the budgeting literature, but CALM's ability to fit even deflated budget data is exceptional.

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[14] For 21 of the 22 years for which $TMAX_t - DMIN_t - NMIN_t > 0$, PT_t was less than $TMAX_t$. In the other year it exceeded $TMAX_t$ by only \$2 billion. Similarly, in 19 of these 22 years, PD_t exceeded $DMIN_t$, and was always within \$2 billion of $DMIN_t$. And in 21 of these 22 years, PN_t exceeded $NMIN_t$, falling short in the one other case by only \$2 billion.

A final, and perhaps the strongest criterion for evaluating CALM is to compare the CALM specification with a more general class of specifications. In particular, one might accept that fiscal, defense, and domestic priorities interact and that the variables we have specified are important influences on actual budgetary totals, but believe that these variables interact in some different way. Our final equation system, Equations (11-14), implies that the independent variables of our model influence the dependent variables in very particular ways. Discarding one of the equations, for example, Equation (13) (recall that the constraint (Equation 14) makes one of the equations superfluous), there are a total of 14 right-hand variables in the remaining two equations. The CALM specification restricts these 14 parameters to be (nonlinear) functions of 10 parameters (three β's, one α, three δ's, and three γ's). Actually, because $\beta_1 + \beta_2 = \beta_3$, there are only 9 free parameters in the CALM specification presented.

We can explicitly test the hypothesis that the 14 parameters of the unconstrained version of Equations (11) and (12) are indeed functions of the 9 underlying parameters of the CALM specification. This is a strong hypothesis; it amounts to contending that one cannot significantly better predict *PN, PD,* and *PT* by any other set of restrictions on the parameters of the right-hand variables in Equations (11-14) (including the case of imposing no restrictions whatsoever). One can test this hypothesis by imposing no restrictions on the right-hand variable parameters at all and comparing the results with those obtained under the CALM restrictions. One can then compute the logarithm of the ratio of the likelihood functions obtained for the constrained and unconstrained specifications, and perform a likelihood ratio test. Asymptotically, -2 times the ratio of the likelihood functions has a χ^2 distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the dimensionality of the constraints imposed under the null hypothesis, which is 5 in this case. (CALM restricts the number of free parameters from 14 to 9.) Running this test, the logarithm of the likelihood function for the CALM specification is -487.673. The logarithm of the likelihood function for the unconstrained estimation, allowing 14 free parameters, is -485.014. Twice the difference in these logarithms is the log-likelihood ratio statistic, which here is 5.32. The critical value for a χ^2 distribution with 5 degrees of freedom at the 95% confidence level is 13.28. Thus the CALM model passes this test, and we can accept the hypothesis that all of the CALM-imposed parameter constraints hold, and that one could not significantly improve the prediction of *PD, PN,* and *PT* values for the time period examined by any other set of parameter constraints.

Implications for Other Models of Presidential Budgeting. One of the strengths of the CALM formulation is that it includes many of the primary models of executive branch budgeting as special cases that can be empirically tested in terms of the parameters of the CALM equations. Our parameter estimates imply that $DMIN_t$ and $NMIN_t$ correspond closely to last year's level of expenditure and that, with very few exceptions, these minimal aspirations are satisfied. These results are consistent with the incrementalist view of budgeting. On the other hand, β_1 and β_2 are both significantly greater than 0, which indicates that there has been a significant influence of fiscal and domestic policy on defense expenditures and a significant influence of fiscal and defense policy on domestic expenditures. This result is in contrast to the assumptions of the independent processes models and the "requirement" models that hold that one of the Great Identity components, defense, nondefense, or total expenditures, comes off the top and is unaffected by the other two.

The results do not support one implication of the shares-of-the-planned-change model; that $\beta_3 = 1$. The fiscal aspiration level ($TMAX_t$) is not exactly satisfied. The parameter estimates are compatible with the share-of-the-planned-change model, however, in that last year's expenditures do correspond closely to $DMIN_t$ and $NMIN_t$, and in that both models portray *PD* and *PN* as being the result of some base level of expenditure plus a fraction of a zone of contention. Indeed, the relative size of the zone of contention going to defense and nondefense is estimated by Fischer and Crecine (1981)'s shares-of-the-planned-change model at .23, quite comparable to CALM's estimate of .27. CALM and the shares-of-the-planned-change formulation may be reconciled as follows. The shares-of-the-change model assumes that the planned total in the president's budget, PT_t, is precisely specified before any decisions are made concerning PD_t and PN_t, and that the implied change (usually growth) is then divided between defense and nondefense. In CALM, defense and nondefense aspirations, as well as fiscal considerations, affect the size of the total. But (given our parameter estimates), the process normally generates a total that exceeds minimal defense plus nondefense aspirations, so defense and nondefense compete for shares of this fiscal surplus in a manner that is essentially equivalent to competition for the planned growth in the shares-of-the-change model.

The CALM results can be related to recent works by Domke, Eichenberg, and Kelleher (1983) and by Russett (1982). Both analyses differ from ours in important respects. In considering trade-offs between defense and nondefense expenditures, both restrict themselves to subsets of nondefense expenditures. Both also consider the combined budgetary effects of Congress and the executive branch. Domke *et al.* (1983) use a recursive simultaneous equation framework that prejudges the causal interactions among defense, welfare, and fiscal policy priorities. Like Fischer and Crecine (1981), they assume that total expenditures are determined exogenously. Total expenditures influence welfare expenditures, and both influence defense expenditures. Russett uses ordinary least squares regressions of domestic program expenditures on military (and other program) expenditure levels and on a variety of exogenous variables. This can result in simultaneity problems if one wishes to interpret the parameter estimates causally and ignores any independent influence of fiscal policy. Both studies find an absence of trade-offs between defense and nondefense expenditures. The CALM analysis is both broadly consistent with and helps shed light on these results. As the CALM framework emphasizes, the real trade-off is not between guns and butter, but among defense, nondefense, and fiscal objectives.

Our estimation results support the contention that fiscal policy constraints have systematically given way to spending pressure over the postwar period. Still, the results certainly do not suggest that fiscal policy considerations have capitulated entirely to nondefense and defense programmatic priorities. β_3 is estimated at only .31, indicating that most of the zone-of-contention is used to reduce the size of the deficit. Coupled with minimal defense and domestic aspirations that are tightly linked to last year's level of spending, the results indicate that the executive branch is an engine of only moderate budgetary growth, even toward the end of the sample period.

How is this finding reconcilable with the large levels of real growth experienced over this period, especially for nondefense programs? (Nondefense programs have grown in real terms from $57 billion in FY 1955 to $265 billion in FY 1980.) To answer this, one must recall that Equations (4-10) separate executive branch effects from congressional effects on the size of expenditures. Congress enters the loop by modifying (usually increasing) presidential budgetary requests (PD_t and PN_t) which alters (usually increases) actual expenditures (D_t and N_t) that serve as the base for the next year's budgetary cycle. Over the period from FY 1955 to 1980, of the $208 billion in real growth in nondefense programs, $176 billion was the result of changes to the budget after it had been presented to Congress. Over the same period, the executive branch proposed, in net, increases of only $31.9 billion over the previous year's budget as enacted by Congress, which underscores the importance of analyzing both congressional and executive budgeting to understand fully the growth of the federal sector in the United States in the postwar period. Congress, not the executive branch, has been the primary engine of growth in nondefense outlays.

Qualifications. As with any statistical analysis of macrophenomena, a number of caveats are in order with respect to the above results. It is clear that the equations specifying aspiration levels are simplified, owing to the difficulty of estimating parameters in Equations (11-14) and the limited degrees of freedom available for estimating additional parameters. Although Equations (8-10) capture much of the flavor of earlier models that have dealt with defense, domestic, and fiscal policy separately, our equations necessarily omit more refined influences that may be of substantive interest.

It can also be argued that the specifications put forth above have parameters that may have varied substantially across administrations. This argument is undermined by the precision of the parameter estimates and the overall goodness of fit of the equation system, even when estimated in real (versus nominal) terms. Also, we have tried various specifications involving administration or party effects or both, but were unable to detect any significant effects. Table 2 lists the residuals from the estimation for *PT, PN,* and *PD.* As this table indicates, there do not appear to have been great political effects of party or administration during the period studied (other than those captured by the time trend in the fiscal policy specification). It might be conjectured that the Reagan administration finally does mark a major shift from budgetary parameters that have prevailed since Eisenhower took office. The truth of this hypothesis will be revealed in time. The CALM framework makes it easier to test.

Third, the present CALM formulation assumes that revenue and tax policy are, to a first approximation, exogenous to the normal executive branch budgetary process. The infrequency of major restructurings of the tax system by the executive branch and the time involved in enacting major tax legislation[15] are consistent with this perspective. Nonetheless, we find this assumption to be the weakest of those employed here and hope to do further research to allow tax policy to be at least partially endogenous.

Finally, it is important to distinguish between

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[15] See Schick (1980).

Table 2. Model Residuals[a]

Fiscal Year	President	Defense	Nondefense	Total[b]
1955	DDE	–3.3	– .6	–3.9
1956	DDE	– .6	–1.8	–2.4
1957	DDE	1.9	1.6	3.4
1958	DDE	4.2	2.2	6.4
1959	DDE	.5	–1.4	– .9
1960	DDE	– .1	–2.7	–2.8
1961	DDE	–1.0	– .8	–1.9
1962	DDE/JFK[c]	.6	–4.8	–4.2
1963	JFK	1.4	.7	2.0
1964	JFK	4.2	4.0	8.2
1965	LBJ	–1.9	–1.3	–3.2
1966	LBJ	–3.3	5.7	2.4
1967	LBJ	–2.2	–2.2	–4.4
1968	LBJ	.8	1.2	2.0
1969	LBJ	–1.9	–8.3	–10.2
1970	LBJ/RMN[c]	3.6	– .1	3.5
1971	RMN	–3.7	–1.2	–4.8
1972	RMN	1.9	6.7	8.6
1973	RMN	–1.1	3.3	2.1
1974	RMN	– .7	1.1	.4
1975	RMN	– .1	3.4	3.2
1976	GRF	.6	7.7	8.4
1977	GRF	– .8	–7.6	–8.4
1978	GRF/JEC[c]	3.0	–2.1	.9
1979	JEC	.8	3.6	4.3
1980	JEC	–1.7	–5.3	–7.0

[a] Actual–Predicted, in billions of real (1972) dollars.

[b] Because of rounding error, the residual for total outlays does not always equal the sum of the residuals for the parts.

[c] Presidential election transition year.

"process" and "outcome" oriented theories of the budgetary process. CALM is outcome oriented. We do not intend to suggest that CALM mirrors the details of the actual bureaucratic and political processes that generate the president's budget. The aspiration levels posited by CALM are unobservable. They should not be construed as publicly stated bargaining positions. In fact, an actor who held them would be foolish to reveal them honestly. Rather, we view the aspiration levels as providing the context around which the larger budgetary game revolves. CALM's exceptional ability to forecast actual budgetary decisions retrospectively lends credence to its assumptions concerning the general structure of the budgetary process and the most important determinants of behavior within this structure, but with two exceptions says relatively little about the actual details of the decision-making process. The exceptions are, first, the observation that both β_1 and β_2 are greater than 0, which casts doubt on independent process and requirements models; and, second, the observation that $\beta_3 < 1$, which casts doubt on process theories that hold that presidential budgeting is a strict top-down process at the macrolevel. These strict top-down explanations (e.g., Fischer and Crecine, 1981) hold that decisions about the total (PT_t) precede and constrain all subsequent decisions about components of the total (e.g., PD_t and PN_t). On the other hand, our results simply do not bear on the question of whether microbudgetary decisions (about the division of PD_t and PN_t) proceed in a strict top-down fashion as suggested by Crecine (1975), Mowery, Kamlet, and Crecine (1980) and Kamlet and Mowery (1980). This view rests on the empirical observation that macroplanning targets for total defense (PD_t) and nondefense (PN_t) expenditures are established early in the planning cycle, and change little thereafter. Microdecisions about specific agencies and programs appear to adapt to these macrolevel targets. Our results neither support nor challenge this characterization of the microbudgetary process. They simply do not bear on the issue.

In general, the estimation results are largely compatible with what is known of the process of executive branch budgeting. Despite the ultimate interdependence of fiscal, defense, and domestic policy, the policy-making processes proceed largely independently (Crecine, 1971, 1975; Mowery, Kamlet, and Crecine, 1980). Actors in each policy stream focus primarily on a parochial set of concerns, with expenditure desires being tempered by general expectations about the constraints that other macrobudgetary components will impose. Coordination among macrobudgetary priorities does not take place continually, only periodically, and then at very high levels, usually presidential. This description is broadly compatible with the CALM assumptions that there are separate aspiration levels for each of these policy areas and that actual allocations are the result of a competition among these policy areas for available funds.

In short, the analyses described above do not address every issue that has been of interest to budgetary theorists, and estimation considerations have forced us to use a relatively simple model specification. Nonetheless, the issues that are addressed are important ones, and the specifications used include the most important variables identified in previous statistical studies. The model fits the data extraordinarily well, and the estimated parameter values are all plausible. We believe that the estimation results reported provide important insights into the structure of budgetary aspirations and trade-offs during the Eisenhower-to-Carter era.

Conclusions

For too long, statistical investigations of executive branch budgeting have ignored the inescapable tension between defense, domestic, and fiscal policy objectives.[16] Such conflict is the very essence of budgetary politics. Absent the need for fiscal restraint, budgetary decision making would be easy, and budgetary politics would be dull, if not nonexistent. The logic of the Great Identity is inescapable, and budgetary decision making at the highest levels focuses on reconciling the conflicting demands of defense, domestic, and fiscal priorities.

The Competing Aspiration Levels Model (CALM) fills a void in the budgetary literature by providing an explicit statistical representation of both the sources of this conflict and the processes that resolve it. The particular specification embodied in Equations (4-7) and (8-10) provides an extremely accurate statistical account of presidential budgetary decisions between FY 1955 and 1980, but the basic structure of CALM is very flexible. Alternative hypotheses about the determinants of defense, domestic, and fiscal policy aspirations can be investigated by altering the right-hand variables in Equations (8-10).

More generally, we view the Competing Aspiration Levels Model as a general framework for representing resource allocation processes in bureaucratic organizations. Organization theorists of the Carnegie school have traditionally appealed to the aspiration level concept to explain the formation of goals by organizational subunits (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1964). The Competing Aspiration Levels Model uses the aspiration level concept to provide a very general representation of macrolevel resource allocation processes. CALM should be applicable not only to federal budgeting, but to state and local budgeting as well. It may even be applicable to some multi-unit businesses and nonprofit organizations. Nonetheless, the most interesting application is to presidential budgeting. In this context, CALM provides a general framework for testing a wide range of hypotheses relating to arms race phenomena, the growth of government, the impact of elections on budgeting, revenue policy, the fiscal impact of war, and trade-offs between defense, domestic, and fiscal policy objectives.

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[16] Fischer and Crecine's (1979, 1981) Great Identity/Shares of the Planned Change Model is an exception to this rule. But this model prejudges the trade-off issue by assuming that PT_t is determined before PD_t and PN_t.

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Exposure to Information, Belief Integration, and Individual Responsiveness to Agenda Change

MICHAEL MACKUEN
Washington University

This article examines individual responsiveness to the media's changing political agenda during the years from 1964 to 1980. In the context of a dynamic model, the data indicate that responsiveness is positively associated with education, political interest, and a social motivation to attend to public affairs. A two-component model, in which heightened involvement increases individuals' exposure to information but also decreases their receptivity to the impact of the messages, is considered in a multivariate analysis. Although the results are only suggestive, the exposure function appears to operate for all three variables, whereas the inhibitions owing to the integration of previous information are evident only for political interest. Some speculations are offered about how these results may elaborate models of democratic public choice.

The study of democratic practice requires an explicit consideration of the dynamics of elite-mass linkages. The analysis presented here focuses on citizen responsiveness. It describes the speed with which citizens adjust to changes in the elite political agenda presented in the mass media. Under successively more elaborate theoretical assumptions, the data from election surveys of the past two decades indicate that the skills and motivations that condition individuals' contact with their information environment shape citizen responsiveness. The results also suggest (although more conditionally) that the manner in which citizens integrate information into their world view is more inductive and associational than deductive or ideological in its character.

The idea of studying citizen responsiveness to media messages about the political agenda is motivated by an understanding of the role the political agenda plays in determining democratic outcomes (see, for example, Cobb & Elder, 1972; Crenson, 1971; Dahl, 1966; or more formally, Davis, Hinich & Ordeshook, 1970; Downs, 1957). It is well known that citizens' agendas are largely set by the media (Erbring, Goldenberg & Miller, 1980; Funkhouser, 1973; MacKuen, 1981; McCombs & Shaw, 1972; McLeod & Byrnes, 1974; Stone & McCombs, 1981; Tipton, Haney & Basehart, 1975; Watt & van den Berg, 1981; Winter & Eyal, 1981). The additional observation that explicit media messages can alter these issue weights more easily than they can change concrete evaluations (at least in the short run—for summaries of an extensive literature see Klapper, 1960; Kraus & Davis, 1976; O'Keefe & Atwood, 1981) suggests that the agenda-setting vein is potentially rich for examining the nature of responsiveness.

Although the broad outlines of the linkage are apparent, the character of citizen information processing that produces this empirical regularity is not well understood. This investigation examines the relationship between the skills and motivations with which citizens approach political messages and their ultimate responsiveness to agenda change in the press. Most existing evidence suggests that better educated and more highly motivated individuals will respond more decisively (Erbring, Goldenberg & Miller, 1980; McLeod, Becker & Byrnes, 1974; Shaw, 1977). However, a minority view holds that the greatest sensitivity (particularly around election time) can be found among the generally less educated and less interested (McCombs, 1977; McLeod, Becker & Byrnes, 1974). Further work on which factors affect responsiveness may reveal insights into 1) the character of agenda-related political understanding, and 2) the degree to which the electorate's ultimate voting choice is susceptible to short-term influence.

The analysis below is developed in three stages. The preliminary part describes briefly a conceptual model of responsiveness that takes into account theoretically contradictory exposure and integration expectations, and it suggests different skills and motivations that might affect political information processing, sets up a simple dynamic model of attitude change, and describes the data used for the empirical work. The second part

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Figure 1. Impact Resulting from Combinations of Exposure and Integration



states more precisely how responsiveness may reflect the contrary exposure and integration effects of individuals' skills and motivation, and it develops an indirect strategy for estimating the inherently unobservable exposure and integration components. The third major part examines the empirical evidence about how responsiveness (as a composite of the contradictory components) is shaped by the skill and motivation variables. The section then provides estimates of the separate effects of the variables on exposure and integration. The last section of the article discusses two sorts of implications that the evidence might have for substantive political analyses.

The Nature of the Problem

A Two-Component Model

The relationship between responsiveness and motivation may be incorporated into a more general model of an individual's sensitivity to his current environment and his reliance on past experience (Converse, 1966). As a first approximation consider two components: exposure and integration (see Figure 1). Exposure is contact. As individuals encounter (and understand) more of the new information in their environment, they are more likely to absorb its content (Figure 1a). Thus, *ceteris paribus,* whatever increases this effectiveness of exposure will lead to a greater appreciation of the contemporary scene. Integration (Figure 1b) is a matter of fitting new ideas into old preconceptions; it reflects an understanding that individuals' retention of previous experience will immunize them against contemporary appeals and hence diminish their receptivity to any potential new impact. From a theoretical viewpoint, retention is shaped by the individuals' integration of new information into a broader framework which persists through time rather than their mere transient reaction to the message. Thus, to the extent to which the individuals' integrative capabilities guide their reactions to current events, the impact of their accumulated experience will be relatively high and their immediate responsiveness, their receptivity, may be thereby muted.

The two parts are confounded because factors such as political interest, education, and issue sensitivity are commonly related to both effectiveness of exposure and learning from the past. As McGuire (1973) has pointed out with regard to a wide range of personal attributes, information must both be received and adopted before it has any impact, but the same factors that enhance reception may also inhibit adoption. For instance, if individuals involved with political affairs have lower information costs or anticipate greater benefits from acquiring more knowledge, they will be more likely to be effectively exposed to new messages. However, these more involved citizens will previously have accumulated more information and have developed a firmer cognitive and evaluative framework, so that any new messages that they encounter must compete against well-established preconceptions. They will resist the attitude changes implied by the new inputs. Overall, citizen responsiveness to any new information will depend on the relative impact of the exposure and integration factors and on how the factors are combined together.

Any number of patterns may be so generated, and two idealized types are illustrated in Figures 1c and 1d. On the left, the importance of effective exposure is dominant, and the curve describing contemporary impact climbs upward as the individuals' involvement grows. Such is the pattern that typifies the impact of purely informational messages in educating a public. The messages are encountered and understood most clearly by those with high cognitive skill and interest (Tichenor, Donohue & Olien, 1970), and find no resistance from what has already been learned. On the other hand, the curve on the right better represents the pattern for domains in which some sort of evaluative judgment is concerned. Mueller (1979), studying the reaction of the public's war expectations to fluctuations in the international environment, found that all sorts of people were sensitive to recent events, but only the better educated demonstrated any continued impact six months after those events. Similarly, the vote choices of the politically attuned are more closely associated with partisanship (an accumulation of past experience) than the choices of the less-interested individuals (Dreyer, 1971; Zukin, 1977). In both these cases members of the upper strata are expected to have processed as much political information as their less-involved friends. Their effective exposure will have been as high. However, by relying more heavily on the guidance of their past political learning, they found themselves to be relatively immune to the latest fashion. These investigations, as well as a number of others (Bybee et al., 1981; Converse, 1966; Kazee, 1981; Mueller, 1973; Weaver et al., 1981), suggest that the combined effects of exposure and learning may yield distinctly different curves for different types of subject matter and measures of involvement. There exists no general pattern. Even less well understood are the characters of the two underlying processes (here drawn in broken lines to suggest their hypothetical nature), and how they interact to produce the composite result.

Skill, Motivation, and Responsiveness

What characteristics shape responsiveness? Among those affecting individuals' contact with their information environment are skills in dealing with symbolic material, personal motivations to follow politics, and incentives to gather information for social interaction. First, individuals' effective exposure to news content will depend on their capability and willingness to deal with abstract concepts. Formal education is a measure of such capabilities, perhaps as much for the selectivity of the screening process as for the effectiveness of the schooling itself. Almost everyone in the United States is capable of consciously registering the contents of a newspaper front page or the evening television news. However, in most cases this contact is fairly casual. Abstract reasoning skills affect the efficiency of this exposure. The ordinary expectation, then, suggests that more highly educated people should exhibit a greater level of effective exposure. On the other hand, owing to their better-developed analytic frameworks, these same persons should better integrate previous agenda judgments and thus show greater stability in their sense of priorities. People on the lower end of the education scale might be less effectively exposed to news content, but their agendas ought to be less securely anchored in the past. The relative weight of the two components, exposure and integration, will thus determine the pattern of the results.

Ease of understanding is only one determinant of differences in responsiveness. Another is personal motivation. Individuals who take a personal interest in public affairs, even if only as a spectator sport, will attend to its events more closely than will their uninterested neighbors. At the same time, the sheer amount of their past experience should also be much greater. Again, for the more attuned, a higher effective exposure rate and a simultaneously stronger integration factor are expected.

These skills and motivations are found within individuals. But participation in social activity and its resulting interactions might affect issue sensitivity, and this could happen in two ways—the classic sense that information is indirectly filtered down to a mass of opinion followers (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955), and the recent argument that the anticipation of discussions may motivate political attentiveness while a public testing of ideas shapes the nature and content of opinion (Noelle-Neuman, 1974, 1979). In particular, some evidence suggests that engaging in political conversations acts as a factor beyond personal political interest in motivating attention to the press (Genova & Greenberg, 1979; Sohn, 1978; Tan, 1980). Like education and intrinsic interest, this social form of involvement predicts immediacy in reaction to political news, but also an associated immunity. Citizens may find new information more credible and influential when it is consistent with the views expressed by friends and neighbors. They may be more likely to reject media-carried agendas that challenge world views embedded in their social network. To be sure, this inhibition against discussing new ideas may not be as strong for agendas as for items of explicit emotional content. Nevertheless, whatever "integration" exists is derived from a social process—the way in which conversational groups define their topics of conversation and their perceptions of reality. An examination of individual responsiveness as a function of conversational incentives yields information about social rather than psychological motivations and social rather than psychological forms of cognitive organization and further completes the exposure-integration model.

Responsiveness: A General Model of Attitude Dynamics

Most of the studies of attitude and agenda change cited above make their inferences on the basis of a simple dynamic model, although its form is sometimes not explicitly specified. It posits that an attitude at any given time can be expressed as a function of the nature of the environmental conditions experienced by the individual and the strength of the previous attitude. For example, take the model for political agendas where C_t is the concern an individual has about an issue, and M_t is the proportion of news coverage devoted to the issue in the interval between measurements. The level of concern at any time can be expressed in a simple equation:

$$C_t = bM_t + dC_{t-1}. \tag{1}$$

The term d represents the duration of the previous attitude and is sometimes referred to as a "memory" function of the past. Most of the correlational studies of attitudes over time focus on the last term (to see if attitude stability differs across individuals). Most of the media studies concentrate on the first term, treating the second (if at all) as a statistical artifact. As will be shown, neither of these tacks is completely off course.

When properly specified (and if d is less than unity—a condition that will obtain for stable systems), the parameters in equation (1) can be described as an exponentially declining distributed lag. Note that $C_{t-1} = bM_{t-1} + dC_{t-2}$ and $C_{t-2} = bM_{t-2} + dC_{t-3}$, and so forth. Expanding equation (1) by replacing the previous levels of concern $C_{t-\tau}$ (where τ is the time lapse) with their function of $M_{t-\tau}$ and $C_{t-\tau-1}$ produces

$$C_t = b \sum_{\tau=0}^{\infty} d^{\tau} M_{t-\tau}. \tag{2}$$

This general form has been widely used as a conceptual model for political learning (see, or example, Fiorina, 1981; for a more general discussion, see Alt & Chrystal, 1983). A good recent example of an empirical analysis of this form can be found in Hibbs (1982a, b).

For estimation purposes it may be equivalently written

$$C_t = b M_t + d \hat{C}_{t-1} \tag{3}$$

where $\hat{C}_{t-1}$ is endogenously generated as a function of the previous M_t.[1] This sort of specification (either equation (2) or (3)) has an advantage over equation (1) in that it does not require a continuous observation on the C_t's. Instead it relies on the history of the exogenous variable, in this case media coverage.

Observing Skill, Motivation, and Responsiveness

An empirical analysis of agenda dynamics as a function of skill and motivations thus requires occasional observations on citizens' agendas and their skills and motivations, and continuous readings on the associated media histories. This study uses the biennial election studies conducted from 1964 to 1980 by the SRC-CPS to sample the response of the issue concerns of the voting-age population of the United States to 20 years of varying news coverage of a broad set of issues, all prominent in their time. The set includes nine surveys and seven issue areas (unemployment and recession, inflation, civil rights, Vietnam, crime, campus unrest, and energy), each combination of which has associated with it a unique media-history of two years' news coverage. The variation in issue-media histories which can be examined reduces the threats to inference associated with specific issue-media combinations, and the large number of individuals (more than 14,000 for these analyses) reduces the error associated with a particular individual's life history.

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[1] A series of $\hat{C}_{jt} = \hat{b}m_{jt} + \hat{d}\hat{C}_{jt-1}$ can be generated (with a starting condition for $\hat{C}_{j0}$) and the values of $\hat{b}$ and $\hat{d}$ can be estimated by iterating on their values so as to minimize $\Sigma\,(C_{jt} - \hat{C}_{jt})^2$ for all observable values of C_{jt}. This is equivalent to equation (2) and has some computational advantages. See Box and Jenkins (1976) for a description of this strategy, or see MacKuen (1981) for further discussion of more complex matters. The starting conditions ($\hat{C}_{j0}$) were estimated by taking the mean of four months' news coverage ($\bar{m}_0 = m_{t-21} - m_{t-24}$) two years before the first observation in each series and applying the equilibrium gain coefficient ($b/(1-d)$, to get a reasonable approximation of public concern at that time. Given the dynamics estimated below, the maximum weight of the starting condition is 0.039 for the first observation, 0.0007 for the second, and of course less for the third. If the original conditions are not far wrong, their effects will not dominate the estimation. (Starting conditions of zero and $b/(1-d)\,m_{t-24}$, which are clearly less well anchored do not yield substantially different estimates.) This format has an additional modest advantage (over equation (1)) because it does not directly incorporate the autocorrelation in the disturbances (in C_{t-1}) which bias the estimates of endogenous lag models (although the disturbances that affect both M_t and C_t will remain, perhaps desirably so).

The level of concern that any individual has about an issue was measured by his or her response to an open-ended question about the most important problem facing the nation or the government. Education was measured by the number of years in formal schooling, political interest by the respondents' self-assessment of how frequently they paid attention to political affairs, and social interaction by their reported attempts to engage in political persuasion.[2] The media histories were constructed from a number count of news magazine articles about the issues studied from 1960 to 1980. The numbers are an indicator of the fluctuations over time in general news content about various political issue areas.[3] The time cuts are in month-long units, so that any short-term movement (resulting from medium differences) will be missed, but the general sweep of change will be picked up. The monthly time frame does, however, allow richer statements about dynamics than, for instance, quarterly or yearly measurements. Thus, each individual's response is associated with seven different media histories, each of which is constructed from dozens of monthly media measurements.[4]

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[2] The data were initially collected for other purposes by the Survey Research Center and the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan and provided through the facilities of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Obviously those institutions bear no responsibility for the inferences drawn here. Until 1970, and again in 1980, the respondent's agenda was tapped by a question that explicitly dealt with problems that the government should address. Otherwise, the items mimic the familiar Gallup phrasing. Although the overall response distributions of the two types of questions are not identical, the relative weight given to the included items (which dominated the national agenda and were clearly governmental) is not as likely to be warped by the change in format as such items as, for example, religious decay. Nevertheless, some error is probably directly attributable analyzing the responses to the different question stimuli.

An individual's concern with an issue is measured as the probability that he or she will volunteer that issue to the interviewer's question. If the problem is mentioned, it is scored one, otherwise zero. Each individual is given a score averaged for the class of individuals being studied at the particular time point—this is equivalent to scores of one and zero, it carries the same information, but eases estimation (see Amemiya, 1981). These are qualitative response variables and some assumption is necessary about the underlying probability function which generates mentions and non-mentions. The usual assumption is that the function is distributed logit or probit. Here the function is approximated linearly (the logit transfer was tested and did not fit the data better) which eases interpretability in the context of a more complicated theoretical model.

Education was assessed by self-report and broken down into five categories (grade school, some high school, high school, some college, and college graduates). Political interest comes from the respondents' self-reported attentiveness to "what's going on in government and public affairs . . . whether there's an election going on or not." The explicit emphasis on long-term rather than election-specific habits coupled with the fact that the observed distribution of responses has been fairly steady over time (about one-third in each the high and medium, and one-sixth in the low and very-low categories) enables its use as an indicator of the respondents' long-term political interest. Talking politics was indicated by respondents who had talked with someone to "show them why they should vote for one of the parties or candidates." The main problem here is that the indicator explicitly measures election-oriented conversational activity, not that dealing with the nature of political priorities. In order to correct for this shortfall, the 1976 respondents were asked whether they had talked with anyone about the problem they had volunteered as most important. Certainly more people chatted about problems facing the country (75%) than engaged in even informal electioneering (37%). However, almost everyone who had talked about a voting choice had also talked about political problems: only 4% of the entire sample talked partisan choice but not issues. Thus the persons marked as having special social motivations to follow politics around election time also carried those incentives to the issue domain. However, many not bending their partner's ear about the election were talking about political problems; the clarity of the distinction which needs to be measured may be obscured in the data available, and the strength of the variable's explanatory power may be diminished. Nevertheless, addressing the measurable social activity will at least provide a clue about the relative strength of social as opposed to individual motives and anchoring.

The timing of the survey measures is peculiar. They were conducted during election campaigns, periods when political information is unusually cheap and forceful. Further, none of the historical moments coincided with seismic shifts in the national political agenda. These factors may lead to an underestimate of the theoretically expected results: the identifiable effects outlined below may understate the importance of the skill-motivation variables.

[3] The counts were made on the basis (and are subject to indexing vagaries) of the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* entries for *Time, Newsweek,* and *U.S. News & World Report.* The issues examined here are unemployment and economy generally, inflation, racism

Although rich in some aspects, this historical record is not perfect for present purposes. The results laid out below are complementary to those derived from laboratory research (for example, see Iyengar, Peters, & Kinder, 1982) and "natural" experimentation. Certainly more control over the conditions that lead to agenda change and better readings on theoretically interesting individual and social characteristics may produce more subtle understandings of the process. However, the SRC-CPS surveys do provide a unique opportunity to examine agenda change in a wide variety of contexts, and their analysis should yield parameter estimates of some interest for their own sake and which can serve as a guide for further exploration.

A More Precise Formulation

Responsiveness as a Function of Exposure and Integration

The purpose of this study is to analyze how individual information processing is shaped by skills and motivations. Differences in the dynamics may be assessed by estimating the parameters in equations (2) or (3) and modeling those differences as functions of the individual or social characteristics of moment. However, as they stand so far, the parameters are descriptive in nature—their theoretical implications are not immediately apparent. A little development can show that they are more meaningful than they may look.

What sorts of factors might increase an individual's (say, teacher's) concern C with issue j at time t, measured as the probability that she will mention the problem in a survey response? What sort of model might describe how media coverage might move ΔC_{jt} in a positive direction? The literature suggests that the upward movement will depend on the proportion of media attention given to the issue at the time (M_{jt}). Further, the effect of the available coverage on an individual will be governed by the probability that she will notice it and understand its implications—the effective exposure (ϵ). Thus the impact on the teacher might be ϵM_{jt}. However, that impact is bounded (an individual can have a maximum probability of giving a response of only 1.0), which is equivalent to saying that her concern can only be increased to the extent to which she is also concerned about some other issues at the previous time. Because the sum of probabilities associated with all issues (including those not being examined) will be unity, the possible range of increase for issue j is one minus the previous level of concern about issue j: $1-C_{jt-1}$. Now the impact of the new media coverage may be inhibited to the extent to which the individual has integrated those other concerns into her world view. Let the probability that the individual be set in her ways be expressed ι (for integration) and the probability that the coverage, once received and understood, can effect a change be $(1-\iota) = \varrho$ a measure of receptivity to change (ϱ for receptivity). Thus the maximum possible impact is $\varrho(1-C_{jt-1})$. The overall positive movement in the probability that she will mention the problem j may be expressed as the joint probability that she will effectively process the new information, ϵM_{jt}, and that she will adopt it, $\pi(1-C_{jt-1})$, or

$$\Delta^{+}C_{jt} = \epsilon M_{jt} \cdot \varrho(1-C_{jt-1}). \qquad (4)$$

Note that if the teacher is completely open to new ideas ($\varrho=1.0$) and hadn't given issue j a previous thought ($C_{jt-1} = 0$), then the effect is simply ϵM_{jt}. Similarly, if she is absolutely dogmatic ($\varrho=0.0$) or already completely consumed by the issue in question ($C_{jt-1} = 1.0$), then no increase in concern can occur.

Of course other messages in the environment may cause the individual to change the level of concern downward. For example, if the teacher

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and civil rights, Vietnam, crime, campus unrest, and energy. The issue of dissatisfaction with government (Watergate) was not included because respondents' concern with that item during Nixon's decline might be confounded with their partisanship. Concern with the environment fluctuated over the period but was not easily modeled as a function of media coverage.

[4] Given the apparent dynamics (see Table 1) and the fact that the time points are separated by two years, each case history of media coverage appears to be an independent piece of information for this examination of agenda setting. That is, the relevant media input for individuals interviewed in 1968 does not overlap much with that affecting respondents in 1970. Interviews taken only a few months apart would share much of the same relevant history, and the sampling of media histories would represent less unique information than is possible with interviews taken over such wide intervals. The time frame is necessarily restricted by the sampling design of these surveys. Interviews were taken over a period of about six weeks, although most occurred in the month they were assigned. Thus a little additional imprecision is unavoidably introduced.

were concerned about civil rights and suddenly the news were full of Vietnam stories, then she would be likely to change downward her weighting of civil rights in favor of the war. The probability of these other stories being appreciated is, of course, ϵ, and their total weight is the proportion of all news coverage not devoted to issue j: $(1-M_{jt})$. The maximum amount that they may reduce her concern is the level she started out with (C_{jt-1}). This impact will, of course, be affected by her receptiveness to novel ideas ϱ. So the impact of all other coverage on the teacher's concern about issue j is the same sort of joint product:

$$\Delta^{-} C_{jt} = -\epsilon(1-M_{jt}) \cdot \varrho(C_{jt-1}). \qquad (5)$$

This expression produces the memory parameter in equations (2) or (3) as a function of the individual's experience during the interval between observations rather than as a simple function of time's passage.

Combining the positive and negative terms[5] (4) and (5) yields

$$\Delta C_{jt} = \epsilon M_{jt} \cdot \varrho(1-C_{jt-1}) - \epsilon(1-M_{jt}) \cdot \varrho(C_{jt-1})$$

or

$$\Delta C_{jt} = \epsilon\varrho\, M_{jt} - \epsilon\varrho\, C_{jt-1}. \qquad (6)$$

Applying the difference operater and adding C_{jt-1} to both sides produces

$$C_{jt} = \epsilon\varrho\, M_{jt} + (1-\epsilon\varrho)C_{jt-1}. \qquad (7)$$

The individual's dynamic behavior thus depends on the value of the responsiveness ($\epsilon\varrho$) parameter. The implications of equation (7) are illustrated in Figure 2 for a low level of responsiveness (.14) and for one of higher magnitude (.33). The graph depicts the response of an individual to an idealized shift in media coverage of an issue which starts at zero and then jumps to 1.00 (which is to say that the press is completely full of such issue coverage). The amount of citizen concern C_t, measured on the vertical axis, is shown as it responds to the continuous coverage over time, marked on the horizontal. While the curves asymptotically approach 1.00, the differential speed in response is clear.

For estimation purposes, a problem arises because M_{jt} (the *proportion* of media coverage devoted to issue j) is not readily measurable.[6] However, if it is assumed that total media coverage on all matters is constant through time (the reasonableness of which can be attested to by many frustrated editors who fight battles about

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[5] It may be noted that one may specify an ϵ and ϱ, which is unique to each issue (for example, an individual may be especially attentive to news about the war and loath to give up his concern about inflation). This produces a complex model of the form

$$\Delta C_{jt} = \epsilon_j M_{jt} \cdot (\Sigma\, \varrho_{jk}\, C_{kt-1}) - (\Sigma\, e_k\, M_{kt}) \cdot (\delta_{kj} C_{jt-1}).$$

For an excellent discussion of models of this sort (and ones more complex) see May (1973). Such coefficients are in principle measurable and might yield inferences about issue characteristics and individual cognitive structures. The model could be further developed if ϵ and ϱ were specified as dependent on the level of C_{jt-1} (say, through self-selection processes). Both of these developments suggest themselves for further analysis, but the historical record is not up to the task. The purpose of the work presented below is to model responsiveness as parsimoniously as possible, with an understanding that interesting side issues remain to be explored.

The crucial assumption that enables the aggregation across issue domains in this study is that the issue-specific disturbances are independent of the theoretical factors that shape responsiveness. That is, if $\epsilon_j = \epsilon + u_j$ and $\varrho_j = \varrho + v_j$, that $E(\epsilon, u_j) = E(\varrho, v_j) = 0$. This is, of course, an assumption about specification; however, its effects can be tested. A particularly troublesome aspect of the models being developed here is the underspecification of directly experiencable conditions in the individuals' personal lives which might influence their issue agendas. As has been shown elsewhere (MacKuen, 1981), this threat is greatest for the economic issue areas. With this in mind, the analyses were carried out eliminating unemployment and inflation. Although the parameter estimates bounce around a little (well within the standard errors given), the values were not changed much and their pattern remained constant. The results speak well for combining a number of issues in order to maximize the ratio of the theoretically interesting variation to the variation due to issue-specific disturbances. They also suggest that the issue-specific disturbances are relatively independent of the theoretical factors that determine responsiveness and that the given results are not too badly biased.

[6] This issue is a little more complicated. Individuals may discount news stories about commonly covered items (e.g., the economy). In addition, the news coverage of news magazines may be weighted slightly differently from that of the more general media environment. An analysis, not shown, of the news magazines and the *Washington Post*, the New Orleans *Times-Picayune*, the *Chicago Tribune*, and the *Los Angeles Times* from 1972 to 1976 suggested that the absolute levels of coverage of each issue varied with the particular publication, but that those levels move in concert over time. The term b thus includes an additional reweighting of issues coverage to reflect individual expectations or cross-source variations.

Figure 2. Dynamic Response in Concern to a 0-1 Step Function Input



fitting competing stories into a fixed newspaper, magazine, or television program), then M_{jt} may be written $m_{jt}/M_{..}$, a ratio of the observable *amount* of coverage and an unknown constant "newshole." Equation (7) becomes

$$C_{jt} = \epsilon\varrho\,(1/M_{..})\,m_{jt} + (1-\epsilon\varrho)C_{jt-1}$$

or letting $b = (\epsilon\varrho/M_{..})$ and $d = (1 - \epsilon\varrho)$,

$$C_{jt} = bm_{jt} + dC_{jt-1}. \tag{8}$$

This is identical to equation (3). Happily, the expression yields a clean estimate of $\epsilon\varrho$ (from d) which is not confounded with $(M_{..})$, which is, strictly speaking, unknowable. Note, however, that ϵ and ϱ counterbalance each other if they are negatively associated (as expected). Any observable differences in their products will considerably understate differences in their individual values.

These estimates of the $\epsilon\varrho$ coefficients can serve two purposes. At the most direct level, they may indicate the relationship between responsiveness and citizen skills and motivations. Responsiveness may be expressed as a function of the theoretical variables: $\epsilon\varrho = (1-d) = f(V)$, where f is to be determined. Measuring differential responsiveness by itself will be a useful addition to an understanding of mass-elite dynamics. But the terms contain more information than that. By making appropriate assumptions, it will be possible to model the impact of skill and motivation on the *underlying components.*

Exposure and Integration as a Function of Skill and Motivation

For this more ambitious purpose, the first step is developing a theoretical specification of how the skill-motivation variables are likely to translate into effective exposure and integration. The argument for equation (7) produced a composite $\epsilon\varrho$ term for each class of individuals; the matter at hand is uncovering how exposure and integration can be expressed in terms of political interest, education, and conversational activity. Exposure may be written $e(V)$ and integration $i(V)$, where V represents the theoretical variables, but neither $e(V)$ nor $i(V)$ may be observed directly. However, because $\varrho=(1-\iota)$ from equation (4) above, it follows that $\epsilon\pi = f(V) - \epsilon(V)\cdot(1-i(V))$. Thus, if the functional forms of $e(V)$ and $i(V)$ can be determined, then they may be expressed in terms of $\epsilon\varrho=f(V)$, which is observable. Such expressions are not self-evident. The strategy used here is to introduce a minimal set of theoretical constraints on their functional forms in order to measure the relative slopes of exposure and integration with respect to skills and motivations.

The simplest guess, that the functions are roughly linear, cannot reproduce the general form of the data (see below), so some theoretically informed specification is required. Here the exposure function is laid out as having a quadratic form under the argument that as individuals learn about or get engaged in politics, they will be inclined to go even further. A logarithmic form is given to the integration function. This form is motivated by its use as a fundamental element in information theory as a representation of how past information gets organized. (See the Appendix for further discussion.) This introduction of the quadratic and logarithmic forms does not mean to state an exact formulation of the functions (which are likely to be more complex), but to produce parsimonious representations that are consistent with theoretical ideas of how they might look. The aim is to see how exposure and integration might be related to the theoretical variables, not to model those relationships in a precise way. Any inferences about these patterns must be broad gauged and suggestive rather than definitive in form.

This rough outline may be approximated by translating the responsiveness expression into the quadratic and logarithmic forms:

$$\epsilon\varrho = e(V)\cdot(1-i(V))$$

or, as derived in the Appendix,

$$\begin{aligned}\epsilon\varrho = {} & (K_e + \tfrac{1}{2}b_F F^2 + \tfrac{1}{2}b_E E^2 + b_T T)\\ & \cdot [1 - (K_i + c_F/d_F \log(1+d_F F)\\ & + c_E/d_E \log(1+d_E E) + d_T T)].\end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

for various combinations of Follow Politics (F), Education (E), and Talk Politics (T).

This estimation equation represents exposure as an additive combination of the two quadratic functions of follow politics and education plus an inseparable constant K_e, and information integration as an additive combination of the two logarithmic functions plus a constant K_i. The dichotomy for talking politics is also introduced to complete the specification. However, little can be done with the last variable other than to generate a simple pair of estimates.

Empirical Results

Evidence on Responsiveness

The estimates of the separate effects of education, follow politics, and talk politics on composite responsiveness are outlined in Table 1. They show empirically how far these skill and motivation variables affect how citizens respond

Table 1. Responsiveness to Media Agenda Change by Citizen Skill and Motivation

	$\epsilon\rho$ $(1-d)$	R^2
Education		.67
Grade school	.16 (.06)	
Some high school	.17 (.05)	
High school	.24 (.05)	
Some college	.23 (.06)	
College	.32 (.08)	
Follow politics		.69
Very low	.15 (.05)	
Low	.19 (.05)	
Medium	.21 (.05)	
High	.33 (.08)	
Talk politics		.69
Not talk politics	.21 (.05)	
Talk politics	.27 (.08)	

Notes. These estimates derive from estimating the concern of an individual at time t as a function $C_{ijt} = b\, M_{jt} + d\, C_{ijt-1}$ for each of the subclasses involved, where $\epsilon\rho = (1-d)$. See text and equations (7,8) for details. Standard errors for the $\epsilon\rho$ estimates are displayed in parentheses.

to changes in their political environment. They may also encourage the more demanding exposure-integration investigation. Table 1 (Education) displays the parameter estimates[7] for the dynamic model (7), estimated by equation (3), for each of five levels of formal schooling. Here the form of f, which relates education to responsiveness, is unconstrained: $\epsilon\varrho$ is left free to vary for individuals of each education category. The parameter estimates suggest that the agendas of the better educated are more responsive to the media's message than are those of their fellows:[8] ϵ_Q for the college educated is .32, twice the value of .16 estimated for those with grade school education only.

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[7] The actual observations (of C_t) used here are the proportions of the public who named the particular problem as "most important" for each level of skill and motivation for each year and each issue. This procedure retains the information that would result from running the analysis on the entire set of individual cases (scored zero or one), and is computationally more efficient. The analysis excludes from consideration readings taken when an issue was not at all on the public agenda (for example, energy before 1974). Although diminishing the apparent degrees of freedom for the analysis, this tactic avoids artificially boosting apparent explanatory power (and apparent precision in parameter estimation) which would ensue from predicting no issue concern when there is no media coverage. This prediction is, of course, sustained but it contains no novel information about dynamics. Thus the number of separate histories is 44 rather than 63 (nine surveys and seven issues) for each class of individuals.

Because the observed media content comes from news magazines and is scored in raw numbers of stories, some issue-specific scalar transformation of m_{jt} was necessary for it to reflect M_{jt}, the proportion of stories on issue (j) at time (t) which was available to the individual (see note 6). This was accomplished by estimating a scalar transform a_j such that $\hat{C}_{jt} = \hat{a}_j(m_{jt} + m_{jt-1} + m_{jt-2} + m_{jt-3})/4$ for all individuals (regardless of subclassification). The results of the procedure acted as a starting estimate for the nonlinear-parameter models.

In addition, these results provide a check on the validity of the expression developed for equation (7). When the $\epsilon\varrho$ values are calculated from the estimated a_j's and the b's from the estimation equation (8), they are in close accord with the $\epsilon\varrho$ values estimated directly from the d's in equation (8) shown in Table 1. The indirect estimates are: (Education) .14, .17, .24, .23, .33; (Follow politics) .14, .18, .21, .32; (Talk Politics) .21, .26. The assumptions that produced equation (7) imply that $b = (1-d) = \epsilon\varrho$ for each category of response type, a constraint not inherent in the more general dynamic model. The similarity of the separate estimates of $\epsilon\varrho$ supports the theoretical motivations for exposure and integration that underlie this analysis.

Second-order dynamic models (with coefficients in the real domain) proved no better at representing the data than the simpler ones discussed in the text. This is not to say that further work on the nature of the causal process is likely to be fruitless; only that no alternatives jump out and demand their implementation. Technically, the model requires an iterative nonlinear estimation (a combination grid search and steepest descent convergence algorithm was used—for a description, see Ralston & Jenrich, 1978). The efficiency of the estimates takes into account probable heteroskedasticity in the disturbances due to theoretical measurement variance in the dependent variable—a form of weighted least squares was used in calculating the evaluation criterion.

The second conceptual item is motivation. The question is whether following politics (rather than a more general cognitive capability) generates a firmer organization of past experience and thus tempers the media's immediate impact. An estimation of the model's coefficients for separate groups corresponding to levels of interest yields Table 1 (Follows Politics). Again, the more involved individuals demonstrate a greater volatility than anyone else. Thus the tentative story developed for education is substantiated by the similar pattern for political interest. Here the differences stand up a little better against the null hypothesis (the probability that differences between the top and bottom categories arise by chance is $p = .03$).

The differences in the estimated magnitudes of responsiveness are substantial. The coefficients for the high and low categories of education and interest are almost exactly those illustrated in Figure 2. This means, for example, that if one were able to control the media agenda completely for two months (the length of a formal electoral campaign), one could change the agenda of about 26% of the less interested or the poorly educated as opposed to approximately 55% of the most highly involved. For six months' control, the numbers are 60% and 91%. The uninvolved are considerably less responsive.

Finally, the social interaction model provides the response patterns of Table 1 (Talk Politics). Although talkers show a modestly greater and quicker media impact, they do not differ markedly from their less-sociable neighbors. This is true with regard to both the magnitude of the difference and its weaker ability to fend off the null hypothesis of no difference ($p = .29$). Thus, the indications are that the social incentive to attend to the news is not particularly potent (although they fall in the expected direction, the coefficients are not really statistically distinct), or that it is partially counterbalanced by the social integration component, or that the measure is insufficiently precise to pick up differential sensitivity.

Nevertheless, these straightforward empirical estimates suggest that responsiveness to political agenda information may be shaped in an important way by individual skill and motivation. The evidence on the social factor is somewhat weaker. By themselves, the data indicate that the theoretical expectations are confirmed, or at least not disconfirmed. The statistical precision of such dynamic estimators does not allow very definite statements.

Further, consistently finding the volatility at the top of the involvement scale indicates that as far as a sense of political urgency goes, the underlying exposure-integration model for agendas is different from that of voting preference or war expectations and similar to that of pure information acquisition. Citizen political priorities are apparently not very firmly embedded in a broader conceptual framework. Among the most sophisticated stratum, it appears that the integration factor hardly plays a part at all, but it is here that one would expect the organization of experience, the political learning, which might insulate the individual from manipulation. The evident stability toward the bottom of the scale may be attributed to the relatively low media impact rather than an organizing world view, thereby suggesting a portrait of innocence rather than a worldly wise skepticism toward new ideas. As a first sketch, at low levels of skill and motivation lies a relatively inert mass whom the media move only modestly and then only by a long accumulation of partial effects. Short-term public responsiveness to events on the public stage is concentrated only at the upper stratum of political involvement.

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[8] The estimates are not so precise as to enable this inference to stand against a *strong* argument for a null effect (or a mutually balanced exposure integration). The extreme points are about two standard errors apart and are arrayed in the direction suggested by the bulk of published evidence, but a test of their difference (which combines the variances) allows a probability ($p = .16$) that they might come from the same distribution (although, of course, the best estimates suggest that they are substantially different). If the inferences were counter to the weight of previous findings (see above) or were totally counterintuitive, their acceptance would be problematical. However, the data certainly do not suggest that the null hypothesis (of no effect) dominates. The alternate view, that the pattern from top to bottom is reversed, is of course disconfirmed in these data. The fact that the pattern is pretty nearly monotonic and is consistently maintained through the rest of the breakdowns (see below) gives further support to the conclusion that the observable differences are not simply the result of a chance occurrence.

[9] Ideally, one would like to estimate its parameters on the full set of data (here 1760 observations: 44 issue-time readings containing dynamic information times 40 skill-motivation combinations). However the nonlinearities in the parameters make this ideal unattainable because the computational requirements for such an estimation are spectacular. A second-best strategy entails estimating the relationship between exposure-integration and the conditional variables on the 40 estimated responsiveness parameters—one for each combination of the theoretical variables. This idea is not as bizarre as it sounds. The estimates represent the same information as found in the original data. Modeling their values (weighted by their relative efficiency and sample size) will provide unbiased and relatively efficient estimates of how exposure and integration are related to interest and education. The procedure can produce useful parameter estimates, but cannot yield good estimates of precision. This tactic is similar to an analysis of variance of subgroup means, when the "within" variance is represented in summary form.

The utility of the collapsed data set is confirmed when the estimated model (see below) is tested on the entire data set. Although it is not possible (for computational reasons) to search over the entire parameter space, when the estimates presented below were used as starting conditions, their values appeared to be relatively stable and the fit was essentially the same.

Evidence on Exposure and Integration

These results suggest that the posited relationship between the separate exposure and integration components and the skill and motivation variables may yield to empirical analysis. Because exposure and integration cancel each other, their individual association with the theoretical variables may be expected to be stronger than that of their composite. Observing the tip suggests looking for the iceberg beneath.

The task of estimating the different effects of the skill-motivational variables on exposure and belief integration is a delicate one. It relies on both the assumption of how the underlying processes are related to the theoretical variables and on a highly interdependent model specification. To carry the iceberg analogy one step further, this is equivalent to applying general physical principles in estimating the mass of subsurface ice from the observable profile. The underlying physics may not be adequate for describing the unknown in detail, but they may permit an estimate of whether the underwater structure is large or small.

For this more ambitious purpose, the data will lie in the subgroup-based estimates of ϵ_Q for each of the 40 ($5 \times 4 \times 2$) combinations of Education (5), Follow Politics (4), and Talk Politics (2).[9] Any particular estimate for each cell will be noisy, so the entire pattern must be examined at once. This may be accomplished by systematically subjecting the pattern of responsiveness to the more formal analysis suggested by the development of expression (9). The numeric estimates presented in Table 2 represent the coefficients of the quadratic-logarithmic combination of functions. A first inference is immediately apparent. Conversational activity increases the probability of gathering information (by .053), but does not increase resistance at all (.00). Thus, the social motivation to attend to public affairs is given some (though statistically weak) support, whereas the resistance to new ideas in a conversational circle, the notion of a socially determined reality, is not. In terms of the individual skill-motivation components, the *b* coefficients suggest that the following-politics effect on exposure is greater than that of education. Similarly, the effect on belief integration is greater for following politics than for education (the slope is inversely related to the *d* coefficient). It should be noted, however, that these coefficients have little meaning when they are taken out of context. By construction, the individual terms are highly interdependent; their estimators are collinear and thus covary. Furthermore, the slopes depend on the values of the variables involved. For this reason, the two sets of components that the coefficients represent may be generated for the values of F and E in order to give a graphic illustration of how the two variables differ. Figure 3 shows exposure and integration for education (left) and the curves for political interest (right).

The two sets of curves are dissimilar.[10] In terms of education, the slope of $i(V)$ seems almost zero, except for those individuals with only a grade school education or less. The college graduates do not seem to have organized their agenda information any better than those of a ninth-grade achievement (the level of political interest being held constant). Only at the very bottom is any effect noticed, in that the woefully unschooled do seem slightly less resistant to the latest ideas. Thus, the two-component model's integration feature seems rather limited in its application to symbolic skills. The whole ball game lies in the better educated's being more effectively exposed to the available media content.

The picture is markedly different for following politics. The exposure function *and* the integration function rise over the range. Increased political interest generates greater effectiveness of ex-

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[10] The estimates reflected in Figure 3 are by no means precise. The temptation to read the probability values on the vertical axis must be avoided. Because the parameters that drive the curves are so collinear, no simple statement for statistical inference is available, but it is apparent from experimentation that the level of the curves may be shifted up and down to produce similar fits to the data. However, the important inference, that the *slopes* are different for Follow Politics and Education, can be subjected to a rough statistical test. Modeling the process with the same parameter values for the two variables yields a notably inferior fit (R^2 = .44 as opposed to .58). This difference persists under a strong test that assumes that the parameters are independent (they are not); the Adjusted R^2's are .38 and .45 for the simpler and more complex models respectively. Thus, although the picture in Figure 3 is only a very rough sketch of the true relationship, the apparent differences in slopes (particularly for integration) are given fairly strong support by the data.

Table 2. Numerical Estimates of the Exposure-Integration Model for Follow Politics, Education, and Talk Politics (Variable Derivative Model)

Observable	Exposure		Integration	
Constant		.160		.087
Talk politics	*b*	.053	*d*	.000
Follow politics	*b*	.065	*c*	.910
			d	14.44
Education	*b*	.025	*c*	10.45
			d	1161.11

Note. This model specifies the *e*(*V*) as exponential and the *i*(*V*) as logarithmic functions of Follow Politics and Education, and introducing Talk Politics as a pair of dichotomies. See equation (9) in the text. Thus the slope on exposure is explosively associated with *b* and that on integration is inversely associated with the *d* coefficients. The fit is indicated by an R^2 of .583.

posure than does increased education, but the impact of that exposure is dampened by its having to overcome a much stronger weight of previously acquired information. Here the two-component model's excitation-inhibition operation can be seen clearly. The volatility of the uninterested can be attributed to their innocence about political matters—whatever mark political events have had on them has been exceedingly poorly stored and does not inhibit their responsiveness to the media's recent messages. Their counterparts on the opposite end of the spectrum have retained a much stronger guide to an interpretation of politics and would show much less responsiveness were they to be exposed to their brethren's modest level of information. However, because they are motivated to attend to the media's message, that greater inhibition is overwhelmed by the much higher levels of input, so that they are the most responsive of all.

After modeling the two processes, the picture of political cognition that emerges differs considerably from the sketch of the last section. The initial portrait of a citizenry whose less-involved strata remain political isolates and whose upper echelon are led willy-nilly by the media's message

Figure 3. Exposure and Integration for Education and Follow Politics



Note. Graphed on the vertical axes are the estimated probabilities that individuals see and understand a message (Exposure) and the probabilities that they will be immunized against it (Integration). On the horizontal axes are Education (0=GS, 1=Some HS, 2=HS, 3=Some College, 4=College) and Follow Politics (0=Very Low, 1=Low, 2=Medium, 3=High). The estimates were derived by assuming the exponential and logarithmic shapes of the curves.

can be elaborated. As a vague empirical description it is adequate, but the understanding of the underlying mechanisms suggests that this is not simply a matter of ignorance and gullibility. The evidence indicates the politically interested exhibit a responsiveness not because they naively accept every news story, but because they are so much more attentive. The effects of their previous experience are clearly seen to be substantial, and if their increased reading of the press were not so heavily conditioned, then their responsiveness would be very much greater. The less interested, and to a modest extent the less skilled, also show some responsiveness simply because those inhibitions of accumulated past information are much less evident.[11]

Finally, the implications for the overall model are illustrated in Figure 4. The two surfaces represent the estimated ϵ_Q for political interest and education; the one on the left is for the less socially active (talk = 0), whereas the one on the right is for those engaged in more political conversations (talk = 1). Apparently the social process modestly raises volatility (through exposure). The character of the two-component exposure-integration model is demonstrated in the bowl-like shape of the surfaces. At the upper extremes it is most obvious that interest and symbolic skills are not strictly monotonic with volatility. This curvilinearity, due to the integration effect, is represented all over the surfaces, but its impact is muted in the lower regions where the exposure it

Figure 4. Multivariate Estimates of Responsiveness Education, Follow Politics, and Talk Politics (Exposure and Integration Model)



Note. The estimated responsiveness, $\epsilon_i \rho_i$, to the media environment are graphed in the joint space of Education and Follow Politics for relative isolates (Talk Politics=0) on the left and for those who talked with their fellows (Talk Politics=1) on the right. The estimates were derived by assuming the exponential and logarithmic forms for Exposure and Integration in a mildly interactive model.

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[11] A note of caution. These results on exposure and integration are clear, but their meaningfulness may be restricted for two reasons. First, the probability numbers can be produced only by assuming the exposure and integration functions to be quadratic and logarithmic in form. Thus the shape of the curves in Figure 3 is predetermined, and only their relative slopes were elicited from the data. Of course it is the slopes that are crucial for the inferences made here. These functional forms are likely to be very much more complex. Further work may yield richer theoretical statements. Similarly, the measurement scales for Follow Politics and Education are ordinal, and the shapes of the curves might be different for other cardinal mappings. The point assignments are, however, roughly linearly related to the number of media sources consulted and to the number of years of formal education. Things would have to be very wrong for the overall picture presented here to be absolutely misleading. Second, the estimates are imprecise. The goal here was to get an idea of the strength of a relationship between a hypothetical construct and the skill-motivation variables. The data support the very broad-gauged inferences offered here, but cannot sustain more precise interpretations.

operates on is least. The magnitudes of responsiveness (ϵ_Q) are similar to those indicated by the bivariate analysis, with the extremes being slightly more distinct. The range of dynamic behavior estimated by the multivariate analysis is similar to that depicted in Figure 2.

Some Implications

This analysis has been limited to the subject of heterogeneity in citizen responsiveness to agenda changes in the media. This is a matter of some consequence in its own right. However, the central ideas that political dynamics may vary in theoretically interesting ways and that any given reaction may be composed of several, even contradictory, components should be more generally applicable. Sensitivity to these sorts of subtleties may provide leverage in developing richer models of political interactions.

This modeling and empirical work presents results at two levels of certainty. The results on responsiveness are relatively straightforward; they indicate that the speed with which citizens react to changes in media coverage is shaped by the skill and motivations associated with their information processing. The magnitudes of the differential responsiveness are substantial. On less certain empirical footing is the work on the skill-motivation effects on exposure and integration. The analysis depends on theoretical assumptions about functional forms and on relatively imprecise estimators. Nevertheless, the exploratory work does suggest that ability, personal motivation, and perhaps social incentives increase exposure to information, but that the integration of previous agenda beliefs is associated only with following politics. These inferences are of some interest on their own right, although of course they remain tentative subject to further work. However, if they are indicative of the true state of the world, then they may have some implications for more substantive political analysis.

Political Cognitions

Examining the dynamics of agenda response produces an insight into the style of political cognition which is associated with individuals' developing a sense of political priorities. The evidence on composite responsiveness (ϵ_Q) indicates that agenda changes look much like simple information acquisition—the exposure function dominates.

The more indirect estimates of integration effects yield a further characterization of what substantiates political priorities. Three manners of belief organization spring to mind: abstract structure, associational linkages, and social definition of reality. Perhaps the most commonly discussed form is the first, in which individuals condition their learning on abstract principles, whether they be complex ideologies, historical analogies, or laymen's rules of political thumb. The quality of such a consciousness would clearly be different from that of individuals who merely accumulate political facts or symbolic representations and generate a view of the world by deriving correlations among observations. Also of a distinct quality would be those views that relied on conversational cues for their formulation. The skill-motivation variables outlined here do not correspond uniquely with these styles of learning, but a differential weighting may be made. In a carefully constructed study of political cognition, Neuman (1981) reports that education is clearly associated with abstract organization and hardly at all with the number of discrete cognitions an individual holds. On the other hand, it would be reasonable to expect that the extent to which an individual follows politics would be associated with the mass of acquired information and, when the abstraction capability is factored out, with a dependence on associational linkages rather than conceptual organization for firming up a political view. On its face, the conversational activity variable is most closely associated with the social definition of reality.

The integration effects elicited from the data indicate that the substance of individuals' political agendas is formed by the mass of their previous exposure rather than by any abstract organization or social anchoring. Any inhibition to responsiveness is limited to those who follow public affairs regularly. It is not evident for the highly educated or the socially active. The rough equivalence of the three measured variables with the three styles of cognition suggests that the mortar holding agenda beliefs together is associational, rather than abstract or social, in character. These views appear to be more informational than evaluative in their content—they depend more on content of the information environment than on internalized standards. Thus the character of public agendas may better reflect the need for individuals to orient themselves to a changeable world than their political demands or fundamental interests.

This finding is consistent with the oft-reported empirical finding that individuals' political agendas are more easily altered than their evaluations of political ideas. More specifically, it suggests that those seeking to alter the public's sense of priorities may be less concerned with altering the abstractions that motivate the status quo in favor of generating a sufficient volume of targeted messages, so that their coincidence will appear to have an associational logic powerful enough to overcome previous linkages. At the limit, a candidate or other political actor need only repeat a message for it to be accepted as a matter requiring political attention. Thus the exogeneity of citizen views comes into question not only in the sense that they may be shaped by elite or press posturing, but also in the sense that their substance depends not on any abstract understandings or social anchors which might be outside the control of political actors, but instead on the mere volume of political appeals that is surely in the hands of political elites. Rulers may set the standards by which they are judged.

Strategic Behavior, Popular Choice, and Institutional Constraints

A second, and more indirect implication has to do with candidate electoral strategies and democratic theory. In the classic treatment of competitive representative democracy (Downs, 1957), the candidates move about in a policy space so as to enhance their chances for victory. In purely theoretical terms, it has been shown (McKelvey, 1976) that, aside from unusual circumstances, the electoral outcome of this process will not depend in any crucial way on the distribution of voter preferences. For this class of situations Shepsle (1979) and Riker (1980) argue that the outcome will be determined by the institutions that constrain political strategies. The idea of looking for systematic constraints which translate individual volitions into public decisions is an attractive and important area for consideration. In application to electoral politics, however, the idea of institutional constraints finds no formalized referent.

In practice, candidates are not able to wander freely over the issue space because they must maintain credibility in the electorate and carry their own supporters along with them. Similarly, candidates may find it difficult to raise new issues quickly enough to take advantage of their efforts. More often, it seems, candidates seek to influence the citizens' evaluations of the political alternatives by shaping the ground on which the campaign is fought: they will try to raise the voters' concern about the issues for which their established policy posture (promise or record) is favored by the electorate and also try to distract the voters' attention from issues on which their opponents figure to be more appealing. For example, the 1972 media campaign for president seems to have been one of agenda setting in which each candidate tried to impress "his" issues on the voters' minds (Hofstetter & Zukin, 1979). More recently, the 1976 electorate preferred the prospect of Carter's handling the problem of unemployment while it preferred Ford on inflation, and the 1980 electorate preferred Reagan's stance on economic recovery and Carter's on the maintenance of peace. From casual observation, it appears that both campaigns concentrated on trying to alter voters' views about the issue agenda rather than their more fundamental evaluations.

The theoretical result of this agenda contest is the same as the majority disequilibrium problem, with the indeterminacy being derived from the candidates' altering the electorate's agenda rather than from their shifting policy positions. Because the voters must choose between bundles of policy positions, and they do so by weighting the significance of each item, the final outcome may be as much the result of weighting scheme as of the policy comparisons themselves. Thus, without constraints on the agenda game, the democratic result may be independent of the electorate's policy preferences and entirely the result of candidates' ability to manipulate the electoral agenda (at least to the extent to which voting depends on the terms of evaluation).

However, the data in this article indicate that individuals differ in the speed with which they respond to changes in the elite political environment. The responsiveness estimates (the implications of which are illustrated in Figure 2) indicate that the priorities of a number of citizens are largely beyond the control of political candidates, even if politicians can dominate the topics of elite political analysis.[12] A democratic result is thus constrained by the agendas of those who remain largely unaffected by recent events. This differential responsiveness limits the solution set of the agenda contest, and the fact that political communication must take place over time provides an institutional setting in a broad sense. Further, the set of social characteristics considered here, individual abstract reasoning skills and personal and social motivations to follow politics, have some of the same properties as formalized institutional rules: they are not strictly part of the agenda game (because candidates may not hope to change citizens' fundamental skills and motives as a short-term strategy), but they are interesting nevertheless because they may have policy consequences—these citizen attributes may not be neutral with respect to political interests, and they are in theory manipulable over the longer run. For purposes of abstraction they may be taken as fixed for individual elections but may be considered endogenous in a longer set of repeated contests. An unfortunate aspect of this result, however, is that this constraint is most clearly generated by the least well-educated and the least-interested citizens.[13] To the extent to which democratic outcomes are judged on the consideration voters give to the policy alternatives, this result is discouraging.[14]

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[12] The power of politicians to set the media agenda is great but far from absolute. Sigal (1973) reports that the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* front page stories rely predominantly on government officials for sources. However, Patterson (1980) points out the proclivity of news organizations to look for novel campaign issues during election coverage. Those issues are not always candidate directed.

Appendix

The choice of the function to represent $e(V)$ and $i(V)$ is an important matter. Only by positing these functions can one dissect the information in the estimates of $\epsilon_Q = f(V)$ to produce an idea of how strongly the theoretical variables are related to exposure and integration. The goal is to measure the first derivative of $e(V)$ and $i(V)$.

The first assumption deals with the sign of the derivatives and is motivated by the elementary information-processing ideas discussed above. They are that with respect to the skill-motivation variables the derivatives of $e(V)$ and $i(V)$ be positive. That is to say, that as individuals' political interest, education, and conversational activity increases, so should the effectiveness of their exposure to information. Also, as that involvement grows, so should the organization and mass of their reservoir of experience and perhaps the impact of social consensus.

Beyond the sign of the derivative, the forms of the $e(V)$ and $i(V)$ functions are not determined. The simplest assumption is that $e(V)$ and $i(V)$ may be approximated by a linear function (the first term of the Taylor series). This sets a constant first derivative. Here, however, this first approximation fails empirically. Geometrically, the data indicate that the surface of ϵ_Q as a function of Education and Follow Politics is convex (from below), whereas a constant positive slope formulation can only produce a concave surface. Thus the simplest form of $e(V)$ and $i(V)$ is inadequate for the purpose of uncovering the underlying parameters. If those terms are to be measured, then a more elaborate strategy must be used. Some further understanding of the underlying processes must be mobilized.

In order to develop an exposure function, consider the internal dynamics that are likely to be involved. Changes in an individual's attention toward politics must certainly be partially contingent on his or her current motivational level. The highly interested will see a great deal of material which not only satisfies current levels of curiosity but which also spurs further interest. The totally inattentive will see nothing of interest which might otherwise motivate them to attend more closely. Thus the change in exposure level will depend on current motivations: $e' = b\ V$. The same model holds for political understanding in a way familiar to educators. Those of little comprehension will be unable to fathom the political material that they do see and are unlikely to increase their understanding much at all. On the other hand, those who already understand a great deal will be able to utilize new information and readily increase their level of comprehension. Again, $e' = b\ V$. Of course this growth may be limited at the top, but it is unlikely that the boundary conditions are encountered by large portions of the general public. Integrating (in the mathematical sense) these differentials yields

$$e(V) = (1/2)\, b\, V^2 + K_e \qquad (10)$$

(where K_e is the constant of integration) which suggests that effective exposure ought to be (roughly) a quadratic function of political interest and education.[15]

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[13] Although the less involved are slightly less likely to vote, the profile of voters-only looks much like that for the general population. This is true for both presidential and congressional elections; the warping of the space does become slightly more noticeable for the electorate participating in primaries (in which relatively few of the isolates participate). It is tempting to speculate about the extra power given to the uninvolved and its implications for policy—say, a heightened concern for redistributive issues—but such a matter is best left for empirical analyses.

[14] An intriguing aside here relates to how candidates may use this temporal framework in devising their agenda-setting strategies. A simple result is that, given resource constraints, a single candidate will try to mold the views of the less involved first (because the opponents' counterarguments will not erode the initial message) and concentrate on the involved in later time periods. However, the opponents may follow the same strategy and cancel out its effects. Devising solutions to this game depends on adding further complications that would extend this argument considerably.

An illustration of the use of this sort of tactic may be found in the strategies followed by political action committees in recent years. They have entered political contests a year or so before the election and set an initial agenda favoring their candidates, and then left the scene well before "politics as usual" began. When the official candidates have tried to set their own electoral agendas, they have found their task exceedingly difficult. The expectation here is that the candidates' efforts would have been least effective in altering the reference frames of the politically uninvolved. If this were so, then the effects of the early-bird strategy would have been less evident to political elites, and thus discounted in political discussions, but remained undercover waiting for election day to show themselves.

[15] Although the specification of function is an assumption, some evidence which examines the reasonableness

On the integration side, the idea is to model how the individual's certainty about the world varies with his or her nominal political interest or symbolic skills (it is this certainty about the true state of affairs that leads to the individual's resisting the implications of the new evidence presented by the media). As a typical citizen's political interest increases, so should the mass of ideas against which new evidence must compete. However the number of elementary beliefs that must be changed should increase more slowly simply because much of the rise in mass will be redundant. Elementary information theory (for a classic introduction, see Shannon & Weaver, 1949) suggests that the amount of fundamental "information" that lies at the heart of a mass of different representations may be expressed as a logarithmic function of the mass. In this application, the number of central ideas against which the media's message must compete is expressed as a logarithmic function of the nominal mass of past experience.[16] Abstract organization similarly ought to be a logarithmic function of symbolic skills. As an individual gains abstract concepts with which to order his or her images of the political world, the strength of that organization should increase. However, the rate of increase should taper off again, as those ordering principles take on a logical or symbolic coherence.

Another way of looking at the same phenomenon is to examine the changeability of an individual's certainty about his or her understanding of the world. For the relatively innocent, the addition of a few pieces of information may lead to a reevaluation of the world view; for the worldly wise a similar input will have little effect. Similarly, for those with sparse intellectual organization, the acquisition of a few integrating principles may lead to a much firmer sense of understanding whereas the ideologue's encountering a new argument will do little to increase his or her sense of coherence. One way to express this is to model the changeability of an individual's integration (i) as inversely related to the current level of experience or abstract skills: $i' = 1/(dV)$, or, integrating (again in the mathematical sense) $i = (1/d) \log (dV) + K_i$ (where K_i is again a constant of integration). The last term, as it turns out, is not sufficiently subtle to yield a curve within the probability range 0-1, so two modifications are introduced:

$$i(v) = (c/d) \log (1 + dV) + K_i, \qquad (11)$$

where c is merely a scalar transformation and the introduction of the constant term into the log function assures a positive result.

In order to obtain equations that can be estimated, values for Education (E) and Follow Politics (F) are substituted for V in these quadratic (10) and logarithmic (11) equations for $e(V)$ and $i(V)$. The result is portrayed in equation (9) in the text.

Although these functions can be specified on theoretical grounds, the purpose here is not to provide a precise theoretical model, but only to set up a minimal tool for the empirical work. Certainly the true functions may be more complex. These forms constrain the derivatives only in the sense that they are said to be direct and inverse functions of (V). Other arguments (for example, Bayesian updating) produce categorically similar results, although the details may differ. It might be noted that a number of alternative specifications were examined; they proved too complex for empirical use or they were unable to match the broad outlines of the data. Although no claim is offered about the unique virtue of the exponential-logarithmic combination, it does work.

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of this form may be mobilized. Data pertaining to these matters are not available for all the surveys, but in 1974 the respondents were asked which of four television newscasts (morning national, evening local, evening national, and nightly local) they watched, and which public affairs sections (international, national, state and local, and editorials) they consulted in the newspaper. The relation between the four-point Follow Politics scale and simple exposure is roughly linear. However, if the criterion is how often those channels were attended to, the relation becomes markedly quadratic. Thus, to the extent to which exposure is measured in terms of intensity, the functional form begins to appear to require higher order terms. Similar evidence holds for education and comprehension. Respondents were asked if politics were "so complicated that a person like (the respondent) can't really understand what's going on." The five-point education scale is best mapped into those responses (reversed) by a quadratic function.

A similar form can be derived for $e' = e(V)$, which yields the exponential form $e(V) = \exp(bV)$. This specification produces a modestly better fit, although the qualitative inferences are the same. The quadratic function was used instead to maintain parallelism with the logarithmic derivation below.

[16] The theoretical specifications are usually in terms of $\log_2$ or $\log_e$, but the Follow-Politics and Education variables are at best a rescaling of the amount of previous information and its integration. Thus it is not surprising that the base of the logarithm varies to fit the scale (the log base = $\exp(1/c)$). Nevertheless, the functional form (with its decreasing slope) is motivated by elementary information theory.

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Black Representation and Educational Policy: Are They Related?

KENNETH J. MEIER
University of Oklahoma

ROBERT E. ENGLAND
Oklahoma State University

This study examines the impact of black school board members on educational policies that affect black students. Using data from 82 of the largest urban school districts in the United States, several measures of second-generation educational discrimination are analyzed. Black membership on the school board is associated with more equitable educational policies; this relationship remains in some cases even with controls for black political and economic resources. The implications of these findings for the study of representation are then discussed.

A growing number of studies have assessed the representation of blacks and other minority groups in the federal bureaucracy (Meier & Nigro, 1976), in state and local bureaucracies (Cayer & Sigelman, 1980; Dye & Renick, 1981; Eisinger, 1982a, b; Sigelman, 1974), on city councils (Cole, 1974; Engstrom & McDonald, 1981; Jones, 1976; Karnig, 1976, 1979; MacManus, 1978; Robinson & Dye, 1978), and on urban school boards (Robinson & England, 1981; Welch & Karnig, 1978).[1] Using concepts such as "proportional representation," "representative bureaucracy," and "affirmative action," these studies empirically examine a variety of questions, including aggregate black representation scores for bureaucracies and other political institutions, the impact of political and structural characteristics (e.g., form of government and size of body) on minority representation, the effects of socioeconomic conditions on black representation, and regional variations in black representation levels.

Despite the massive literature, the research is not clear on whether or not black representation results in different policy outcomes. As Eisinger (1982a, p. 380) notes, "There are still few explorations of the impact of black officials . . . and those that do exist are comparatively rudimentary." Addressing this gap in the literature, this article examines the relationship between black representation on urban school boards and a number of nonexpenditure educational policy indicators. The study is organized into three sections. The first section establishes the theoretical context for the study of black representation and surveys the literature with a focus on policy impacts. In the second section, the measures used to test the linkage between black school board representation and educational policy are analyzed with the use of a variety of univariate and multivariate tests. Finally, we discuss the implications of the study with respect to representation, public policy, and black politics.

Black Representation: Theory and Policy Impact

As Kuklinski (1979, p. 121) so aptly reminds us, "Few concerns, if any, have as hallowed a tradition in political science as the linkage between the few who represent and the many who are represented." Despite the voluminous research, however, little consensus has developed as to the meaning of representation. Representation, rather, is a concept with a myriad of facets. A survey of the general representation literature shows that the nature and meaning of representation has been characterized as description (Pitkin, 1967), congruence (Miller & Stokes, 1963), concurrence (Verba & Nie, 1972), responsiveness (Eulau & Karps, 1977), representativeness (Kingsley, 1944), accountability (Friedrich, 1950), institutional (Weissberg, 1978), and activity (Pitkin, 1967). The study of black representation has focused on only a few of these dimensions, and therein lies its major weakness. More specifically, black repre-

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[1] For studies focusing on the representation of women, see Karnig and Walker (1976) and MacManus (1976); for Hispanics, see Taebel (1978).

sentation has been largely defined in passive rather than active terms, and the major analytical focus of the literature has been on identifying the determinants rather than on analyzing the impact of black representation. As a result, the linkage between passive (or descriptive) and active black representation (policy outcomes) remains unclear. Drawing upon the general representation literature, a brief explanation is in order.

Defining and Measuring Representation: Passive v. Active Modes

In large part, the study of black representation has been based on "some variant of a proportionality notion . . . representation is described as equitable or fair when it approaches symmetry with the share of the black population" (Lineberry, 1978, p. 174). The literature on minority representation demonstrates, for example, that blacks are underrepresented (i.e., the proportion of offices they hold is smaller than their proportion of the population) on city councils (Karnig, 1976; Robinson & Dye, 1978), police forces (Preston, 1977), and upper-level administrative positions (Dye & Renick, 1981; Eisinger, 1982a, for cities; Cayer & Sigelman, 1980; Hutchins & Sigelman, 1981, for states; Meier & Nigro, 1976, for the federal government). In contrast, blacks are equitably or overrepresented on central city school boards (Robinson & England, 1981; Welch & Karnig, 1978) and in total government employment (Eisinger, 1982a; Meier & Nigro, 1976; Sigelman, 1974).

This accounting or census perspective of representation corresponds to what Pitkin (1967) labels descriptive representation, where representation is defined in terms of the characteristics of representatives or the compositional make-up of policymaking bodies. The notion of descriptive representation is inextricably linked to the concept of representativeness and more specifically to the theory of representative bureaucracy (see Kingsley, 1944; Long, 1952). Although this theory was developed for minority representation in bureaucracies, the logic also applies to minority representation in elected positions. If, the argument goes, officials have some discretion in the policies they adopt or implement, then the officials are likely to use this discretion to maximize their own political values.[2] The source of these political values is, of course, rooted in the political socialization of the individual. Since socialization patterns vary by race, sex, ethnicity, income, and other demographic characteristics, the theory argues that policy will be responsive to the general public to the extent that the officials mirror the origins of the populace (Mosher, 1968).

Descriptive representation, however, is only one dimension of the representational process. In fact, Pitkin (1967, p. 67) suggests that it constitutes a passive view of representation—it focuses on "being something rather than doing something." Instead, Pitkin (1967, p. 209) argues, representation should be viewed as an "activity"; representation means "acting in the interests of the represented." The important theoretical question, therefore, is to what extent is passive representation linked to active representation? Does electing blacks to school board positions (passive representation) result in school board policies beneficial to black constituents (active representation)?

In the more general representational studies, the link between active and passive representation has received some attention. For example, Eulau et al. (1959, adapted to school boards by Mann, 1974) suggest that after assuming an office or position, political representatives choose a representational style as they go about their business (activity) of representing. Three main representational role orientations are available: *trustee,* the official makes decisions based on his or her own judgments or values; *delegate,* the official follows constituency preferences; and *politico,* the official adopts either the trustee or delegate style depending on the situation. In the American context, with its focus on representative government, representation has generally been defined as a high congruence between constituency opinion and legislative voting on a pairwise basis—a delegate orientation (Weissberg, 1978, p. 536). The widely cited Miller and Stokes (1963) study, as well as numerous other representative-constituency linkage efforts (see Kuklinski, 1979, for a review), testifies to the popularity of measuring representation according to this dyadic perspective.

Eulau and Karps (1977, p. 235) assert, however, that "restricting the study of representation to the electoral connection produces a very limited version of the representational process." Instead, they argue that representation as an activity may manifest itself in one of four ways: 1) as official-constituent policy congruence (e.g., representative follows constituency policy preferences); 2) as service responsiveness (e.g., representatives secure particular benefits for individual constituents); 3) as allocative responsiveness (e.g., representative obtains collective benefits for his or her constituency); 4) symbolically (e.g., representative takes actions that build constituency trust and diffuse support). Active black representation can take place on any of these four dimensions if black officials, for example, 1) pursue constituency-favored policy goals, 2) seek jobs and other benefits for individual minorities, 3) seek compensatory education funds or other collective benefits, or 4) attempt to mobilize the political resources of the black community.

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[2] Discretion is still a key even when elected officials are examined. All elected officials are constrained by their political and economic environments as well as by constitutions, charters, and laws. In some areas of policy, the elected official may have no discretion to act.

Unfortunately, few black representation studies have been based on even the simple congruence models (for exceptions see Brooks, 1982; Harmel, Hamm & Thompson, 1983), let alone the four dimensions of activity that Eulau and Karps (1979) discuss. As a result, the degree to which black electoral success results in substantive benefits for blacks has received little analysis (Eisinger, 1982a, p. 380). Rather, employing an approach used by state and local policy output analysts (see, for example, Cole, 1971; Dawson & Robinson, 1963; Dye, 1966; Lineberry & Fowler, 1967; Rodgers, 1969; Sharkansky & Hofferbert, 1969), the major analytical focus of the black representation literature has been on isolating the determinants of representation (Davidson & Korbel, 1981; Lineberry, 1978). Of particular concern has been the type of election plan (Jones, 1976; Karnig, 1976; Robinson & Dye, 1978; Taebel, 1978). Other determinants examined include the size of the organizations (Long, 1952; Meier, 1979; Robinson & England, 1981; Taebel, 1978), socioeconomic factors (Cole, 1974; MacManus, 1978), political influences (England & Robinson, 1981; Karnig, 1979), and region (Engstrom & McDonald, 1981; Karnig, 1976, 1979; Taebel, 1978).

Just as a focus on descriptive minority representation tells us little about representation as an activity, an analytical approach that focuses on isolating the determinants of minority representation tells us little about the impact black representation has on public policy. Five years have passed since Lineberry (1978, p. 175), in a concluding essay on the significance of several of the major descriptive and determinant black representation studies, stated: "I, for one, would be very interested in knowing whether the composition of school boards and city councils resulted in any appreciable differences in their policy choices."

Although the impact of black representation on public policy has not received the attention that explaining black representation in descriptive or determinant terms has, a few studies have examined the question (see Welch & Karnig, 1980, for a comprehensive review). Keller (1978) examined six cities, three with black mayors (Gary, Cleveland, and Newark) and three with white mayors (Cincinnati, Trenton, and Indianapolis). Based on an analysis of spending patterns between 1965 and 1973 across functional areas (police, fire, roads, housing and urban development, parks and recreation, and public welfare), Keller (1978, p. 50) found "Black mayors do not, as a rule, spend less than white mayors on community wide items . . . and . . . it is not clear that they spend more on welfare type programs." In contrast, Keech's (1968) case studies of Durham and Tuskegee found numerous cases of black officials affecting public policy, particularly in Tuskegee. Other case studies of black mayors show additional instances of impact (Campbell & Feagin, 1975; Levine, 1974; Nelson, 1972; Nelson & Meranto, 1976; Poinsett, 1970; Stone, 1971).

Building on this work, Welch and Karnig (1979a, b; 1980) present a comprehensive analysis of the effects of black mayors and city council members on public expenditures. For 135 cities with populations of at least 50,000 and at least 10% black population, they found that black mayors spent more for social welfare and less for protective services, physical facilities (except for hospitals), and amenities. Black representation on city councils, however, had no consistent impact.

In a state-level study, Meier (1979) related minority employment in the state bureaucracy—both in numbers and in access to high level positions—to variations in state expenditure levels. He found that minority employment was, in fact, related to policy outputs even when a series of socioeconomic control variables were introduced.

Rather than using expenditure measures of public policy, Dye and Renick (1981) and Eisinger (1982a, b) used minority employment (particular benefits, Eulau & Karps, 1977) as the dependent variable. Analyzing the workforce composition in 42 cities, Dye and Renick (1981, p. 484) found that "For blacks and Hispanics, employment in top city jobs appears to be a function of political power as it is reflected in city council representation." City council representation is more important than other variables such as income or education in gaining administrative and professional positions. Eisinger (1982a, p. 390) found that the presence of a black mayor has a "modest incremental effect on levels of black employment and on affirmative action effort," but he is quick to note that the black population percentage is the best predictor of black employment.

These studies hardly resolve the question of whether or not passive black representation translates into active black representation and, therefore, public policy. Most of the studies use expenditure measures as policy indicators. As Eisinger (1982a) contends, expenditure measures are too crude and too distantly related to favorable policy toward blacks to be valid indicators of such policies. In addition, aggregate expenditures hide any shift in policies within a functional category which may be favorable to blacks (Welch & Karnig, 1979b, p. 122). Similarly, using personnel measures of public policy is not a great improvement, since this process will result in determining if representation in one political institution will also translate into representation in another political or bureaucratic institution (see Sigelman & Karnig, 1976). The question still remains; given better policy measures, will representation result in favorable policy outputs?

Data and Analysis

Measures of Representation

The impact of black representation on public policy will be examined for 82 of the largest central city school districts in the United States. These districts were chosen because data had to be gathered from numerous divergent sources and matched for this analysis. In many cases the data did not exist for smaller school districts. As a result of the "sample," our generalizations are only relevant to these large urban school districts, although the process by which representation is transformed into public policy should be similar in other jurisdictions.

The two most frequently used measures of representation are the representation index—a ratio of the percentage of blacks on the school board[3] to the percentage of blacks in the school district[4] (Sigelman, 1974)—and the deficit measure—the difference between the percentage of blacks on the school board and the percentage of blacks in the school district (MacManus, 1978; see critiques by Engstrom & McDonald, 1981, and Karnig & Welch, 1982).[5] For the present study both these measures have flaws. If one is concerned with the policy impact of black representation, neither of these measures is, in theory, monotonically related to policy impact. For example, black representation has a greater chance of being converted into black-favored policy outputs in Atlanta, Georgia, where blacks compose 55.6% of the school board than in Madison, Wisconsin, where blacks have 14.2% of the school board seats. Despite the obvious nature of this comparison, Madison has a more positive deficit (+12.9% versus 9.1%) and a much larger representation index (10.2 versus 1.2). To translate black demands into public policy, numbers on the school board are the sine qua non. If a school board has a 60% black majority, the representation ratio and the deficit measure become irrelevant.[6] For this reason, the present study uses the percentage of black-held seats on the school board as the representation measure and, thus, prime independent variable (see Bullock & Dennis, 1982; Bullock & MacManus, 1981; and Welch & Karnig, 1979b, p. 106). The percentage of blacks on urban school boards ranges from 0 to 80% with a mean of 20.1%.[7]

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[3] The percentage of blacks on the school board was taken from two different sources for three time points: 1978, 1974, and 1970. The 1978 data are from an original survey of urban school boards by Theodore P. Robinson (see Robinson & England, 1981). Data for 1970 and 1974 are from the Joint Center for Political Studies. In cases where the Center did not have data for certain cities, we supplemented their data with our own survey efforts. Different years are used so that representation measures could precede temporally the dependent policy variables; that is, if the dependent variable was for 1976, the 1974 representation measure was used. In univariate analysis, the 1978 data were used. In two cases, for college attendance and high school dropouts, the independent and dependent variables are for the same year.

We should also note that the data from the Joint Center have been criticized for errors; Robinson and Dye (1978), Taebel (1978), and MacManus (1978) all note that not all black officials are reported to the Center. Comparison of Center data for 1978 with the Robinson and England (1981) data for 1978 showed several errors. Because of such errors, we tried to correct some of the 1974 and 1970 data by our own survey efforts. Problems with identifying errors and recall errors limited this effort. Both corrected and uncorrected data yield the same results.

[4] All demographic data are based on the school district, not on the district's city. School-district boundaries may differ significantly from those of the city. All school district demographics are taken from The National Center for Education Statistics (1975), *Social and Economic Characteristics of U.S. School Districts, 1970* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare). The correlations between the school district and city demographics are as follows: income (.89), poverty level (.88), education (.86), and percent black (.94). This study deals with representation of and public policy toward blacks. In many cities in the Southwest and West, both Hispanics and Asians constitute a significant minority population. These minorities were not analyzed because only a small number of cities had large non-black minority populations. As a result, finding significant relationships would not be likely.

[5] For this data set, the representation index ranges from 0 to 10.2 with a mean of 1.20 (i.e., the average school board overrepresents blacks by 20%). For the deficit measure, the scores range from −28% to +59% with a mean of 1.4% (very slight overrepresentation).

[6] In practice, there might be cases where blacks would benefit more from minority status on the governing board than from majority status. A black majority might result in whites fleeing the school system. If this occurs and whites no longer care about the public education system, whites may be able to limit the resources available to the school system. The black student in Madison, Wisconsin, therefore, might be better off than the black student in Atlanta. In addition, one black member might be able to make a difference by articulating new views, checking racist impulses, and educating other members. I am indebted to Mike Goldstein of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission and Joseph Stewart for these arguments. For an alternative view, see Keech (1968).

Policy Indicators

Good policy indicators must meet two criteria. The indicator must relate to a program output that the policymaker can affect, particularly in the short run. The indicator must also be directly tied to race, so that the linkage between race and policy is clearly evident to the policymaker. Traditionally, expenditure data have been used in policy analysis (see Dye, 1966). Unfortunately, expenditure data meet neither of the two criteria. Expenditures are often limited by law or economics and may not be under the control of the school board in the short run. Expenditures are also difficult to link to black-favored policy goals; i.e., does increasing education spending automatically indicate policy outputs favorable to blacks (see Eisinger, 1982a)? Similarly, normal measures of educational attainment (e.g., scores on standardized tests) are difficult for the school board to affect in the short run.

The policy indicators in this study are more direct indicators of racial preference. Although segregation policies are affected by numerous actors other than school boards, one element of segregation, hiring black teachers, is under direct school-board control. Segregation can be maintained by denying blacks access to teaching positions, thus eliminating positive role models for the black student.[8] As a measure of teacher segregation, we use the percentage of school teachers who are black divided by the percentage of the district population that is black. Similar to the representation index, this measure equals 1.0 if the proportion of black teachers is equal to the proportion of blacks in the population. Index numbers less than 1.0 indicate too few black teachers, and numbers greater than 1.0 indicate more black teachers than expected.[9] The mean and range for this and other dependent variables are found in Table 1.

In a series of articles, Bullock and Stewart (1978, 1979; Stewart & Bullock, 1981) argue that as schools become desegregated, more subtle forms of discrimination may take place against black students. Black students are punished in greater numbers, are more likely to be assigned to special education classes to get rid of them, and are less likely to be guided into college prep and quality programs. Eight "representation" measures of "second generation discrimination," as Bullock and Stewart term these actions, were created by dividing the proportion of blacks experiencing some form of second generation discrimination (e.g., suspensions) by the proportion of whites similarly treated. Measures were created

Table 1. Measures of Policy Impact for Urban School Districts

Measure	Low	High	Means	Standard Deviation	n
Teacher ratio	.42	1.58	1.02	.27	77
Ratio of blacks to whites:					
Attending college	.05	2.24	.38	.31	79
In votech programs	.31	1.76	.96	.21	82
Suspended	.51	6.87	1.79	.80	82
School dropouts	.84	3.12	1.49	.42	81
Special education	.66	2.34	1.24	.31	80
EMR classes	.00	4.20	1.89	.87	82
Gifted programs	.07	1.72	.50	.30	82
Enriched classes	.11	2.72	.57	.34	82

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[7] The intercorrelation (r) between the deficit measure and the representation ratio is .58. The correlation of the percentage of blacks on the school board with the deficit measure is .62 and with the representation measure is .28.

[8] Teachers can also be segregated in the sense that all the minority teachers can be located in specified schools. Although this is also an important segregation policy, there are no currently available Taeuber indexes (which measures segregation) for school teachers. See Taeuber and Taeuber (1978).

[9] The teachers' data are taken from the U.S. Office of Civil Rights ("Student Trend Data") and were supplied by Professor Franklin Wilson of the University of Wisconsin. The data are for 1973, the last year without large quantities of missing data.

(see Table 1) for graduates enrolled in college,[10] assignment to vocational programs,[11] students suspended, students dropping out of school, and students assigned to special education classes, educable mentally retarded (EMR) classes, gifted programs, and enriched, honors, or advanced classes.

Findings

If black access to school board seats results in policy changes, we would expect that those cities with higher proportions of blacks on the school board would also have better representation of black teachers, a larger proportion of blacks attending college, fewer blacks in vocational training programs, fewer blacks suspended, fewer blacks dropping out, fewer blacks in special education classes and classes for the educable mentally retarded, and more blacks in gifted programs and enriched classes. Table 2 shows the simple correlations between each of the nine policy indicators and the percentage of black members on the school board.[12]

Table 2 shows that employment of black teachers is related to school board representation as hypothesized. School districts with more black school board members also have a better representation of black teachers. The relationship is not strong, but it is in the correct direction.

Table 2 also shows that student career plans are not immune to influence via school board representation. The relative proportion of blacks attending college is related to black school board membership. Vocational enrollments, however, are unaffected. The absence of a linkage to vocational education may well be the result of a reevaluation of vocational education in the educational system. Given today's job market, many vocational schools are highly competitive, and admissions are prized. The positive relationship may well reflect the denial of opportunities to blacks in this area also.[13]

For all four punitive aspects of second generation discrimination—suspensions, dropouts, assignment to special education classes, and assignment to EMR classes—significant relationships exist in the hypothesized direction. In cities

Table 2. Relationship between Black Representation and Policy Outputs

Policy Variable	Correlation with % Blacks on School Board	Predicted Direction
Teacher ratio, 1973^a	.20*	+
Attending college, 1970^a	.18	+
Vocational school, 1976^b	.05	–
Suspended, 1976^b	–.39*	–
Dropouts, 1970^a	–.40*	–
Special education, 1976^b	–.40*	–
EMR classes, 1976^b	–.32*	–
Gifted, 1976^b	.01	+
Enriched, 1976^b	.24*	+

*p less than .05.

^{a}Independent variable is 1970 Black Representation.

^{b}Independent variable is 1974 Black Representation.

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[10] The college enrollment data are taken from the National Center for Education Statistics (1975; see note 4). The data are for 1970, the most recent available year. School dropout rates are taken from the same source and are for the same year.

[11] The vocational education data are from the U.S. Office of Civil Rights ("Elementary and Secondary School Civil Rights Survey: School Year 1976-77") and were provided by Professor Joseph Stewart of Rice University. The data on suspensions, special education, EMR programs, gifted programs, and enriched classes are from the same source for the same year.

[12] The correlations between the representation index and the policy variables are college (–.08), votech (–.14), suspensions (.06), dropouts (.09), special education (.32), EMR classes (–.06), gifted (.00), enriched (–.12), and teachers (.00). The correlations for the deficit measure are college (–.04), votech (–.05), suspensions (–.01), dropouts (–.01), special education (.06), EMR classes (–.01), gifted (.01), enriched (–.08), teachers (–.06).

[13] The argument on vocational education was called to my attention by Michael Preston. According to Preston (personal communication), vocational education slots are highly valued in today's job market and in many locations are not used to funnel off blacks from better educational opportunities.

with more blacks on the school board, fewer blacks (proportionally) are suspended, drop out of school, are placed in special education programs, or are placed in EMR classes (Table 2).

Similar results hold for denial of access to quality programs. In school districts with a higher percentage of blacks on the board, proportionately more blacks are admitted to gifted and enriched classes. In the case of enriched classes, the relationship is statistically significant.

Although the correlations in Table 2 generally support our hypotheses, the relationships are fairly modest. One reason is that each of the measures of second generation discrimination contains some measurement error. The suspension ratio, for example, probably taps both second generation discrimination and some variations in discipline problems. The common variation shared by each of the eight measures of second generation discrimination, therefore, is probably a better measure of second generation discrimination than any of the individual measures. Using factor analysis, this commonality was extracted and used as a composite indicator of second generation discrimination.[14] Higher scores on the factor score indicate greater second-generation discrimination. As expected, the correlation between the second generation discrimination factor and the percentage of black seats on the school board is larger than those for the individual indicators ($r = -.48$; $p < .05$).

Although Table 2 suggests that black representation on school boards can limit the degree of second generation discrimination against black students, this conclusion is premature. The relationship may well be spurious. For example, black representation might be high and second generation discrimination might be low because the proportion of blacks residing in the school district is large. A large black population can elect more black board members, and it also has the political influence to discourage discrimination efforts. Similarly, cities with greater black resources (education, income, political organization) will have a black minority that has the political clout both to elect more school board members and to influence the direction of educational policy.

To determine if the relationship between black representation on school boards and second generation discrimination is spurious, therefore, each of the policy indicators will be used as a dependent variable in a multiple regression. The independent variables are the percentage of blacks on the school board and four black resource variables—the black population percentage in the district, the median family income for blacks, the median black education level,[15] and a measure of black political resources.[16]

The results of the multiple regressions appear in Table 3. As expected, the statistical results show some variation across the policy indicators. In six of the nine cases the relationship between black school-board seats and second-generation discrimination disappears when black resources are controlled. For placement in EMR classes, placement in gifted classes, and college enrollments, the impact of black school-board seats remains statistically significant. For the factor measure of second-generation discrimination, black population dwarfs the impact of all other variables. Black representation on school boards, therefore, does affect educational equity policies and in some cases has an impact even with controls for black population, black income, black education, and black political resources. This conclusion must be tempered, however, since many of the equations in Table 3 suffer from collinearity, thus, limiting the interpretation of the individual regression coefficients.

The relationship between black resources, black elected officials, and public policy merits further discussion. School district black resources strongly influence the extent of black representation on

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[14] The first factor was used because all indicators loaded in the correct direction. The total variance explained by the first factor is 33.9%. It was the only significant factor. The loadings of each indicator on the factor were as follows: college (−.13), votech (.15), suspensions (.82), dropouts (.59), special education (.72), EMR classes (.80), gifted (−.21), enriched (−.37).

[15] All data are from the National Center for Education Statistics (1975); see note 4. On the importance of education, see Sigelman and Karnig (1977).

[16] The black controlled-resource variable is a factor score index combining several indicators of black resources: 1) number of black state senators, 2) number of black state representatives, 3) number of black judicial officials, 4) graduate chapters of Kappa Alpha Psi, 5) number of Links, Inc., chapters, 6) number of Alpha Kappa Alpha chapters, 7) number of National Urban League chapters, 8) number of top 100 black-owned businesses, 9) number of black-owned banks, and 10) number of black-owned businesses registered with the Small Business Administration. The indicators were unidimensional, with the first factor accounting for 54% of the total variance. For a discussion of the validity of using these variables as indicators of black-controlled resources see Karnig (1979) and Birmingham (1977). We did not include black mayors or police chiefs in the resource variable because there were only nine black mayors and three black police chiefs in our sample. Exclusion did not affect the factor scores appreciably. Finding only one factor is significant because it indicates black political, economic, and organizational resources are highly linked.

Table 3. Impact of Black Representation on Public Policy Controlling for Black Resources

Partial Slopes[a]	Dependent Policy Variable									
Independent Variable	Teachers	Votech	Suspensions	Dropouts	Spec. Ed	EMR Class	Gifted	Enriched	College	Factor
% Black population	–.21	–.05	–.74*	–.48*	–.53*	–1.00*	.61*	.41	–.01	–.90*
Black income	–.37*	–.08	–.15	.33*	.02	–.18	.03	.12	–.37*	–.05
Black education	–.04	–.21	–.09	–.38*	.07	–.26*	.25	–.18	.38*	–.23
Black resources	.45*	.04	.05	.15	–.00	–.01	–.16	–.03	–.17	.06
School board seats	.22	.08	.08	–.22	–.04	.39*	–.37*	–.10	.42*	.11
R^2	.27	.06	.40	.27	.30	.50	.10	.19	.19	.51

*p less than .05.

[a] Standardized regression coefficients.

school boards (see England & Robinson, 1981), and then black school board members create policies to limit educational discrimination. Because population and other resources cannot directly affect educational policies without going through the school board, representation on the school board becomes a necessary condition for policy impact. As long as black population and other resources are freely translated into black seats on the school board, public policy should be responsive to public sentiment. In cases where electoral systems restrict black representation, this linkage is attenuated. In other words, the determinants of representation studies are important because elected representatives transform public policy demands into public policies. Any variables that affect the efficiency of the transformation device, therefore, are important subjects of political research.[17]

To illustrate in a crude way the effect of one variable, school board section plans, on the translation of votes into policy, the percentage of black population was regressed on the percentage of blacks on the school board for subsets of cities with three types of selection plan—appointive, ward or mixed, and at-large. According to Engstrom and McDonald (1981), the slopes of these regression equations show whether or not representation is affected by the selection plan. The closer the slope is to 1.0 (indicating blacks hold seats in proportion to their numbers), the more equitable black representation is. Table 4 shows that the appointive system overrepresents blacks by approximately 10%, whereas ward or mixed systems result in almost perfect representation.[18] At-large elections, on the other hand, produce only 69% of the black school board members that would be expected.

The use of an appointive school board raises an interesting policy question. Are the appointive school board members likely to be responsive to the black community, or is their loyalty to other political forces? Clearly the appointment process creates possibilities of minority appointees who are unresponsive to the minority community. To investigate this possibility, the means for the second-generation discrimination indicators are shown in Table 5 for each type of selection plan. The table definitely shows that appointive selection plans are not detrimental to black policy objectives. Second-generation discrimination policies are more favorable to blacks under appointive systems in eight of the nine cases compared to at-large systems and in six of nine cases compared to ward and mixed systems. In addition, ward and mixed systems result in more favorable policies toward blacks in six of the nine cases when compared to at-large systems. On the factor measure of second-generation discrimination, the appointive board is associated with the least-discriminatory school systems. Clearly appointive school boards are not less responsive than other school boards to the black community.

Summary and Implications

This research examined the relationship between black representation on urban school boards and several educational policies that affect blacks. The study was designed in a manner favorable to finding some representational impact on public policy. The policy arenas were local where fewer political resources are necessary to have an impact, and the educational policy indicators were nonexpenditure variables that are directly tied to second generation educational discrimination

Table 4. The Relationship between Seats and Population for Different School Board Selection Procedures

	Appointive	Ward and Mixed	At-Large
Slope	1.096	.981	.690
F Score	53.9	23.6	11.8
R^2	.81	.55	.21
N	15	21	46

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[17] One interesting question related to the efficiency of the translation of resources into policy is whether or not there is an interaction between resources and representation; that is, do resources have more impact when accompanied by representation? To test this proposition, we added four interaction terms (representation with each of the four resources variables) to the equations in Table 3. The results were disappointing. In none of the equations did the predictive power (measured by adjusted R^2) improve appreciably. In only 4 out of 40 cases did significant relationships occur where none existed before, well within the limits of chance.

[18] Ward systems and mixed systems (those that combine elements of both ward and at-large elections) were combined because there were too few cases in each category for separate analysis.

against blacks. Significant relationships were found between black representation and education policy. When controls for black resources were introduced, some, but not all, of the relationships disappeared. In short, a modest relationship between black representation on school boards and educational policy exists and, in some cases, persists when black political and economic resources are introduced.

Although the relationships were modest, expecting stronger relationships than those found here is not theoretically realistic. The barriers to black impact on educational policy are numerous. Specifically, six preconditions must be met before black school-board members can affect school policies. First, some blacks must be elected to the school board. Second, educational issues must matter to the black community; that is, the black community must have consistent preferences about the direction of educational policy. In this study we assumed that blacks wished to end inequitable treatment of black students in the educational process. Third, issues relevant to the black community must be on the school board's agenda. If such issues are kept off the agenda, representation will not affect policy (see Bachrach & Baratz, 1963). Fourth, the blacks on the school board must hold the same policy stands as the black community. If black school-board members adopt white educational values, the linkage between race and policy is severed. Fifth, the blacks on the school board must be able to influence the direction of the board's activities. If blacks are not able to persuade nonblack members to vote for favorable policies, then this condition may be met only if blacks constitute a majority or sizable minority on the school board. Sixth, the policies adopted by the school board must be implemented by the educational bureaucracy (see Mladenka, 1981; Tucker & Zeigler, 1980, pp. 229-230).

If these six conditions are not met, black representation on school boards may become symbolic. Although symbolic representation and access are important, representation is more important if it leads to actual representation and policy responsiveness. In many districts these preconditions are not met or only partially met. As a result, the transformation of electoral results into policy will be inexact and partial. Expecting relationships stronger than those found in this research, therefore, is expecting too much. As more of the preconditions are met, the relationships between representation and policy will become stronger.

The findings in this research have implications for three research traditions—representation theory, black politics, and public policy analysis. First, in terms of representation theory, this study finds a linkage between passive and active representation. In some areas of representation research, such as representative bureaucracy (see Meier, 1979; Saltzstein, 1979; and Subramaniam, 1967, among others), and elite background studies (see Nagel, 1977), this linkage has been assumed with little empirical evidence. Although active and passive representation are theoretically distinct dimensions of representation, in this study they partially overlap. What is needed in representation theory, therefore, is some effort to specify the conditions under which the two representations are linked.

Second, in terms of black politics, this study supports those findings that contend electoral structure is important. Haunting the large literature on the impact of at-large districts and other urban "reforms" on black representation has been the question of whether or not representation makes a difference. If it does not, representation becomes symbolic. In terms of school districts, an argument can be made that representation makes a difference. The type of electoral system affects the number of seats blacks attain on the school board (Table 4), and the number of black-held seats on the school board affects

Table 5. School Board Selection Plan and Second Generation Discrimination

Discrimination Measure	Appointment	Ward and Mixed	At-Large	*p*
College	.43	.33	.39	NS
Suspensions	1.56	1.67	1.93	NS
Special education	1.14	1.22	1.28	NS
Gifted	.53	.48	.51	NS
Votech	1.03	.98	.94	NS
Dropouts	1.32	1.41	1.57	.10
EMR	1.66	1.78	2.02	NS
Enriched	.68	.72	.47	.01
Black teachers	1.04	1.09	.98	NS
FACTOR	−6.02	−2.94	8.96	.08
N	15	21	46	

second-generation discrimination (Tables 2 and 3). This finding underscores the importance of the determinants research and the litigation challenging at-large elections.

The third finding, also in terms of black politics, concerns the effect of appointive school boards. School districts with appointive boards had the least second-generation discrimination of any type of selection plan. This finding implies that elections are not a necessary condition for the exercise of black actual representation. Although this is a fairly common perspective in the bureaucratic politics literature (see Rourke, 1976), the black-politics literature has always been concerned about the potential of cooptation. Possession of policymaking positions, therefore, may be more important than how those positions are attained.

Fourth, in terms of public policy analysis, this research indicates that the area needs continued effort to refine its policy output measures. Expenditure measures are too difficult to link theoretically to public preferences and too often constrained by environmental factors. In this case and possibly others, moving beyond expenditures is possible. The result should be more exacting tests of key hypotheses.

Finally, in terms of public policy analysis, this study contributes to the massive debate on politics and public policy. Are political variables or socioeconomic variables the key to understanding public policy? No other question in the state policy analysis literature has received the attention that this one has. Using expenditure measures of public policy, the frequent conclusion is that political variables have little or no impact on public policy (Dye, 1966). In this case, political factors (the election of blacks to school board seats) are associated with variation in specific educational policies. Politics matters.

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The Public Hearing as an Effective Citizen Participation Mechanism: A Case Study of the General Revenue Sharing Program

Richard L. Cole
The University of Texas at Arlington

David A. Caputo
Purdue University

Students of citizen participation in public affairs disagree as to the effectiveness of such citizen involvement. Using the General Revenue Sharing program as a case study and applying techniques of both cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis, this article examines the effectiveness of one form of citizen participation, the public hearing. It is found that in the revenue-sharing program, the public hearing did have an immediate, but only short-term, impact on levels of public interest and citizen involvement. Evidence to support some short-term and some long-term effects on reported expenditure decisions is presented; however, these impacts generally are found to be inconsequential and not statistically significant. It is concluded that, as a form of citizen participation, the public hearing—at least as demonstrated in the General Revenue Sharing program—has not had much of an impact on citizen behavior or policy choices.

> Two dominant outcomes [of citizen participation] are improved services and improved flow of information. The rates of these outcomes, especially of improved services, suggest . . . a fairly positive picture for the decentralization experience. (Yin & Yates, 1975, p. 56).
>
> Advocates of citizen participation have more reason to despair now than they did ten years ago. Citizen organizations have little influence on the . . . decision making process. (Gittell, 1980, p. 741).

These quotations reflect the polar views of students of citizen participation in public affairs concerning the effectiveness of such participation efforts. Indeed, in spite of the literally hundreds of studies of direct citizen participation in the public sector conducted in the past three decades,[1] there has been little consensus about the effectiveness of such behavior. As Checkoway and Van Til (1978) have noted, "It is remarkable how little research and analysis has been done [on the ways in which participation can make a difference in the policy outcomes of government]. Does participation work? Does it make government more responsive? Few major studies address these questions and the important issues they raise." As many citizen participation programs now are potentially threatened by budget cuts, decentralization of decision making, deregulation, and weakening of statutes,[2] it seems especially appropriate to examine the accomplishments of citizen participation efforts and to attempt to determine what sort of citizen participation strategies are successful under what conditions.

This is a study of the impacts of one form of citizen participation—the public hearing—in one federally sponsored and locally administered program, General Revenue Sharing (GRS). Considering the number of participating jurisdictions, GRS represents the most extensive federal grant

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[1] For an introduction to the citizen participation literature in the private, corporate sector, see Vogel (1978).

[2] See the discussion by Berry (1981).

program incorporating the public hearing process ever enacted and offers a unique opportunity to assess the impact of the public hearing as a form of direct citizen involvement.

The General Revenue Sharing Program

The State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act (GRS), originally passed as part of President Nixon's New Federalism program in 1972 and extended by two renewal legislations through 1983, has been called by some a "milestone in fiscal federalism" (Reagan & Sanzone, 1982, p. 81). There is no question that GRS is an important program in the contemporary intergovernmental system. In 1980, GRS was the sixth largest federal grant program.[3] At the conclusion of fiscal 1983, GRS has distributed more than $62 billion to states and localities. Equal in importance to the amount of money distributed through the program is the way in which the money is allocated. The no-strings (or at least few-strings) feature of GRS marked a significant departure from many of the categorical grant programs of the 1960s and initiated a trend that to varying degrees would be reflected in other major grant programs of the 1970s. The significance of GRS is illustrated by a poll of scholars of American government and politics, which found the program to be rated the second most important intergovernmental program of the past two decades (Cole, Stenberg, & Weissert, in press).

But for scholars of active participation in public affairs, GRS is important in terms other than amount and flexibility of money allocated through the program. Because of its nature and because of some significant changes in the 1976 renewal legislation, GRS provides a rare opportunity to examine the effectiveness of one form of citizen participation.

The initial GRS legislation (1972 to 1976) included no requirement for citizen participation by recipient units of government,[4] which in fact was one of the most controversial and distinguishing features of the program, especially when compared with many of the Great Society programs. Yet, many cities did hold public hearings in reaching their GRS expenditure decisions. Thus, use patterns from 1972 to 1976 can be compared for those localities permitting hearings with those not permitting hearings, and inferences can be made about the effects of public hearings. In fact, a few studies are available which make such comparisons for the early years of GRS. A later section of this article compares the results of those studies with our own similar analysis.

More important, the 1976 renewal legislation required *all* recipient units of government to hold public hearings before allocating GRS funds. Specifically, the 1976 renewal legislation required a proposed-use hearing to be held not less than seven days before the presentation of the budget to the body responsible for enacting it. Notice of this hearing must be published at least ten days before the hearing. After this, a hearing must be held before the adoption of the entire budget, and this second hearing must focus on the relationship of revenue-sharing funds to the entire budget. Notice of this hearing, too, must be published at least ten days before the hearing, and a summary of the entire budget and the proposed use of the GRS funds must be made available for public inspection. These very important changes in the legislation permit a comparison of use patterns and other outcome measures for those cities that did not hold hearings before 1976 but were required to hold hearings after 1976. Thus the program permits the application of a quasi-experimental research design (Campbell & Stanley, 1963), where a type of pre- and post-test analysis is possible. Before the discussion of our methods and the presentation of results, a brief review of attempts to measure citizen participation in the broader context is in order.

Citizen Participation, Public Hearings, and Prior Research

It is not possible in the present article to review all the citizen participation literature of the last three decades or even that portion dealing specifically with the public hearing as a citizen participation device. It is important to note, however, that in spite of numerous citizen-participation studies,[5] very few serious and systematic attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of citizen participation in general, or of public hearings in particular, are available. In a major analysis of citizen-participation efforts in federal programs, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) acknowledged the "general absence of soundly prepared evaluation studies in the federal government and elsewhere" (ACIR, 1979, p. 305). Reviewing specifically the literature in the area of public hearings, Checkoway (1980) found "few studies which address the effectiveness [of the public hearing] as a participation method."

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[3] See the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1981, p. 158).

[4] The exceptions to this statement are few. The recipients were required to prepare planned and actual use reports and to publish these reports in local newspapers and also were required to expend funds in accordance with state law.

[5] For a thorough review of this literature, see Hutcheson and Shevin (1976).

Given the extensive reliance on the public hearing as a form of citizen involvement in the United States, it is indeed remarkable to reflect on how little is known about the effectiveness of the technique. As Checkoway (1980) notes, "Public hearings are among the most traditional methods for citizen participation in America. They are required at all levels of government and are increasing in number and use. It is safe to estimate that their numbers run to the tens of thousands per year." The ACIR, in its 1979 survey of participation requirements in federal grant programs, found that of the 155 federal grant programs requiring citizen participation, 55 of these mandated public hearings as the form of citizen input (ACIR, 1979). Clearly the time has come for at least some initial evaluations of the public hearing as a citizen participation device.

Some attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of citizen participation efforts are available.[6] But, as Rosener (1978) points out, the participation concept is multifaceted, and many of the past evaluation efforts do not adequately address this complexity. For effective evaluation, Rosener (1978) argues, there must be agreement on goals and objectives, and there needs also "to be fairly complete knowledge of a cause and effect relationship between some specified participation program, and the achievement of agreed upon goals or objectives." Similarly, in discussing the obstacles to effective citizen participation program evaluation, Yin and Yates (1975) described these evaluation problems as follows: studies rarely possess even elementary aspects of experimental design; criteria for success or failure are often vague and ambiguous; many of the studies cover only very brief time periods; and often evaluators are themselves active participants in the experiments.

A study of citizen participation in the GRS program does not resolve all of these problems, but it does address many thorny methodological issues that have long plagued evaluation research in the participation area. First, since the program has been in existence for a decade, extensive longitudinal data can be analyzed. Second, GRS is received by every general purpose unit of local government in the country, so a large number of experiences are available for study. These two points alone—a large number of cases and a relatively long time period—distinguish evaluation of citizen participation in GRS from that possible in the majority of participation efforts. Additionally, the aggregate analysis possible with GRS avoids some of the more subjective biases that may be associated with case studies or participant-observation methodologies. And, although the 1976 GRS renewal legislation is typically vague concerning the objectives of citizen involvement in the program, enough revenue-sharing research has been completed so that, at least among scholars, some common interests and expectations of the outcomes of citizen involvement in the program have developed. These objectives will be reviewed more carefully below.

But, most important, as previously mentioned, GRS provides an opportunity to utilize a research design somewhat analogous to the true experiment where pre-test and post-test conditions apply. Collectively, these aspects of GRS render the program a very attractive test of the effectiveness of citizen participation, or at least of the public hearing as a form of citizen participation, in a public program.

Data and Methodology

GRS also poses some very difficult methodological issues, especially for those attempting to assess fiscal impacts of the program. The most critical of these center around two concerns: fungibility and substitution. Briefly stated, fungibility involves the difficulty in tracing specific expenditure decisions to GRS funds rather than other general revenues, whereas substitution involves the use of GRS funds to release (substitute for) local funds that can then be used for other expenditure purposes. As observers of local finance will attest, these closely related problems complicate analysis and make it extraordinarily difficult to measure the net effects of GRS or, for that matter, any other grant or intergovernmental transfer program. Various strategies have been used by those attempting to measure GRS's fiscal impact, including the analysis of reports filed by recipient units with the Department of the Treasury, the use of field observers for monitoring how GRS is used in various jurisdictions, the use of survey research methods, and the development of sophisticated computer simulation models which attempt to predict what would have been expected to happen to local expenditures in the absence of GRS funds.[7] We do not intend to raise, let alone to resolve, in this article the com-

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[6] In her review of citizen participation evaluation attempts, Rosener (1978) cites the following studies as those evaluating participation effectiveness: Cole (1974), Mazmanian (1976), Rosenbaum (1975), and Yin and Yates (1975).

[7] For a survey of these approaches, see Caputo and Cole (1976), Nathan and Adams (1977), Larkey (1979), and Newcomer and Welch (1981).

Table 1. Frequencies of Public Hearings in General Revenue Sharing Decisions, 1973-1982 (%)

	Hearings held		
	Yes	No	*N*
1973	49.7	50.3	214
1974	58.6	41.4	217
1975	57.9	42.1	207
1976	56.2	42.8	208
1977	83.4	16.6	163
1978	96.4	3.6	165
1979	100.0	–	213
1980	98.1	1.9	215
1981	100.0	–	220
1982	100.0	–	211

Source: Authors' annual survey data.

plex conceptual and methodological points addressed by these various approaches. Our method is to ask chief executives, as local expert judges, to indicate what they believed to have been the fiscal impact of GRS. Thus, we rely on survey research methods to measure fiscal impact, and our data can best be described as estimates of perceived impact by local officials. Although our methodology is as vulnerable to the fungibility and substitution problems as that of others, we believe that in most of the areas of interest to GRS researchers, our previous findings generally conform to the conclusions of scholars using other techniques.[8]

Our data are derived from mailed questionnaire surveys of chief executive officers in every American city with a population over 50,000 conducted by the authors every year since the inception of GRS. In addition to questions on citizen involvement, our survey has dealt with perceived impact of the program. All of our fiscal impact questions and many of our attitudinal questions are identical, or nearly so, over the entire period.[9] Thus, we are able to draw upon a unique set of time series data. Our annual return rate has been approximately 50% (ranging from 41% in 1977 to 54% in 1982). Extensive and published analysis has failed to detect any systematic demographic, regional, or political bias in the return (Cole & Caputo, 1977). Data for this article represent results from the 1973 through 1982 surveys. Our 1977 survey, conducted in late spring and early summer of 1977, is the first survey reflecting post-renewal (i.e., post-1976) data.

Participation in the GRS Program: Hypotheses and Assumptions

As mentioned above, a number of cities held public hearings in conjunction with GRS decisions even before the 1976 renewal legislation required such participation. Table 1 indicates the proportion of our sample reporting public hearings for the entire period of our surveys.

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[8] This is not to minimize some of the significant differences found by students of GRS using differing methodologies. But it is to say that the available research demonstrates broad areas of consensus and also that precise comparisons among studies are difficult owing to differing populations and categories of jurisdictions studied and differing time periods of analysis. For our sample of cities over 50,000 we found in 1975 responding officials to report allocating 34% of GRS to public safety and 6.0% to social services. The Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan's study of that same year (using an equal dollar weighting scheme) found cities over 300,000 allocated 20.5% to public safety and 13.6% to social services. The SRC found cities between 100,000 and 300,000 to have allocated 45.7% to public safety and 1.8% to social services. The SRC found cities between 25,000 and 100,000 to have allocated 31.7% to public safety and 4.4% to social services. We found in our sample of cities over 50,000 that 49.7% and 58.6% reported having held public hearings in 1973 and 1974, respectively. The SRC found 64.5% and 56.2% of cities over 300,000 in its sample to have held hearings those years. The SRC found significantly fewer smaller cities having held hearings in those years. In our 1974 survey, we found cities reporting about 18% of their revenue sharing funds to have been allocated to new program areas (as compared with substitution uses). The SRC found this figure to be about 20% for cities over 100,000 (the only size category they reported for this area).

[9] This is the case with the exception of 1973, when we did not ask respondents to indicate levels of public interest. For purposes of analysis, we assigned cities a 1973 public interest level score identical to their 1974 score. For all cities, agreement from one year to the next on this variable was 84%.

It can be seen that approximately half of the cities in our sample reported holding public hearings in the prerenewal period. In this sense, our data are comparable with other studies of the early years of the GRS program. The Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, in its NSF-sponsored study (Juster, 1975), found in 1973 that 54.7% of the cities in its sample held public hearings. (The SRC study did not include separate breakdowns for cities in the "over 50,000" category.) Table 1 indicates that the renewal legislation and its requirement for public involvement did have an impact. By the end of the decade virtually 100% of all cities reported compliance with the provision of the renewal legislation requiring public hearings.

But those interested in the impact of citizen involvement in the GRS program obviously are concerned with impact factors other than simply compliance with the law. *The real question, and the one that this article addresses, is whether in a substantive sense the public hearing process has had an impact.* In assessing the impact of the public hearing process, three measures will be examined: expenditure outcomes, public interest and involvement in local affairs, and net fiscal effect (i.e., proportion allocated to new and expanded programs as opposed to proportion used for program maintenance, tax reduction, and other substitution uses). These are issues that have concerned students of GRS and especially those interested in public involvement in GRS since the inception of the program. Each of these is discussed below.

Expenditure Outcomes. Expenditure outcomes have always been a major concern of those advocating greater citizen involvement in GRS and especially those concerned with the small proportion of GRS allocated to human services. Study after study has concluded that very large proportions of GRS have been allocated to traditional municipal services, but very little has been allocated to social and human services (Juster, 1975). For those concerned about these differentials, it always has been hoped that greater citizen involvement would result in higher proportions of GRS being allocated to human services. As noted in the ACIR (1979) study, "A substantial share of the original demands for federal participation requirements in GRS sprang from dissatisfaction with the alleged allocation of funds in a racially or geographically discriminating way. Particular emphasis was placed on the tendency for established budget processes to allocate GRS funds to traditional municipal services (e.g., police, fire, sanitation) as against social or human services." Indeed, in their early study of the GRS program, Nathan and Adams (1977) found that in those jurisdictions where public interest groups were active in GRS decisions, those groups favored the use of GRS "primarily for social service programs affecting the poor and otherwise disadvantaged."

The GRS legislative hearings themselves provide numerous examples of witnesses attempting to link the citizen participation issue with the expenditure of GRS funds for social services. John Martin (1975) of the National Retired Teachers Association testified during the first renewal debate that "Communities have shown little or no inclination to use these monies to increase available social services. . . ." In order to remedy this, Martin argued, "There is a need for more adequate citizen input into the process of planning for the use of such monies." Likewise, Nan Watterman (1975) of the League of Women Voters testified, "Our basic concern is that the distribution of funds is equitable and meets human needs. . . . To fulfill the promise of the program, citizens must be involved in decisions about spending GRS funds." It has been widely assumed, then, that citizens and public interest groups would favor greater proportions of GRS funds to be allocated to human services and that mandated public hearings would be a way to accomplish such a distribution.

In fact, early studies of GRS did establish certain links between public hearings and the proportion allocated to social services. The Survey Research Center's study (Juster, 1975), for example, found that of the cities with populations over 100,000 which had held public hearings, 77% reported health and social services to be new issues attended to because of GRS, compared with only 37% of the same size cities not holding public hearings. The study further concluded, "City officials in places with hearings and citizen activity reported attention to social services more than other city officials," and that "Both large and small cities with initial hearings did spend a greater percent of their GRS allocations on social services than did other cities" (Juster, 1975, pp. 75, 76).

In an earlier study, we found an association between public hearings and the proportion of GRS allocated to social service programs. In that study, we concluded that "Cities which did not hold public hearings were much more likely to allocate their revenue sharing funds for public safety functions. . . . Cities that did hold public hearings, on the other hand, spend larger proportions of their money . . . for social services and health services" (Caputo & Cole, 1974, pp. 102-103).

The first proposition we examine, then, is that public hearings will influence expenditure outcomes and, in particular, that such hearings will be associated with greater proportions of GRS being allocated in the areas of human services and smaller proportions being allocated in traditional service areas, such as public safety.

New or Expanded Operations. It also is anticipated that citizens and public interest groups will favor greater GRS allocations for new programming areas because, as Nathan and Adams (1977) argue, "New or expanded operating programs can be expected to have a more direct and immediate effect on people than is true of most capital projects." As was the case with functional expenditure outcome, some early, but tentative, evidence already exists to substantiate this expectation. The Survey Research Center's study, for example, concluded that "cities with initial GRS hearings spent more than twice as great a percentage of their GRS allocations on new programs as cities without hearings" (Juster, 1975, p. 76). Also, Nathan and Adams (1977) found that cities having no citizen involvement allocated 8% of their GRS funds to new operating uses compared with 13% for new operating outlays for those cities permitting citizen involvement. We will test the proposition, then, that public hearings will be positively related to the proportion of GRS allocated to new and expanded uses as opposed to that allocated for substitution purposes.

Public Interest and Involvement. Our final measure of effectiveness is impact of public hearings on the overall level of citizen interest in local affairs. Again, some of the earlier studies provide hypotheses that can be more fully explored in this study. The Opinion Research Corporation (1975) survey, funded by NSF, included more than 1,000 telephone interviews of the general public and 800 telephone interviews of community leaders. Approximately 18% of the public and 24% of community leaders believed the GRS program had increased their public interest and participation in local affairs. Further, one-third of all respondents to the Opinion Research Corporation's survey believed GRS had increased the participation of local organizations in local government.

Nathan and Adams, too, found increased public interest as a result of GRS, especially among those jurisdictions permitting public hearings. They stated, "One distinguishing characteristic associated with those jurisdictions permitting citizen involvement was the degree of overall public interest in revenue sharing. In six of the nine citizen involvement localities, the overall level of public interest was described as significant. By comparison, in only two of the other forty-four governments . . . was significant public interest reported" (Nathan & Adams, 1977, p. 119). We examine the assumption, then, that public hearings are positively associated with increased public interest in community affairs.

A Summary Thus Far

Using GRS as a case study, we intend to test for the possibility that public hearings are positively related to expenditure outcomes, new program allocations, and increased public interest. Some research, in fact, has been conducted in each of these areas, and, as reported above, generally confirms a positive association between public hearings and these impact areas. But the available literature, although supportive of general hypotheses and expectations, suffers in at least two significant ways.

First, almost every major empirical GRS study was conducted in the first year or two of the program. This is true of the Nathan and Adams study, of the SRC study, and of the Opinion Research Corporation survey. It also is true of much of our own published research. The country's decade-long experience with the program now permits a much longer-range and definitive assessment of the impact of public hearings.

Second, and more important, we are now able to study the impacts of public hearings in those cities not holding hearings in the pre-1976 period, but which are now required to hold public hearings. Prior studies only compared groups of cities with respect to whether or not they had held public hearings. Although important differences have been found (as reported above), it is not possible to conclude from these studies that public hearings caused these differences (cities that voluntarily held public hearings may also have been more prone to allocate GRS for social and human services and for new and expanded programs). The pre-test and post-test aspect of the renewal legislation provides increased confidence in our conclusions about the impact of the public hearing process. Our impact measures, tested below, are effects of public hearings on expenditure outcomes, public interest, and new spending. Three separate propositions are tested:

1. Before mandated public hearings, GRS behavior will be found to be different in cities that voluntarily held public hearings from those that did not hold hearings.
2. Before mandated public hearings, GRS behavior will be found to vary with the number of hearings held.
3. GRS behavior will be found to change in the post-renewal period for cities required to hold public hearings, but which had not held hearings in the pre-renewal period.

These propositions require separate research procedures. The first two may be tested by what

Table 2. Reported Public-Safety Allocations by Presence or Absence of Public Hearings and by Number of Public Hearings (%)

	Public Hearings			Number of Hearings			
	Yes	No	*p*	1	2	3+	*N*
1973	21.9	22.3	NS	a			214
1974	25.6	40.2	.05	a			217
1975	29.6	40.7	.05	35.2	33.2	25.6	207
1976	38.4	45.2	NS	48.4	46.6	49.8	208
1977				54.9	35.9	18.9	163
1978				52.0	47.6	32.5	165
1979				55.1	45.8	40.1	213
1980				66.6	45.4	40.9	215
1981				72.7	42.9	30.4	220
1982				50.8	46.5	38.1	211

[a]Question not asked this year.

Source: Authors' annual survey data.

Tucker (1981) calls "cross-sectional analysis." Here, the comparison is between cities holding and not holding hearings at distinct points in time. The third proposition requires what Tucker calls a "longitudinal" or time-series research design. In this case, the focus is on the behavior of cities over several time periods. Both of these approaches will be used in this study (see also Tucker, 1982a, b).

Findings

GRS Behavior: A Cross-Sectional Analysis

The first impact measure to be examined is expenditure outcomes. If public hearings are to have an impact, the expectation is that hearings will be associated with smaller proportions of GRS being allocated to traditional areas and larger proportions being allocated to areas of human needs. We have combined operating and capital expenditures in the areas of fire prevention and public safety into one category called "public safety." Likewise, we have combined operating and capital expenditures in the areas of health and social services into one category called "social services." Tables 2 and 3 show the results of our analysis of public safety and social services expenditure patterns by whether cities did or did not hold public hearings in the pre-renewal period, and by the number of public hearings in all years (except in 1973 and 1974, when we did not ask for number of hearings).

In general, the findings shown in Tables 2 and 3 confirm our expectations. In all cases in the pre-renewal period, the criterion of whether cities did

Table 3. Reported Social Service Allocations by Presence or Absence of Public Hearings and by Number of Public Hearings (%)

	Public Hearings			Number of Hearings			
	Yes	No	*p*	1	2	3+	*N*
1973	3.6	1.5	.05	a			214
1974	7.7	3.3	.05	a			217
1975	6.8	4.7	NS	4.1	6.2	8.8	207
1976	5.4	3.1	.05	4.3	4.4	7.7	208
1977				3.9	2.6	10.5	163
1978				2.2	3.4	7.0	165
1979				6.4	3.4	5.2	213
1980				3.3	4.9	7.4	215
1981				1.6	3.5	4.8	220
1982				3.1	5.5	6.4	211

[a]Question not asked this year.

Source: Authors' annual survey data.

or did not hold public hearings was associated with public safety and social service GRS allocations in the predicted directions. Cities holding public hearings reported allocating more to social services and less to public safety than cities not holding hearings.

For all years this pattern is strengthened when the number of hearings is considered. Generally, cities that held greater numbers of public hearings report allocating even larger proportions of GRS funds to social services and even less to public safety than those holding fewer or no hearings. These trends are especially pronounced for those cities holding three or more public hearings both in the pre- and post-renewal periods.

Almost uniformly then, we find that for all the years our public-hearing criteria of whether cities did or did not hold hearings and numbers of hearings held are associated with expenditure outcomes in the expected directions. To this extent, our data confirm the earlier SRC and Nathan and Adams studies reaching similar conclusions. Although we find that even one public hearing made a difference, we find the expenditure distinctions particularly marked with greater numbers of hearings.

A second area of concern to observers of GRS is its effect on public interest in local politics. Some reserch detected a relationship between public hearings and levels of public interest in the early years of the program. In a more recent survey, the ACIR (1979) reported evidence to suggest a link between the renewal legislation's mandate for public hearings and increased public interest, but the ACIR also speculated that any such effect might have been only temporary. Table 4 indicates the relationship between public hearings and proportions of respondents in our survey who reported GRS to have had a positive impact on public interest and involvement in local affairs.

For all years a pattern similar to that noted when examining expenditure outcomes is found; that is, greater public interest is reported by those cities holding public hearings than by those cities holding none, and for all years the proportion reporting a positive impact generally increases as the numbers of hearings increase. These differences are shown to be statistically significant.

But Table 4 also demonstrates another important aspect of the extent of public interest in GRS. This is a general decline in the overall levels of public interest generated by GRS as the program has matured. By the time of our 1981 and 1982 surveys, only 32 and 27% respectively of all cities were reporting a positive impact of GRS on public interest in local affairs. This compares with about 70%, indicating a positive impact in the program's earlier years. Numbers of public hearings do seem to stimulate greater levels of public interest in local affairs. As the number of hearings increases, the level of reported public interest increases; however, the overall level of public interest attributable to GRS has declined over the years.

The last impact measure examined is the proportional allocation of GRS to new or expanding service levels compared with the proportion of GRS used for funding substitutions (a ratio sometimes referred to as "net fiscal effect"). The general argument, it will be recalled, is that, because of their direct and more obvious effect on people, new and expanded expenditure patterns are more likely to be favored by citizens. The early SRC and Nathan and Adams studies, as reviewed above, did detect such deviations between cities holding and those not holding public hearings.

Table 4. Percentage of Cities Reporting Positive Impact on Public Interest by Presence or Absence of Public Hearings and by Number of Hearings

	Public Hearings			Number of Hearings			
	Yes	No	*p*	1	2	3+	*N*
1973	71.2	64.7	.05	[a]			
1974	71.3	50.0	.05	[a]			
1975	77.7	55.4	.05	60.0	80.0	75.0	207
1976	68.9	42.7	.05	55.7	61.5	73.2	208
1977				46.7	58.5	62.9	163
1978				50.0	49.5	61.4	165
1979				24.1	33.3	36.4	213
1980				20.0	35.4	44.2	215
1981				16.7	28.6	44.4	220
1982				20.0	23.8	37.8	211

[a] Question not asked this year.
Source: Authors' annual survey data.

Table 5. Percentage of General Revenue Sharing Allocated to New and Expanding Functions by Presence or Absence of Hearings and by Number of Hearings, 1975 and 1976

	Public Hearings			Number of Hearings		
	Yes	No	*p*	1	2	3+
1975						
Operating	6.2	3.8	NS	6.0	7.5	7.9
Capital	12.7	6.6	.05	11.4	17.2	12.8
Total	18.9	10.4	.05	17.4	24.7	20.8
N	114	55		51	35	57
1976						
Operating	3.0	3.8	NS	3.0	3.0	6.6
Capital	9.6	6.6	NS	6.3	12.2	10.2
Total	12.6	10.4	NS	9.4	15.2	16.8
N	119	55		61	39	56

Source: Authors' annual survey data.

Table 5 indicates the effects of holding or not holding public hearings on expenditure patterns. For convenience of presentation, only data from the 1975 and 1976 surveys are presented. Analysis for all years does not deviate from the trends shown in Table 5 except that the total proportion of GRS funds allocated to new programming areas declined steadily over the ten-year period.

Holding public hearings does appear to be related to allocations when considering proportions of GRS allocated to operating expenses, capital outlays, and total new program spending as shown in Table 5. Although the reported differences are not always statistically significant, those cities holding public hearings generally allocated larger proportions of their GRS funds to new program areas than did cities not holding public hearings. This is true for all ten years of our survey, and it also is the case that greater numbers of public hearings were associated with even larger proportions of GRS allocated to new program areas.

Cross-sectional comparisons tend to confirm the propositions as stated. As earlier analysts have shown, the holding of public hearings in the pre-renewal period tended to be associated with larger proportions of GRS allocated to areas of human services and needs, larger proportions allocated to new and expanding program areas, and greater levels of public interest and involvement. These trends all were strengthened when considering numbers of public hearings.

GRS Behavior: A Longitudinal Analysis

In her treatment of American state policies, Gray (1976) points out that cross-sectional analysis alone may lead to severe inference errors. Cross-sectional analysis, she argues, is subject to interpretation problems similar to those encountered in the ecological fallacy situation (Gray, 1976). What has been termed by others "cross-sectional illusions" may seem to justify inferences which, in reality, do not exist (Boudon, 1974). The proposition that GRS behavior has changed for cities that in the pre-renewal period did not hold hearings can only be tested by means of a longitudinal research design. We use a quasi-experimental time-series design (Campbell & Stanley, 1963, pp. 37-43), to test for the effects of the mandated hearings over time. In order to apply the model, the cities are divided into two groups: an experimental group consisting of those that did not hold hearings in the pre-renewal period, but which have been required to hold hearings since and (as a control) those cities that consistently held hearings over the entire period. According to Campbell and Stanley (1963, p. 40), such a scheme controls for many of the commonly discussed threats to internal validity, including maturity, testing, regression, selection, mortality, and the interaction of these.

Also, as Campbell and Stanley (1963) demonstrate, although the results of an interrupted time series can often be shown graphically, statistical testing is necessary for conclusive interpretation. McCain and McCleary (1979) have developed a statistical model that estimates both short-term and long-term impacts.[10] We use that model to test for the impacts of the mandated public hearing, but before presenting our findings, we pause

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[10] That model, used successfully in other recent policy research situations (see Morgan & Pelissero, 1980, and Meier, 1980), can be presented as follows:

$$Y = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + e$$

where:

Y = predicted GRS behavior

X_1 = a linear measure of time coded 1, 2, 3, . . . N

X_2 = a dummy variable coded 0 before renewal and 1 after renewal

X_3 = a dummy variable coded 0 before renewal and is a time variable thereafter (e.g., 0,0,0, 0,1,2,3, . . . N)

The coefficient b_2 will be statistically significant if the renewal legislation and its mandate for public hearings had a short-term effect. If the renewal legislation has had a long-term effect, b_3 will be statistically different from zero. In each case, of course, the direction of change as represented by the slope must be in the proposed direction if it is to be concluded that the mandated hearing has had the impact proposed.

As is true with any time series analysis, the risk of autocorrelation is high. The Durbin-Watson test (Durbin & Watson, 1951) was used to examine for autocorrelation. If autocorrelation is found, procedures for identifying the pattern of autocorrelatioan will be used and new regression models generated.

for some clarifying comments. Our regression formulas include no measures of other social, economic, or political characteristics of the cities; only the time variables are examined. Following Morgan and Pelissero (1980), we find that the level of explained variance for all equations generally is very high, and the inclusion of additional variables would have relatively little explanatory effect. Additionally, with a small N, more variables risk over determining the equations. Also, it should be noted that the dependent variables in our equations reported in Table 6 are averages for all cities in the categories examined. Again following Morgan and Pelissero, we use this averaging procedure in order to permit the reporting of far fewer equations than would otherwise be required. However, a separate time series analysis was conducted for individual cities. The individual city analyses do not alter the conclusions reported for the aggregate analysis. The results of the analysis are reported in Table 6.

In Table 6, the regression coefficients are shown for each variable along with the degrees of statistical significance and the variance explained. (The Durbin-Watson test of autocorrelation was

Table 6. The Impact of the Public Hearings on GRS Behavior

	X_1		X_2		X_3		
Dependent Variables	Average Yearly Change (Time)	F Value	Short-term Impact	F Value	Long-term Impact	F Value	R^2
Public safety expenditures							
Cities required to hold hearings (N=83)	5.53	.05	−1.70	NS	−5.53	.05	.74
Control cities (N=114)	6.92	.01	1.42	NS	−6.43	.01	.97
Social service expenditures							
Cities required to hold hearings	.98	NS	−3.03	NS	− .40	NS	.45
Control cities	.77	NS	− .48	NS	−1.35	.05	.65
Public interest levels							
Cities required to hold hearings	− .95	NS	5.17	NS	−5.97	NS	.82
Control cities	−4.80	NS	2.09	NS	−2.64	NS	.92
Net fiscal effects (operational allocations)							
Cities required to hold hearings	2.04	.01	−7.87	.01	−2.48	NS	.98
Control cities	− .19	NS	−1.01	NS	− .87	NS	.63
Net fiscal effects (capital outlays)							
Cities required to hold hearings	1.25	NS	− .97	NS	−1.83	NS	.74
Control cities	.07	NS	−6.09	NS	−1.00	NS	.88
Net fiscal effects (total)							
Cities required to hold hearings	3.29	.05	−8.85	.05	−5.32	.01	.94
Control cities	− .11	NS	−7.10	NS	−1.88	NS	.81

performed, and the results in each case were not significant.) Interpreting Table 6, one is first concerned with the direction of change as reflected in the various slopes. If change is not in the predicted direction, then the results of mandated hearings cannot be said to have had the expected results. For public-safety expenditures, we predict that public hearings would reduce the level of spending and thus yield a negative slope. For all other dependent variables, we predict positive slopes.

Table 6 indicates that many of the changes are not in the expected directions. The proportion of GRS allocated to social services changed very little for both sets of cities over this time period (less than an average of 1% per year), and for both sets of cities the period following the renewal legislation and mandated hearings is marked by a *decrease* in social service allocations. Thus, the direction of change is counter to that proposed; public hearings had no effect in increasing levels of GRS allocated to social service functions. Similarly, the mandated public hearings appear to have had no significant impact on the allocation of GRS to new programming areas. Here, too, the post-renewal period is marked by a general decline of spending for both sets of cities, trends that were not abated by the mandated hearings.

The mandated public hearings do appear to have had a short-term impact on public interest levels for both sets of cities. Indeed, both sets of cities experienced a short-term increase in public interest levels, and this is greater for cities newly required to hold hearings than for those holding hearings over the entire period. For neither set of cities, however, is the impact of the mandated hearing found to be statistically significant. As can be seen, no positive long-term impact on interest levels was recorded. Rather, the post-renewal period has been marked by a steady decline in levels of reported public interest and involvement.

Perhaps the most important impact of the mandated public hearing as demonstrated in this study is its impact on public safety expenditures, which increased over this time period; however, the model demonstrates both a short-term (but not significant) and a long-term (statistically significant) impact on public safety expenditures in the expected direction. However, this finding is tempered by the fact that the control cities also experienced a long-term reduction in public safety expenditures, indicating that perhaps factors other than, or in combination with, the public hearings were responsible for the detected decline.

Thus, of all the impact tests for those cities required to hold public hearings, only three were in the predicted directions (short-term impacts on public interest levels and short- and long-term impacts on public safety expenditures), and only one of these (long-term impact on public safety allocations) was found to be statistically significant. Overall, the aggregate findings do not provide much evidence for accepting the propositions that public hearings greatly affected GRS expenditure results.

We also analyzed results at the individual city level. Among the 79 cities that responded to at least eight of our ten surveys, results generally conform to those presented above. It will be recalled that we predicted a positive slope for social service allocations and public interest levels and a negative slope for public safety expenditures. Of a total of 79 cases, only 22 short-term and 18 long-term positive slopes for social service allocations were found, and only 11 of these were among the experimental group of cities ($N=39$). As with the aggregate analysis, the individual city analysis demonstrates the mandated public hearings to have had more of an impact on short-term than on long-term interest levels. Forty-six of the cities experienced a short-term positive effect on public interest levels, and 23 experienced long-term positive impacts. (However, none of these was statistically significant.) The individual city analysis also conforms with the aggregate findings that the mandated public hearing was most significantly related to public safety expenditures. Thirty-three of the cities experienced short-term impacts on public safety expenditures in the predicted direction (18 of these were control cities), and 46 experienced long-term impacts (24 of these were control cities).

The individual city analysis shows, again, that the public hearing was occasionally related to GRS behavior in the predicted directions. Some cities experienced short-term increases in public interest levels, and several experienced declines in public-safety expenditures, both in the short and long runs. But overall, most of the relationships were opposite to that predicted. Even those that were in the predicted directions were rarely of the magnitude to be statistically significant.

Conclusions

The citizen participation movement of the past two decades has had many objectives, but surely one major goal has been the forging at all levels of a more accountable, more responsive, more democratic government, especially in administrative and bureaucratic activities. As noted by the ACIR, one of the "ultimate objectives" of such participation "is to change governmental behavior so that governmental units respond better to citizens' needs and desires and refrain from the arbitrary, capricious, insensitive, or oppressive exercise of power" (ACIR, 1979, p. 61).

The data that can be brought to bear on one form of citizen participation (the public hearing) in one federally funded program (General Revenue Sharing) present a fairly consistent picture of the consequences of such an effort. Cross-sectional analysis showed that in the pre-renewal period, there was an association between the voluntary holding by cities of public hearings and GRS behavior. These differences were accentuated when the numbers of hearings held were considered. However, longitudinal analysis, based on data collected over a ten-year period, indicates that the public hearing has had very little lasting effect on altering GRS decisions or behavior. We find that the 1976 mandated GRS public hearings did have an immediate, but short-term, impact on levels of public interest and involvement. We found evidence that some short-term and some long-term effects on levels of public-safety expenditures may have been attributable to the mandated public hearing. However, these findings generally were not statistically significant and did not deviate appreciably from behavior of the control group of cities. No short-term or long-term effect of the hearings on social service, welfare, and health expenditures were detected, nor were any effects found on levels of spending for new and expanding capital outlays or operating programs.

Perhaps it is not surprising to find that the public hearing—generally considered to be a "weak" form of public involvement (Arnstein, 1971)—would not have a significant impact on policy choices. However, as discussed earlier, the public hearing now is among the most often utilized forms of citizen participation. The ACIR (1979) found that in 1978 an average of 30 citizens per city participated in GRS public hearings. Considering the GRS program alone, then, more than half a million citizens annually participate in the hearing ritual. If experiences with the GRS program are representative of experiences with the several dozen other federal programs and hundreds of state and local programs requiring public hearings as the principal form of citizen involvement, one must ask what is accomplished by the hearing process if significant policy impacts are not realized.

Perhaps participation in the hearing process may have positive results for participants themselves. Perhaps such participation promotes and enhances individual leadership qualities, personal growth, and awareness of government and the process of making public policy. In short, the process may lead to a better and more informed citizenry. We have not tested for these possibilities in this study. However, as a mechanism for changing government behavior, we find the public hearing to have been largely inconsequential. Unfortunately, rather than opening the process of administration to public involvement, the public hearing may permit sanctioned isolation of agencies and agency officials seeking as little program and policy change as possible. Certainly, this does not describe GRS decision making for all cities, but it is the case that for the majority of cities in our sample, the mandated hearing had little significant or lasting effect on patterns of behavior.

For those who advocate greater public involvement in administrative decision making, we do not conclude that the time for despair is upon us, as Gittell (1981) seems to suggest. But we do suggest that now is the time for more thoughtful and more thorough examinations of the effectiveness of the various forms of citizen participation. The extensive experience the country has had with a variety of citizen participation alternatives in a variety of program contexts should allow for the removal of these questions from the realm of conjecture and speculation and permit, instead, more rigorous and conclusive examination. We should seek to discover which structural and environmental characteristics appear to maximize the effectiveness of citizen involvement. Also, we should seek a better understanding of bureaucratic norms as well as those circumstances under which citizen involvement may be actively sought by program administrators (rather than simply required by funding sources) for expertise, program responsiveness, and perhaps, most of all for needed political support. Ultimately, such examinations would call for the development of sounder theoretical linkages between public policy formulation and administration and citizen participation.[11]

Citizen participation was, and remains, a bold and exciting experiment in the administration of public policy. The experiment has not failed, but we do not yet know when and under what conditions it may best succeed. We believe that these issues demand attention and that the data are now at hand to begin to provide at least tentative answers to the many questions raised by the citizen participation movement. Both the theory and the practice of public administration would be strengthened by such efforts.

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[11] For an essay reaching similar conclusions, see Berry, Portnew, Bablitch, and Mahoney (in press).

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Political Solutions to Market Problems

KENNETH A. SHEPSLE
BARRY R. WEINGAST
Washington University

For some, market failures serve as a rationale for public intervention. However, the fact that self-interested market behavior does not always produce felicitous social consequences is not sufficient reason to draw this conclusion. It is necessary to assess public performance under comparable conditions, and hence to analyze self-interested political behavior in the institutional structures of the public sector. Our approach emphasizes this institutional structure—warts and all—and thereby provides specific cautionary warnings about optimistic reliance on political institutions to improve upon market performance.

> We may tell the society to jump out of the market frying pan, but we have no basis for predicting whether it will land in the fire or a luxurious bed.
>
> George Stigler, *Citizen and the State*

For Bator (1958), Baumol (1965), Head (1962), and others, the presence of externalities, the undersupply of public goods, and, generally, the existence of market failures serve as now-standard justifications for (if not explanations of) a positive governmental role in the private economy. Governmental coercion, it is maintained, can resolve the free rider problem, mitigate third-party effects, regulate natural monopolies, and otherwise restore market competition or substitute for it. In short, political governance of the marketplace enhances efficient performance.

The idea of political solutions to market problems became something of a political-economic orthodoxy in the post-New Deal period. In recent years, however, this orthodoxy has spawned a revisionist literature that identifies some of the warts on the body politic. Models of bureaucratic, regulatory, and legislative institutions;[1] of self-interested pressure groups, elected politicians, and bureaucrats;[2] and of fiscal illusion and incrementalism[3] all underscore potential biases that may neutralize the anticipated efficiency gains associated with political solutions. Political solutions may entail efficiency gains or they may exacerbate market failures. The common theme in these models is that political actors do not reserve a privileged place for efficiency in their solutions to market problems. In fact, politicians, either in reaction to or in anticipation of constituency clamoring, often have no incentive to discriminate between market failures and market successes.[4]

According to the market failure orthodoxy, inefficiency in the marketplace provides a prima facie case for public intervention. To the public failure school, on the other hand, efficiency distortions associated with political choice constitute a basis for strongly qualifying, if not rejecting, this case. The lesson of these contending arguments is that alternative institutional arrange-

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[1] See Niskanen (1971), Stigler (1971), and Buchanan (1967). More generally, for the "public failure" school, see Mitchell (1978), Buchanan (1979), and Wolf (1979).

[2] See Aranson (1980) and Wolf (1979).

[3] See Aranson and Ordeshook (1977a, b, 1978) and Wagner (1976).

[4] In our view the mechanism that enables a political agent to detect the concerns of his principal (the constituency) is much like a decibel-meter. Noise from the folks back home grabs his attention. The problem with this kind of mechanism is that it does not identify the reasons for all the noise. In some cases it may derive from complaints about negative externalities, monopolistic practices, or undersupplied public goods. On other occasions, it may derive from the fact that in efficiently operating markets, changes in relative prices adversely affect individuals, eroding their capitalized wealth position ("prices push people around"). Both those bearing externality burdens and those "victimized" by price changes scream loudly; politicians hear undifferentiated noise.

ments are imperfect, implying that the ultimate choice of institutions must depend upon comparative performance (Buchanan, 1967; Buchanan & Brennan, 1980). This conclusion requires a theory of comparative institutional performance—a theory that currently does not exist.

The tension between the public failure and market failure schools remains alive today. The issues over which they quarrel, as indicated by Musgrave's (1981) recent article, "The Leviathan Cometh—or Does He?," remain unresolved. In our opinion, insights on these controversies will not be forthcoming unless grounded in a theory of comparative performance. The analyses of both the market failure and the public failure schools entail comparisons of an institution's performance against an *ideal*. We believe it is more fruitful (and scientifically appropriate) to compare the performance of one institutional arrangement with that of another. This practical perspective is especially appropriate for students of public policy. Much of the discussion of public policy has assumed that political solutions can improve on market failures. The model we offer shows that this assumption is not justified. Consequently, students of public policy must pose for themselves questions of *comparative* institutional performance rather than those that compare markets against an unattainable ideal.

This article points the way toward the development of the missing theory. We develop models of legislatures in a manner that allows direct comparison of political performance with market performance. The models are simple and hardly definitive, but they do focus the debate squarely on the issue of comparative institutional performance and on endogenous political institutions that are the counterpart to market mechanisms. It is important to emphasize that the simple models we develop initially are barren of complex institutional detail; their purpose is to sharpen intuitions about how a stripped-down institutional arrangement works. These intuitions, in turn, serve to focus analysis in richer institutional settings, which we then develop. Finally, we explore, even in the richer setting, the effects of relaxing some still restrictive features of our analysis.

The article proceeds as follows. After developing a model of political preference in the next section, we investigate the performance of a majority-rule legislature in the context of some familiar market failures. In each case, we compare the political solution, the market failure outcome, and the efficient outcome in order to gain some purchase on the question of comparative institutional performance. The techniques that are more clearly developed in a simple context are then applied to more complex and realistic institutional arrangements like those found in existing legislatures.

A Model of Political Preferences

The simple model of political choice we develop is one in which legislative institutions and processes of representation induce net benefit functions for legislative agents. These benefit functions differ from their normative economic counterparts because politicians pursue private purposes that need not be consonant with broader public ideals. Specifically, the geographic basis of representation encourages a truncated form of cost-benefit calculation in which the geographic impact of policy looms large in the politician's calculus.

Consider a public policy or project $\pi(x)$ where x is initially assumed to be a scalar measure of project size, scope, or scale. This is a restrictive assumption that is relaxed below under "Political Solutions in Richer Institutional Settings." Let $\beta(x)$ and $\chi(x)$ represent the present values, respectively, of the social benefits and costs flowing from $\pi(x)$. The benefit and cost functions may be "unpacked" into politically relevant components by examining them from the point of view of the agents of the n legislative districts into which the polity is partitioned. Since $\beta(x)$ and $\chi(x)$ have distributional characteristics, and since the relevant distributional characteristic for legislators is geographic (because that is the basis on which their constituencies are determined), we decompose the benefits and costs according to their incidence on the jth legislative district. Consider benefits first. Letting $\hat{b}_j(x) = \sum_{i \neq j} b_i(x)$, we characterize total benefits as

$$\beta(x) = b_j(x) + \hat{b}_j(x). \tag{1}$$

Equation (1) distinguishes economic benefits according to their incidence. For the constituency-oriented representative of the jth district, $b_j(x)$, not $\beta(x)$, is the politically relevant benefit function when the policy $\pi(x)$ is evaluated. Benefits flowing to other districts, $\hat{b}_j(x)$, do not figure in j's calculations. We assume that the various $b_k(x)$ functions, and consequently $\beta(x)$, are concave and increasing in x:

Assumption 1. $b_k'(x) > 0$, $b_k''(x) < 0$, $k = 1, \ldots, n$.

Similarly, costs may be represented in terms of their respective incidences. Two kinds of costs are distinguished. First, there are public expenditures that are authorized and appropriated by the legislature to purchase inputs for the policy or project. By $c_{1k}(x)$ we designate the amount earmarked to be spent in the kth district; by $\hat{c}_{1k}(x) = \sum_{i \neq k} c_{1i}(x)$ we designate the amount earmarked for all districts but the kth. The amount $c_1(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} c_{1i}(x)$ represents total *expenditure cost* for $\pi(x)$. Second, there are *nonexpenditure costs* borne by each of the n districts, e.g., project externalities. By $c_{2k}(x)$, we denote externalities borne by the kth district and, by $\hat{c}_{2k}(x)$, those borne by all other districts. Total cost for the project $\pi(x)$ is the sum of expenditure and nonexpenditure costs:

$$\pi(x) = [c_{1j}(x) + c_{2j}(x)] + [\hat{c}_{1j}(x) + \hat{c}_{2j}(x)]. \qquad (2)$$

Regarding expenditure and nonexpenditure costs, we assume

> *Assumption 2.* $c_{ik}{}'(x) > 0$, $c_{ik}{}''(x) > 0$, $i = 1,2$, $k = 1, \ldots, n$.

That is, both expenditures and externalities increase with project scale x at an increasing rate; so, too, does $\pi(x)$.

Taxes are raised to cover all expenditures, with district j's share exogenously given as t_j. Regarding taxes, we assume

> *Assumption 3.* There is a vector of tax shares, $t = (t_1, \ldots, t_n)$, with $t_k \geqslant 0$ and $\sum_{k=1}^{n} t_k = 1$.
>
> For project $\pi(x)$, the tax bill, $T(x)$, satisfies
>
> $$T(x) = \sum_{k=1}^{n} c_{1k}(x),$$
>
> with district k's share given by
>
> $$T_k(x) = t_k T(x),\ k = 1, \ldots, n.$$

That is, taxes just cover expenditures, with the tax bill apportioned among districts according to a fixed sharing rule, t. Some policies do not entail expenditures and thus do not require taxes (see below).

As in his evaluation of benefits, legislator j is concerned with (and only with) district-specific components of cost: geographically earmarked expenditures, $c_{1j}(x)$; nonexpenditure costs borne by the district, $c_{2j}(x)$; and the district's tax bill, $T_j(x)$. By virtue of our specification in equations (1) and (2) and Assumptions 1-3, then, the project $\pi(x)$ has (present-value-adjusted) benefit and cost flows that have an associated geographic incidence. Notice that we place great weight on geography as the basis of representation and hence as the politically relevant feature of policy incidence. This is a narrow construction of the "electoral connection." Indeed, our legislators are mere shadows of their real-world counterparts. In our concluding section we show that the form of our conclusions is not fundamentally altered by richer conceptualizations of representation. Further discussion of this point is best left until after our simple models are presented.

Having described the incidence of benefits, expenditures, external costs, and tax shares in terms of political districting, we now complete the initial characterization of our model with a discussion of political accounting. The geographical basis for representation determines, in a natural way, a political objective function for legislative agents. The political objective functions, in turn, induce preferences over various values of x for these agents, and hence over various projects $\pi(x)$. Political institutions aggregate these preferences, usually through some voting rule or bureaucratic process, into political choices.

Consider the *objective function* of the jth legislative agent:

$$N_j(x) = b_j(x) + f[(c_{1j}(x)] - c_{2j}(x) - t_j T(x) \qquad (3)$$
$$j = 1, \ldots, n.$$

The n equations of formulation (3) represent the evaluative criteria by which each of the n legislative agents assesses the project $\pi(x)$ in terms of impact on his district. $N_j(x)$ is the *legislator's* objective function since his political support is enhanced by consumption benefits and public spending targeted for his district and, conversely, his support erodes with increasing externality and tax burdens for his district. Notice first that, in contrast to equation (1), j includes only his district's benefits in the calculation; he ignores $\hat{b}_j(x)$. Second, in contrast to equation (2), the taxation mechanism induces j to focus only on his district's tax bill, thereby ignoring $(1 - t_j)\,T(x)$. Third, and again in contrast to equation (2), j internalizes in his calculation only those externality costs his district bears, paying no attention to $\hat{c}_{2j}(x)$. Finally, j attributes indirect benefits, $f[c_{1j}(x)]$, to project expenditures targeted for his district to purchase project inputs.[5] In $c_{1j}(x)$, the constituents of district j see employment, business contracts, local tax revenues, and generally increased economic activity in the district.

In equation (3), the $b_j(x)$, $-c_{2j}(x)$, and $-t_j T(x)$ terms need no further elaboration except to reemphasize that, in the political arena, geographic incidence matters profoundly. However, the transformation of expenditures earmarked for the jth district, $c_{1j}(x)$, into a kind of political benefit requires a few additional comments (a more detailed discussion is found in Weingast, Shepsle, & Johnsen, 1981). First, and perhaps most transparent, legislators and their constituents regard $c_{1j}(x)$ as a source of rent for the district. Citizens (at least those that own inputs) support public expenditures in the local economy because, by increasing the demand for the project's inputs, these expenditures produce windfall gains for input owners. These gains, in turn, filter through the local economy. In response to constituent desire for local public expenditures, the district representative, moreover, seeks to attract local expenditures because they are "credit-claimable" (Mayhew, 1974). Although a single legislator cannot credibly claim responsibility for broad public policies like national defense, for example, he can claim credit for the weapons contract given the local defense contractor, the uniform order for the textile plant in the district, or the increased personnel expenditures at the local military base. Because expenditures made in a given legislator's district redound to his credit, legislators go after c_{1j}-type expenditures, thus making it appropriate for us to treat this peculiar form of cost accounting as in equation (3).[6]

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[5] In equation (3) we represent the political benefits derived from district-earmarked expenditures by $f[c_{1j}(x)]$. We assume throughout that f is concave and increasing in x—that political benefits from expenditures increase in project scale at a decreasing rate—and that $f(0) = 0$.

Equation (3) and Assumptions 1-3 provide the basis for deriving the preferences of legislative agents. Once political institutions are specified, public choices on policies may be deduced from the preferences given by the $N_j(x)$ functions and the institutional rules of preference aggregation.

As a baseline against which to compare political choices given the political objective functions of equation (3), consider the objective function that embodies the criterion of economic efficiency:

$$E(x) = \beta(x) - \varkappa(x). \tag{4}$$

Economic efficiency requires the selection of a project scale that maximizes net benefits (with $x = 0$ if $E(x) < 0$ for all positive project scales), irrespective of the incidence of those net benefits. It is this last feature that distinguishes the economic norm from political objectives and, as we show below, is the basis for efficiency distortions caused by political intervention. With the efficiency model as a normative benchmark, we may begin the task of comparative institutional performance.

Market Failure

Since our concern here is with political performance in the context of market failures, we now turn to a definition of the latter. We shall say that a market has failed whenever the market equilibrium is inefficient. As this outcome constitutes the status quo ante for potential political intervention, we label it x^0. Thus, *a market failure is an inefficient status quo.* Specifically, letting equation (4) serve as our criterion or objective function, an efficient outcome is a point $x = x^E$ satisfying

$$E'(x^E) = \beta'(x^E) - \varkappa'(x^E) = 0 \tag{5}$$

and

$$E''(x^E) = \beta''(x^E) - \varkappa''(x^E) < 0. \tag{6}$$

From Assumption 1 and 2, there is a unique global maximum of $E(x)$; thus, x^E is the unambiguous normative solution to the problem of policy choice according to equation (4).

> *Definition.* The political status quo, x^0, is said to constitute a *market failure* if and only if $x^0 \neq x^E$.

That is, x^0 is a case of market failure if and only if $E'(x^0) \neq 0$. If $E'(x^0) > 0$, then Assumptions 1 and 2 imply x^0 is "too small," whereas the converse is implied if $E'(x^0) < 0$. Of course, market failures may manifest themselves in distinct ways—externalities, public goods, and other market imperfections. For now it is the existence of a market failure rather than its particular form that is important.

Political Choice: A Simple Legislature

As noted above, comparing political solutions to market failures requires specific, clear notions of each. We already have a precise definition of market failure. We now require a model of political institutions and an identification of their equilibrium outcomes.[7] We begin with an examination of majority rule in a one-dimensional special case where the market has failed ($x^0 \neq x^E$). The results derived in this case are then extended in the next section to choices by structured legislatures in multidimensional settings.

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[6] Our notion of political cost accounting displayed in equation (3) formalizes some ideas originally presented in a somewhat different context by Aranson and Ordeshook (1977a, b, 1978) and discussed by Shepsle (1980). They seek to learn why interest groups lobby for public goods in view of the fact that the same logic that implies market failure in the private supply of public goods also applies to the phenomenon of private lobbying for public provision. They note, however, that *goods public in consumption are typically private in production,* that is, contracts for inputs are appropriable and excludable. A private interest group lobbies in anticipation of private pecuniary gain (the public good is a by-product of that enterprise). Our model complements their analysis by allowing the politician to target these private pecuniary gains to his constituency.

A political equilibrium in the one-dimensional case is the familiar Condorcet winner, where the preferences of individual legislators are induced by the $N_j(x)$ functions given in equation (3). That is, a majority rule equilibrium is a policy alternative x^* having the property that no other policy alternative can command a majority against it. Technically, we have

> *Definition.* A political outcome x^* is said to be a *majority rule equilibrium* (MRE) if and only if it is strictly preferred by more than $n/2$ legislators in paired comparison with each other feasible outcome. Specifically, if $S(x^*, x) = \{j | N_j(x^*) > N_j(x)\}$, where N_j is given in equation (3), then x^* is a MRE if and only if $|S(x^*, x)| > n/2$ for all feasible $x \neq x^*$.[8]

Thus, in our terminology, a "political solution to a market failure" is an outcome x^* which is a MRE given a status quo, $x^0 \neq x^E$.

Public policies differ in their characteristics, and it will be useful to distinguish between two classes, regulatory and expenditure.

> *Definition.* A policy, $\pi(x)$, is said to be a *regulatory policy,* whenever $c_{1j}(x) = 0$ for every j; otherwise it is said to be an *expenditure policy.*

A regulatory policy entails no public expenditure, and, since taxes are collected only to cover expenditures, it thus entails no taxes. The costs of a regulatory policy are borne by the private sector directly; the government plays no role as fiscal intermediary in this class of policies. An expenditure policy, as in selective subsidies to the private sector or in the public provision of a public good, entails governmental spending and taxing with their geographic incidences as noted earlier. Whenever $\pi(x)$ is a regulatory policy, political objective functions given in equation (3) specialize to

$$N_j(x) = b_j(x) - c_{2j}(x) \tag{7}$$

For regulatory policy, the standard median voter theorem affords the following result.

> *Proposition.* For any regulatory policy $\pi(x)$ decided by a majority rule, a MRE exists. In particular, $\pi(x^M)$ is the MRE, where $x^M = \underset{j \in N}{\text{median}} \{x_j^* | x_j^* = \underset{x}{\text{argmax}}\, N_j(x)\}$.

From Assumptions 1 and 2, $N_j(x)$ as given in equation (7) is strictly concave in x. It may be established that a function concave in x is single peaked in x. Consequently, the proposition follows from Black's Median Dominance Theorem (Black, 1958). Thus, the majority rule equilibrium in this context is the most-preferred point of the median legislator, x^M.

The main effect of a regulatory policy is through the benefits and costs that are distributed as a consequence of compliance (Weidenbaum, 1978). In contrast to expenditure policies, government expenditures and tax burdens in the regulatory realm figure much less prominently (indeed, we have stipulated here that they are zero). The Proposition establishes that the process of regulatory policymaking in a majority-rule legislature is both decisive and stable. To be sure, the MRE Policy might be $\pi(0)$ if the incidence of costs and benefits for a majority of legislators is such that $c_{2j}(x) > b_j(x)$ for every $x > 0$. Alternatively, for other distributions and costs, $x^M > 0$, as is illustrated for a five-person legislature in Figure 1. Under these conditions there exists a positive policy scale that defeats all contenders in a majority rule contest.

In order to explore the application of this well-known result to the question of market failure, we state an obvious

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[7] A troublesome feature with political institutions is that they often lack equilibrium outcomes. Rarely, in Riker's (1980) terms, is there an "equilibrium of tastes," since political choices typically entail preference cycles. For our purposes, the lack of equilibrium implies that there is no basis for unambiguously claiming that a political solution will improve or fail to improve upon the market failure it sought to correct. However, even though there is normally no equilibrium of tastes owing to preference cycles, there may nevertheless be equilibrium outcomes induced by structural arrangements. For example, rules governing the comparison of alternatives, various forms of agenda control, requirements on the order of voting like considering the status quo last, all serve to prevent endless cycling. Consequently, we believe the pure majority rule/unstructured legislature, that has been the object of analysis for most political equilibrium theorists, is a very special case. Some insight on the question of political solutions to market failures can be obtained by studying legislatures, not as atomistic collections of legislative agents, but rather as structured institutions (see Shepsle, 1979a, and Shepsle and Weingast, 1981b).

[8] This definition characterizes *strong Condorcet winners.* If the requirement is relaxed to $|S(x^*, x)| > |S(x, x^*)|$ for all feasible $x \neq x^*$, we have *strong plurality winners.* And if the requirement is further relaxed to $|S(x, x^*)| < n/2$ for all $x \neq x^*$, we have characterized the *strong majority core.* Each reflects slightly different treatments accorded indifferent voters.

Figure 1. Majority Rule Equilibrium for Regulatory Policy



Corollary 1. A regulatory policy, $\pi(x)$, is a MRE if and only if $b_M'(x) - c_{2M}'(x) = 0$ (or $x=0$ if the median ideal point is a corner solution of equation (7)).

That is, for legislative decision making in the regulatory realm, the political solution that emerges in a simple majority-rule context is one for which the first-order condition is satisfied *for the median legislator.* Contrast this fact with the efficient scale $x=x^E$ satisfying:

$$\sum_{j=1}^{n} b_j'(x) - \sum_{j=1}^{n} c_{2j}'(x) = 0. \tag{8}$$

This follows from substituting equations (1) and (2) into equation (5) with the stipulation that $c_{1j}(x) = 0$ for all j and all x.

Letting x^E be the efficient solution, x^0 the market solution (which constitutes the political status quo), and x^L the regulatory solution of a simple legislature, we know, in the case of market failure, only that $x^E \neq x^0$ and $x^L = x^M$. If $x^L \neq x^0$—that is, if the regulatory solution differs from the market (failure) solution—then we know only that a majority of legislators prefers x^L to x^0, viz. $N_j(x^L(> N_j(x^0)$ for more than $n/2$ legislators. What we do not know is the relationship of x^L to x^E, and only a very benign view of political institutions allows the belief that x^L "improves" upon x^0.

Combining the first-order conditions of Corollary 1 and equation (8), we may specify the rather stringent requirement for efficient regulatory solutions.

Corollary 2. $x^L = x^E$ if and only if

$$\sum_{j\neq M} b_j'(x^M) - \sum_{j\neq M} c_{2j}'(x^M) = 0.$$

That is, for the legislative equilibrium to be efficient, the distribution of marginal net benefits at the policy scale preferred by the median legislator must sum precisely to zero. This knife-edge condition is very stringent and unlikely to be observed in practice.

An additional implication follows from this analysis. Since x^L is the ideal point of the median legislator, i.e., $x^L = x^M$, and since it is highly unlikely that $x^L = x^E$, it follows from the definition of an MRE that x^L beats x^E. That is, a majority actually prefers the chosen outcome to the efficient point. As noted, political agents worry about benefit and cost incidences, not efficiency.

This treatment has paralleled the traditional market-failure analysis, comparing expected institutional performance against an ideal. Like its counterpart in market-failure analysis, however, it fails to take the next step. That is, it neglects to compare expected performance under one institutional regime with performance under alternative institutional arrangements. This we now proceed to do. Therefore, of more interest, and at bottom of greatest importance to an accurate assessment of political solutions in market-failure situations, are the six possible orderings of x^E, x^0, and x^L (notice that *strict* inequalities are sometimes used to be consistent with an assumed market failure):

$$\begin{array}{ll} 1. & x^0 \leqslant x^L \leqslant x^E \\ 2. & x^0 < x^E \leqslant x^L \\ 3. & x^E \leqslant x^L \leqslant x^0 \\ 4. & x^L \leqslant x^E < x^0 \\ 5. & x^L \leqslant x^0 < x^E \\ 6. & x^E < x^0 \leqslant x^L. \end{array} \qquad (*)$$

Here we inquire not whether $x^L = x^E$—the unlikely circumstances for this are given in Corollary 2—but rather whether x^L improves upon x^0. Cases 1 and 2 are traditional market-failure situations in which the market operates at suboptimal scale. In each of these cases, the regulatory solution is a scale exceeding x^0. In case 1 the political solution is an unambiguous improvement upon the market failure/political status quo. Case 2, on the other hand, has the scale of the regulatory solution exceeding both x^0 and x^E; whereas the market fails to produce enough of, say, a positive externality, the public solution may entail too much public provision. At any rate, the signals are ambiguous and there is no prima facie case for either tolerating market failures or permitting public intervention. Cases 3 and 4, respectively, are mirror images of cases 1 and 2. Here the market operates at an undesirably high level, producing too much of, say, pollution or some other public bad. Case 3 is, and case 4 is not, an unambiguous public improvement over the market-produced status quo. Cases 5 and 6 are interesting because they describe instances of perverse public intervention in which x^L represents a deterioration of the market-produced status quo. These are unanticipated consequences *in extremum!*

Cases 1, 2, and 5—market failures representing "undersupply"—may be examined more systematically in the following simple example (cases 3, 4, and 6—instances of "oversupply"—are simply mirror images). Cases 1 and 5 are instances of improvement and deterioration in x^0, respectively, from political intervention. Case 2 is more ambiguous. We set $x^0 = 0$, and choose a very simple representation for political preferences:

$$N_j(x) = k_j - (a_j - x)^2 \text{ for } j = 1, \ldots, n.$$

Legislator j's ideal point is a_j. At that level, $N_j(x)$ is maximized with $N_j(a_j) = k_j$. Defining $E(x) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} N_j(x)$, the first-order condition for a maximum, $E'(x) = 0$, implies that the efficient point is simply the *mean* ideal point:[9] $x^E = 1/n \sum_{j=1}^{n} a_j = \bar{a}$. The political choice, on the other hand, is $x^L = \underset{j}{\text{med}} \{a_j\} = a_m$. Thus, cases 1, 2, and 5 become (see Figure 2):

1. $0 \leqslant a_m \leqslant \bar{a}$.
2. $0 < \bar{a} \leqslant a_m$.
5. $a_m \leqslant 0 < \bar{a}$.

From Figure 2, we observe that there is an unambiguous improvement from political intervention (case 1) when the mean ideal point exceeds the median (both positive), a circumstance reflecting a distribution of ideal points skewed toward $x^0 = 0$. If, on the other hand, both mean and

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[9] $$E'(n) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} N_j'(x) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} 2(a_j - x).$$
$E'(x) = 0$ implies $\sum_{j=1}^{n} (a_j - x) = 0$, or $\sum_{j=1}^{n} a_j = nx$, and the result follows.

Figure 2. Comparison of Market "Problem" with Political "Solution"



median are positive but the distribution is skewed away from zero (case 2), the improvement from political intervention is ambiguous. The more extreme the skew, the less warranted is the political intervention. That is, the more extreme the skew (i.e., move 1 and 2 closer to x^0, with $\bar{a}$ moving toward x^0 as well), the more likely the costs imposed on constituencies from political intervention will exceed total benefits (even though a majority of districts will, on net, experience an improvement). Finally, if more than half of the legislators prefer a level of x below x^0, i.e., $a_j < 0$ for $n/2$ or more legislators, but a minority of districts prefer positive levels that, on average, more than compensate for the majority wishes (case 5), then politicizing this market failure will actually lead to a reduction in social welfare.[10]

This example illustrates the results that can be derived under specific assumptions about preferences. Before turning to our more general analysis, we identify some circumstances in which public policies outperform market institutions, and vice versa. These results are of a more substantive nature.

1. Assume there is a market failure but that the potential net beneficiaries of a political solution do not involve a majority of districts. Then x^0 is an MRE. In short, absent additional ingenuity, the political solution exactly duplicates the market failure. Market failures that do not impose burdens on a majority of districts will not be improved upon by political intervention.

2. Assume there is a market failure that affects a large number of districts. Some legislators will prefer high values of x, some low values. As long as the median legislator prefers a level x^M greater than x^0 but less than x^E, then Pareto improvements follow from public intervention. This is the most sanguine conclusion of our model, and shows that public sector performance is not, in principle, strictly inferior to market performance.

3. Suppose that markets are working perfectly, i.e., $x^0 = x^E$. Here, too, x^M need not equal x^E. It may well be that large numbers of districts, possibly including a majority, benefit from some type of market intervention. Intervention in efficient markets occurs whenever a majority of districts can benefit from it. Nothing in the model constrains current, temporary majorities from advantaging themselves at the expense of others, and in the process destroying efficient markets.

4. Consider, finally, a very troubling result that underscores how fundamentally arbitrary political choice is in relation to the underlying configuration of districts. Assume a market failure exists so $x^0 \neq x^E$ and let x^M be the legislative solution based upon some set of districts. Now, fix the economic interests of every citizen (so that the underlying economic problem remains unchanged), but redraw the boundaries of political districts. Regrouping citizens in different districts changes the preferences of political representatives, since the politically relevant incidences now differ. In particular, redistricting may alter the

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[10] This last case is reminiscent of the classic democratic paradox of the intense minority opposed by a (relatively) indifferent majority. Perhaps it should not be surprising that, in general, political solutions improve upon market failures when (with appropriate qualifications) means and median preferences do not differ by much. Indeed, when equal, we have efficient political intervention. However, if mean and median diverge, and especially when the mean and median are on opposite sides of the status quo, then opening the gates to political intervention produces "public failure."

preferences (indeed, change the identity) of the median legislator, thereby altering the location of x^M. This implies that the political solution to a given market problem is not invariant with respect to arbitrary political divisions associated with geographic representation. This underscores our main point, namely that there is no determinate relationship between x^M and x^E.

What, on balance, does this simple but suggestive analysis say about the ameliorative impact of political solutions on market failures? We have some positive results (result 2), some null results (result 1), and some negative results (results 3 and 4). In some specific circumstances, however, we can provide realistic expectations. In economies suffering pervasive, geographically dispersed, and wide-ranging, market failures, result (2) may well provide the inspiration and justification for market intervention. However, in economies with competitive markets prevalent and market failures minor and few in number, most political interventions will themselves fail to correct these failures. Indeed, they will more likely have a destructive effect on reasonably well-functioning markets.

We have developed our model of political incidence in some detail for the one-dimensional world of regulatory policymaking in an unstructured legislature. We have conducted this analysis, not because we believe it to model real legislative choice adequately, but rather because it reveals cleanly and in an unencumbered fashion the *potential* divergence between social choice and social welfare. We underscore "potential" to emphasize that public failure proponents are quite wrong to maintain their viewpoint everywhere and in all circumstances. But so, too, are the market failure advocates.[11]

Political Solutions in Richer Institutional Settings

In the simple, one-dimensional context of an unstructured legislature, we have argued that there is no basis for presuming political interventions improve upon market failures. Our principal aim now is to enrich our simple legislative model in ways that are relatively general, but which nevertheless possess features characteristic of real legislatures. Although our strictly geographic representation of benefit and cost incidences remains simple and mechanical, we define our task now as that of moving beyond the abstract world of Duncan Black and public choice theory to the more substantive world of David Mayhew and Richard Fenno. Our modest objective is to trace the consequences of our simple "incidence analysis" for policy formation in a political institution more structured than the pure majority rule legislature.

Three elements are described: committees with agenda power, a status quo that prevails if committees fail to make proposals or if the parent legislature rejects such proposals, and a policy space, multidimensional in nature, partitioned into committee jurisdictions. Our purpose here is not so much to provide a finely fashioned model of a legislature; rather we intend to demonstrate the robustness of our earlier claims for political solutions in circumstances that possess the prominent features of legislatures like the U.S. Congress.

Observers since the time of Woodrow Wilson (1885) have been struck by the importance of legislative committees in shaping policies within the jurisdictions entrusted to their care by the entire legislature. In developing a legislative committee model, we assume that a subset of the legislature, called a committee, is delegated agenda power or jurisdiction over a particular set of policy issues. We model this jurisdiction as a subspace, X, of a multidimensional policy space. For the present, we rule out the possibility of amendments to committee proposals so that committees have exclusive agenda control. Further, we abstract from the question of committee composition and assume that the committee can be characterized by a transitive utility function, U^C.[12]

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[11] We mention for completeness that the results just obtained are not substantially changed when we switch from regulatory to expenditure policy. Technically, adding $f[c_{1j}(x)] - t_j T(x)$ to equation (7) preserves concavity and hence single peakedness. Thus, although the details differ somewhat, we still obtain a majority rule equilibrium. Similarly, an efficient expenditure policy, like an efficient regulatory policy, depends upon the satisfaction of a knife-edge condition that parallels the one given in Corollary 2 above. So, as in the case of regulatory policy, efficiency is unlikely in expenditure policies, and "public success" is a chancy business. The only detail worth stressing is that social choices and their welfare consequences, in the expenditure realm, depend on a public production process, and hence on where inputs are purchased and taxes extracted. These incidences are a complicating factor that likely cause distortions in productive efficiency. A more complete analysis of expenditure policy is contained in an earlier draft of this article, issued as Working Paper No. 74 of the Center for Study of American Business, Washington University, and available from the authors.

[12] Since committees are legislatures writ small, unless the committee assignment mechanism selects out only special subsets of preferences, majority committee cycles are normally expected. However, precisely the same argument we are about to present for committees (with agenda control) in legislatures can be made for a chairman (with agenda control) in committees. That is, ultimately we can claim to be dealing with a "well-

Figure 3. Voter *j*'s Preferred-to and Indifferent-to Sets



Finally, we impose the restriction, common in most Anglo-American legislatures including the U.S. Congress, that the status quo is voted upon last. Legislator preferences, as before, are induced by the policy incidence of an alternative, $x \epsilon X$, on his district (where X is multidimensional and x is a vector). Legislator *j*'s most preferred policy alternative is x_j^N, the point in X that maximizes $N_j(x)$. Notice that the dimensions of X are not restricted to a single level of some public intervention; x is no longer a scalar, so that we no longer retain the restrictive interpretation required in the one-dimensional setting.

The process of legislative choice in this model differs systematically from the simple legislature described in the previous sections. First, in a multidimensional policy space, majority rule is not well-behaved. Specifically, following from the theorems of Cohen (1979), Matthews (1979), McKelvey (1976, 1979), Plott (1967), Schofield (1978), and Slutsky (1979), for any alternative in the policy space, there exists a set of points that command a majority of votes against it. In terms of our earlier development, this may be seen as follows. From each legislator's incidence-induced preference function $N_j(x)$, given in equation (3), we may define his preferred-to set:

$$P_j(x) = \{x' \epsilon X | N_j(x') > N_j(x)\}.$$

$P_j(x)$ is the set of points j prefers to x. Our assumptions about $N_j(x)$ imply that $P_j(x)$ is a strictly convex set, a two-dimensional illustration of which is found in Figure 3. There, the ellipse passing through x, labeled $I_j(x)$, is an iso-preference contour of $N_j(x)$, and its interior, a convex set, is j's preferred-to set. From the individual $P_j(x)$ sets, the *majority win set*, $W(x)$, is constructed. $W(x)$ is the set of points contained in the $P_j(x)$ sets of at least a simple majority of legislators:

$$W(x) = \{x' \epsilon X | x' \epsilon P_j(x) \text{ for more than } n/2 \text{ legislators}\}.$$

Thus, $W(x)$ is the set of points preferred by legislative majorities to x. The theorems cited above show that generally $W(x) \neq \phi$ for all $x \epsilon X$ (a fact illustrated shortly).

Second, the legislative committee model differs from the pure majority rule model of the last two sections in that agenda control is delegated to the committee with jurisdiction. The results of McKelvey (1976) and Plott and Levine (1979) show that agenda power, within limits, allows those controlling the agenda to manipulate the outcome. Even though our assumptions require the committee in its agenda formation role to allow the status quo to be voted last—a requirement that imposes significant restrictions upon the committee's ability to manipulate the outcome (Shepsle & Weingast, 1984)—committee members

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behaved" utility function. For further details, see Shepsle and Weingast, 1981c.

Figure 4. Structure-Induced Equilibrium for Three Voters



have greater influence over outcomes than other legislative agents.

Consider the set of policy alternatives that command a majority against the status quo, $W(x^0)$. The committee will only propose alternatives from $W(x^0)$ since any other would be rejected by the full legislature when paired against x^0 in the final vote. Knowing this, the committee treats $W(x^0)$ as a constraint—a feasible set—over which it maximizes. Let x^* be the point in this set that the committee prefers most, i.e.,

$$x^* = \underset{x \in W(x^0)}{\operatorname{argmax}} U^C(x).^{13}$$

Complete agenda power allows the committee to propose this point for a vote against x^0 (which then replaces x^0 since $x^* \in W(x^0)$).

Alternative x^* is the policy outcome of this legislative committee game in the following sense. Even though $W(x^*) \neq \phi$, so that points exist that command a majority of votes against x^*, the committee in its gatekeeping, agenda-setting role assures that only its proposals are moved for a vote. Those individuals who prefer some alternative $y \in W(x^*)$ are prohibited by the legislative rules from proposing y. Given this structural arrangement imposed by the legislative rules, x^* is a *structure induced equilibrium* (Shepsle, 1979).

Figure 4 illustrates this discussion for three ideal points. The (one-man) committee's ideal point is located at x_c^N. Also depicted are the

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[13] Since $W(x^0)$ is defined as an open set, a limit argument is required for x^* to be well defined.

status quo, x^0, and two other ideal points, $x_1{}^N$ and $x_2{}^N$. The interiors of the ellipses passing through x^0 are the preferred-to sets of the three legislators, and the shaded petals—points common to the preferred-to sets of at least a majority of legislators—constitute $W(x^0)$. The point x^* is simply the best one the committee can secure, given that its proposal must satisfy the constraint of being an element of $W(x^0)$, i.e., must command a majority against x^0.

So far we have not considered x^E in our discussion. It should be apparent, however, that x^E plays no necessary role in legislative choice. The legislative outcome, x^*, is determined by an optimization process over $W(x^0)$ by a particular committee. Both the constraint set, $W(x^0)$, and the function constituting the committee maximand are determined by the legislator objective functions, $N_j(x)$. These functions tell us the set of policies that legislator j prefers to x^0, and hence the set of policies preferred by a majority to x^0. Similarly, the objective functions of the committee members determine x^* from among the alternatives in $W(x^0)$. Since these functions and their respective optima, $x_j{}^N$, stand in no particular relationship to x^E, neither do $W(x^0)$ and x^*.

Our model of choice in a structured, majority-rule legislature implies that the status quo (which constitutes a market failure, i.e., $x^0 \neq x^E$) is replaced by an extreme point of the constraint set $W(x^0)$.[14] Even if $x^E \epsilon W(x^0)$, it would be sheer accident for it to be an extreme point, and even more unlikely for it to be the constrained maximum of $U^c(x)$. It is clear, then, that a highly implausible knife-edge condition must once again hold to insure efficient legislative choice.

We may also show the change in policy that accompanies a change in committee membership

Figure 5. Policy Change Following Committee Turnover



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[14] With one exception to be noted in the next two paragraphs.

(Weingast & Moran, 1983). Suppose that the status quo is preferred by the current committee to all other points that beat this policy alternative. Then the committee qua agenda setter "keeps the gates closed," and the legislature is in equilibrium even though $W(x^0) \neq \phi$ (Denzau & Mackay, 1983). The legislative rules yield x^0 as a structure-induced equilibrium which cannot be upset as long as committee preferences remain unchanged. This holds regardless of the relation of x^0 to x^E. Thus, even if $W(x^0)$ is large relative to the convex hull of ideal points, and even if x^E is contained in $W(x^0)$, x^0 remains an equilibrium. The case of two-dimensional choice with five legislators is illustrated in Figure 5, where $x^0 = x_c{}^N$ is both the status quo and the ideal point of the committee, and x^E is the efficient point, a centrally located alternative that also is the ideal point of legislator 3.

If the committee changes hands, it is apparent that no matter which legislator takes over the committee, x^0 is no longer an equilibrium. For all other legislators, alternatives exist in $W(x^0)$ that are preferred to x^0. Notice, moreover, that all prefer x^E to x^0. The new equilibrium depends upon which member takes over the committee. Unless the new committee ideal is located at x^3 (the exception referred to in note 14), the new equilibrium is not x^E, but rather is defined by maximizing the new committee's objective function over $W(x^0)$. If, for example, legislator 4 takes over, then the new equilibrium is x^{*4}. This new equilibrium need bear no necessary relation to x^E. In particular, this equilibrium is determined by the preferences of a small subset of legislators—the committee. It could be closer to or further away from x^E than is x^0. The rule or practice according to which members are assigned to committees will tell us the nature and extent of this bias.

The rules for assigning members to the committee attenuate any relationship between x^* and x^E. In order for x^* to bear some direct relation to x^E, the committee assignment process must select particular committee members on the basis of the relationship of their ideal points to x^E. Other assignment mechanisms may be biased away from x^E. In practice, assignment rules in the U.S. Congress typically select for qualities that are at best unrelated to x^E, and may in fact be negatively related. For example, in both the House and Senate the mechanism used assigns members to committees on the basis of their demand for committee positions. Those with the highest stake in a given jurisdiction generally gain membership on the relevant committees (Shepsle, 1978). Thus, this mechanism is disposed toward members from districts that bear either mostly costs or mostly benefits. The empirical evidence in the congressional literature lends strong support to the conclusion that committees typically consist of "preference outliers." The predictions of our models are consistent with these empirical regularities.

To see this, return to the situation illustrated in Figure 5. Suppose we are considering a multidimensional policy like environmental protection. The status quo is x^0 and represents a market failure. Initially, it is an equilibrium since the committee's ideal is located there. These individuals might represent the Southern Democrats in the early 1960s who see little benefits but significant costs in changing the policy on environmental matters from the status quo. Environmentalists, who appear in the mid-1960s, are "high demanders" (that is, they prefer very high levels of environmental protection, see benefits everywhere, and do not bear much of the costs). Their ideal might be placed at $x_5{}^N$. As well, we have other legislators who bear different mixes of benefits and costs, including one centrally located representative whose ideal is precisely the efficient point. Now, what happens as the Southern Democrats, through attrition, begin turning power in the committee over to the environmentalist legislators—in particular, what happens if the high demanders at $x_5{}^N$ are able to take over the committee? The new equilibrium is determined by maximizing the new committee objective function, $N_5(x)$, over the set $W(x^0)$. Since this maximand includes a disproportionate amount of benefits over costs, it selects a much higher level of environmental protection than x^E. In fact, this choice does not even guarantee an improvement over x^0, and may involve "too much" environmental protection. Since the committee system selects outliers from the distribution of preferences, it ensures that the political solution, x^*, to market problems, x^0, is biased away from x^E. Indeed, this conclusion holds even if many legislators prefer outcomes close to x^E—the latter a case of market failure that would seem to be the most amenable to a democratic resolution. Although there are only a few outliers, the committee system nevertheless advantages them.

This basic message about political solutions holds, a fortiori, in the case of no market failure. If $x^0 = x^E$, the earlier theorems cited on majority rule imply that $W(x^E) \neq \phi$. Thus, if the committee with jurisdiction prefers points in $W(x^E)$ to x^E, the political intervention has the counterproductive effect of destroying an efficiently operating sector of the political economy. In short, once the political machinery is established, political "solutions" will be imposed everywhere, even in markets that have not failed.

There is one additional point we wish to emphasize, and it is best developed in a comparative statics framework. Nonempty win sets provide opportunities for agenda setters. Agenda setters,

Figure 6. Preference Outliers and the Comparative Statics of Win-Sets



by virtue of the committee assignment mechanism, are outliers of the legislature's preference distribution. Agenda setters, therefore, pick extreme points of $W(x^0)$. Replacing one set of agenda setters with another effects a switch from one extreme point of $W(x^0)$ to another. Such changes bear no relationship to efficiency as, for example, when agenda setters preferring too little market intervention (in relation to x^E) are replaced by those wanting too much. A counterintuitive comparative statics result follows in this setting (and generalizes ideas of Romer & Rosenthal, 1978). Fix x^E, and consider the effect of moving x^0 away from x^E (thus worsening the market failure). The ironic consequence is that outlier agenda setters are now in a position to select an outcome even further away from x^E as a result of $W(x^0)$ growing larger. In Figure 6, with x_5^N the ideal of the high-demand agenda setter, as x^0 moves toward the southwest, $W(x^0)$ grows so that the choice of Mr. 5 changes from x' to x'' (the latter even farther away from x^E than the former). Put simply, the worse the problem, the worse the solution!

Discussion and Extension

Having conceded at various points in this article the simplicity and restrictiveness of our model, it is appropriate to conclude our analysis with an attempt to address these complexities. We have little more than suggestions to offer at this point, although others (Cox, McCubbins & Sullivan, 1983; Fiorina, 1982, 1983) are already taking our model and enriching it in useful ways. We turn now to some of our sins of omission to determine whether and how they affect our conclusion.

Alternative Evaluations of Incidence by Legislators

In the development of our model, the geographic incidence of benefits and costs, and only these incidences, induce legislator preferences. This observation suggests an almost religious attachment to Mayhew's "electoral connection," and perhaps a naive version of it at that. Yet one might ponder, even after having granted considerable weight to geographic incidence, the extent to which other sources attenuate the tugs of geography. In most Anglo-American legislatures, for example, there is a tension between party and constituency. In a similar spirit, we may explore the effects of subgeographic constituencies (like Fenno's (1978) reelection, primary, and personal constituencies) and extrageographic constituencies (like organized groups, outside the district, which possess election-relevant resources). For each of the substantive extensions developed below, we show how our framework can handle the broader perspective. We emphasize that these modifications entail changes in the $N_j(x)$ preference functions, but do not alter the form of our conclusions about policy choice.

Sub-geographic constituencies. Our incidence analysis takes the legally defined geographic constituency as the source of all electoral rewards. Although this view properly emphasizes the efficiency distortions of political solutions entailed by the less-than-national district perspective of legislators, it may not have gone far enough. There are two ways to think about the effects of subgeographic constituencies on the legislator's calculus, each of which reinforces our earlier conclusions.

The first, popularized by economists (Olson, 1965; Peltzman, 1976; Stigler, 1971), emphasizes the role of organization, transactions costs, and rational ignorance. According to this view, the transactions costs involved in organizing for political action give small groups, who may already be organized for other purposes, a distinct political advantage over unorganized groups. Because such groups are more easily mobilized, more skilled at raising resources to make their views and preferences known, and more capable of using their resources to reward or punish politicians, the induced political preferences of a given representative may give disproportionate weight to incidence on these privileged groups. Unorganized voter-citizens, on the other hand, may be victimized by policies tilted toward privileged groups.

The second view, articulated by Fenno (1978), suggests that politicians partition their geographic districts in politically relevant ways. The legislator is especially attentive to policy incidence on his political allies—his reelection, primary, and personal constituencies inside the geographic district—a perspective given some analytical force by Fiorina (1974).

Each of these views suggests that politicians, whom we had modeled as provincially oriented toward their geographic constituencies, may be more provincial still. Not only are the benefits and costs falling on citizens in other districts ignored, but the same may also hold for the powerless and unorganized, according to the first view, or the opposition, according to the second, *within* the geographic constituency. Benefits, therefore, are targeted by politicians toward subgeographic constituencies, whereas costs are permitted to fall not only on those outside the district, but also on those inside the district who either will not notice, cannot mobilize, or would not support the legislator in any event.

Both of these considerations can be handled by a simple modification of our model. This involves disaggregating each district into a politically relevant set of groups (a la Fiorina, 1974, or Cox, McCubbins, & Sullivan, 1983). For example, $N_j(x)$ may become

$$N_j(x) = \sum_i (b_{ij}(x) - c_{ij}(x))\, a_{ij}$$

where i is an index over politically relevant groups and $b_{ij}(x)$ and $c_{ij}(x)$ are the benefits and costs, respectively, received from policy x by the members of the ith group located in district j. The term a_{ij} is a weighting factor which depends on group responsiveness and whether the group is in legislator j's electoral support coalition (see Cox, McCubbins, & Sullivan, 1983, for an explicit model of this process).

This modification of our model gives greater play to subgeographic constituencies, and it implies an even less sanguine appraisal of political solutions to market problems than we had initially given. Legislator attention to specific groups within the district implies political preferences for policies beneficial to narrow strata of the constituency, with the pool of citizens available to absorb costs including nonconstituents and (some) constituents alike. It is clientele politics with a vengeance!

Extra-Geographic Constituencies. Unlike the effects of subgeographic constituencies on the geographic calculus of legislators, which tend to exacerbate politically induced inefficiencies, extrageographic constituency effects are more ambiguous. On the negative side, an interest group, like the National Association of Car Dealers or the American Medical Association, is prepared to bribe legislators with campaign resources in exchange for a policy geared to its interests. A legislator would willingly accept his share of such bribes if the expected constituency votes that these payments could ultimately secure exceeded the votes the legislator expected to lose by virtue of his support for the policy (Denzau & Munger, 1983).

The paucity of empirical knowledge of the relative magnitudes of these various effects leaves us in the unhappy position of not being able to draw firm conclusions. Since little is known about how contributions drawn from outside the district can be turned into votes within the district, the trade-off between district and extradistrict welfare remains unknown.

Nevertheless, two hypotheses seem reasonable to assert. First, since the biggest source of extradistrict funds is interest groups, this process seems to build a bias into the legislative system away from efficient solutions in favor of those benefiting groups that can readily mobilize funds. Second, unless extradistrict resources completely dominate local elections, geographic incidence, in some form, survives.

Party. There is some reason to believe that partisan pressures attenuate legislator ties to geography and push political preferences toward less provincial policies. At the extreme, where a party regards the nation as a single constituency, the optimal party policy is driven toward x^E as external effects, ignored by individual legislators, are internalized (see Weingast, Shepsle, & Johnsen, 1981).[15] To the extent, then, that a party position is responsive to these forces, it is one that pushes toward efficient resolution of market failures.

The model studied above can be modified in several different ways to include a party system. Again, we focus on how party impact at the district level alters the induced preference functions for legislators. Let the new induced preference functions be $M_j(x,\alpha)$ where

$$M_j(x,\alpha) = \alpha N_j(x) + (1-\alpha)\, Q_j(x).$$

$Q_j(x)$ is legislator j's party evaluation function on policy x, $N_j(x)$ is defined as above, and α ($0 \leqslant \alpha \leqslant 1$) is a shift parameter that varies with the strength of the party system. This formulation allows for a direct trade-off between a legislator's parochial, district defined evaluation of a given policy, i.e., $N_j(x)$, and that of his party, i.e., $Q_j(x)$. α represents the strength of the party system. As it declines, for example, the weight a legislator gives party evaluations increases relative to that of district incidence.

A perfect party system is one in which $\alpha = 0$, i.e., legislator preferences are induced solely by the position taken by his party, regardless of the incidence of the policy on his district. Although our model is capable of handling this substantive change, it is unclear what conclusions if any can be derived; this follows because there is virtually no theoretical understanding of party dynamics, i.e., from whence the $Q_j(x)$ functions derive. Once some dynamics are assumed, however, conclusions from this perspective can be given.

This view of a strong party system is incomplete, however, since party "ideals" are not self-enforcing. If partisan pressure is to attenuate individual legislator ties to constituency, then there must be some mechanism of leverage on individual legislators by which the party enforces its positions. Control over party nominations and committee assignments in the United States, for example, are the tools with which party leaders could impose greater observance of party positions. Neither would appear to be of much significance in the contemporary American context. Local interests control nominations, and neither the national parties nor the president intrude on these local prerogatives. During most of the post-World War II period, committee assignments have essentially been by self-selection (Shepsle, 1978), although the last decade has witnessed a somewhat more active role by party leaders in the process. In neither the case of nominations nor that of committee assignments has the force of partisanship successfully competed with geography as a basis for legislator preferences.

Essentially the same conclusion is reached if we examine other possible sources of party leverage over individual legislators. Parties figure in only a minor way in the raising and allocating of campaign resources, so that the possibility of denying them to some legislator too attached to local interests is likely only to earn that party the enmity of one of its members. The same may be said of internal institutional resources, such as staff and office space, which tend to be distributed relatively evenly within parties.

In short, the absence of strong parties in the United States, exogenous to the legislature, means that the parties are legislative parties, composed of precisely the legislators for whom district-related incidences are paramount. It should come as no surprise that, if anything, parties facilitate the ties to constituency by giving legislators district-relevant committee assignments, by not intruding in local nominating processes, and by distributing campaign and institutional resources in a relatively evenhanded fashion.[16] Thus, although it would be useful to enrich our model with a partisan component to preferences, it would also be something of a surprise if such a component counted for much in the modern American context.

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[15] A closely related argument is made by Olson (1982, p. 53): "Encompassing organizations have some incentive to make the society in which they operate more prosperous, and an incentive to redistribute income to their members with as little excess burden as possible, and to cease such redistribution unless the amount redistributed is substantial in relation to the social cost of the redistribution." A party or president that treats the entire nation as a single constituency, and whose political success depends on producing policies that improve constituency well-being, is precisely an "encompassing organization" of which Olson speaks.

[16] The key appears to be whether or not a party has strength, resources, and leverage derived from sources outside the legislature itself. Polities with strong parties

Conclusions

Market failures derive from structural defects in which self-interested market behavior does not produce the felicitous social consequences found in the externality-free world of perfect competition. In order to assess public performance in a comparable context, it would appear necessary to analyze self-interested political behavior in institutional structures of the public sector. One of the major advantages of our approach, therefore, is its emphasis on this institutional structure. The division-of-labor in a legislature represented by its committee system is not merely an economical way of doing business. Based on its gatekeeping and other agenda control power, a legislative committee may block changes in the status quo of which it disapproves and may strongly influence the menu of alternatives from which the parent legislature chooses. Given the propensity in the U.S. Congress for "preference outliers" to gravitate to appropriate committees, public interventions are distorted toward the extremes of the preference distribution represented in the legislature.

Our purpose in this article has been that of modeling public sector institutions which are the counterparts to market institutions in the private sector. Although it is well known that markets fail owing to various imperfections in production, consumption, and, more generally, in the system of property rights, it is presumed, according to one orthodoxy, that public interventions ameliorate such failure. This presumption involves a comparison of market institutions, richly detailed in terms of their divergence from the perfectly competitive model, with a smoothly operating, detail-free, public sector. There is no basis for this presumption. Our results provide specific cautionary warnings about optimistic reliance on political institutions to improve upon market performance.

Students of public policy need especially to take heed of this possibility—the cure may be worse than the disease. This conclusion is all the more important when it is noted that once the political machinery for market intervention is created, no market is immune, even those that are tolerably efficient. Since majority preferences in a legislature diverge from those of social welfare maximization, even an efficient outcome, x^E, is vulnerable to democratic tinkering. The majority win set of x^E, $W(x^E)$, is nonempty, so there are points which provide net improvements for a majority of districts at an expense to the minority that more than wipes out those gains. Thus, our analysis suggests not only that political interventions are no panacea for market failures; as well, they may be positively destructive of well-functioning markets.

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Conflict and Complexity:
Goal Diversity and Organizational Search Effectiveness

MICHAEL D. COHEN
University of Michigan

There is a long-standing concern in organization theory with the effect of conflict on search. This article uses a computer model of organizational decision making to demonstrate an effect called "search-enhancing conflict": organizational decision-making performance when there are conflicting subgoals may be better than it would be if all subunits evaluated alternatives in terms of a single organizational goal.

Many of the systems that interest contemporary political scientists are formal organizations or are larger systems having organizations as their major actors. Thus it has been natural for work in fields as diverse as administrative reform (Taylor, 1983), legislative agenda setting (Kingdon, in press; Walker, 1981), foreign policy crisis management (Allison, 1971), or even political participation (Olsen, 1981) to construct explanations that rely in part on the observations and models of organization theorists from Max Weber to Herbert Simon.

Of course, contemporary organization theory is characterized by sharp disagreements on many important matters, but one can distinguish two principles that are especially appropriate for research on politics and on which there is a healthy consensus. The first of these is the need to appreciate the multiplicity of the goals pursued within an organization and the conflict that follows from that goal diversity. The second principle is the significance of the environmental complexity to which an organization must adapt. The central import of conflict among the diverse goals within an organization is a point of agreement among theorists as different as Argyris (1976) and Simon (1964). The role played by complexity is asserted in such fundamental theoretical contributions as those of Thompson (1967), Weick (1969), or Emery and Trist (1965). Environmental complexity implies that an organization's policies, or repertoire of standard operating procedures (Cyert & March, 1963), will be the result of a process of search. Conflict among goals implies a number of complications for search, since the existence of multiple goals makes it problematic which performance standards are to guide a search or be used in evaluating its results. The view is widely held that the net effect of goal conflict on a search is probably deleterious (Argyris, 1976; Beyer, 1981; Mitroff & Emshoff, 1979). There is, however, a long tradition on the other side, arguing that a search may benefit from conflict (Coser, 1956; Hedberg, Nystrom, & Starbuck, 1976; Wildavsky, 1964). A prominent example of the controversy is provided by Allison's (1971) treatment of the Cuban missile crisis and George's (1972) subsequent critique. In Allison's view the loyalties of the participants to the subgoals of the diverse agencies involved were a major obstacle to effective decision making. In George's view the "multiple advocacy" process which President Kennedy set in motion provides an excellent example of the way policies should be chosen in a complex situation.

This article contributes to the debate by using a formal model to demonstrate the existence of search-enhancing conflict. It shows that under plausible theoretical assumptions the loyalty of organizational members to the diverse goals of their subunits may lead to improved organizational search; that is, an organization may do better when the standard of performance measurement actually matters less to its members! The article also gives a detailed analysis of the process by which conflict can enhance search performance.

The surprising effect is not always to be expected, of course, and the implications of this fact are an important part of the interpretation section that concludes the article. But demonstrating the effect with a rigorous theoretical procedure and explaining how it can occur may help to deepen

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organization theory's understanding of the subtle connections between conflict and complexity and may enrich the conceptual repertoire of those who observe and design organizations.

The method used to demonstrate the existence of search-enhancing conflict is the controlled comparison of the search performance of two model organizations. The models are rich in organizational detail—far richer than has previously been possible in formal models of decision-making systems—and they are identical except for the goals pursued by individual members. In one case, called the global model, all members have the same goal, maximization of the organization's overall performance. In the second case, called the local model, members of the model organization are concerned only about the goals and operating constraints in their own part of the organization.

A controlled comparison is established by observing the behavior of both models in each of ten model environments that demand a very high quality organizational search to achieve policies that perform well. In every one of the ten model environments better performance is achieved by the local model, in which members are motivated by subunit goals at the expense of concern for the overall organizational objective; this leaves little doubt that, in this formalization, an increase in subgoal diversity and attendant conflict can enhance the quality of search.

The remaining sections of this article describe the organizational modelling system that provides the models used in the argument, explain the parameter variations that are studied here, report the model behavior resulting from the various combinations of parameter settings, and interpret that model behavior and its significance.

General Elements of the Models

The two organizational models used in the comparison are possible because of the development of a computer system for modelling organizational decision making which permits one to construct quite detailed models both of organizations and of their environments and to study the resulting organization-environment interaction. The foundation of the system is a model individual with sharply bounded information-processing capabilities: a very limited memory, a simple aspiration level driven by recently experienced rewards and compared with current rewards to yield a satisfaction state, a weak theory of the structure of the environment in which the organization operates, a small set of friends scattered through the organization, and a small set of specific decisions for which the individual is responsible and which receive the greatest part of the limited total of available attention.

In the current version of the system, up to 40 of these individuals can be assembled into virtually any organizational structure one wants to examine, and they can be provided with any pattern of incentives and rewards for their decisions that one may want to study. Thus it is possible to make all the individuals in the organization maximizers of a single shared objective. It is also possible, while holding all other features of the model constant, to reward each individual according to a function of his local responsibilities, experience, and subunit membership. Comparisons of the performance of such paired models will provide the basic results we need.

A great many features of the model organizations that can be constructed in this system could be varied, but are held constant in the runs reported here. Among these are friendship networks, agenda for meetings, attendance patterns at meetings, rules governing collective decisions, noise, lags, and other environmental uncertainties, and organizational precedents.[1] For our present purpose it is possible to suppress exposition of many of these details since they are arranged identically in the two models being compared and do not interact with the one difference being studied. But in order to judge results reported below, the reader will need some discussion of how individuals make decisions and receive rewards. That discussion will also show how the modelling system improves on other formal representations by incorporating a model individual with many more of the bounded rationality properties that are characteristically assumed in organizational studies (Axelrod, 1973; Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1958). The preliminary material on the structure of the modelling system concludes with a sketch of a typical period of model operation and an account of the particular type of environment in which both the models reported here are operating.

The decisions made by members of a model organization may be thought of as activating (or deactivating) potential standard operating procedures. At any moment in the history of a model, the organization has a policy that specifies for each of 64 distinct standard operating procedures whether or not it is currently in effect.[2] In the model, each individual has a small set of ideas, each of which specifies the activation or deactivation or both of a small subset of the 64 potential standard operating procedures. Ideas are generated as individuals construct variations on current policy at the loci for which they are responsible or variations on ideas of others which they encounter at meetings. An individual considers an idea by comparing its estimated value to the estimated value of the least attractive member of his current short list of good ideas. If the new idea is better from the individual's point of view, it is substituted into the list. If not, it is forgotten. Good ideas are mentioned to others in meetings.

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[1] A full account of these details is available in Cohen (1981a). An account of moderate length appears in Appendix 1. These two sources provide increasingly detailed accounts of the computer subroutines and data structures that provide formal analogs for the processes and structures that the body of the article designates with such everyday language terms as "considering an idea" or "a responsibility of an individual."

When an individual judges the value of an idea, a function is called to estimate the rewards that an individual would receive if current policy were modified as the idea specifies. (Ideas usually involve fewer than six loci. The remaining idea loci are blank and would leave current policy at the corresponding positions unaffected.) This estimate of the rewards, like the rewards themselves, may depend on the individual's identity or organizational position, on time, on the current or previous states of policy, or on exogenous events, stochastic or not. In addition, estimates may diverge, randomly or systematically, from the actual rewards that will occur if an idea becomes policy.

Actual rewards are produced in a model once per period when a function is called for each individual that gives the environment's actual response to the standard operating procedures that are in force under current policy. The actual and estimated reward functions can, of course, be strongly similar in those cases where one wishes to model individuals who "know what they are doing." In other cases one might want to study an organization in which some members acted on beliefs (estimates of the environment) that diverged systematically from the underlying reality. In the models reported here, estimated and actual rewards both result from a deterministic environment overlayed with random noise. Thus beliefs and experience may differ from each other.

An ordinary period in the life of one of the model organizations studied here begins with every individual going through an updating cycle. The actual rewards generated for each individual by the policy in force at the close of the previous period are received. Aspiration level, satisfaction state, and just-noticeable-difference are brought up to date. Then each individual compares current policy on those loci for which he or she is responsible to what is believed to be best policy on those loci. If current policy is better, then ideas are adjusted. Each individual generates potential new ideas by reversing one locus of responsibility at a time in current good ideas. If any of these are estimated improvements, they are added to the individual's short list of good ideas in place of the list's current minimum-value member. If there are changes in loci of responsibility that the individual believes would be improvements and has authority to make unilaterally, those changes in policy are made.

In the next major cycle of a model period, the regularly scheduled meetings of the organization are held. At such meetings each individual mentions the most attractive idea on his or her list. The others consider each idea mentioned, remember it if it is found attractive, and, whether or not the mentioned idea is attractive, try to estimate which actions on their own loci of responsibility would be best if the mentioned idea became policy. These hypothetical responses to proposals are also mentioned to, and considered by, the others attending.[3] At the close of the discussion, the group votes on each individual's current best idea, and the idea becomes new policy if estimates of its value are preferred by a majority to the estimated value of the status quo.

In the final major cycle of a period, any special or ad hoc meetings are held. Those attending consider specific agendas and vote on whether they should become policy. After the completion of all meetings, a new period begins with another updating cycle.

Particulars of the Present Models

What distinguishes this modelling system from others—and makes possible this study of search capability—is the presence in the models of both the very detailed internal dynamics just sketched and a model of the organization's environment. If we are to study the relationship between what Simon (1969) would call the organization's inner and outer environments, we must be able to represent and vary both. In this modelling system, it is

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[2] Current policy is represented by a string of 64 zeroes or ones. There are therefore $2^{64} > 10^{19}$ possible policies. The many similarities of the evolution of policy to genetic evolution make it natural to refer to any particular position in the policy string as a "locus." See the discussion of "genes as routines," and Winter (1975) and Nelson and Winter (1982). In these works and others in the Cyert-March tradition organizational learning may be said to be equated to the coevolution of a repertoire of standard operating procedures.

[3] The response-to-proposals process goes no deeper than three iterations (i.e., responses to responses to responses to proposals).

Table 1. Dantzig's Original Transport Example

	Warehouse					Factory capacity
	1	2	3	4	5	
Costs of Shipping per unit						
Factory 1	9	20	18	12	25	500
Factory 2	6	16	14	18	25	750
Factory 3	27	18	15	10	9	250
Warehouse capacities	300	300	300	300	300	1500
Optimal Solution						
Factory 1	150	0	0	300	50	500
Factory 2	150	300	300	0	0	750
Factory 3	0	0	0	0	250	250
Total	300	300	300	300	300	1500

Cost of optimal feasible solution 18,350
Cost of pessimal feasible solution 30,950

possible to study a very wide range of environments that includes all functions from the space of possible policies, time, individual identity, and past history into the rational numbers. Thus we can specify an environment for which optimal policy is known and study the organization's ability to find that policy, or a good approximation of it. Proceeding in this way we can, in effect, judge the behavior of the models relative to an external performance standard. In this case we will be using cost minimization, but in general the strategy of explicitly representing in the model both the organization and its environment makes it possible to erect a variety of expicit performance standards that can be used to assess model behavior. In turn, this makes it possible to follow the suggestion of Newell and Simon (1972, p. 13) that, along with the more conventional criteria, theory should be subjected to a test of "sufficiency"; does one's understanding of the phenomena permit the construction of a model that can perform relevant tasks? The models presented here pass this test with flying colors. (See also Cohen, 1981b.)

The environments studied in this article are all variations of a problem first used by Dantzig in his classic text on linear programming as an illustration of the power of operations research techniques to resolve complexities that would be difficult for unaided decision makers. Dantzig's original problem is shown in Table 1. It represents a system with three sources ("Factories") and five sinks ("Warehouses"). Each sink has a fixed demand (for "merchandise") each month, and each source has a ("monthly production") capacity as shown in the constraints. The first matrix displays the cost of ("shipping") one unit from any source to any sink. The problem is to satisfy all the constraints at minimum cost. It is an instance of the standard transportation problem and has the optimal solution shown in the second matrix. In these problems there are 15 policy variables, one for each monthly order by a warehouse from a factory. The value of each of these variables within the model is controlled by four policy loci and thus may be in any of the 16 states, which may be thought of as varying from 0 to 15 "truckloads" of 25 cases each. In order to have sufficient replications of model performance, ten variants of the Dantzig problem have been created, each serving as an environment to which a model organization must adapt. The variants were created by holding the constraints (reexpressed in truckloads) constant and generating new cost matrices by drawing cost entries with equal probability and replacement from the integers 5 through 25. The resulting problems are shown in Appendix 2.

It should be noted that the model individuals proceed in the decision making without access to any of the relevant analytic technique. On the contrary, the processes embodied in the models only permit an individual to estimate (with error) the value (as measured by his own particular goals) of a concrete alternative to current policy that would occur if a particular small set of standard operating procedures were altered and then to compare that estimate to the status quo.

Now that the model environment has been described, it is appropriate to provide some detail about the model organizations that will actually be deciding every period how many truckloads of merchandise each warehouse should be ordering from each factory. In all the runs reported here, an organization has 16 members, 15 of whom have direct responsibilities. Each of the five warehouses has an individual responsible for its orders from each of the three factories. Three individuals at each warehouse form a standing committee that holds a regular meeting each period. In addition, there is a sixteenth member, the manager, who calls and attends the organization's ad hoc meetings.[4] The manager does this by choosing a warehouse at random, choosing two members of that warehouse at random, and bringing them together with their counterparts from a second randomly selected warehouse. The agenda of an ad hoc meeting is always the shifting of one unit order from one factory to another.

The individuals in a model are linked to the environment of the organization by the rewards that alternative policies actually produce for them and by the estimates they make of those rewards. The comparison that we want to make is between two patterns of reward which may be called global and local. In the global pattern, each individual is rewarded and gets estimates of that reward on the basis of the overall objective of the organization: cost minimization. A policy that costs less overall is better for everyone, so long as it satisfies the constraints at least as well. In the local pattern, the individuals are concerned primarily with minimizing ordering costs and constraint violations at their own warehouses, and secondarily with minimizing the number of units they are ordering individually. In both patterns constraint violations are subjected to penalties that are large relative to potential cost savings. In the case of warehouse constraints, the penalty is 25 times the squared magnitude of the violation. In the case of factory constraints, the cumulative effect is about 14 times the magnitude of the violation. In the local pattern individuals are insensitive to constraint violation penalties at other warehouses. In the global pattern, all constraint penalties affect everyone. The detailed functions are in Appendix 3.

Thus the global pattern of reward gives every model individual an incentive structure that corresponds to our external performance standard. The local pattern gives a model individual incentives that diverge from our external performance standard by ignoring the consequences that actions in one's own warehouse may have elsewhere in the organization. We shall see, however, that with noise in the environment, organizational performance, as measured by the external standard, can be markedly better in the local model.

In addition to the two patterns of reward, the model environments reported will embody random noise. Individuals' estimates of the rewards that would follow from alternative policies are constructed from an accurate base multiplied by an error factor drawn from a uniform density over (.90, 1.10), which corresponds to an average absolute estimating error of 5%. Actual rewards are subject to similar fluctuations.

These conditions will produce substantial difficulty in making a valid comparison of an alternative with existing policy. For example, if an individual considers an alternative with an expected value of 5% greater than that of the status quo, then, with noise in both the estimate of the alternative and in the actual value produced by the status quo, the superior alternative will be rejected more than a quarter of the time. The estimate of the alternative will be low enough for such an error to be possible three quarters of the time. The actual (noisy) result of the status quo will be high enough for error three quarters of the time. When both are in the range of possible error, such error will occur half the time under the distributional assumptions made for the noise. The product of the three probabilities is $9/32 > .28$. Thus an alternative that is actually a 5% improvement will be rejected more than one quarter of the time. Symmetrically, alternatives 5% worse than the status quo will be adopted with the same probability.

Model Behavior

The global reward structure is meant to capture a commonly assumed pattern of conditions (although the empirical literature on organizations gives some grounds for expecting their actual occurrence to be rare). When global and local reward models are run with perfectly accurate rewards and estimates of rewards, the results are very similar. Both models are able to find optimal policies in a few periods, which demonstrates that an appropriate organization of either type built from model individuals with severe cognitive limitations is capable of very rapid and accurate adaptation and strongly indicates that an appropriate organization of boundedly rational individuals may be much more effective than the individuals themselves.[5]

The results presented in Table 2 and Figure 1 are from the conditions described earlier: local

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[4] In runs reported in a preceding article (Cohen, 1981c), the manager also alters the incentives of the other members when he or she sees fit. That feature is not active in the runs reported here. The manager is primarily interested in satisfaction of factory constraints and secondarily in total cost minimization.

[5] This point is developed in Cohen (1981a). See also March (1978, p. 590).

Table 2.

	Local				Global			
Problem	Performance mean	Performance SD	Distance from optimum	Constraint violations	Performance mean	Performance SD	Distance from optimum	Constraint violations
1	686.2	37.3	.011	0	761.7	136.5	.084	2
2	863.5	56.4	.035	0	966.5	103.4	.208	4
3	652.6	35.6	.016	0	810.1	231.3	.211	6
4	693.9	39.6	.014	0	858.5	152.3	.070	2
5	792.0	63.8	.016	0	960.6	201.4	.121	2
6	886.1	37.5	.009	0	1021.1	147.1	.260	6
7	491.9	46.6	.021	0	602.5	187.2	.305	4
8	781.0	75.0	.009	0	966.3	245.9	.057	0
9	670.1	75.0	.005	0	727.3	142.1	.339	8
10	678.6	79.7	.005	0	847.7	206.5	.128	2

and global incentive patterns with noisy estimated and actual rewards. These results demonstrate that *with uncertainty added to the picture, the local pattern of incentives may very significantly outperform the global one.* The ten rows of Table 2 display the results achieved by the two models in each of the ten variants of the Dantzig transport problem. Each of the runs reported was 50 periods in length; the table shows for each variant the mean and standard deviation of a performance measure, the sum of costs and constraint violation penalties implied by the policy in force at the close of a period. This measure can be computed for both models and is comparable. The means are consistently lower for the local model although—in fact, because—no one in the local organization is pursuing this exact measure. The next major objective of the article is to explicate this surprising contribution of goal diversity and conflict to search.

Two further measures of performance reported in Table 2 confirm the occurrence of the effect. The first measure is the distance from the policy in force at the close of the 50th period to an optimal policy. The measurement unit is the range of feasible policy costs. Thus in row seven the local model came within 2.1% of the optimal policy value, whereas the global model ended its run at a policy with a value equivalent to 30% of the maximum feasible policy cost error. Table 2 also

Figure 1. Logarithm of Global Cost of Closing Policy in Periods 1-50. Environment One



Figure 2. Environment Five



reports for each model the total number of constraint violations implied by the 50th period policy. On all three performance measures the local model is substantially better than the global. In all ten environments its average policy has lower cost, and its final policy is nearer the optimum. The local model always ends at a feasible policy, and the global does so only once.

Figures 1-3 give a better sense of the dynamics that produced the results in Table 2. The figures correspond to the runs in rows one, five, and nine. (The costs-plus-penalties performance measure has been subjected to a log transformation to compress the variation.) Figures 1 and 2 show the more typical situation in the runs. The local model has better performance in almost every period.

Figure 3. Environment Nine



Figure 3 shows a rare but instructive example. Even when the global model manages to find substantially better policy in the early going, it is unable to hold its advantage. The greater instability of the global model that is evident in all three plots and in the standard deviations of Table 2 eventually dissipates its advantage.

Interpretation

To understand how this happens we will have to explore the search and choice processes of the models in a little more detail. The runs of row one (shown in Figure 1) provide an excellent case study. In the 50 periods of these runs, both models experienced some setbacks, policy changes that reduced the performance of the organization relative to the previous period. If we take 10% of the feasible cost range as a (somewhat arbitrary) standard for a major setback, we obtain some interesting results. The local model experienced only three setbacks of that magnitude, whereas the global model had twelve, which indicates that the global model is substantially more prone to erroneous policy choices even though individuals in both models were subjected to identical noise distributions.

A further observation on setbacks is useful. By taking the ratio of the forward-to-backward first differences in the performance measure, we can compute a recovery ratio for each setback episode (i.e., what fraction of the setback loss did the model recover in the subsequent period?). The respective means (standard deviations) of the recovery ratios are 1.16 (.28) for the local and .29 (1.29) for the global models. This sharp contrast identifies a further difference in the models' abilities to make effective responses in policy once a major setback has occurred.

What properties of the search and decision processes in the two models contribute to the global model's greater tendency to make major errors, and its lesser ability to recover once this has happened? It should be pointed out that there is an upper bound on the size of errors either model can make in a single decision. At the limit, a majority of individuals making a decision could undervalue current rewards by 10% and overestimate rewards of an alternative by the same amount. Thus the largest possible error is 20% of the underlying expected value of current policy. Larger period-to-period differences appearing in major setbacks are actually the combined result of multiple errors within a single period; this is of particular relevance for the global model since it makes policy changes at a rate about three times that of the local model (six changes per period versus two).

Changes actually made in policy are the result of the convolution of two processes: search and choice. The search process in each condition may be characterized by the probability that alternatives in some class of interest will be generated by the individual reflection and group discussions that go on within the organization. The choice process may be characterized by the probability that proposed alternatives in some class of interest will be preferred to the status quo by a majority. The modelling system permits us to generate this kind of information for search and choice, respectively.

In Figure 4 histograms have been constructed for each model using all the alternatives proposed in meetings during the 50 periods of operation in Environment One, a total of 985 alternatives in the global condition and 951 in the local. The horizontal scale is the underlying total cost implied by the proposed alternative. This is our external standard of performance, and it is a well-defined measure on alternatives generated in either condition, although it was used by model individuals only in the global case. It is evident that the alternatives generated in the local model have a much lower total cost on average; thus the absolute quality of the local search process is clearly superior.

This difference in absolute search quality requires some qualification, however. Although the total populations of alternatives generated are better in the local case, one cannot conclude that this results from a superiority of local search in generating desirable alternatives if one controls for the quality of current policy. After all, the search processes in both models are strongly influenced by current policy. If most alternatives have value in the neighborhood of the value of current policy, then the difference in Figure 4 might well be the result of the global model's inferior policy choices, rather than the cause. Table 3 supports this view. It reports for the two models the fraction of alternatives generated that are total cost improvements with current policy value controlled. Both models are less likely to generate improvements when current policy is already quite good, but the global model is actually a little better than the local on each subinterval of current policy value. Since the global model relative search is, if anything, better than that of the local model, and the difference in absolute search quality seems derived from the choice errors we seek to explain, it seems appropriate to turn to an examination of choice processes themselves.

In Figure 5 the conditional probability that an alternative will be chosen, given that it has been generated by a search, is plotted as a function of the relative gain or loss in underlying total cost implied by the alternative. Both the global and local models reliably choose alternatives representing substantial gains over the status quo. For alternatives not unmistakably superior to the status quo, however, clear and important differences can be seen. The local model choice process is less prone both to errors of omission and of commission. The global choice process is more likely to reject proposed alternatives that would be decreases in underlying total cost and to accept alternatives that actually increase costs.

At first sight it may seem puzzling that the same noise distribution produces in the two models different probabilities of making an error of the same magnitude. But the scale on which both models' choices are being measured in Figure 5 is not the scale on which individuals in the local

Figure 4. Histogram of Global Values of Alternatives Generated in Environment One



Table 3.

Global Value of Policy at Time of Generation	Fraction of Alternatives Better than Policy (*N* Alternatives)	
	Local	Global
625-649	.018 (221)	.053 (19)
650-674	.091 (132)	.143 (105)
675-699	.102 (225)	.226 (208)
700-724	.136 (301)	.251 (223)
725-749	.213 (47)	.281 (178)
750-774	– (0)	.345 (165)
775-799	.222 (9)	.500 (22)
800-824	.667 (3)	.250 (4)
825-849	– (0)	.389 (18)
850-874	– (0)	.500 (10)

Figure 5. Probability that an Alternative Will Be Accepted Given that It Has Been Proposed. 1% Intervals of Gain or Loss Relative to Global Value of Status Quo



model were actually measuring proposed alternatives. Figure 6 demonstrates the importance of this fact; it shows three histograms of the value of alternatives generated relative to the policy in force. The first shows, for 1% increments in magnitude, the frequencies of globally measured relative gains and losses implied by alternatives generated in the global model. The second shows globally measured gains and losses for alternatives generated in the local model. The third shows the same alternatives with gains and losses recalculated according to the local incentive structure of one of the participants in the particular meeting at which each alternative was proposed. (In the local model other participants might take different views of the alternative.)

Alternatives that may be falsely preferred by an individual will be above the 10% loss level and below zero. This area is shown on all three histograms by the box in Figure 6. This area contains a very much smaller fraction of all alternatives in the locally measured local model case than it does for the global model. In effect, this returns the question to search, since the figure shows that fewer alternatives are generated in the local case that are close enough to the status quo to be easily

Figure 6. Three Histograms of Relative Value of Alternatives. 1% Intervals. Tails Slightly Truncated



misjudged. The relative value of alternatives seen by an individual in the local model has greater dispersion and therefore misjudgments of the same relative magnitude produce fewer choice errors in the local case. The error-prone process that emerges in the global model is in substantial correspondence with the analysis by Goodin and Waldner (1979) of the pitfalls of incremental decision making. With local incentives a different and far less error-prone process emerges. However, the condition giving rise to error proneness, homogeneity of the actors' incentives, is quite different from the decentralization on which Goodin and Waldner focused. Thus the considerably more rigorous exploration of theory that is possible within the modelling system casts a central question about the advantages of an incrementalist process in a surprising new light.

It is, of course, not necessary in general that a search under local incentives generate alternatives with more disperse relative value. However, there are two strong reasons to expect this effect to occur with significant frequency in models such as those used here. The local value of an alternative, if it is distinct from the global value, will usually depend on a proper subset of the many consequences the alternative has for the organization. Thus we expect local evaluations to be more clear-cut and global evaluations to be a balancing of many pluses and minuses. But the latter will naturally tend to the error-prone neighborhood of the status quo. This tendency is reinforced by the expected negative correlations among effects. Once good policy has been reached, alternatives that are good for one part of the organization will usually be bad for some other part. The objects of search are precisely the exceptions to this rule, but the difficulty is to avoid errors along the way. This is easier when fewer alternatives look as good to participants as current policy.

A final basis for believing the pattern reported here to be common rests outside the specific assumptions of the models, but further fortifies the advantages of local incentives; it is the probability that relative errors will often be of smaller average magnitude in local judgments. This conclusion would seem to follow from the added difficulty faced by a global evaluator in assessing the magnitude of consequences remote from specialized responsibilities and daily flows of information and experience.

This "search enhancement effect," in which global goals are better served by an appropriate organization of divergent local incentives, demonstrates again that organizations may have properties very different from the properties of their component individuals. It also shows the potential value of a theoretical method that permits the rigorous tracing of complex interactions among multiple organizational processes. The search-enhancement effect arises, as do many organizational processes, from the interaction of several organizational features. It is a (globally) positive effect because the divergent incentives of the actors are effectively channeled by the organization's structure of decision-making authority. Under a different pattern of authority, one might well expect different results. The art of institutional design is, in part, to conceive of decision-making arrangements that will successfully harness the potential inherent in strongly held and partially divergent incentives. If a theoretical method is to support the study of such possibilities, it must have the capability of representing a rich variety of interacting organizational features. The use of computer models in organization theory holds out some hope of increasing that required capability.

Although the behavior of the models provides logical support for the existence of search-enhancing conflict, it obviously does not provide empirical support, nor does it establish how general such phenomena might be. The results reported here are best thought of as an analog of a constructive existence proof, showing that goal diversity can enhance search by exhibiting ten cases in which it happens. Although the arguments made above give some reason to believe that the effect is likely to occur, real confidence in its empirical frequency will have to await careful field work and laboratory studies of organizational decision making.[6]

In the meantime, the model results reinforce the position of those who have argued that conflict may enhance search by demonstrating a logically coherent formalization of the argument and by providing a detailed analysis of the simulated process producing the results. The modelling system has been shown to be a method of determining the consequences of our ideas about organizations that vastly extends our powers to reason about complex events that are determined by the interaction of multiple organizational processes.

Appendix 1
Major Elements of the Modelling System

The models used here are members of a very large family that can be created by varying elements of the organizational modelling system. The general system is a computer program and subroutines that encode organizational structures and processes. By altering data that initialize the program or by small changes in the subroutines, wide variations can be induced in organizational structures and processes.[7] The major elements of the system fall into four clusters, which will be discussed in turn.[8]

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[6] One such laboratory study has begun (Cohen, 1981b).

The Policy String

At any moment the policies in effect in a model organization are represented by the state of a 64 variable string. The most natural interpretation is that each variable displays whether (1) or not (0) a particular standard operating procedure of the organization is currently in force. For some applications, very different interpretations may be convenient. However, the favored interpretation meshes comfortably with an evolutionary view of organizational policy in which, following Winter (1975), routines of the organization are treated as analogous to biological genes. An individual variable will often be referenced as a "locus." The whole string will be called "the policy." In this interpretation following changes in policy is akin to observing the evolution of a system of genes.

The Environment Function

The meaning for any individual in the organization of a particular overall policy is determined by the interaction of the policy and the organization's environment. In each time period each individual's identification number and the current policy become arguments of an environment function that returns to the individual the actual rewards he or she experiences in that period. This is called operating in *real mode.* "The environment of the organization" may be something different for each individual and in every time period. The only theoretical limit is set by what can be written as a mathematical function from the space of possible policies, individual identification numbers, and time periods, into the rational numbers. In the cases resembling the simplest firm models traditionally used in economics, all individuals may have the same environment function, typically one returning the utility associated with a profit stream produced by the policy. However, the system permits the study of more complex cases in which values differ between individuals or change over time or both, and in which environmental responses to organizational policies do not stand still (for example, see March, 1978).

The environment function may also be called by an individual in an *estimating mode.* In a typical model constructed in the system, there will be many such calls per time period. In this model, the function returns to the individual an estimate of the rewards that would flow from some altered version of current policy. In the limiting case in which individuals can predict perfectly the consequences of alternatives, the estimating mode may be identical to the real mode. The more interesting cases, however, will be those in which the estimates of rewards are distorted or erroneous assessments of the actual consequences of a potential policy. This feature makes it possible to study the variety of organizational learning "pathologies" surveyed by March and Olsen (1976) and Hedberg (1981).

Attributes of Model Individuals

An individual in models built with the system is represented by a small set of ideas for policy improvements, an aspiration level, a satisfaction state, and a just-noticeable-difference (JND). In effect, ideas are represented as 64-place strings from the alphabet 0,1 where # means "don't care." A typical idea for an individual will be blank (#) on most, but not necessarily all, loci outside his or her domain of formal responsibility, owing to the very limited attention range and sharply bounded cognitive power of the individuals. Operating in isolation, individuals are capable of systematic exploration of alternatives only in their domains of formal responsibility and only if those domains are relatively small, no more than six loci. Ideas about loci outside the domain of responsibility mostly come to an individual from others via organizational processes described in the next section. These structures are meant to conform to the strong tendency (Allison, 1971; Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1958) of alternatives considered to be few in number and sharply constrained by local attention focus and incentives.

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[7] The system is in FORTRAN and is transferable to most computer installations with relatively minor adjustments. Full details can be obtained from the Institute of Public Policy Studies, University of Michigan, as Discussion Paper #151, "Documentation of an Organizational Modelling System."

[8] In the ensuing presentation, as in the main text, the exposition is conducted using organizational and individual terms such as "meeting" or "responsibility" to designate processes and structures within the models. This usage has advantages and disadvantages that perhaps deserve explicit mention. Such terms denote the phenomena that the models seek to represent. The objective of the modelling system is to permit the careful study of the interactions among formal analogs of familiar processes and structures. Use of the terms (rather than, say, the computer names of the corresponding computer subprograms and data structures) helps the reader to gain intuition for the behavior of the models at the expense of a detailed understanding the formalisms themselves. It underrepresents to some extent the inescapable fact that the formalisms are simpler than the everyday language terms used here to designate them. Nonetheless, the correspondence of the detailed formalisms to the intention of verbal theoretical categories is far higher than one finds in typical mathematizations of organization theoretic issues.

When an individual considers an idea, either one self-generated or one suggested by someone else, it is evaluated by substituting current policy for all the don't care (#) loci and then calling the environment function in estimating mode. In the process of retaining or discarding new ideas, only ordinal use is made of the resulting estimate. If the new idea has a better estimate than the worst idea in an individual's set of good ideas, the new idea replaces the old minimum. Otherwise the new idea is forgotten. The set of good ideas is quite small, ordinarily about five.

The JND is the average distance between good ideas. The aspiration level is a weighted average of recent period rewards. The satisfaction state rises when rewards exceed aspirations by at least a JND and falls when the opposite occurs. Both high and low extremes of satisfaction dampen somewhat individual exploration of alternatives to current policy.

Attributes of Model Organizations

The organizational structure of any model developed using this system is determined by five major components: the regular meetings held in the organization together with their agenda; the method of calling irregular or special meetings and setting their agenda; the processes of give-and-take over ideas that occur as individuals "talk" in meetings; and the procedures in the organization for making authoritative choices of policy. The first and last of these can be altered by varying the initializing data set. Meetings and agenda setting can be changed by altering subroutines. Talk processes are relatively invariant.

The responsibilities of each individual are the loci to which he or she predominantly attends. This number is limited, usually to about four. Within that small domain, individuals examine deviations from current policy rather intensively. They do so both in isolation and when they explore how they would respond to policy changes suggested by others in meetings. Responsibilities may also enter into the choice procedures described below. A given locus may have one, many, or no responsible individuals.

The regular meetings of the organization occur in every time period and bring together fixed sets of participants over fixed agendas. A typical example of a regular meeting process assembles meetings of individuals whose responsibilities are strongly interdependent. Each individual in such a meeting proposes a change in policy drawn from his or her list of good ideas. After talking the matter over, the organization's choice procedures are invoked and produce a change in policy or a continuation of the status quo. Then the next meeting scheduled for the period takes place. This example is consistent with the models reported here. For a different type of investigation, quite different regular meeting processes can be readily defined by altering the regular meeting subroutine.

The special meeting subroutine provides a device for holding meetings over a tabled proposal that responds to particular problems or nonrecurring conditions the organization may confront. An example might be a meeting called to bring together individuals for a discussion of a policy alternative with effects that cut across the boundaries implied by the regular meeting structure.

The talk processes of a model consist of two phases. The first is the simple suggesting of ideas to others. The second is determining and reporting what responses an individual would make in his or her own domain to suggestions made by others. The latter amounts to answering the question "If that idea were to become policy, what changes would I want to make in the loci for which I am responsible?" Since the answer is also an idea, there can also be responses to responses to suggestions. A limit of three iterations is usual.

The choice procedures of a model specify for each locus the decision rule that must be used to make changes at that locus, a precedence structure that resolves conflicts over decision rules in multilocus decisions, and a set of individuals who must be present for choices that affect a given locus. A typical model might have majority rule decisions for all loci, with responsible individuals required to be present. An alternative might give veto power over changes at some loci to particular individuals, or some loci might be subject to unilateral changes made by the individuals responsible for them. Various combinations of unilateral, majority, and veto choice procedures can be made by altering the choice subroutine.

Appendix 2. Dantzig Problem Variants

Problem	Cost Matrix					Optimal Solution (in 25 unit truckloads)					Best Value/Worst
1	21	23	5	24	12	8	0	12	0	0	630/912
	15	10	5	16	5	4	12	0	2	12	
	23	16	8	13	7	0	0	0	10	0	
2	12	17	23	12	5	0	0	0	8	12	766/1026
	9	16	24	18	14	12	2	12	4	0	
	8	11	22	19	12	0	10	0	0	0	
3	9	20	10	15	15	6	0	12	0	2	622/1098
	6	8	23	8	17	6	12	0	12	0	
	21	17	18	24	19	0	0	0	0	10	
4	7	17	11	12	23	8	0	12	0	0	656/1124
	12	17	24	16	12	4	2	0	12	12	
	14	5	22	15	24	0	10	0	0	0	
5	20	13	10	11	21	0	0	8	12	0	752/1236
	18	16	22	18	8	6	12	0	0	12	
	16	24	12	17	10	6	0	4	0	0	
6	18	17	5	15	22	0	2	12	0	6	858/1200
	18	23	6	14	23	12	0	0	12	6	
	12	11	24	7	19	0	10	0	0	0	
7	24	13	5	13	7	0	0	12	0	8	476/1142
	8	12	18	11	21	12	6	0	12	0	
	12	6	13	21	6	0	6	0	0	4	
8	15	20	16	21	6	0	0	8	0	12	742/1078
	6	21	24	23	13	12	6	0	12	0	
	10	6	8	11	6	0	6	4	0	0	
9–	18	9	15	5	17	0	0	8	12	0	570/914
	12	6	15	9	17	12	12	4	0	2	
	15	5	14	20	8	0	0	0	0	10	
10	6	15	20	15	19	12	0	0	8	0	652/1082
	22	9	16	17	11	0	2	12	4	12	
	16	5	12	14	18	0	10	0	0	0	

Appendix 3. Definitions

$x_{ij} \equiv$ order level, $0 \leqslant x_{ij} \leqslant 15$. x_{ij} may be interpreted as "truckloads."

$1 \leqslant i \leqslant 3$, factories

$1 \leqslant j \leqslant 5$, warehouses

$y_{ab} \equiv$ expected value of policy for individual (a,b)

$z_{ab} \equiv$ value for policy returned to individual (a,b)

$c_{ij} \equiv$ cost of shipping one ordered truckload from i to j.

$r_i \equiv$ total of orders from factory $i = \sum_{j=1}^{5} x_{ij}$

$p = |r_1 - 20| + |r_2 - 30| + |r_3 - 10| \equiv$ sum of factory capacity violations

Appendix (continued)

$w_j = \sum_{i=1}^{3} |x_{ij} - 12| \equiv$ capacity violation at warehouse j.

$U(0,.2)$ = uniform random noise on the interval $(0,.2)$

For directly responsible local individual (a,b) ordering from factory a for warehouse b,

$$y_{ab} = \sum_{i=1}^{3} c_{ib} x_{ib} + (.55)p25 + (5w_b)^2 + .01(x_{ab} c_{ab})$$

The individual ordering from factory a for warehouse b seeks to minimize this function of total shipping costs at warehouse b, factory capacity violations, own warehouse capacity violations, and—to a very small degree—shipping costs of orders personally placed.

$$z_{ab} = y_{ab}\,(.9 + U(0,.2))$$

The actual report to the individual is the above expected value perturbed by uniform random noise.

For the directly responsible global individual (a,b),

$$y_{ab} = \sum_{i=1}^{3} \sum_{j=1}^{5} x_{ij} c_{ij}\,(.55)p25 + \sum_{j=1}^{5} (5w_j)^2.$$

The global individual acts to minimize this function of total shipping costs at all warehouses, factory capacity violations, and all warehouse capacity violations.

$$z_{ab} = y_{ab}\,(.9 + U(0,.2)).$$

This is again perturbed with uniform noise.

For the manager in either case

$$y_m = .0001 \sum_{i=1}^{3} \sum_{j=1}^{5} x_{ij} c_{ij} + p$$

$$z_m = K + y_m(.9 + U(0,.2))$$

where K is an index integer that increases each time organizational policy has been unchanged for three consecutive periods. The integer K plays no important role here, but is significant in other work with the model where policy stability has been made an important condition of managerial alteration of incentives. That process is absent in these models, so that z_m responds to y_m. The scaling factor (.0001) establishes a priority of reducing p, factory constraint violations, and preferring the least cost member of a set of alternatives with equal p.

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Parliament and Political Support in Canada

HAROLD D. CLARKE
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

ALLAN KORNBERG
Duke University

MARIANNE C. STEWART
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Legislatures are widely recognized as institutional embodiments of the concept of representation in contemporary liberal democracies, but how support for legislatures and evaluations of their members's activities influence support for national political regimes and communities is imperfectly understood. This article investigates the question with the use of data from a 1979 national survey of the Canadian public. Analyses of a model of support demonstrate that feelings about parliament and assessments of MPs' performance have significant effects on levels of support for the national political community and regime. Other important variables include cost-benefit evaluations of the personal impact of governmental activity, more general evaluations of governmental performance, and subcultural variations in political socialization.

The salience of legislatures as institutional embodiments of the concept of representation in contemporary liberal democracies suggests that public evaluations of the activities of these bodies and their members constitute important forces governing political support. Despite the plausibility of this proposition, the extent to which orientations toward legislative institutions and actors influence political support remains imperfectly understood. This article addresses the question by focusing on Parliament and its members in the matrix of forces governing support for the national political community and regime in contemporary Canada. The analysis builds on our previous research and also is informed by the results of investigations of the roles played by legislatures and their members in facilitating or eroding support for various political systems.[1]

Conceptually, much of the recent research on how legislatures and the activities of their members affect political support has been informed by two propositions. First, and most basic, under certain conditions a legislature can foster a polity's legitimacy and enhance its effectiveness.[2] Although other institutions also can perform this function, the contention is that legislatures frequently can do it better, because in many countries they are the most salient and dramatic symbol of the representative character of the political system (e.g., Loewenberg & Patterson, 1979, Chap. 8; Mezey, 1979, pp. 272-273; Wahlke, 1971). Second, and relatedly, it is argued that individual legislators can play important roles

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[1] In the 1960s and 1970s the impetus for much of the research on legislatures and political support derived from a concern with the roles legislative bodies play in processes of economic and political development (Morris-Jones, 1983; Smith & Musolf, 1979). A substantial portion of this research was conducted by scholars associated with the Comparative Legislative Research Center of the University of Iowa (Boynton & Kim, 1975; Boynton & Loewenberg, 1973; Jewell & Kim, 1976; Kim, Barkan, Turan, & Jewell, 1984; Loewenberg, 1971, 1973; Loewenberg & Patterson, 1979; Patterson, Hedlund, & Boynton, 1975; Patterson, Wahlke, & Boynton, 1971; and Wahlke, 1971). See also Grumm (1973); Kornberg (1973); Kornberg and Musolf (1970); and, for a useful summary of much of the relevant literature, Mezey (1979).

[2] Of course, such activities can have deleterious consequences for political support. Packenham (1970, p. 578) has noted that legislatures in developing states often are vigorous and unyielding defenders of the status quo. Kornberg and Pittman (1979, pp. 68-87) have argued that legislators' actions can lead to public confusion and cynicism, outcomes that Price and Clarke (1980, p. 81) hypothesize are most likely to occur when individuals with little or no prior understanding of the substantive and symbolic significance of parliamentary procedure are exposed to the intricate and oftentimes arcane practices of legislative institutions.

in generating support for legislatures and other components of a political system by effectively executing various representational activities (e.g., Mezey, 1979, pp. 191-193; Muller, 1970; Wahlke, 1971). Legislators link citizens to the polity by articulating public needs and demands to political authorities, apprising constituents of governmental actions, obtaining pork-barrel projects for their districts, and performing ombudsman and other constituency services. The importance of these activities is underscored by the fact that they characterize legislative behavior in widely different political milieux (Clarke, 1978; Mezey, 1979, pp. 159-193; Morris-Jones, 1976).

Political Support in Canada: Problems

Canada confronts support-eroding problems that most other mature liberal democracies either have long since resolved or are encountering in less acute forms. The 1976 election of a Parti Québécois government whose raison d'être is political independence for Quebec, the subsequent sovereignty-association referendum of 1980, and—despite the referendum's defeat—the comfortable reelection of the Parti Québécois in 1981, are the most recent and dramatic, but certainly not the only, illustrations of the national unity problems that the country continues to experience. To an extent, these problems are products of long-standing conditions, in particular the distribution of population and natural resources among the provinces. Regarding these conditions, the Canadian population is distributed in a narrow band along the American border: two-thirds of the population live on Ontario and Quebec, and the latter province is the home of four-fifths of Canada's francophones. (Approximately 29% of Canada's total population are persons of French descent [Kalbach & McVey, 1979, p. 195].) This distribution has provided the demographic basis on which culturally and economically based regional and other center v. periphery cleavages have fed. Exacerbating these cleavages are British-style parliamentary government, disciplined parliamentary parties, single-member constituencies, and plurality elections. In combination they have made it extremely difficult for small provinces to represent their interests in either the cabinets or parliamentary caucuses of the major parties (e.g., Irvine, 1979; Kornberg, 1970; Kornberg, Clarke, & Goddard, 1980). Public perceptions of inadequate representation have provided several provincial protest parties in Quebec and the West with opportunities to intensify and to exploit political discontent and to compete with Ottawa for the hearts and minds of Canadians (Cairns, 1977, 1983; Falcone & Van Loon, 1983; Simeon & Elkins, 1974). Adding to problems of political support are substantial variations in the value and character of the provinces' natural resources. These factors, together with the fact that Canadians share their continent with a far richer and more powerful southern neighbor, have perpetuated sharp regional economic disparities and hindered the growth of a distinctive Canadian national identity (Bell & Tepperman, 1979; Feldman & Nevitte, 1979; Schwartz, 1967, 1974; Simeon, 1977; Smiley, 1980, pp. 284-303; Ulmann, 1977, 1978).

It can be argued that various policy decisions also have had deleterious consequences for support. Paradoxically, some policies intended to foster national unity appear to have had opposite effects. Attempts to respond to economically based regional grievances have been criticized as "too little, too late" (Smiley, 1980, pp. 261-269). Initiatives to satisfy the cultural and linguistic aspirations of Québécois have been rejected by many of them as condescending and mere symbol-mongering while simultaneously irritating many English-speaking Canadians (e.g., Bernard, 1978; Simeon, 1977; Smiley, 1980, p. 256). Finally, federal government efforts to accommodate provincial demands for increased control over financial resources have led the former to agree to funding arrangements for major social programs in which Ottawa has been cast in the unenviable role of tax-collector, whereas the provinces have been able to represent themselves as providers of highly valued public goods (e.g., Cairns, 1977, 1983; Cody, 1977; Falcone & Van Loon, 1983).

Political Support in Canada: A Model

In trying to provide a general explanation of the factors governing political stability and change, David Easton distinguished between three objects of support—community, regime, and authorities—and the character of support—diffuse or specific.[3] Over the past two decades Easton's concepts have inspired a number of empirical inquiries, among them the aforementioned investigations of legislatures and support (e.g., Patterson et al., 1973, 1975). Some of these studies have attempted to measure directly specific or diffuse support or both (e.g., Muller & Jukam, 1977; Muller & Williams, 1980), whereas others have used suggested analogs such as efficacy, trust, cynicism, or alienation.[4]

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[3] Easton defines the political community as "that aspect of a political system that consists of its members seen as a group of persons bound together by a political division of labor" (1965, p. 177). The political regime includes formal structures of government and constitutionally prescribed procedures as well as "a broadly defined underlying set of political values and principles, articulated or implicit, which impose constraints on the purposes for which the energies and resources of the system may be committed" (1965, p. 194). Political authorities include all types of political officials, i.e., persons who "have acquired the primary responsibility for making decisions at the most inclusive level of the system" and those "whose authority is considerably narrower" (1965, p. 213).

A variety of criticisms of Easton's formulations of diffuse and specific support has accompanied the growth of this body of research. Some of these criticisms have been methodological, whereas others have been conceptual or theoretical. As an example of the former, Loewenberg (1971, p. 184) has argued that the distinction between diffuse and specific support cannot be established empirically. Similarly, Citrin and Muller and their colleagues have stressed the analytical difficulties of disentangling public evaluation (positive or negative) of the performance of governmental authorities from feelings of regime legitimacy or the lack thereof (e.g., Citrin, 1974; Citrin et al., 1975; Muller, 1979; Muller & Jukam, 1977). Zimmermann (1979, p. 72) has contended that there is a symbolic component to diffuse support, the content of which cannot be identified empirically. Conceptually, diffuse support has been criticized because it fails to acknowledge that all political support is ultimately contingent in nature (Rogowski, 1974). Regarding its theoretical utility, Wright (1976, p. 259) has observed that at least some democracies are seemingly able to function for long periods of time without large reservoirs of diffuse support. The notion of specific support, in turn, has been found wanting by some because it rests on the (debatable) assumption that citizens can make a cognitive connection between what they want from a political system and what that system actually delivers (Rogowski, 1983).

Given the difficulties with these concepts, we have concerned ourselves with what is supported and not whether support is diffuse or specific in character. We view political support as an affective orientation (positive, neutral, negative) toward a political object or process.[5] Objects may include individuals or groups (e.g., legislators, political parties), institutions (e.g., Parliament, the bureaucracy), as well as more abstract entities such as the political regime and community. Processes may be relatively specific and well defined (e.g., procedures for electing members of Parliament or appealing judicial decisions) or very general and amorphous (e.g., federalism, representative democracy). In general, it is argued that support for any political object or process has two principal sources. One source is political socialization experiences in early or later life which generate affective feelings varying in their duration and intensity (e.g., Citrin et al., 1975; Easton, 1965, 1975; Sears, 1975). The other source of support is cost-benefit evaluations—however rough and ready—concerning the effectiveness of political objects or processes in allocating societal values generally, and providing for the well-being of the person making judgments in particular (e.g., Citrin et al., 1975; Easton, 1965, 1975; Rogowski, 1974).[6] In liberal democracies such as Canada not only must political objects and processes be perceived as effective, they also must be seen to be equitable in their operation and impact and capable of being affected by the needs and demands of average citizens, because concepts such as fairness, equity, and responsiveness are deeply embedded in the political cultures of liberal democracies and serve as normative standards for evaluating govern-

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According to Easton, diffuse support "is independent of the effects of daily outputs. It consists of a reserve of support that enables a system to weather the many storms when outputs cannot be balanced off against inputs or demands" (1965, p. 273). Specific support, in contrast, is accorded "as a consequence from [sic] specific satisfactions obtained from the [political] system with respect to a demand that members make" (1965, p. 268). See also Easton (1975, 1976).

[4] Many of the studies using these concepts are cited by Muller and Jukam (1977, pp. 1562-1564, notes 5-7). See also Citrin (1974); Citrin et al. (1975); Finifter (1970); Gamson (1968); Miller (1974a, b); Muller, Jukam, and Seligson (1982); Muller and Williams (1980); Shanks and Citrin (1975); Shingles (1981); Sniderman (1981); and Wright (1976).

[5] Defining support this way retains what Easton and others consider to be the core meaning of the concept. "[W]e can describe support as an attitude by which a person orients himself to an object either favorably or unfavorably, positively or negatively" (Easton, 1975, p. 436). Similarly, Muller and Williams (1980, p. 33) conceptualize support as "favorable through unfavorable *affect* [emphasis added] for the political system or structure of political authority in a nation."

[6] Muller and Jukam equate effectiveness with "approval of the performance of an incumbent administration" and legitimacy with "support for the system of government in general" (1977, p. 1563). They also state that the distinction between effectiveness and legitimacy is "roughly comparable" to that which Easton makes between specific and diffuse support. In the present analysis, the significance of effectiveness judgments as a source of support for any political figure, object, or process is treated as an empirical question rather than something to be assumed a priori.

Figure 1. Proposed Model of the Determinants of Political Support in Canada


EVALUATIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL IMPACT ON PERSONAL WELL-BEING
EDUCATION
AGE
EVALUATIONS OF MPs' PERFORMANCE AND RESPONSIVENESS
SUPPORT FOR PARLIAMENT
EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENTAL PERFORMANCE
SUPPORT FOR FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
SUPPORT FOR CANADA
ATLANTIC
QUEBEC-FRENCH
QUEBEC-NON-FRENCH
WEST

mental performance (Almond & Verba, 1963, Chap. 4; Hochschild, 1981; Rae, 1981).

As noted above, Canada provides an example of a liberal democracy encountering problems of support that most other such systems already have resolved or are experiencing less acutely. In previous investigations we have attempted to determine how deep-seated, reinforcing regional and ethnolinguistic cleavages and the associated configuration of partisan forces have affected the distribution of public support for Canada's national political community and regime (Kornberg, Clarke, & LeDuc, 1978; Kornberg, Clarke, & Stewart, 1979, 1980). In this article we extend our investigation by positing a multivariate model that specifies the roles Parliament and its members play in the support process. Figure 1 is a schematic representation of this model.

On its left-hand side are several exogenous variables, including a measure of respondents' evaluations of the impact of government on their own and their family's economic and more general well-being. Other exogenous variables include age, level of formal education, and region-ethnicity. The two columns immediately to the right of the exogenous variables contain a measure of public assessments of the performance and responsiveness of members of Parliament and a measure of the support ascribed to the institution of Parliament. To the right of those variables is an index of public evaluations of the equity or fairness and effective performance of the federal government. On the extreme right are two variables measuring support for the government of Canada (the national regime) and Canada (the national political community).

Regarding linkages between variables in the model, as indicated above, we hypothesize that one source of support is citizens' cost-benefit assessments of the impact of government on their own and their family's economic and more general well-being. Consequently, these assessments should have direct effects on their evaluations of the performance and responsiveness of members of Parliament, support for the institution of Parliament, and evaluations of the effectiveness, equity, and fairness of the federal government more generally. Since the second principal source of support is assumed to be sentiments resulting from socialization processes, we have included six sociodemographic variables (age, level of formal education, and four region-ethnicity dummy variables) that are proxies intended to reflect the effects on support of those processes. Specifically, because residents of Quebec and the Atlantic and western provinces long have believed that they are inadequately represented at the national level of government and that the operation of the federal system is disadvantageous to their regions, we expect that they will evaluate the performance of both their MPs and national governmental institutions less positively than will residents of Ontario, the country's largest and historically most favored region. We further expect support for Parliament and the national regime to vary with age and educational level, such that the older and more highly educated a person is, the more he or she will support those institutions. In addition, because the disaffection of many Québécois has gone beyond unhappiness with the performance of their MPs and the federal system and now extends to the national political community itself, as well as to its single most important political symbol, Parliament (e.g., Bernard, 1978; Clarke, 1983; Pinard & Hamilton, 1977; Simeon, 1977), direct negative links are posited between the Quebec-French variable and support for those two political objects. In contrast, the disaffection of non-French Quebecers is hypothesized to be less widespread, being confined to the performance of MPs and the federal government (Pammett et al., 1983). Thus, negative associations are hypothesized between those variables.

As for other relationships in the model (and consistent with the salience of legislators' representational roles in liberal democratic theory and practice), we hypothesize positive linkages between public assessments of the performance and responsiveness of MPs on the one hand, and support for Parliament and evaluations of federal governmental performance on the other. In turn, because of the potent symbolism of legislative institutions in liberal democracies, variations in support for Parliament not only should influence evaluations of governmental performance, they also should have a spread of affect to the national political regime and community. Consequently, positive linkages are hypothesized between support for Parliament and those objects. Further, consonant with the presumed importance of cost-benefit calculations as sources of support in liberal democracies, positive evaluations of the effectiveness and equitable and fair performance of the federal government are expected to increase regime support. It can be hypothesized that variations in such evaluations have especially important effects on levels of regime support in Canada because of long-standing beliefs that the national political system has failed to respond equitably and fairly to regional needs and demands.

Finally, regarding the relationship between regime and community support, it can be hypothesized that affect for the regime will spill over to the community. Although the opposite flow of causality, i.e., from community to regime, also would seem plausible (Muller & Williams, 1980), a previous investigation (Kornberg, Clarke, & Stewart, 1979) has indicated that the flow of support in Canada primarily is upward, from regime to community.[7] Consequently, it is assumed that support for the federal government will influence community support, but that community support will have no significant impact on support for the federal government. Before discussing the fit of the model to the data, we will describe how the latter were generated and how key variables were constructed. (Full details on variable construction are provided in the Appendix.)

Data and Measures

The data derive from structured interviews (averaging 90 minutes in length) with a national probability sample of 2744 Canadians eligible to vote in the 1979 federal election. To compensate for oversampling in certain smaller provinces, a weighting factor was used and yielded a representative national sample of 2670 cases.[8]

Support for Parliament and the National Political Regime and Community

Support for Parliament, the national political regime (the government of Canada), and the national political community (Canada) was measured by thermometer scales. Respondents were presented with a diagram of a thermometer scale ranging from 0 to 100 (50 was explicitly designated as a neutral point), and requested to indicate their feelings about political objects such as Parliament, the government of Canada, and Canada. Regarding the regime support measure, feelings about government, in the sense of regime, may be influenced by attitudes toward a "government of the day" (Citrin, 1974; Citrin et al., 1975; Miller, 1974a; Muller & Jukam, 1977; Tanenhaus & Foley, 1982). This tendency may be particularly strong in parliamentary systems such as Canada's, which have majority or single-party minority governments (Atkinson, Coleman, & Lewis, 1980; Kornberg, Clarke, & LeDuc, 1980).[9] Sensitive to the potentially contaminating effects of partisanship on the measure of regime support, we regressed the latter on the former and computed residual scores.[10] These residuals are used to measure national regime support in the analyses presented below.[11]

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[7] This conclusion derives from a two-stage least squares analysis in which national community support was regressed on regime support and vice versa (Kornberg, Clarke, & Stewart, 1979, pp. 900-902).

[8] The survey and related research were funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Interviews were conducted immediately after the 1979 federal election. The data and details regarding sampling procedures and other aspects of this study are available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. All analyses and interpretations of the data presented in this article are the responsibility of the authors.

MPs' Performance and Responsiveness

Two sets of questions were used to measure evaluations of the behavior of members of Parliament. One set requested that respondents assess several key aspects of the job performance of their present and past MPs (Clarke & Price, 1980, 1981). A second set of questions focused explicitly on judgments regarding the likelihood that MPs would respond to public needs and demands. The latter questions were used because democratic political cultures ascribe great value to legislative responsiveness (e.g., Pitkin, 1967; Eulau & Karps, 1977; Loewenberg & Patterson, 1979, pp. 167-195). In the analyses below answers to these two sets of questions are combined into one overall index.[2]

Federal Governmental Performance

In general, it can be assumed that their political culture will condition the criteria that citizens emphasize when evaluating a political system (Kornberg, Clarke, & Stewart, 1980). In liberal democratic cultures, for example, fairness and equity can be expected to serve as important standards (Hochschild, 1981; Rae, 1981). Other criteria, however, have transcultural relevance and serve as standards for judging governmental activity in a wide variety of political systems. Perhaps the best example is the protection of the public's security from internal and external threats. In advanced industrial states such long-standing criteria have been supplemented by expectations concerning government's ability to intervene in the economy in order to generate wealth, control inflation and unemployment, and provide a panoply of welfare state entitlement programs (e.g., Heclo, 1974; Janowitz, 1976; Rose & Peters, 1978). In contemporary western democracies such as Canada, then, citizens can be expected to use a combination of such expectations and assumptions about the proper functions of government when evaluating governmental performance.

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[9] Empirically, the relationship between the government of Canada thermometer scores and identification with the governing party (i.e., the Progressive Conservatives) versus one of the opposition parties is statistically significant (eta = .28, $p < .001$).

[10] The regression equation used to compute predicted government-of-Canada thermometer scores is: thermometer score = 58.43 + 2.72 × party identification. Party identification is a 7-point scale ranging from +3 (very strong government party identifier) to −3 (very strong opposition party identifier). It should be noted that partisanship does *not* correlate strongly with other endogenous variables in the model. Relevant correlations with community support, support for Parliament, evaluations of federal government performance, and assessments of the performance and responsiveness of MPs are .02, .06, .01, and .06, respectively. Correlations between partisanship and the exogenous variables are similarly weak.

It also is noteworthy that the data indicate strongly that respondents distinguished among the three support objects (Parliament, government of Canada, and Canada) when assigning thermometer scores. The mean inter-item correlation among these scores is .39; using the adjusted measure of regime support, the mean is .38. To place these figures in perspective, it may be observed that the mean inter-item correlation in 1979 among thermometer scores measuring levels of affect for party leaders, local candidates, and parties as a whole is .62 (Liberal), .68 (Conservative), and .71 (NDP).

[11] External evidence concerning the validity of the support measures is available in the form of relationships with opinions and behavior regarding alterations in Quebec's constitutional status. In 1979 and 1980 Quebecers were asked about various constitutional options for the province. As anticipated, those wishing to sever ties with Canada had much lower national community and regime support scores than did those opposing independence. (Etas were .50, $p < .001$, and .35, $p < .001$, for community and regime support respectively in 1979, and .55, $p < .001$, and .43, $p < .001$, in 1980.) Similarly, in 1974, persons in favor of "Quebec separating from the rest of Canada and becoming an independent country" had much lower scores on thermometer measures of national community and regime support (etas = .37 and .35, respectively). Additionally, analyses of voting in the 1980 sovereignty-association referendum with the use of identical support measures shows that Quebecers voting for sovereignty-association had much lower community and regime support scores than those who opposed it (etas = .66, $p < .001$, and .44, $p < .001$, respectively). The sovereignty-association proposition, had it been approved, would have enabled the Parti Québécois to initiate negotiations with the federal government to implement Quebec's political independence (sovereignty) in conjunction with an economic tie (association) with the remainder of Canada. Finally, considerable survey and other evidence indicates that disaffection with the Canadian polity is greatest among younger Québécois (e.g., McRoberts & Posgate, 1980; Pinard & Hamilton, 1977). National community and regime support, therefore, should be positively associated with age, and this is the case. In every survey (1974, 1979, 1980, Quebec referendum), scores on both support variables increase monotonically across five age cohorts (e.g., etas for 1979 = .29, community, and .24, regime).

[12] Principal components analyses of the performance and responsiveness items yield single factor solutions in both cases. Mean factor loadings are .74 and .75, respectively. The performance and responsiveness indexes are combined into one overall index to keep the political support model as parsimonious as possible. The correlation (r) between the component indexes is +.44.

A battery of questions was used to tap public evaluations of effective and equitable and fair governmental performance. Respondents were asked whether the federal government—not a particular government of the day—should perform various activities and, if so, how well it has done them. For each task which they indicated government should carry out they were asked whether it has performed it "very well," "fairly well," or "not very well." Respondents also were asked if they "agreed strongly," "agreed," "disagreed," or "disagreed strongly" with a number of statements pertaining to the equity and fairness of governmental performance. A summary index was generated from responses to the two sets of items.[13]

Governmental Impact on Personal Well-Being

Judgments of government's impact on personal well-being were measured by asking respondents whether they were satisfied or dissatisfied both with their economic condition and lives more generally, and whether, in their view, government has had "a great deal," "something," or "not much" to do with their condition. An index of evaluations of governmental impact on personal well-being was derived from responses to these four items.[14]

Analyses of Political Support

Before analyzing the determinants of support, it will be useful to inspect levels and distributions of support for Parliament and the national political regime and community. The hypothesized importance of public evaluations of governmental performance counsels that distributions of these evaluations also should be considered. We begin with the latter.

Distributions of Evaluations and Support

Table 1 shows that many, but certainly not all, Canadians are satisfied with the material side of their lives. Slightly more people are very or fairly content with their lives as a whole. Significantly, many assign blame or credit to government for their condition, with a somewhat larger proportion indicating that it affects their level of material well-being. Scores on the index demonstrate that one-half of the sample is satisfied and believes that government bears some responsibility for this. One-third does not perceive that government has anything to do with their life situation, or they express an equally weighted mixture of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Finally, slightly less than one-sixth is on balance dissatisfied and thinks that government must assume some responsibility for their unhappy condition.

Table 2 presents public evaluations of the performance and anticipated responsiveness of members of Parliament. Many Canadians feel that the performance of their former and current MPs has been satisfactory, but relatively few believe it has been outstanding. Expectations regarding MPs' anticipated responsiveness also tend to be lukewarm, i.e., for four of five items, pluralities of respondents believe members are only "somewhat likely" to act responsively. MPs receive lowest grades for constituency service, with a sizable plurality (42%) judging it is unlikely that an MP would respond to their requests for assistance.

Table 3 reports responses to questions about the effectiveness and equity and fairness of the federal government. These responses indicate that Canadians believe the federal government should perform a wide range of activities on their behalf, including not only such basic functions as ensuring the common defense and protecting life, liberty, and property, but also intervening in the economy and providing for the general welfare.[15]

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[13] Separate principal component analyses of the items in the effectiveness and equity-fairness indexes yield single factor solutions with mean factor loadings of .55 and .51, respectively. Also, as one would expect in a polity where notions of equity and fairness constitute important standards for judging governmental performance, the effectiveness and equity-fairness indexes correlate quite strongly ($r = +.40$). Again, the use of an overall governmental performance index helps to maintain parsimony in the political support model.

[14] The component variables in the index, i.e., the measures of evaluations of governmental impact on material and more general well-being, have a strong positive correlation ($r = +.48$). This is not peculiar to 1979. Identical variables constructed using 1974 and 1980 national election study data also are strongly related (r's = +.44 and +.45, respectively).

[15] Other recent studies also have indicated that most Canadians expect government to perform a wide variety of functions. For example, in a 1977 national survey

Table 1. Evaluations of Material and General Life Satisfaction

		Very satisfied	Fairly satisfied	Little dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	N
Level of Satisfaction with						
material side of life (%)		25	52	17	6	2656
life as a whole (%)		33	55	10	3	2655
			Great deal	Something	Not much	N
Amount of Governmental Impact on						
material satisfaction (%)			31	36	33	2599
general life satisfaction (%)			17	33	50	2604
	−8 to −4	−3 to −1	0	1 to 4	5 to 8	N
Index of Evaluations of Governmental Impact on Personal Well-Being (%)	4	12	32	36	16	2564

Many people judge that the federal government has performed most of these functions quite successfully. The major exceptions pertain to government's economic role, with large percentages citing Ottawa's failure to provide adequate employment opportunities (48%), control inflation (68%), or curb foreign investment (44%). However, despite dissatisfaction with its economic performance, people tend to believe that the federal government has acted equitably

Table 2. Public Evaluations of the Performance and Responsiveness of Federal MPs ($N = 2670$)

	Very good	Good	Bad	Very bad	No opinion
MPs' Performance to Date (%)					
Availability to people of riding	20	54	9	2	15
Explaining federal government activities	14	51	17	3	15
Participating in parliamentary activities	14	51	8	2	25
Helping constituents with problems	12	47	11	2	28
Obtaining projects for riding	12	52	12	2	22
		Very likely	Somewhat likely	Not very likely	No opinion
MPs' Likely Responsiveness (%)					
Consider opinions of constituents when making decisions		15	44	35	7
Help to obtain something for riding when constituents make requests		26	50	18	6
Make substantial effort to perform constituency service tasks		16	33	42	9
Make substantial effort to be available to constituents for consultation		30	41	20	9

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which presented respondents with a list of 21 areas of possible governmental activity, in only 3 did more than one-quarter state that they wanted *less* government intervention. In 16 areas majorities indicated that they desired "more" or "much more" involvement. Mean percentages wanting more and less governmental activity were 55% and 11%, respectively. A 1979 national survey yielded very similar results. See Kornberg, Mishler, and Clarke (1982, pp. 75-78); and Clarke et al. (1984, Chap. 2).

Table 3. Public Evaluations of the Effectiveness, Fairness, and Equity of the Federal Government ($N = 2670$)

			Federal government performs		
	Should not do	No opinion, don't know	Not very well	Fairly well	Very well
Effectiveness (%)					
Provide welfare services	13	6	27	41	14
Keep armed forces strong	14	13	23	38	11
Protect lives and property	9	9	17	53	12
Provide employment opportunities	5	5	48	36	6
Protect civil liberties	7	13	21	51	9
Control inflation	2	5	68	23	2
Control foreign investment	8	15	44	28	4
Decent living standards in all regions	8	12	36	40	4

	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion
Fairness and Equity (%)					
Laws apply equally to rich and poor	8	46	32	7	8
Benefits of federal system outweigh costs	9	55	17	3	17
Parties look after interests of all Canadians	6	64	20	3	7
Courts act speedily and fairly	4	49	29	5	13
Interest groups do not have undue influence	2	36	41	7	15
Civil service treats all Canadians fairly	2	54	26	4	14

and fairly. The major departure from this pattern is that nearly half of the respondents (48%) judges that interest groups enjoy undue influence in Ottawa.

The data in Table 4 depict the distribution of support for Parliament, the government of Canada, and Canada by region and ethnicity. On average, levels of support for Parliament are positive, albeit not high, in every region. Similarly, only modest regional differences characterize respondents' feelings about the government of Canada, with Quebecers being the least positive ($\bar{X} = 54$). In every area of the country support for Canada exceeds that for Parliament and government generally. However, regional variations also are greater, with Quebecers again expressing the least favorable attitudes toward the national political community ($\bar{X} = 71$). Ethnicity also manifests only modest associations with support for Parliament and the government of Canada, but has a relatively strong relationship with support for Canada. As anticipated, persons of French descent, especially Québécois, are less supportive of the national political community ($\bar{X} = 69$). This tendency is particularly strong among younger Québécois (i.e., those 35 or less), whose mean thermometer score for Canada is 65, fully 15 points below the national average (data not shown in tabular form).

Testing the Model of Support

Multivariate analyses are undertaken to determine the roles that citizens' evaluations of MPs and feelings about Parliament play in the model of political support outlined above. Starting at the right-hand side of the model (with support for Canada), each endogenous variable is regressed on all preceding variables.[16] With the .001 level of

[16] Multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis. The average inter-item correlation (r) for the 12 variables in the model is only .12. Only 1 of the 66 correlations has an absolute value greater than .40, and only 5 have magnitudes of .30 to .39. Also, the determinants of the correlation matrices of independent variables for each equation defining the fully saturated version of the model range from .64 to .33, well above the conventional boundary (.10) for multicollinearity biases (Farrar & Glauber, 1967; Pedhazur, 1982, pp. 232-247; Weatherford, 1983, p. 172).

[17] The X^2 goodness-of-fit test used is $Q = 1 - R^2m / 1 - M$ where R^2m is the product of the residual paths in the fully saturated model, and M is the product of these paths for the overidentified model. X^2 for the original model is 332.74; for the revised model, 99.18 (where df = the number of overidentifying restrictions in the model). Although the latter value remains statistically significant, large samples, such as those used in the pres-

Table 4. Levels of Support for Parliament, the Government of Canada, and Canada by Region of Residence and Ethnicity (mean scores)

	Parliament	Government of Canada		Canada
Region				
Atlantic	58	2.15[a]	59	81
Quebec	55	−1.16	54	71
Ontario	59	−0.68	56	85
West	58	1.31	59	82
Canada	57	0.00	57	80
eta	.07[c]	.06[d]	.11[b]	.29[b]
Ethnicity				
Anglo-Celtic	58	0.83	58	84
French	55	−1.77	53	72
Other	58	0.17	57	81
eta	.06[c]	.05[d]	.10[b]	.24[b]

[a] Entries are the mean thermometer score residuals for regression of Government of Canada thermometer scores on the direction and strength of federal party identification.

[b] $p < .001$.

[c] $p < .01$.

[d] $p < .05$.

statistical significance as the criterion for including or excluding linkages between variables, 15 of 23 hypothesized causal links are retained, with 13 in the anticipated direction. Six additional, unanticipated linkages also achieve statistical significance. As a consequence, the original model depicted in Figure 1 was revised as shown in Figure 2. Compared to the original, a goodness-of-fit test indicates that the revised model fits the data quite well, with the value of Q increasing from .86 to .96 (maximum value = 1.0).[17] Path analysis of the revised model (using standardized OLS regression coefficients to estimate the strength of the linkages) shows that it reproduces the correlation matrix with reasonable accuracy, the average deviation between 45 actual and predicted correlations being .049.[18] Direct, indirect, and total causal effects in the revised model are displayed in Table 5.

Three results of the path analysis are noteworthy. First, consistent with the proposition that orientations toward legislatures and their members influence the support process in Canada, evaluations of MPs and level of support for Parliament exert significant direct or indirect effects or both on assessments of federal governmental performance and national regime and community support. Indeed, support for Parliament has the strongest direct and total effects on regime support of *any* variable in the model. It also has the second strongest direct effects on community support and assessments of federal governmental performance.[19] Additionally, evaluations of MPs' performance and responsiveness manifest significant effects on regime and community support and have the strongest direct effects on parliamentary support as well as the strongest direct and total effects on judgments of federal governmental performance.

A second finding, anticipated by previous comments on the effect of assessments of MPs, concerns the more general importance of the evaluative basis of political support. Fully one-third of all linkages in the revised model involves variables

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ent study, mean that there is a high probability that X^2 will be significant even when a model fits the data quite well. For this reason Q values (and changes in X^2 relative to those in *df*) are more useful indicators of how changes in overidentifying restrictions improve the fit of a model (Pedhazar, 1982, p. 620).

[18] Indirect effects and spurious and unanalyzed components are computed using the matrix algebra routine developed by Fox (1981).

[19] As further evidence of the validity of the model it might be noted that assessments of federal governmental performance do not have a reciprocal effect on support for Parliament. A two-stage least squares analysis of a version of the revised model, including a link from the former variable to the latter, demonstrated that the link was not statistically significant ($p > .05$). Support for Parliament, however, did retain its significant effect on governmental performance assessments ($p < .001$). Details are available from the authors upon request.

Table 5. Summary of Direct and Indirect Effects in Revised Model of Determinants of Political Support in Canada

		Direct	Indirect	Total
Effects on support for Canada				
Support for federal government		.18	.00	.18
Evaluations of federal government performance		.00	.03	.03
Support for Parliament		.20	.07	.27
Evaluations of MP's performance and responsiveness		.09	.01	.10
Evaluations of government impact on personal well-being		.00	.02	.02
Age		.10	.03	.13
Level of formal education		.00	–.02	–.02
Region-ethnicity:	Atlantic	.00	.00	.00
	Quebec-French	–.27	–.01	–.28
	Quebec-Non-French	–.11	.00	–.11
	West	.00	–.01	–.01
R = .50				
Effects on support for federal government				
Evaluations of federal government performance		.17	.00	.17
Support for Parliament		.42	.03	.45
Evaluations of MPs' performance and responsiveness		.00	.11	.11
Evaluations of government impact on personal well-being		.00	.06	.06
Age		.00	.03	.03
Level of formal education		–.10	.00	–.10
Region-ethnicity:	Atlantic	.00	.01	.01
	Quebec-French	.00	.01	.01
	Quebec-Non-French	.00	.01	.01
	West	.00	.01	.01
R = .51				
Effects on evaluations of federal government performance				
Support for Parliament		.18	.00	.18
Evaluations of MPs' performance and responsiveness		.27	.03	.30
Evaluations of government impact on personal well-being		.18	.06	.24
Age		.00	.08	.08
Level of formal education		.00	.00	.00
Region-ethnicity:	Atlantic	.08	.00	.08
	Quebec-French	.00	–.02	–.02
	Quebec-Non-French	.00	–.01	–.01
	West	.00	–.02	–.02
R = .44				
Effects on support for Parliament				
Evaluations of MPs' performance and responsiveness		.17	.00	.17
Evaluations of government impact on personal well-being		.12	.02	.14
Age		.14	.04	.18
Level of formal education		.00	.00	.00
Region-ethnicity:	Atlantic	.00	.00	.00
	Quebec-French	.00	–.01	–.01
	Quebec-Non-French	.00	–.01	–.01
	West	.00	–.01	–.01
R = .28				
Effects on evaluations of MPs' performance and responsiveness				
Evaluations of government impact on personal well-being		.14	.00	.14
Age		.22	.00	.22
Level of formal education		.00	.00	.00
Region-ethnicity:	Atlantic	.00	.00	.00
	Quebec-French	–.08	.00	–.08
	Quebec-Non-French	–.07	.00	–.07
	West	–.06	.00	–.06
R = .29				

Figure 2. Revised Model of the Determinants of Political Support in Canada*


EVALUATIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL IMPACT ON PERSONAL WELL-BEING
EDUCATION
AGE
ATLANTIC
QUEBEC-FRENCH
QUEBEC-NON-FRENCH
WEST
EVALUATIONS OF MPs' PERFORMANCE AND RESPONSIVENESS
SUPPORT FOR PARLIAMENT
EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENTAL PERFORMANCE
SUPPORT FOR FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
SUPPORT FOR CANADA
-.10
.18
.12
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.18
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.42
.20
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-.08
-.07
-.06
-.27
-.11

*Path coefficients are estimated as standardized OLS regression coefficients. For all coefficients, $p < .001$.

measuring public evaluations of political figures and institutions. In this respect, judgments of the performance of MPs and the federal government are not the only relevant factors. Assessments of government's impact on personal well-being exert direct effects on perceptions of the performance of MPs and government, as well as on support for Parliament. In addition, they have measurable indirect effects on four of the five endogenous variables in the model. The pervasiveness of these effects indicates that citizens' cost-benefit assessments of the consequences of governmental activity for themselves and their families undergird the larger set of forces shaping support.

A third finding concerns the several sociodemographic variables in the model. As anticipated, the regional dummy variables for Quebec and the West have statistically significant negative effects on judgments about MPs' performance and responsiveness. These linkages may be interpreted as reflecting regional variations in political culture that condition the evaluative basis of political support. However, the region-ethnicity variables also influence support directly. In particular, the two Quebec variables have direct links with national community support. During the past decade much has been written about Quebec's Quiet Revolution, with many scholars arguing that the province has undergone a profound cultural transformation involving a redefinition of political community (e.g., Bernard, 1978, pp. 71-93; McRoberts & Posgate, 1980, pp. 155-197). The direct negative links between the Quebec-ethnicity variables and national community support are consistent with this argument.

Age and level of formal education also have direct and indirect effects on political support. Age exerts direct positive effects on support for Parliament and Canada, and education has a negative impact on support for the federal government. These *direct* links suggest that the polity has failed to sustain high levels of supportive feelings among younger, better-educated citizens. Additionally, the less positive assessments of the performance and responsiveness of federal legislators among younger Canadians indicate that they may have acquired more stringent standards for assessing the behavior of their legislative representatives. The larger significance of this finding is that attitudes toward MPs, in turn, have both direct and indirect effects on national regime and community support.

Political Support in Canada: Reprise

A principal aim of this investigation has been to examine the proposition that Parliament and its members exercise significant effects on political support in contemporary liberal democracies. Analyses in one such polity, Canada, are consonant with this proposition. Particularly impressive are the effects of support for Parliament on evaluations of federal governmental activity and support for the national regime and community. Whether these effects would be equally robust in presidential systems or constitutional hybrids where the legislature is not a preeminent representational institution and symbol of national sovereignty is a question worth pursuing in future studies.

Indicative of the role of MPs in the support process is the finding that judgments about them are linked directly and indirectly to support for Parliament and other aspects of the political system. A reasonable assumption is that some people base these judgments on personal interactions with MPs. For example, 24% of those surveyed in 1979 reported contacting or being contacted by a member of Parliament. For over four-fifths of them the nature of the contact involved constituency service requests. Although there is collateral evidence that MPs' casework activities may exercise a multiplier effect in that persons assisted may apprise family and friends of the fact,[20] probably only a minority of citizens forms their opinions about MPs in this way. Much more likely is that public opinion about members of Parliament is generated largely by impressions conveyed in the print and electronic media. Media representations of Parliament and its members are not invariably positive (Kornberg & Wolfe, 1980). Given this and the additional fact that significant proportions of the public do not fully comprehend how legislative behavior is conditioned and constrained by the parliamentary system (Price & Clarke, 1980), MPs are forced to try to improve their public image by engaging in what Mayhew (1974) has labelled "advertising" and "credit claiming" activities.[21] However, since Canadian parliamentary committees are weak, party discipline is strong, and individual members are not highly visible or important participants in the policy process (e.g., Jackson & Atkinson, 1980, pp. 167-171; Kornberg & Mishler, 1976, Chap. 3), it is not surprising that MPs' public relations efforts may be less than completely successful. One indication of this is the distribution of public sentiments concerning MPs' performance and responsiveness documented above.

Assessments of the behavior of legislators do not exhaust the range of public judgments of the performance of political figures and institutions that influence political support in liberal democracies. In such systems public evaluations reflect expectations that government will protect lives and property, provide a wide variety of social programs, foster economic growth while controlling inflation and unemployment, and otherwise promote the general welfare. Moreover, people expect these tasks to be discharged efficiently and, given the value ascribed to equity and fairness, they expect government to adhere to these principles as well. Analyses demonstrate that Canadians differ, in some cases rather sharply, in their estimates of governmental performance. Although these judgments exert direct and indirect effects on national regime and community support respectively, their impact is not as great as initially anticipated. We may speculate the effects of public judgments of the effectiveness and equity and fairness of governmental performance on support might have been considerably more pronounced had we been able to measure more precisely the importance citizens ascribe to each of the several areas of governmental activity. Again, investigating this possibility is an appropriate topic for future inquiry.

There also is evidence that the process by which support is generated or eroded "begins at home." Evaluations of government's impact on the material and more general well-being of oneself and one's family are related directly to assessments of MPs and support for Parliament. Additionally, these evaluations have direct or indirect effects or both on perceptions of governmental performance and support for the national political regime and community.

As argued in the introduction to this article, performance evaluations are not the sole sources of political support. Variations in support for national political communities and regimes also may have amorphous and complex roots in socialization processes that covary with deep-seated socioeconomic and demographic cleavages. Although the characteristics of this source of support necessarily make it an elusive quarry in empirical analysis (Sears, 1975, pp. 128-139), evidence of its existence in Canada is provided by direct associations between age, level of formal education, and region-ethnicity on the one hand, and the support measures on the other. Regarding age and education, younger people assign lower grades to MPs and offer less support to Parliament and the political community than do older persons. The less educated are more supportive of the regime than are better-educated individuals. As for region-ethnicity, Quebecers, particularly Quebec-French, tend to have lower levels of national community support and to evaluate the performance and responsiveness of MPs more harshly than do Canadians living in Ontario. Westerners likewise tend to be more negative in their assessments of parliamentary representatives, whereas residents of the Atlantic provinces have atypically positive judgments of federal governmental performance.

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[20] Nearly two-thirds of the respondents in the 1979 survey report that they "often" (27%) or "sometimes" (36%) discuss politics with such persons (Kornberg, Mishler, & Clarke, 1982, p. 100).

[21] The norm of party discipline means that, unlike American congressmen, MPs find it difficult to gain credit with constituents by taking public positions on major policy issues. This is the prerogative of party leaders. See Kornberg and Mishler (1976, Chap. 2).

From a socialization perspective, it is worth noting that socialization processes in all liberal democracies tend to be relatively haphazard. Informal norms limit the extent to which agencies such as schools or the mass media may be used to instill supportive attitudes toward community, regime, and authorities. To use these agencies more vigorously and overtly would risk contravening some of the core values upon which the legitimacy of such systems rests. In Canada, especially in present-day Quebec, generational differences in political socialization may be particularly important. In this regard, our findings demonstrate that French Quebecers who have reached the age of majority since the initiation of the Quiet Revolution in the early 1960s ascribe markedly lower levels of support to the national political community than does any other group of Canadians.

Can a national parliament and its members halt, or even reverse, downward trends in political support in a liberal democratic polity? As the embodiment of the belief that the political system is representative of its citizenry, the Canadian Parliament, like its counterparts in other democracies, would appear to be better suited to the task of enhancing political support than are many other institutions and authorities. If the core meaning of representation is responsiveness (e.g., Eulau & Karps, 1977; Pitkin, 1967), an optimal and seemingly obvious strategy to pursue would be to generate policies and programs and to engage in representational activities that meet citizen needs and demands. However, one need not labor the point that this prescription is more easily offered than implemented in an era when rising expectations and dwindling resources compound the problems besetting a country that historically has been characterized by reinforcing cultural, linguistic, and regional conflicts. Thus, how the Canadian Parliament addresses these issues in the decade ahead may provide a valuable test of whether legislatures in democracies experiencing similar stresses can augment support and thereby help to maintain the integrity of their political systems.[22]

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[22] Computer simulation may be used to provide an indication of the magnitude of increases in political support attendant upon more positive orientations toward Parliament and the activities of MPs. Using the revised model (with appropriate stochastic error terms), increases of one-half a standard deviation in support for Parliament and evaluations of MPs yield average national community support scores of 82.95 over 30 runs of the model. This result compares ($p < .001$) with a validation mean of 79.17 for community support on this number of runs. (Actual national community support mean is 79.99, and the mean individual-level difference over 30 runs is 0.84.) If scores for Parliament and MPs are increased by a full standard deviation, the mean simulated community support score increases to 86.76 ($p < .001$) and less than 1% of the sample have scores equal to or less than 50 (the neutral point of the support scale). Whether it would be possible to effect such large-scale changes in orientations toward Parliament and its members is problematic. On possible strategies of parliamentary reform in Canada see Clarke et al. (1980), and Jackson and Atkinson (1980). Naylor (1971) offers a useful guide to computer simulation.

Appendix

MPs' Performance and Responsiveness. The question below was used to measure public assessments of the performance of members of Parliament.

> Generally speaking, what kind of job do you think your members of Parliament, the one you have now and those you've had in the past, have done in the following areas. As I mention these different areas, would you tell me if they have done a very good job, a good job, a bad job, or a very bad job.

The areas mentioned included:

(a) being available to the people of the riding;
(b) explaining to people in the riding what kinds of things the federal government is thinking about doing;
(c) taking part in parliamentary debates, question period, and committee work and so forth;
(d) helping people in the riding who have problems with the federal government to solve them;
(e) getting projects and other things the riding needs.

Using these items, an index of evaluations of MPs' performance was constructed. For this purpose responses were scored: "very good job" = +2; "good job" = +1; "bad job" = −1; and "very bad job" = −2. Scores on the five items were summed to yield an index ranging from +10 to −10.

A second question focused on judgments about the anticipated responsiveness of MPs in various situations where legislators are expected to respond to constituent needs and demands:

> Still thinking about the *federal* government in general, how likely is it, in your opinion, that a member of Parliament would do the following:
>
> (a) take into consideration the opinions of people like yourself when making up his or her mind on an important issue if he or she knew your feelings on it;
> (b) try hard to do or get something for the riding if people like yourself asked him or her for something or needed something;
> (c) try hard to do something about a specific personal or family problem that a person like yourself approached him or her with;
> (d) make himself or herself available at home in his or her constituency office and in Ottawa to people like yourself if they should need to call on him or her.

Response categories included "very likely," "somewhat likely," and "not very likely," which were scored +1, 0, and −1, respectively. The resulting index ranges from +4 to −4. When analyzing the effects of assessments of MPs' behavior on political support, the two indexes of MPs' performance and anticipated responsiveness were combined into one overall additive index ranging from +14 to −14.

Governmental Performance. To measure evaluations of the overall effectiveness of governmental performance, respondents were asked how well the federal government has operated in several areas. For each area a filter question was used to establish whether or not the respondent judged that it was desirable for government to involve itself in that particular type of activity. The preamble for the question is as follows:

> Thinking now about the federal government *generally*, not a particular party government, I would like to read you a list of things people have said the federal government should consider doing. As I read each of these to you, would you tell me whether you think the government should or should not be doing these things.

Respondents then were presented with a list of possible governmental activities. For each activity which they indicated the government should perform, they were asked how well the government has performed it. Activities included:

(a) providing welfare services for anyone who needs them;
(b) keeping the armed forces strong enough to protect Canada from a possible attack from any source;
(c) guaranteeing the protection of the lives and property of all people;
(d) insuring that everyone who wants to work has the opportunity to do so;
(e) insuring that the personal liberties and rights of people never are endangered by the police, the courts, or the civil service;
(f) insuring that inflation is kept under control;
(g) limiting foreign investment and control of natural resources by foreign ownership;
(h) insuring that people in every region of Canada have a decent standard of living by passing laws that benefit all regions equally.

"Very well" responses to these questions were scored +1, and "not very well" and "should not do" responses, −1. Other answers were scored 0.

A second battery of questions focused on perceptions of the equity and fairness of governmental performance. In this sequence, respondents were asked to "*think about the federal government generally*" and to tell the interviewer whether they agreed, agreed strongly, disagreed, or disagreed strongly with each statement. Statements included:

(a) In some countries there may be one law for the rich and another for the poor but that is not the way the federal government works in Canada.
(b) Although dividing powers between the federal and provincial governments may have presented problems at times, on the whole the benefits of our federal system far outweigh the costs.
(c) Over the years, political parties generally have tried to look after the best interests of all Canadians, not just the interests of those who vote for them.
(d) Over the years, the federal courts generally have acted speedily and treated people fairly.
(e) In some countries, interest groups like business, labour, or farmers groups have had too much say in politics, but this hasn't been the case in Canada.
(f) Although there may have been minor exceptions, over the years the federal civil service generally has treated all Canadians equally.

For these items "strongly agree," "agree," "disagree," and "strongly disagree" responses were scored +2, +1, −1, and 2 respectively. No opinion and "don't know" answers were scored 0. The overall index of federal governmental performance and equity and fairness was formed by summing the scores to the two sets of items.

Governmental Impact on Personal Well-Being. Judgments of personal well-being were measured using responses to questions regarding material and more general life satisfaction. Responses were scored: "very satisfied" = +2; "fairly satisfied" = +1; "a little dissatisfied" = −1; "very dissatisfied" = −2. These scores were multiplied by those for variables measuring assessments of governmental impact on the two types of satisfaction. The governmental impact variables were scored: "a great deal" = 2; "something" = 1; "not much" = 0. The resulting indexes (ranging from +4 to −4) were summed to yield an overall index (range = +8 to −8) of evaluations of governmental impact on personal well-being.

Age. The variable is measured as age in years.

Level of Formal Education. This is a five-category variable: elementary school or less = 1; some secondary school = 2; completed secondary school = 3; some college or university (less than B.A. or B.Sc. level) = 4; college or university graduate (B.A. or B.Sc. level or above) = 5.

Region. Four categories are used: Atlantic (Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick), Quebec, Ontario, and the West (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia).

Ethnicity. Thirty-one ethnicity categories are collapsed into three: Anglo-Celtic, French, Other.

Region-Ethnicity. To avoid multicollinearity problems in the multiple regression analyses occasioned by the large concentration of persons of French ethnicity in Quebec, a set of dummy region-ethnicity variables is constructed. These are Atlantic, Quebec-French, Quebec-Non-French, and West. Ontario is the suppressed category.

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Partisan Instability in Canada: Evidence from a New Panel Study

LAWRENCE LEDUC
University of Windsor

HAROLD D. CLARKE
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

JANE JENSON
JON H. PAMMETT
Carleton University

One of the critical questions in the debate about the concept of party identification is its stability over time, particularly its stability relative to that of voting behavior. This article utilizes data from a new three-wave panel study to assess the properties of party identification in Canada, and to compare levels of partisan stability in Canada with those in Great Britain and the United States. In addition to directional stability, other features of the party identification concept and its applicability to Canada are examined, notably the constituency of identification across levels of the federal system. Analyses indicate that party identification in Canada is subject to considerable fluctuation, and that the U.S. pattern of relatively stable party identification coupled with substantial short-term swings in voting behavior reflect the institutional characteristics of the U.S. electoral system. The article concludes by suggesting that patterns of partisanship in Canada, although distinctive in certain respects, probably have important commonalities with those in many other contemporary liberal democracies.

The concept of party identification derives from more general precepts of social psychological theory which stress the importance of reference groups in processes of attitude formation and the development of a sense of personal identity. Political scientists who have traced the origins of the concept often cite Wallas's (1920, p. 83) description of political parties as objects that could be "loved and trusted" by individuals because they could be recognized from one election to another as being the same thing. Since the publication of the seminal work by Campbell and his colleagues (1960, 1966), the notion that voters develop partisan identities and that these self-perceptions serve as a powerful influence on voting choice has provided the basis for much of our theoretical understanding of the forces that act on individual voting behavior. As Miller (1976, p. 21) notes in a review of the evolution and application of the concept:

> Party identification has become one of the ubiquitous concepts in national and cross-national electoral analysis. In one version or another, the concept has been used in innumerable studies of mass politics and has now been described or otherwise analyzed in at least fifteen different countries.

Although the concept of an enduring psychological predisposition in favor of a political party appears to have a high degree of theoretical generality, it would seem particularly applicable to polities characterized by a relatively stable two-party system combined with electoral arrangements in which a large number of voting choices are required. In systems that do not possess one or both of these attributes, the meaning of the concept is less certain. Thus, although the concept of party identification has been applied to the study of electoral behavior in several countries, its utility in models of voting choice in non-American settings has been questioned, particularly in political milieux with multiparty systems, electoral systems less complex than that of the United States, or both (Budge, Crewe, & Farlie, 1976).

The importance of comprehending the characteristics of partisanship in different political systems goes beyond questions related to the determinants of individual voting behavior. In

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particular, patterns and levels of instability in individual partisan ties are relevant for understanding aggregate change in party systems over time. A key indicator, for example, of hypothesized patterns of dealignment in several contemporary Western political systems has been an observed increase in the number of individuals without strong psychological attachments to political parties (Crewe, Alt & Sarlvik, 1977; Nie, Verba, & Petrocik, 1979). Similarly, hypotheses regarding partisan realignment involve the initial abandonment of an established party tie, followed by its replacement with an equally strong attachment to another party, either simultaneously or within some definable period of time. Theories of dealignment, therefore, postulate increased or increasing levels of partisan instability at the individual and aggregate levels, whereas theories of realignment require a specific sequence of events at both levels culminating in a changed but once again stable party system and pattern of identification.

In the past decade, two research developments have helped to advance our theoretical understanding of the concept of party identification along the lines suggested by Miller in his discussion of its cross-national applications quoted above. One of these has been the study of party identification in countries with party and electoral systems considerably different from those of the United States. A second, related, development has been a growing recognition of the need for accurate data on changes in party identification over time. To date, theoretically fruitful cross-national comparisons have been hampered by the absence in many countries of panel survey data which would permit reliable measurement of cross-time change in party identification at the individual level. Recall data utilized for this purpose, although suggestive of general patterns, are subject to challenge on methodological grounds and are limited in the amount of information they can yield regarding the actual dynamics of partisanship (Gutek, 1978; Niemi, Katz, & Newman, 1980; Weir, 1975).

Juxtaposing the results of the handful of existing panel studies suggests the existence of interesting and potentially important cross-national differences in key characteristics of party identification. Analyses of the three U.S. panel studies to date (1956-1960, 1972-1976, and 1980) have found relatively high levels of directional stability in individual partisanship (Converse, 1966; Converse & Markus, 1979; Markus, 1982), findings consistent with earlier conceptions of party identification as an enduring psychological tie between the voter and the party system. Studies in other countries, in contrast, have disclosed a greater tendency for party identification to travel with the vote, thereby suggesting that partisanship in non-American political settings is more responsive to the various short-term forces associated with particular elections. In one of the earlier and best known comparisons, Butler and Stokes (1969, pp. 35-36) noted the strong tendency in Britain for partisan change to accompany vote switching although they did not question the overall utility of a concept of partisan self-image in the British case. In the Netherlands, however, Thomassen's finding (1976) that party identification was *less* stable than vote across a three-year period prompted him to conclude that the role of party identification in explaining voting behavior in that country was doubtful.

The findings of such panel surveys should be considered in conjunction with the results of recent analyses of nonrecursive models of electoral choice that demonstrate that party identification should be conceptualized as endogenous to the matrix of forces operative in the electoral arena during particular time periods (e.g., Cain, 1978; Clarke & Stewart, 1982; Fiorina, 1981; Jackson, 1975; Markus, 1979, 1982; Markus & Converse, 1979; Page & Jones, 1979; Shively, 1979). Rather than being unmoved movers, the strength and, in some instances, even the direction of party identification are subject to the short-term effects of voters' prospective and retrospective evaluations of candidates and parties.

Although American panel survey data indicate high levels of continuity in the direction of party identification, there is evidence that, in certain circumstances, the directional stability of party identification in the United States is not impervious to short-term forces. In particular, the panel study by Jennings and Niemi suggests that levels of directional change in partisanship can be substantial. Their research shows that, in the late 1960s and early 1970s at least, levels of partisan change varied across generations, with the identifications of younger persons being considerably less stable than those of their parents (Jennings & Niemi, 1981, pp. 48-52). Secondary analysis of their data by Markus (1979) shows that tendencies toward partisan change were at least partly a function of reactions to salient political issues. Such findings notwithstanding, the weight of the evidence suggests that, in the American case, short-term forces primarily influence the strength rather than the direction of party identification. In this respect, the United States stands in contrast to other countries such as Britain and the Netherlands, where it appears that such forces can have sizable effects on both the directional stability and the strength of partisan attachments.

In sum, recent studies in the United States and elsewhere indicate that the nature of party identification remains imperfectly understood. Clearly, the hitherto-prevailing conception of party identification as a stable, exogenous force in models of voting behavior and election outcomes seems inadequate, both in the American case and a fortiori, in other Western polities where requisite research has been conducted. Taken together, existing evidence suggests that the theoretical status of party identification in such models, and the more general utility of the concept for cross-national inquiry, cannot be definitively established until more is learned about the characteristics of partisan attachments in different political milieux.

In this article, we attempt to deepen and extend our understanding of the party identification concept by examining some of its crucial properties in one contemporary liberal democracy—Canada.[1] Generally, it can be anticipated that a number of the important aspects of party identification in Canada will resemble those of the British case more closely than those of the United States or the Netherlands. The Canadian party system, with two major parties and a strong third party, is similar to that of Britain in the 1970s, and the electoral systems of the two countries are identical. However, Canada, unlike Britain or the Netherlands, is also a federal system. Surprisingly little is known about patterns of partisanship at multiple levels of government in federal polities. Unlike other federal systems such as the United States, West Germany, or Australia, provincial politics in Canada often are quite distinctive, with party systems such as those of Quebec or British Columbia differing greatly from that of the national arena. The opportunity to investigate more fully the question of dual loyalties, and the particular meaning that these may have for broadening our understanding of the party identification concept, makes the Canadian case an important one for cross-national research.

An examination of party identification in Canada is facilitated by the availability of a major new three-wave panel study which greatly enhances our ability to measure the stability of the components of partisanship in this country and to make direct comparisons with the known properties of party identification elsewhere.[2] Specifically, we are able to investigate the nature and extent of instability of party identification in Canada, as well as some of the characteristics of Canadian party identification deriving from the existence of autonomous federal and provincial party systems. If provincial and federal partisanship are mutually reinforcing, then those whose identification is consistent across the two levels of the political system should be more likely to be stable than those whose identification is inconsistent. Furthermore, if it were argued, as the classic literature might suggest, that cross-level inconsistency in partisanship represents a state of cognitive dissonance, then it can be expected that changes in provincial partisanship will be in the direction of federal partisanship (or vice versa), i.e., in the direction of consistency. If, however, in a decentralized federal system such as Canada's, inconsistent identification reflects a more general independence of political orientation toward the two levels of government, one would not anticipate a trend toward resolution in favor of consistency, but rather an approximately equal flow in both directions.

The value of the Canadian panels for investigating these and related questions is enhanced by the timing of recent federal elections, which provide a rare opportunity to contrast movement over a relatively limited period of time (1979-1980) with that over considerably longer intervals (1974-1979, 1974-1980). A three-wave panel also possesses a great advantage over one containing only two waves in that it is possible to distinguish patterns of sustained change from simple volatility. For example, one can distinguish persons who change partisanship for a short period only and then return to a former identification from those who change or abandon partisanship on a more permanent basis. The existence of recent panel studies for comparable time periods in both Britain and the United States provides an additional bonus, in that it permits more accurate comparisons of patterns of partisanship in Canada with those in other countries, thereby advancing our understanding of the theoretical generality of the party identification concept.

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[1] An examination of the characteristics of party identification in Canada based on cross-sectional studies may be found in Irvine (1975); Jenson (1975, 1976); Meisel (1975), and Sniderman, Forbes, & Melzer (1974). See also Clarke et al. (1979). For a comparison using panel data of party identification in Canada with other countries, see LeDuc (1981). On the dynamics of partisanship in Quebec, see Clarke (1983).

[2] The 1974-1979-1980 National Election and Panel Studies were conducted by Harold Clarke, Jane Jenson, Lawrence LeDuc, and Jon Pammett with funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Field work for the studies was conducted by Canadian Facts, Ltd. (Toronto). The 1974 survey employed a national cross-sectional sample of 2562 respondents interviewed immediately after the 1974 federal election. Details concerning the study design may be found in LeDuc et al. (1974, pp. 701-708). After the 1979 federal election, 1295 of these respondents were reinterviewed as part of the 1979 Election Study to form a 1974-1979 panel. A total of 822 of the original respondents were interviewed a third time after the 1980 federal election to form a three-wave panel, together with 926 new respondents drawn in a 1979 cross-sectional sample. These two groups together form a second (1979-1980) panel of 1748 respondents. Weights are applied in all three panels to approximate national cross-section samples of the Canadian electorate. Further information on these studies may be obtained from the principal investigators or from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.

To orient readers unfamiliar with the Canadian case, we may observe that data on party identification in Canada (Figure 1) depict an electorate in which the vast majority of voters identify at least "fairly strongly" with a party. Similar to

Figure 1. Direction and Intensity of Federal Party Identification in Canada: 1980 National Sample



Table 1. Turnover in Party Identification and Voting Behavior: 1974-1979 and 1979-1980 Canadian Panels (%)

	Party identification			
	Same party in both waves	Different parties	Moving to or from non-identification[a]	Total
1974-1979 Panel[b]				
Voting for the same party in 1974 and 1979 elections	48	4	8	60
Voting for different parties in 1974 and 1979	7	10	5	22
Moving to or from nonvoting	10	4	4	18
Total	65	18	17	100
1979-1980 Panel[c]				
Voting for the same party in 1979 and 1980 elections	58	3	7	68
Voting for different parties in 1979 and 1980	7	7	3	17
Moving to or from nonvoting	10	3	2	15
Total	75	13	12	100

[a] Includes respondents reporting nonidentification in both waves (3% in 1974-1979 and 3% in 1979-1980).

[b] Diagonal percentages. N = 1213. Excludes nonvoters in both elections.

[c] Diagonal percentages. N = 1558. Excludes nonvoters in both elections.

the British case, but in contrast to that for the United States, the number of respondents who classify themselves as independents or who decline a party identification is small. Also, unlike the results of recent surveys in Britain and the United States, the percentage of Canadians reporting only a weak partisan attachment is relatively small (LeDuc, 1983). Again dissimilar to the British and American cases, no sustained pattern of aggregate change is suggested by the Canadian data, the direction and strength of identifications in 1980 being generally very similar to the results of every national survey conducted since 1965 (Clarke et al., 1979; Meisel, 1975). Identification with the Liberal party, long the dominant party in Canadian federal politics, continues to exceed that for all other parties by a substantial margin. Percentages of respondents identifying with the Progressive Conservative or the New Democratic parties, the second and third largest federal parties, are substantially smaller than that for the Liberals, and are likewise at levels very similar to those for previous national surveys. Social Credit, an erratic factor in Canadian politics since the 1930s, has witnessed its level of partisan support erode very slowly over the past decade and a half (from 6% in 1965 to 1% in 1980), and it is no longer a significant political force in national politics.

In both direction and intensity of partisanship, then, the survey data portray a seemingly stable party system and a partisan electorate. Of course aggregate stability should not be taken to imply individual stability. Nevertheless, it is clear that party identification in Canada has not been subject to extensive weakening or dealignment, and it is unlikely, although not impossible, that these data mask an ongoing process of sustained realignment or other secular change. Whether this portrait of aggregate stability reflects patterns of stability at the individual level is an empirical question that can best be addressed via the panel surveys.

The Directional Stability of Partisanship

Although the Canadian party system appears stable in the aggregate, it is nevertheless a system that contains large numbers of "flexible" partisans, including many who report instability of partisanship at some time in the past.[3] The Canadian electorate likewise contains durable party identifiers, for whom long-term forces are powerful predictors of voting choice (Clarke et al., 1979, pp. 343-348). To investigate individual-level stability in partisanship, we examine first the turnover of party identification and vote between two proximate pairings of elections (1974-1979 and 1979-1980) as shown in Table 1. We use 3 x 3 tables for this purpose because it is desirable to include nonidentifiers in the analysis and to distinguish clearly between the adoption of a new party identification and the abandonment of a former one. The inclusion of nonidentifiers is especially important for comparative purposes. Butler and Stokes' finding, for example, that party identification in Great Britain has a greater tendency to travel with vote than in the United States has been shown to derive largely from their decision to include British Liberal party identifiers in the analysis while excluding American Independents (Cain & Ferejohn, 1981). When both groups are included, the conclusion drawn is somewhat different. The same point may be inferred from Converse's (1966) study of the dynamics of partisanship in the United States. Although his analysis of the 1956-1960 panel shows little actual turnover of party identification, a much higher level of instability is evident if movement from identification to independence and vice versa is considered. Similar arguments may be applied with respect to nonvoters. The exclusion of nonvoters eliminates a type of electoral change that is known to be an important element of the dynamics of both individual voting behavior and electoral outcomes (Clarke et al., 1979). Linkages between nonvoting and partisan instability therefore require careful examination.

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[3] The concept of flexible partisanship is developed at some length in Clarke et al. (1979, pp. 135-164 and 301-319). In the 1974 national sample, respondents were classified as flexible if they reported no party identification or weak identification (34%), if they recalled hav-

During the five years between the 1974 and 1979 elections, less than half of the panel (48%) was stable with regard to both party identification and vote (Table 1). Between the 1979 and 1980 elections, the comparable figure is only 58%, although these two contests occurred within a nine-month span. This finding suggests that time alone is of limited importance in accounting for partisan instability. Time is seemingly less important than the existence of opportunities for change, such as those provided by exposure to short-term forces generated by events such as elections. Relatedly, a noticeable proportion of the movement in both the 1974-1979 and 1979-1980 cases is accounted for by the entry and exit of transient voters including, in each instance, 10% of the panel who fail to vote in one of the paired elections but who show no change in their partisanship. This effect represents the mobilization or demobilization of persons whose identifications are directionally stable over the period surveyed. To this group may be added an additional complement of transient voters who do show changes in partisanship—8% in the 1974-1979 panel and 5% in the 1979-1980 panel—but whose partisan leanings, or lack thereof, are reflected in their voting choice in only one of the elections in question. This category divides about equally in both instances between those shifting between parties and those moving between partisanship and nonidentification.

Particularly interesting is the cell (7% in each panel) that combines stability of partisanship with variability in voting choice, because it is this group that most closely fits the concept of partisanship described in the early American voting studies. Although this cell demonstrates that the Canadian electorate contains individuals whose partisanship survives periodic changes in voting behavior, it is perhaps of greater importance to note that this group is considerably smaller than is commonly reported in American studies and that it is smaller than (in the case of 1974-1979 panel) or equal to (in the 1979-1980 panel) the proportion of the electorate for whom partisanship travels with vote (center cell of Table 1).[4] These

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ing changed their party identification in the past, or if they held differing federal and provincial partisan identities (30%). On this basis, 63% of the sample were classified as flexible in partisanship by reason of holding at least one of these attributes. Similar proportions are found in the 1979 and 1980 national samples.

[4] For example, if partisanship and vote in Canada and the United States are compared directly across the two-wave panels, it is evident that the relationship between party identification and vote differs even though the proportion who report both stable partisanship and vote is nearly identical. Considering only those respondents in the 1974-1979 Canadian panel and the 1972-1976 U.S. panel who report both a party identification and a vote, the following pattern is obtained:

	Party Identification	
Vote	**Stable**	**Unstable**
Canada		
Stable	70	5
Variable	10	15/100%
United States		
Stable	71	4
Variable	22	3/100%

For more than 90% of those reporting a change in both party identification and vote, the direction of movement is the same for both.

Congressional rather than presidential vote is used in these analyses because it provides the nearest approximation to the Canadian and British electoral system. Also, there are three congressional elections (1972, two groups, found in the center and center-left cells of each panel in Table 1, represent two basic types of partisan-vote change. Clearly, there are Canadian voters whose partisanship is durable, supported by various long-term forces that may change only slowly, if at all. For these individuals, party identification is more stable than voting choice in any given election. But there are also those for whom partisanship is as unstable as voting choice itself, changing with the vote in response to various short-term forces associated with elections.

There is, it may be noted, a third group of individuals who do not fit either of the two basic types described above, but who collectively account for a significant portion of the total movement found in both panels, namely persons who decline to identify with a party in one or both of the two waves of the respective panels. In the American studies, these are commonly referred to as "independents," but the term "independent" is rarely used in Canadian politics, either by survey respondents or by analysts. Although Canada, unlike the United States, does not have a large or increasing contingent of political independents, the role of nonidentification in the dynamics of partisanship in Canada is an important one. At a given point in time only about one voter in ten does not report a party identification at the federal level (see Figure 1) and, if federal and provincial identifications are considered together, the percentage of voters lacking a party tie in some form is even smaller. However, this nonpartisan tenth of the electorate is not a fixed entity. In each of the two-wave panels (1974-1979, 1979-1980), the percentage of respondents who maintain continuous nonidentification is only 3%, and the percentage doing so across all three waves (1974-1979-1980) is about the same. In Canada, therefore, most nonidentifiers are not a permanently unaligned contingent of voters, but rather individuals caught at any given time in the process of movement from one party identification to another or away from a party and back again. Like a single frame clipped from a strip of movie film, nonidentification in Canada is a static fragment of a dynamic process.

Although this pattern suggests that the number of true independents is actually very small in Canada, it also may be interpreted to mean that the phenomenon of nonidentification is somewhat more widespread than it appears in a single cross-section survey. Although only one voter in ten reports nonidentification in any given wave, and only 3% do so continuously, 22% of the total panel report nonidentification in one of the three waves. Nonidentification reflects electoral behavior less than does partisan change in that it occurs as often in conjunction with stable voting preferences as with a change of vote or a move to nonvoting. In the aggregate, it is as important a source of instability across time as directional partisan change.

The various types of movement across all three waves of the panel are summarized in Table 2. Over the three waves, 41% of the respondents display stability of partisanship and vote. As noted, nonidentification occurs in conjunction with both stability and instability of voting choice. The three other main types of movement in the panel are delineated by the cells italicized

Table 2. Summary of Turnover in Party Identification and Voting Behavior in Three Panel Waves: 1974-1979-1980 (percentages of total sample)[a]

	Party identification		
Vote	Same in three waves	Changing at least once	Moving to or from nonidentification[b]
Voting three times for the same party	41	3	7
Switching at least once	*11*	*16*	9
Not voting at least once	*13*	6	6

[a] N = 791. The table excludes nonvoters in all three elections. Rows and columns do not total, and do not total to 100%, because not all categories are mutually exclusive. A respondent, for example, who switched in one pair of elections and did not vote in the other is counted in two cells. The same is true of those who moved to or from nonidentification and also changed party identification.

[b] Includes 2% of sample that reported continuous nonidentification.

1974, and 1976) available in the panel but only two presidential elections (1972 and 1976), thereby facilitating direct comparison with Table 4. However, if presidential rather than congressional vote is used in a two-wave analysis similar to that shown above, the percentage reporting the same party identification and vote is 68% rather than 71%. Other cells vary from those shown above by only 1% when presidential vote is used.

Table 3. Turnover of Party Identification and Vote in Three-Wave Panels in Canada, the United States, and Great Britain (%)

	Canada 1974-1979-1980	United States 1972-1974-1976	Britain 1974 (Feb.)-1974 (Oct.)-1979
Party Identification			
Same in three waves	59[a]	68	73
Changing at least once	23	11	23
Moving to or from nonidentification[b]	22	24	6
Voting Behavior			
Voting for the same party in three elections	49	39[c]	57
Switching at least once	33	28	28
Abstaining at least once[d]	24	39	19
Specific Partisanship/Vote Patterns			
Same party identification and vote in three-panel waves	41	33	52
Changing both party and vote at least once	16	4	13
Same party identification, but switching vote at least once	11	19	11
Same party identification but abstaining at least once[d]	13	25	11
N	791	772	706

[a] The percentages total more than 100% because categories are not mutually exclusive.

[b] Includes continuous nonidentifiers in all three waves: Canada, 2%; United States, 4%; Britain, less than 1%.

[c] For House of Representatives.

[d] But excluding nonvoters in all three elections, which makes a significant difference only for the United States in which 17% of the total sample report not voting for Congressional candidates in all three elections.

for emphasis in Table 2, each of which represents a distinctive type of movement of party identification or vote or both. Sixteen percent of the sample report a change in partisanship together with a change in vote in at least one wave of the panel, whereas 11% report partisan stability combined with at least one voting switch. The third of these cells, at 13%, consists of those who report the same party identification across the three waves, but were not mobilized to vote in all three elections. Together with the fully stable group and those moving to or away from nonidentification, these represent the main categories of stability and change in partisanship and voting in the Canadian electorate.

In assessing the picture of party identification in Canada presented by these data, a comparison with other countries is useful: Table 3 replicates and summarizes the analysis up to this point with the use of panel studies in the United States and Britain conducted over approximately the same period and with similar research designs and virtually identical measures.[5] Of the three countries, Canada has the smallest percentage of respondents maintaining the same party identification across all three panel waves. The meaning of this statistic is illustrated by the particular characteristics of party identification in each country. The percentage reporting a change in the direction of party identification in the United States is significantly lower than in Britain or Canada, reflecting the unusually stable character of U.S. party identification even during a politically volatile period.[6] Similar to Canada, Britain displays a relatively high degree of directional change in party identification, but is distinguished by the much smaller role played by moves to or from nonidentification. Partisan instability in Canada, then, is greater than in Britain or the United States because it incorporates both of these features, whereas the other two countries display only one of them in significant numbers.

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[5] For purposes of this analysis, identical definitions of party identification are used in the U.S. and British studies. The U.S. data were collected by the Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, and made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The British data were collected by Bo Sarlvik and Ivor Crewe and made available by the SSRC Survey Archive, University of Essex. In both cases, neither the principal investigators nor the archives are responsible for the analyses or interpretations of the data reported here.

[6] The political instability associated with the Vietnam war-Watergate period in American politics and the landslide character of two of the last three presidential elections provide simple but powerful testimony on this point.

When voting choice is taken into account (Table 3), the picture changes considerably. The three countries differ only slightly with regard to vote switching between elections, although Canada is still the most volatile of the three. But it is the very high incidence of nonvoting which distinguishes the United States from the other two cases and results in the relatively small percentage of Americans (30%) who report voting for the same party across the three elections. Also distinctive in the American case is the combination of high levels of stability in party identification with considerable volatility in voting behavior (Table 3). Although Canada stands between Britain and the United States in terms of the percentage maintaining a stable identification and vote, it is in fact quite similar to Britain in displaying a greater tendency for party identification to travel with the vote. Overall, then, although there are some distinctive features in the patterns of partisanship and voting in Britain and Canada, it is the United States that appears to constitute the special case.

To this point, the primary concern has been to measure levels of partisan and electoral change and to distinguish broadly between certain types of change, e.g., variations in the direction of party identification, moves to and from nonidentification, and the reentry and exit of nonvoters. We should recognize, however, that variations in partisanship, particularly when measured across a pair of elections, may conform to a number of different patterns, some of which constitute an enduring change and others of which might be more properly classified as ongoing volatility or fluctuation. For example, individuals who abandoned a party tie in 1979 but returned to it in 1980 might be said to have followed a classic pattern of short-term deviation, rather than one of longer-term partisan change. In contrast, voters who adopted a new party tie in 1979 and kept it through the 1980 election are displaying a potentially more permanent alteration of partisan attachment. The three-wave panel can be of considerable value in isolating and identifying these types of movement which, if systematic, may suggest patterns of realignment or dealignment. When a change of partisanship occurs in the second wave of the panel, it is possible to use the third wave to confirm the nature of that change. Where the variation occurs in the third (1980) wave, however, no additional information is available that would permit a more detailed classification. Within these limitations, it is possible to classify patterns of partisan stability and change in the three-wave panel.

Such a classification is presented in Table 4. The first category comprises the 59% of the panel who have directionally stable partisan ties across the three waves of the panel. More than half of these persons are Liberals, indicating the extent of the advantage this party traditionally has enjoyed in Canadian federal politics. The remaining 41% report directional differences in party identification at some point in the six-year period and display a myriad of specific patterns of partisan change. However, most of these can be grouped into broad types that are readily associated with familiar processes of electoral and partisan change. Thus, slightly more than 6% of the total sample display what might be called a homing pattern of partisanship, that is, abandoning a party identification in 1979 but returning to it in 1980. Most of these are also Liberals, a finding consistent with the temporary decline in Liberal voting associated with that party's defeat in the 1979 election and its subsequent return to power in 1980. A somewhat larger proportion of the panel (14%) displays a pattern consistent with an ongoing process of alignment or realignment, involving a change in 1979 which was subsequently confirmed in the 1980 interview. Given the differing circumstances of the 1979 and 1980 elections, there is every reason to suspect that these represent "real" alterations in partisanship which may have consequences beyond voting choice in specific elections. Although no single party benefits substantially from these sustained changes, fewer than a third moved toward the Liberals, whereas more than two-thirds favored either the Conservatives or the NDP. The term "alignment/realignment" is appropriate in describing the patterns of movement of these respondents as individuals, but it should not be understood as necessarily having such consequences for the party system as a whole. Rather, it appears to be a fragment of the ongoing process of interchange among the parties, in which each gains and loses a certain number of new adherents.

This general pattern is echoed by the small complement of respondents who appear to have undergone a process of dealignment, in which the abandonment of a partisan tie has not been accompanied by the assumption of a new one. This group is exceedingly small in Canada, particularly in comparison with the United States, which has shown marked tendencies toward dealignment in recent years (e.g., Nie et al., 1979, Chap. 4). In the former country, the number of nonidentifiers assuming a party tie is nearly as great as the

Table 4. Summary of Stability and Change Patterns in Party Identification: Three-Wave Panel, 1974-1979-1980 (%)

Stable Partisanship (same party identification in all three waves)	59
Homing Pattern (returning to initial party identification)	6
Alignment and Realignment (moving to a new party identification)	14
Dealignment Pattern (abandoning party identification)	6
Volatility Pattern (all multiple changes)	7
Indeterminate Change (third wave change only)	8
	100
N = 854	

number of identifiers abandoning one, leaving the size of the nonidentifier group virtually constant across the period covered by the national surveys. Clearly, dealignment has not been an important part of the process of partisan change in Canada. Some of the change patterns, of course, do not fit any of the categories detailed above, either because variation occurs only in the third wave of the panel and therefore cannot be classified, or because it is part of a pattern of multiple movement. Of the latter group (7% of the sample), it might be said that the pattern is one of simple volatility—ongoing instability devoid of any clear directional component. Although some of the respondents in this category may eventually settle into a pattern of stable partisanship, it is likely that this group is more representative of that segment of the electorate for whom partisanship is continuously unstable, buffeted by a variety of short-term forces associated with varying perceptions of parties, party leaders, and issues.

Cross-level Consistency

In federal systems, the relationship between partisanship at the federal (national) and provincial (state) levels is relevant to any examination of the properties of party identification generally. Although investigations of cross-level variation in party identification in other federal systems such as the United States and Australia have disclosed that few voters maintain multiple partisan allegiances (Aitkin, 1977, pp. 44-47; Aitkin & Kahan, 1974, p. 446; Jennings & Niemi, 1966, p. 100), there is good reason to believe that the marked differences between the federal and provincial party systems in Canada might be associated with greater cross-level variability. Canadian political parties at different levels of the federal system are quite distinct, even in those provinces where they carry the same name, which may affect partisan attachments in a direct and meaningful way. In several provinces, there are strong provincial parties which either are absent entirely from the federal scene or which fail to compete successfully for support at the federal level. The Parti Québécois in Quebec and Social Credit in British Columbia are good present-day examples of this phenomenon, and historically there have been several important provincial political movements which have had no exact federal counterpart. In addition, a number of provinces such as Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Ontario have political parties that, although they bear the same names, cannot, to paraphrase Wallas, be recognized as being the same thing at different levels of government. Even in the Atlantic provinces, where federal and provincial party alignments are relatively similar, the nature of individual-level partisan linkages at the two levels must be treated as an empirical question. Separate measures of federal and provincial party identifications used in the Canadian surveys provide an opportunity to study multiple-level identifications as a component of partisanship in a decentralized federal system.[7]

The survey data show that only a minority of Canadians maintain a fully consistent party identification across levels of the federal system with respect to both direction and intensity, although about two-thirds do so with regard to direction alone. The proportion of fully consistent identifiers in the nation as a whole has remained virtually constant across the three waves of the panel (44% in 1974 and 45% in 1980), indicating that inconsistency of partisanship across level is an established feature of Canadian politics and not merely part of a transitional phase of a general partisan realignment or the rejection in some provinces of federal parties in favor of provincial ones. Although cross-level inconsistency is greater where the provincial party systems are most distinctive (e.g., in Quebec, British Columbia, and Alberta), it is of more than minor importance in the partisan fabric of virtually every province. In Ontario, for example, barely half of the provincial respondents (e.g., 51% in 1980) are fully consistent across level, whereas 17% of Ontarians in the most recent survey report split (i.e., directionally different) identifications at the two levels of government. Even in the Atlantic provinces, where partisan consistency tends to be greater than elsewhere, there is substantial variation in both direction and intensity between federal and provincial identification. For example, 58% of Nova Scotians and 60% of Newfoundlanders reported fully consistent identification in 1980, whereas 9% and 13%, respectively, were split party identifiers.

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[7] A separate "state party identification" question has rarely been asked in U.S. national studies. In the Australian surveys, level of party identification has been probed only as a followup to the general party identification question. In the three Canadian studies, however, full sequences covering direction and such variables as intensity were asked for each level.

The panel data also provide an opportunity to investigate relationships between patterns of change in federal and provincial party identification. In the aggregate, approximately the same proportions of respondents report changes in provincial as in federal partisanship across the three-wave panel, and the nature of these changes is very similar. Fifty-six percent maintain the same provincial party identification throughout, whereas 29% show at least one change in provincial party attachment (compare Table 3). Twenty percent of the panel report a move to provincial nonidentification at some point, about the same as the percentage doing so federally. Such moves, however, may be either related to, or completely independent of, changes in federal partisanship. Respondents whose party identification was inconsistent across level in 1974 are somewhat more likely to have reported a change in either federal or provincial identification over the course of the three-wave panel ($r = .23$). But this does not necessarily imply a move in the direction of consistency. As noted above, one might hypothesize that inconsistency of identification is an inherently unstable condition, creating a dissonance which must eventually be resolved in favor of one level or the other. Alternatively, the salience of both levels of government and the federalized nature of the Canadian party system suggest that this may not be the case. If the adoption of two separate identifications is consonant with the broader realities of Canadian politics, and if these identifications are to some degree compartmentalized within their respective spheres of relevance (i.e., federal and provincial politics), then no dissonance will be created and inconsistency will prove to be relately enduring, both at the individual level and in the aggregate.

For the three-wave panel taken as a whole, slightly fewer than half (47%) remain consistent with regard to direction of partisanship across the three interviews, whereas 14% maintain a position of inconsistency, a total of 61% showing no change in directional consistency. A change in partisan consistency indicates, by definition, that identification with either a federal or provincial party has changed across the period examined. When both direction and intensity of partisanship are taken into account, treating changes in intensity alone as "partial inconsistency," only 19% are found to maintain a position of continuous and full consistency, and only 29% of the panel show no change at all in cross-level consistency over the six-year period (data not shown).

These are impressive levels of change over a relatively short period of time, but they do not reflect any kind of drive toward consistency on the part of individual partisans. Approximately equal numbers move away from a position of federal-provincial consistency as move toward such a position. This is best seen within categories of partisan change (Table 5). Of those who report a change in either federal or provincial partisanship between any two waves, there is in fact a slightly greater tendency in the direction of inconsistent rather than consistent federal-provincial party identifications. Similarly, among those who report changes in intensity only, the move is as likely to be to a new position of partial consistency as to one of full consistency. In short, it is not possible to infer from the patterns of change shown in either of the panels in Table 5 that changes in the direction or intensity of party identification represent tendencies toward the resolution of dissonant federal-provincial identifications. The alternative conclusion, that inconsistent partisanship is commonplace in the Canadian political environment and not in itself a source of great dissonance, appears much more convincing.

The Dynamics of Partisanship: Summary and Conclusion

The separate treatment of intensity, stability, and consistency presented above should not obscure the fact that a number of different types of change can occur either simultaneously or in sequence. Persons who moved to nonidentification, for example, are likely to report a subsequent partisan change. Similarly, persons who change the direction of their party identification are prone to alter partisan intensity as well, either at the same time or subsequently. Such changes, however, are not all of the same magnitude. Variation in the direction of party identification is of a higher order than a change in intensity, even when the two occur together. Thus, to summarize the various types of movement analyzed above, one may

Table 5. Changes in Consistency of Federal and Provincial Party Identification: 1974-1979, 1979-1980, and Three-Wave Panels, by Stability of Identification (%)

	1974-1979	1979-1980	Three-wave panel
Stable identifiers (federal and provincial)			
Remaining fully consistent	41	38	34
Remaining partially consistent	12	11	4
Remaining inconsistent	15	23	14
Becoming fully consistent	17	15	19
Becoming partially consistent	15	13	18
Other[a]	–	–	11
	100%	100%	100%
N	647	1028	360
Unstable identifiers (federal or provincial)			
Remaining consistent	21	17	13
Remaining inconsistent	19	26	15
Becoming consistent	30	27	24
Becoming inconsistent	30	30	31
Other[a]	–	–	17
	100%	100%	100%
N	577	557	411

[a] Denotes all non-monotonic patterns in three-wave panel.

think in terms of a hierarchy of partisan change, arraying the three panels along single dimensions as shown in Figure 2. In these distributions, individuals reporting changes of several different types across a period are classified in terms of the higher type only, thereby producing an ordering of the degrees of partisan movement found in a panel. It is particularly instructive to note that nearly four-fifths of the three-wave panel report some type of variation in federal partisanship over the six-year period, although a large number of these are changes in intensity only.[8] The effects of time may be seen in the higher level of change shown by the 1974-1979 panel generally in comparison with that for 1979-1980, with the exception that intensity is as likely to vary over the shorter period as the longer one. This is not to say that change across the 1979-1980 panel is trivial. Indeed, only two respondents in five had not altered the direction or strength (or both) of their party identifications over the nine months separating the two interviews.

How can we account for the substantial instability in identification with political parties in Canada? Part of the explanation lies in the weakness of sociodemographic correlates of both party identification and vote and the corresponding sensitivity of attitudes and behavior to short-term forces.[9] At both the federal and provincial levels, Canadian party images are dominated by issue- and policy-related items, and by references to governmental performance and leadership, and such factors are frequently cited by respondents as reasons underlying a change in party identification.[10] These images tend to change easily in response to new issue concerns or changes in party

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[8] If changes in provincial party identification also are included, the percentage showing no change across the three-wave panel is reduced to 17%.

[9] A multivariate analysis of the effects of seven sociodemographic variables (region, religion, language-ethnicity, social class, age, sex, and community size) shows that no more than 10% of the variance in electoral behavior could be explained by such factors (Clarke et al., 1979, pp. 124-127). Similarly, Rose (1974, pp. 13-20) ranked Canada twelfth on a list of 15 countries in terms of the amount of variance in individual voting behavior that could be explained by region, religion, and occupation. See also Irvine and Gold (1980).

[10] Respondents in the 1974 National Election Study who recalled having in the past identified with a different political party from their current one (36%) were asked to indicate their reasons for changing parties. The responses distributed as follows: policy, 31%; leaders/leadership, 25%; party performance, 16%; local candidate, 13%; personal reasons, 7%; all other, 9%. Equivalent responses from the 1979 and 1980 surveys are very similar.

Figure 2. Summary of Changes in Federal Party Identification: 1979-1980, 1974-1979, and Three-Wave Panels (Percent of total samples)



[a] Includes continuous nonidentifiers–3% of 1979-1980 and 1974-1979 panels, and 2% of three-wave (1974-1979-1980) panel.

programs or leaders. Ideological or group-based images, historically an important psychological source of the stability of party ties in many countries (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967), are distinctly weaker elements of the structure of political party images in Canada (Clarke et al., 1979, pp. 194-202).

Also conducive to partisan change are highly salient federal and provincial party systems which compete for the attention and allegiance of the electorate. The substantial separation of these party systems diminishes opportunities for cross-level reinforcement of partisan attitudes at either level. Such opportunities are further inhibited by structural factors such as the independent timing of federal and provincial elections and the more generally decentralized nature of the federal system. Many Canadians respond to the cues from two quite distinct party systems by maintaining two separate partisan identities and seem to find no inherent psychological conflict in so doing. At any point in time, then, a sizable minority of voters hold multiple partisan identities, a phenomenon not commonplace even in other federal polities, and all voters are continually exposed to two distinct sets of party images associated with parties operating in recognizably different party systems. These conditions enhance the likelihood of partisan change at both levels of the federal system.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that we do not interpret our findings as suggesting that the properties of party identification in Canada are *sui generis.* Rather, as noted in the introduction, research over the past two decades in a number of countries has demonstrated sufficient instability in party identification over time to generate a debate on the cross-national utility of the concept. In comparative perspective, it appears that a strong tendency to combine a stable party identity with considerable variation in voting behavior remains a peculiarly American phenomenon, perhaps attributable to the institutional features of the U.S. electoral system. This debate and any American idiosyncracies notwithstanding, it remains possible to argue that the party identification concept has widespread applicability. Citizens in many countries readily identify with political parties, and such identifications can and do provide cues that affect both perception and behavior (Miller, 1976). However, as the Canadian data illustrate, the bases of such identifications are not necessarily long-term, and identifications are not necessarily stable. Although the party identifications of a substantial minority of Canadian voters are durable, that is, strong, stable allegiances resistant to the corrosive effects of short-term forces, there is a majority whose partisan identities are flexible, being amenable to change in response to such forces.

When reflecting upon the broader significance of this mix of partisan types in the Canadian electorate, it is significant to note that this phenomenon is not simply a function of processes of generational replacement or cataclysmic political upheavals (Clarke et al., 1979, Chap. 5; LeDuc, 1981). Rather, the process of partisan change is an ongoing one, with individual-level variations in party identification frequently being associated with reactions to such mundane occurrences as the varying salience of issues, changing party leader images, and the conduct of election campaigns. Such events and conditions, of course, are hardly unique to Canada, but rather constitute much of substance of normal politics in all contemporary liberal democracies. This fact, taken together with evidence that in a number of these polities the relationship between social cleavages and party systems has weakened discernibly over the past two decades (e.g., Crewe, Sarlvik, & Alt, 1977; Inglehart, 1982; Ladd & Hadley, 1978; Lipset, 1981), suggests that patterns of partisanship not unlike those documented in this article may characterize an increasing number of Western European and Anglo-American political systems. The ratio of what we have termed durable and flexible partisans will likely vary from one such system to another, but in all cases, the latter may be a significant and growing proportion of the electorate. To determine if this is so, and thereby to enhance our understanding of the theoretical utility of the party identification concept for comprehending both individual political behavior and broader system-level processes of political stability and change in the 1980s, additional cross-national comparative inquiries will be essential.

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The Just and the Advantageous in Thucydides: The Case of the Mytilenaian Debate

CLIFFORD ORWIN
The University of Toronto

As no passage in Thucydides is more important, so none is more dramatic than the Mytilenaian Debate. Having resolved to punish harshly a rebel city, the Athenians repent and reconsider. Exhorted by Kleon to maintain their original decision and by Diototos to abandon it, the Athenians must scrutinize the relationship between justice and expediency. Diodotos, who professes to argue from interest only, narrowly prevails in the debate. There is, however, much more to his speech than meets the eye. For it proves misleading to say that he is arguing merely from interest—and then, on a deeper level, to say that he is arguing from justice. In fact no passage in Thucydides, including the Melian Dialogue, raises starker questions about the status of political justice.

In the current state of the profession, few writers command the attention of both political scientists and political theorists. One who still does is Thucydides. If either party has neglected him somewhat, it is my fellow theorists. They are concerned, after all, with justice, and the world of Thucydides, it is widely held, is one in which justice looms small. There is some talk of it, of course, if less from Thucydides himself than from his conniving characters. "Even in Thucydides," as Hoffmann (1981, p. 40) has put it, "when statesmen, in their speeches, argue about their respective positions and ambitions, they reason in moral terms of rights and wrongs." That, however, is not to say that they are in the habit of heeding such appeals, or that Thucydides takes them much more seriously than his characters do.

If, then, we may speak of traditions of realism and idealism in the study of international affairs, Thucydides owes his place in the curriculum to his reputation as an archrealist. In the present study I seek to commend him to political theorists, yet without disgracing him before political scientists. I do so by reconsidering an episode, the so-called Mytilenaian debate, which is commonly held to show Thucydides at his most realistic or scientific. This view is correct, so far as it goes; hence the relevance of my presentation to political scientists. They, however, are likely, if they are guided by received opinion, to underestimate Thucydides' subtlety. For the realism of Thucydides is not quite what goes by that name today. Although it is true that he does not exaggerate the role that justice plays in human affairs, neither does he altogether deny it. And as he is mindful of the power of justice, so is he of the problems that justice presents. The status of the claims of right in relations between unequal powers; the nature of human accountability, both individual and collective; and the rationale for punishment among human beings: such are the questions that haunt the pages of the Mytilenaian debate.

I

In the fourth year of the Peloponnesian War, the island city of Mytilene conspired with Sparta and revolted from the Athenian empire. Spartan aid never came, however, and the city, besieged, was compelled to surrender. The facts of the surrender were these (3.27ff.).[1] The city was an oligarchy, and it was the ruling few who had effected the revolt. With food running low, however, and no reinforcements in sight, the Spartan commander on the scene had distributed heavy arms to the many. These had promptly turned them on the few, threatening to surrender the city to Athens unless such grain as remained in it was

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[1] I cite Thucydides throughout according to the standard form of reference: book, paragraph, and where necessary, sentence (e.g., 3.46.2). I used Thucydides 1966-1967; unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

handed over to them. The oligarchs, alarmed at the prospect of a capitulation from which they would be excluded, now resolved to surrender the city to Athens themselves.

The dramatic debate at Athens that follows is about punishing the *demos.* Thucydides nowhere reveals, however, how the people had regarded the revolt of their oligarchic masters against democratic Athens. That the rulers had preferred a disarmed *demos* to an armed one goes without saying, and likewise that the *demos* proved to prefer revolt to starvation. Neither proves anything about the people's disposition toward Athens. Thucydides' silences here have spawned a vast and inconclusive literature.[2] To me they suggest his unwillingness that our response to the ensuing debate turn on the facts of these matters. Like his speakers, he has bigger fish to fry.

II

The debate that Thucydides re-creates is not a consideration but a reconsideration. The Mytilenaians had surrendered on condition that their fate be referred to the Athenian people (3.28). The Athenian commander on the scene had proceeded to pick out a thousand of the oligarchs and ship them to Athens as the ones most to blame for the revolt. The Athenians, however, in the heat of passion, resolved to kill not only these, but the whole male citizenry and to sell the women and children as slaves. They forthwith dispatched a ship to Mytilene to enforce this decree (3.36).

Like most decisions taken in a towering rage, this one registered concerns not of advantage, but of justice. Mytilene, almost alone among the allies of Athens, had never been reduced to subjection and tribute, but had retained her walls and fleet, continuing powerful, prosperous, and free. In return she had betrayed Athens in a manner that argued long premeditation, introducing a Spartan fleet into the heart of the Athenian seaborne empire. Retributive justice was the Athenian concern: premeditated treason the verdict (3.36.1-3).

So, too, when the Athenians awoke the next day with a massive moral hangover, what concerned them was the justice of their decision, not its expediency. "They began to consider what a great and cruel decree it was, that not the authors only, but the whole city should be destroyed" (3.36.4, trans. Hobbes). The way was open to a reconsideration of the matter, that is to say, of its justice.

This last point is worth stressing in the face of a seeming anomaly. The reconsideration as it unfolds appears to turn far less on the question of the justice of the decree than on that of its expediency. This results from the strategy adopted by Kleon, "the most violent of the citizens and at that time by far the most persuasive with the demos" (3.36.6). Having carried the motion of the previous day, it is he who in the present debate speaks most violently and persuasively against rescinding it. In so doing he takes two steps decisive for the discussion. To the question of the justice of the decision he adds that of its expediency. And in addressing these foreign policy issues, he raises the domestic one of loyalty, in particular the loyalty of clever speakers such as those with the nerve to defend Mytilene. He seeks to harden hearts not only against the rebels, but against any domestic rival who might try to get the better of him by defending them. These two steps are connected, and we must keep both of them in mind in approaching the great speech of Diodotos which follows.

It makes sense for Kleon both to introduce the theme of advantage and to assert its priority to justice. He has reason to fear that this second time around an appeal to justice alone might fall flat. It is after all on just this issue that the mood of the crowd has shifted, and the numerous speakers preceding Kleon (3.36.6) have likely harped incessantly on the injustice of yesterday's decree (Andrewes, 1962, pp. 71-72). The situation demands that Kleon try to rebut this claim, but also—and especially, given that the odds there seem to be against him—that he present a compelling argument finessing all discussion of justice. Although reiterating the justice of his decree, therefore, he opts to defend it more vigorously still on grounds of expediency—while insisting that these must prevail over those of justice. This is one half of his strategy; the other is rank intimidation.

Although we may loathe Kleon's speech, there is no denying its power. It is a masterpiece of populism, playing alike on the people's distrust of elites (3.37) and on their distrust of themselves for not being distrustful enough of elites (3.38). Kleon makes it clear (or any rate persuasive) that all who would speak for repeal of the decree are manifest enemies of the people. The result is a highly daunting speech, to be dismissed by no opponent who values either his name or his skin.

In the other, interwoven, strand of his speech, Kleon expounds his new, improved position on Mytilene. He begins with what seems an unlikely assertion. He claims both that the Athenians live with their subjects as fearlessly and trustfully as with one another, and that their empire is an out-and-out tyranny (3.37.2; cf. 1.122.3, 2.63.2, 6.85.1). Although highly implausible, this is not, strictly speaking, a contradiction. An unusually strong, good-natured, and shortsighted ruler (cf. Plato, *Republic* 487e ff.) might be blind to the fact that he owed his rule to the first of these qualities alone. So it is with the Athenians, according to Kleon. Their empire rests on brute force, but they administer it as if, like the democracy that they experience daily, it rested on openness and trust. They are tyrants without facing up to it, and so without acting as tyrants must: in this consists their democratic incapacity for empire (3.37.1). In so arguing, Kleon is able both to tax the Athenians with their leniency and the Mytilenaians with their ingratitude; to urge his listeners to see to their safety without attention to the niceties of justice, while assuring them that justice concurs with safety in demanding the slaughter of the Mytilenaians. If problematic in theory, this approach works admirably in practice, for it appeals in turn to the two harshest passions: fear and anger.

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[2] See Andrewes (1962, p. 78), Bradeen (1960), Gillis (1971), Kagan (1974), Legon (1968), Macleod (1978, pp. 76-77), Quinn (1971), Ste-Croix (1954). I agree with Westlake (1976) (although for different reasons) that Thucydides' reticence here is intentional.

By justice Kleon means just retribution, an eye for an eye. Living as we do in an age so squeamish about punishing, we are inclined to brand all such retribution as vengeance. As Nietzsche (*Genealogy of Morals,* II) has pointed out, however, this *lex talionis* ("law of equivalency") in fact arose to restrain vengeance. Vengeance seeks punitive damages; it would inflict on the offender a grief greater than that by him inflicted. This distinction between vengeance and retribution is useful for seeing through Kleon's speech, which professes the moderate principle while inciting to unrestrained bloodlust.

The trick lies in Kleon's method for calculating the equivalency of punishment and crime. Early on in his speech, he protests against delay in chastising the rebels,

> which is all to the advantage of the guilty. For the victim proceeds against the culprit with his anger blunted, instead of punishing him while the pain is still fresh, and exacting as equivalent a retribution as possible (3.38.1).

So, too, at the end of his speech he urges the Athenians to try to regain the frame of mind into which the first news of the revolt had put them (3.40.7): justice is to be calculated from the perspective of maximum anger.

We have already seen why Kleon can present the Mytilenaians as "hav(ing) wronged [the Athenians] more gravely than any other city" (3.39.1). The Mytilenaians themselves, speaking earlier to a most receptive audience, had been hard put to justify their actions (3.10-14). It should be clear, however, that Kleon's version of equity is to act on those passions that least conduce to it. To nurse our initial rage is precisely to foreclose any justice transcending our wounded vanity and interest; it is to erect getting our own way in life into a principle of universal justice. Kleon's recipe for justice is simple: don't count to ten. Finding the Athenians now disposed to consider seriously the question of the rights and wrongs of their action, he tries to recall the blood to their eyes so as to preclude any such reflection.

On the specific question of the guilt of the Mytilenaian commons, Kleon has curiously little to say. He notes that "all alike assaulted us," and that "the people rose together with the few, believing this to be the safer risk" (3.39.6). He clearly expects his listeners to reprove so perfidious a calculation of safety. Most of his effort he devotes to blasting the revolt as such, in the hopes that the anger of his audience will spill over from the few to the many.

As mentioned, Kleon does not limit his appeal to alleged considerations of justice. He also addresses those of interest. And here his case is clear. Unless the Athenians demonstrate that the penalty for rebellion is death (3.40.7), all of their subjects will soon be up in arms, the prize of success being freedom, and the price of failure being nothing terrible (3.39.3). The result would be catastrophic. "If, then, you do as I tell you, you will do what is at the same time just towards the Mytilenaians and advantageous" (3.40.4). The just is advantageous, for it deters future transgressions.

Kleon notes near the end of the speech that if the Athenians let the rebels off,

> you will not be gratifying them, rather you will be passing judgment on yourselves. For if they did right to rebel, then you must be doing wrong to rule. If, however, be it ever so unbecoming, ruling is what you see fit to do, then, yes, even if it is unfair, still you must punish these men, or have done with empire and play the honest man in safety. (3.40.5)

Thus does Kleon try to have it both ways: the Athenians are just rulers who may justly punish defection, or they are unjust ones, and as such must punish it regardless. Justice and necessity join in condemning Mytilene.

Kleon's speech does suggest, however, certain avenues open to his opponents. Some of these he traces himself, albeit with the intention of closing them. He asks who will be so impudent or corrupt as to maintain "that the crime of the Mytilenaians is advantageous to us" (3.38.1), thus affirming the primacy of considerations of interest over those of justice—and suggesting the possible tack that punishment should be rejected as just but counterproductive. He concedes that were the offense involuntary or compelled by an external force (the enemy), it would then be worthy of indulgence (3.39.2, 7). It is just these two arguments that inform the reply of Diodotos.

In a somewhat different vein, and to underline that never has ally been better treated than the Mytilenaians, Kleon goes so far as to blame their revolt on Athens for having coddled them:

> Why, if we had long ago esteemed them in no way differently from the others, they never would have gotten so insolent. For it is as natural for human beings to despise servility as to be awed by firmness. (3.39.5)

Here the very basis of the charge of ingratitude begins to sound like grounds of exculpation: people are like that. Similarly, Kleon stresses the puffed-up folly of the rebels, deterred neither by the failures of others nor by their own prosperity (3.39.3). Such folly he offers as culpable, as aggravating rather than extenuating. It is not too surprising, however, that Diodotos offers it as the latter.

III

The more we consider the speech of Diodotos, the most remarkable in Thucydides, the more we see how much it owes to Kleon. It too begins with an analysis of deliberation so outspoken as to mask its cunning (3.40-43). In decrying Kleon's practice of besmirching his rivals' motives in speaking as they do, Diodotos besmirches Kleon's motives in speaking as he does. By sowing distrust of those who sow distrust, he reaps the fruits of that practice even while decrying it.[3] He proves to agree with Kleon that trust is everything in democracy—everywhere image is king, and the tactics of Kleon are necessary. Diodotos' analysis of the limits of direct democracy is too subtle to detain us here. We must note, however, the boldest of his bold but sly assertions: that the city is such that it is impossible to benefit it except by deceiving it (3.43.3). He thus summons us to consider what deception lurks within his treatment of the Mytilene question.

If there is one thing in Thucydides that almost every critic agrees upon, it is that Diodotos' plea for clemency rests on expediency rather than justice.[4] Such agreement is understandable. Diodotos does begin by insisting that what should matter is not the deserts of Mytilene but the interests of Athens (3.44), and he ends by stressing the impossibility of a policy combining the two (3.47.5). The fact remains that justice is not absent from his speech. Kleon has merely forced it into hiding.

Diodotos begins this section of the speech by talking even tougher than Kleon. He comes forward, he says, neither to accuse nor to defend; the issue, "if we are sensible men," is not "their justice" but "our good counsel" (3.44.1).

> For though I should pronounce them ever so unjust, I would not for that bid you kill them, unless it would be advantageous to do so: nor, though they had some claim to indulgence, would I recommend it, [unless it] appeared to be for the good of the city. (3.44.2)

This is the line of argument for which Diodotos is celebrated. We should recall, however, that the first to elevate interest above justice was Kleon: even if unjust, his decree is necessary. Diodotos stands this on its head: even if just, the decree is idiotic.

This is quite a rhetorical stroke. Kleon, whose notion of justice is unrestrained vengeance, is made to look soft for having bothered with justice at all. Harshness itself—Kleon's territory—responds to Diodotos' appeal to dispense with all considerations of justice.

There are four stages to Diodotos' self-styled argument from interest. Having sketched them I will show how they also constitute an argument from justice.

The interest at issue is that of deterring revolts. Diodotos therefore begins his attack on the decree with a blanket deprecation of the deterrent power of the death penalty. Although death dogs many offenses far less grave than rebellion, still individuals and cities dare, blindly confident in the soundness of their schemes. "All are by nature prone to transgress, whether acting as private men or as the people assembled, and there is no law that can prevent it. . . ." (3.45.3).

In support of this view Diodotos makes a surprising assertion about the earliest times. It is "likely"—he does not offer it as certain—that in those days the penalties for the greatest crimes were lighter (3.45.3). Not that he pretends that olden times were a golden age. Offenses abounded then as now—they are, as he has said, endemic to our nature—and punishments therefore soon grew more severe. Nor does he argue that men were wiser then. In fact he presents them as having been as naive as inexperience could make them. Experience brought ever harsher punishments, as those in force continued to fail to contain human nature. This process of learning culminates in the insight of Diodotos himself. Where the men of old had fondly trusted that even mild punishments would deter transgressions, Diodotos sees that none does, however terrible. His sombre wisdom stands at the furthest remove from the hopefulness of antiquity. Yet on the relevant practical point, the two, remarkably enough, concur: neither innocence nor experience leans to harshness as the remedy for crime.

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[3] Cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3.15 and Ps.-Aristotle [Anaximenes?] *Rhet. ad. Alex.* 29; Moraux (1954, p. 17); Orwin (1984), which discusses this aspect of the debate at length. The outstanding treatment of the rhetorical structure of the two speeches is Bodin (1940); cf. Ebener (1956).

[4] Among the most eminent authorities: Bury (1909, pp. 137-139), Cochrane (1929, pp. 103-104), Finley (1942, p. 177), Grene (1965, p. 29), Pearson (1962, p. 25), Romilly (1947, pp. 137-149), Ste-Croix (1972, p. 13), Stahl (1966, p. 121), von Fritz (1967, p. 688), Wassermann (1956, p. 29). Most recently, Pouncey (1980, pp. 86-87), Proctor (1980, p. 61), and Walzer (1977, pp. 9-10).

Diodotos neither has nor claims special access to the truth about the earliest times. Neither the poets, the traditional authorities in such matters, nor the researches of Thucydides himself (1.1-23, 2.29, 2.102, 3.96.1) support Diodotos' version of them. The poets speak of a true golden age, Thucydides of universal penury and violence. Diodotos seems almost to have borrowed his crimes from the latter and his punishments from the former. One wonders why he asserts this combination as "likely."

There is only one assumption on the basis of which Diodotos' account makes sense. It is that from the dawn of punishment its unique and unwavering purpose has been the deterrence of future offenders, with no concern for settling accounts with those in hand. Not retribution (justice) but only deterrence (advantage) has ever moved human beings to punish: such is Diodotos' tacit premise. Only thus could we explain the alleged progression from mildness to harshness, as men continued to transgress despite all previous increments of harshness. So too the inference that only with the passage of time have even the gravest offenses incurred corresponding penalties. Diodotos' account of penal justice abstracts from the concern with justice.

How "likely" an account of punishment this is will appear above all from the case at hand. Neither in wrath nor in doubt have the Athenians given one thought to deterrence. As their first impulse had been to crush the transgressors as they deserved, their second had been to wonder whether all whom they had marked for destruction deserved it. Diodotos' deadpan account of punishment thus ignores just those aspects that have dominated the case before him. By presenting the "history" of punishment as if it were a matter of deterrence only, he unobtrusively nudges his listeners toward acquiescing in this perspective. In asserting the primacy of advantage over justice, he is developing one side of the appeal of Kleon—in order to turn the tables on Kleon.[5]

A policy of self-interest divorced from justice begins by sounding ruthless. It implies the use of harshness without scruple whenever that serves some useful purpose. It further implies, however, the use of harshness *only* when it serves some useful purpose, i.e. some purpose other than justice. In the case of punishment the indicated motive is deterrence. Diodotos seems to argue, however, that in fact harsh punishment never deters. His tough approach implies not sterner punishments, but the abolition of punishment. Explicitly he wisely leaves it at suggesting that to kill the Mytilenaians would, although just, serve no useful purpose.

By exploiting Kleon's harsh insistence that interest precedes justice, Diodotos gets away with attacking Kleon's harsh policy without yet questioning its justice. Appearing to accept Kleon's equation of justice with vengeance, he appeals to the brutality underlying it by presenting himself as harsher even than Kleon and his justice, all to promote a policy that is anything but vengeful.

Thus far Diodotos has maintained that however just Kleon's policy, it would not advance Athenian interests. He now proceeds to argue that it would harm them. Although failing to deter rebellions, Kleon's policy would deter surrenders (3.46). As of now an ally that has rebelled and finds itself hopelessly beleaguered will yield as Mytilene did, hoping to extenuate an untimely revolt with a timely surrender. To kill the Mytilenaians, however, would be to proclaim the same fate for those who capitulate early and for those who will not do so at all; it would be to drive all cities to resist to the bitter end. Having impoverished herself with long sieges, Athens will regain only ruined towns, unable to pay either damages or tribute.

The third stage of the argument at first seems almost parenthetical. It is linked to the second by the general reflection that the Athenians should look to their interests (which means to their tribute) rather than sit as strict judges of justice.

> Presently, however, we do the opposite, and if we have defeated some free people which, ruled by force, has risen (as is reasonable) for its independence, we suppose that we must punish them harshly. We ought, however,

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[5] For a different interpretation of this aspect of Diodotos' speech, see Strauss (1964, pp. 234-235).

> not chastise free men to excess after they have risen, but watch them to excess before they rise, and forestall their having a mind to do so; having overpowered them we should put the blame on as few as possible. (3.46.5-6)

The last clause of this passage leads naturally to the fourth stage of the argument. It is that by acting as Kleon advises, the Athenians would delight their enemies. At present the *demos* in each of the subject cities is well disposed toward them, and if forced to revolt by the oligarchs, forms an Athenian fifth column. If, however, the Athenians kill the Mytilenaian people, "who took no part in the rebellion, and as soon as they acquired arms, of their own free will surrendered the city," not only will they be "guilty of the injustice of killing their benefactors," but they will gratify oligarchs everywhere. Henceforth even when the people have been compelled to rise by hated rulers, they too will hold out to the end, Athens "having served notice that the same punishment awaits those who are guilty and those who are not" (3.47). Indeed, Diodotos concludes, even if the *demos* at Mytilene were guilty, the Athenians ought to look the other way rather than lose their only allies in the other cities.

Diodotos has moved from the expediency of distinguishing lesser from greater offenders, i.e., the Mytilenaians from rebels who refuse to surrender, to that of distinguishing between the wholly blameless and the starkly guilty. This last discrimination is one to be made among the Mytilenaians. Both of these arguments, as well as the intermediate sally on the superiority of prevention to cure (3.46.6), implicitly define expediency in the matter as deterrence. A properly calibrated scale of penalties could be counted upon to achieve the desired effects: deterring halfway offenders from going the rest of the way, and the innocent from throwing in their lot with the guilty. Kleon's scheme too would deter, and infallibly, but, as we have seen, in the wrong direction.

This clear emphasis on the deterrent force of punishment (obviously including capital punishment) might seem to clash, both logically and rhetorically, with the first stage of the argument. For there Diodotos had seemed to deprecate that very power of punishment that he is now so concerned to exploit to its fullest. There is, however, no logical contradiction, nor does the speech prove unpersuasive. Diodotos has never actually asserted that punishment deters no transgressions, but merely that there are transgressions that punishment cannot deter and that most rebellions fall among them. When he moves from the psychology of revolt to that of surrender, his more hopeful assessment of the power of deterrence will not jolt his listeners.

The issue between Diodotos and Kleon is not whether punishment deters, but at what stage of a rebellion its power to do so is most reliable. Kleon's error is to place all his eggs in the frailest of baskets, the prospect of deterring the commission of what is after all a crime of passion. He would brandish the likelihood of failure before men dazzled by their hopes of success. Diodotos, on the other hand, would rely on punishment primarily to persuade rebels to cut their losses once they can see that you've got them cornered. He would exploit the power of fear at the juncture when the minds of men are most defenseless before it.

Diodotos would of course be remiss were he too not concerned with forestalling as many rebellions as possible. On this his position (3.46.6) follows from the rest of his argument. What counts is not so much the harshness of the penalty as its certainty. To dissuade offenders beforehand, make them feel cornered from the beginning. The best deterrents are bright streetlights and a cop on the beat (cf. Wilson, 1983).

IV

Diodotos' argument from interest is thus a consistent one. It is also something more. It is what he more than once denies, that is, an argument from justice in the usual sense of just deserts.

At the climax of the speech, where it matters most, the appeal to justice finally breaks the surface (3.47). There, as we have seen, Diodotos states directly that to kill the Mytilenaian *demos* would be more than a stupidity; it would be a very grave crime. This is not an aberration, a *cri de coeur* which escapes Diodotos despite his resolve to speak only of interest. It is fully in character with the rest of the speech, which indeed has been planned precisely to provide the proper prelude and sequel to it. In fact one could not follow Diodotos' self-styled argument from interest without at the same time imbibing a sense of the injustice of the decree.

For maximum clarity I enclose two charts of the plan of Diodotos' argument. Its structure is ABA'B', interweaving two trains of thought, each of which unfolds in two stages. Chart 1 outlines these as arguments from interest, Chart 2 as simultaneous underhanded appeals to justice.

Although the argument outlined at the right of each chart requires no further comment at this stage, a few words may be in order concerning the one on the left. Its unity consists in two points, the recurrence of the mention of freedom as the end for which the Mytilenaians had acted (3.45.6, 3.46.5-6), and the assertion that although guilty as charged, yet they acted only as they could not have helped acting (3.45.4-6; 3.46.5). The stages

Chart 1.

1. (A) (45) Harsh punishment will not prove expedient in the sense that Kleon pretends, because transgressors, including above all rebel cities striving for their freedom, simply cannot help themselves.	2. (B) (46.1-4) That it is expedient to punish the less guilty less harshly than the more so.
3. (A′) (46.5-6) That harsh punishments are not expedient in deterring free men from asserting their freedom; instead one must watch them carefully.	4. (B′) (47) That it is expedient to punish the guilty and not the guiltless.

Chart 2.

1. (A) (45) That although guilty in the usual sense of having done the deed, the Mytilenaians are guiltless in having been driven by overwhelming compulsion, including the yearning for freedom and empire, two of the "greatest things."	2. (B) (46.1-4) That although guilty, they are not as guilty as they might have been.
3. (A′) (46.5-6) That although they did rebel, in so doing they acted as befits free men.	4. (B′) (47) That the people at least are entirely guiltless, i.e., did not rebel, and what is more handed over the city.

differ in that Stage 2 emphasizes the first of these points in a way that transforms the import of the second. In having risen for the sake of freedom as free men will inevitably do, the Mytilenaians have a claim not only on the sympathy of the Athenians but on their admiration as well. Not only have they failed as a result of errors to which all men including Athenians are liable, but they have dared and failed for the sake of something that Athenians prize above all others.[6]

Leo Strauss (1964, p. 234) has rightly remarked that at the first stage of his argument (A), Diodotos vaguely suggests that although guilty, the Mytilenaians might deserve clemency. He does this by implying not that their guilt is less than flagrant—it is too soon to challenge that presumption—but rather that the flagrantly guilty are as such somehow worthy of sympathy; hence his assimilation of all transgression to human folly, his depiction of a world in which crime as such comes equipped with a built-in alibi. There is, he asserts, no circumstance of human life, from poverty with its daring that necessity inspires, to abundance with its craving for more (*pleonexia*) fed by arrogance and presumption, which is not in the grip of some fatal and imperious passion. "Hope also, and longing (*eros*), the latter leading and the former following close behind," lure men to their ruin, as does fortune, which by favoring a few deludes all (3.45.6). Embracing as it does the conception of the criminal intention as well as the bungling (if any) of its execution, his plea constitutes as sweeping an exculpation of wrongdoing as has ever been uttered.

Diodotos could hardly expect his audience to endorse the view that transgressors of every sort are blameless. He escapes the onus of having aired it by pretending to be speaking only of interest, i.e., of the problem of deterring transgressors. He casts upon his listeners the shadow of a doubt about punishing even flagrant offenders, without compelling his audience to confront—in which case they would certainly reject—it. Thus he solicits a sympathetic hearing for his next suggestion, that the Mytilenaians were not such flagrant offenders after all. It is to this end also that he first mentions here the "greatest things," freedom and empire, for which cities are only too prone to hazard everything (3.45.6).

Diodotos invokes these "greatest things" in explaining that the tendency of cities to err is even greater than that of individuals, bent as they are on such glorious prey. This mention serves as well, however, to dignify and justify transgressor cities far above their individual counterparts, the criminals within each city. For freedom and empire are the ends that Athens too respects the most. Diodotos is no moralist on behalf of freedom; the two greatest things are to enjoy it oneself and to deprive others of it. Athens presently manages both, whereas Mytilene, deprived of both, rose up to obtain them (3.2). Diodotos reminds the Athenians that the rebels are their mirror image, not only in their fallibility but also in their aspirations. In revolting from servitude (even so mild a one as that of a privileged subject of Athens), they have done only what the Athenians would themselves have done.

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[6] Cf. Huart (1968, p. 484, n. 1; 1972, p. 30, n. 25); Romilly (1947, p. 141 and n. 1).

It is this last suggestion to which Diodotos returns in the third phase of his argument (A′), when he lectures on how to treat free men. Having just reminded his audience that although guilty of rebellion, the Mytilenaians had not pushed it as far as they might have, he plants the thought that rebellion itself, far from being culpable, is the proof of qualities the Athenians admire. From here, having intimated by now that the Mytilenaians have been swept by forces beyond their control (A) to commit a less-than-flagrant version (B) of what is after all not much of an injustice (A′), Diodotos concludes that of even this offense, so hedged about with extenuations, the mass of Mytilenaians is innocent (B′).

Every step of the argument from interest thus bears an implicit appeal to justice. We have spoken above of the fix in which Kleon's speech has placed Diodotos. His response is to finesse Kleon by coming on even harder than he. He appeals to the people's fairness while reassuring them that he is speaking only to their toughness (3.48).

Even so, the vote is a close one (3.49.1). Kleon has changed more minds than Diodotos has changed back. The final act of the drama unfolds. A second ship is dispatched and hastens to overtake the first. This it just barely succeeds in doing, but only because this first ship had dawdled on its "horrid business" (3.49.4). We can picture the oarsmen, Athenian men of the people all, plying ever more slowly as rage yields to doubt and doubt to remorse. This is a nice touch. It reminds us that the whole story hinges on a spontaneous change of heart of the Athenians. Had they not once again fallen prey to Kleon, they would not have needed Diodotos.

V

From the depths of Diodotos' argument from interest pipes the still, small voice of justice. In this seems to consist the deception that he has promised (3.43.5).[7] There are, however, two further complications. The justice for which he settles seems to fall short of the standard implicit in the bolder reaches of his argument. And, if this is so, the problem of reconciling advantage and justice recurs at a deeper level of the speech.

Diodotos asks in the end only that the Athenians spare the mass of the Mytilenaians while trying at their leisure the thousand ringleaders (3.48.1). He must anticipate that they will kill these latter at least, as they shortly do on the motion of the ubiquitous Kleon (3.50.1). He surely grasps that politics is the art of the possible. He asks no more of the Athenians than that they act as their own second thoughts had suggested (3.36.4); they had never questioned the guilt of the oligarchs. Neither, when push comes to shove, does he. He makes the innocence of the people emerge by contrast with the guilt of the rich (3.47). But can Diodotos regard the rich as guilty?

There are, as I have shown, two strains to Diodotos' appeal, one that presupposes common sense notions of justice (BB′), and one that calls them into question (AA′). The genius of the speech lies in its subordination of the second of those strains to the first. An argument absolving the flagrantly guilty serves in practice merely to further the plea that some of the accused are innocent, and an implicit defense of rebellion, to gain a hearing for the claim that some of the defendants took no part in one. Rhetorically, this makes perfect sense. It raises, however, some troubling questions. What *must* Diodotos *think*—what are *his most attentive* and sympathetic listeners to think—of the justice of killing the oligarchs?

The side of Diodotos' argument that provokes this question gains in significance from the fact that he is not quite alone in expressing it. Several other speakers, mostly Athenians, offer versions of it (1.75-76, 4.59-64, 5.85-114, 6.16, 6.81-85; cf. 4.108). Human nature, their argument runs, is subject to certain necessities in the form of overmastering passions which drive societies to expand to the limits of their power. Despite the recriminations of the weak, they are not more just than the strong; they are merely weaker (cf. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, I.13). Societies are of two kinds, those powerless to heed the call of empire, and those powerless to resist it.

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[7] With the exception of Strauss (1964), only Winnington-Ingram (1965), Huart (1968, 1972), Macleod (1977, 1978), and Manuwald (1979), among all the commentators on this passage, have discerned in it one or the other elements of the appeal to justice which I have emphasized. None, however, has presented the structure of the argument as a whole as implying such an appeal or grasped that each stage of the case from interest has implications for our sense of justice. It was Strauss who, by noting (p. 234) that the treatment of deterrence at 3.45 raised questions not of expediency only, suggested to me that the speech as a whole called for the kind of interpretation I have attempted. The interpretation and its errors are my own. See also Bruell (1974a) and Corsi (1974), followed by Bruell (1974b).

If Diodotos' emphasis differs from that of other exponents of this thesis, that results at least in part from the crucial difference in rhetorical intention. What Athenian speakers otherwise offer in defense of their empire, he reworks as an excuse for rebellion against it. He transforms an apologia for the powerful into a plea on behalf of the powerless.

Diodotos does not, however, so much alter the thesis as he draws out certain latent implications of it. So, for instance, he adds freedom to empire as one of the "greatest things" that nature bids cities pursue. The former, however, is clearly implicit in the latter. If all cities would rule if they could, it follows that none would be ruled, and that freedom is a sort of mean between the two conditions. If human nature is such that Athens cannot but strive to rule, it is such that her subjects cannot but resist her, and if (as other exponents of the thesis suggest) the ruled ought not to blame their rulers, then neither should rulers blame their rebels. The thesis thus implies a certain sympathy of the strong for the aspirations of the weak: in raising the theme of freedom, Diodotos appeals to this.

Second, Diodotos extends the compulsion to transgress to a tendency to err in so doing. This he does the more easily in that one Greek word denotes both (*hamartanein,* "to miss one's mark," "to go astray"). He thus deepens the pathos of the lot of failed rebels, whose errors are to be assigned to the same overwhelming forces that drove them to venture. This argument is especially effective in the present case, where the whole business was bungled from the start. Further, by casting the blunder of the revolt not as contemptible but as a symptom of universal human weakness, Diodotos forges yet another bond of sympathy between victor and vanquished.

Last, Diodotos extends the thesis from cities to individuals. For this too there is an evident practical reason. Wishing to convey that the Mytilenaians, although flagrant transgressors, might yet deserve sympathy, he must suggest that the whole class of transgressors has some claim to it. He begins therefore with the most striking case, not of extenuating circumstances, but of the want of any, and that is the case of common criminals. This done, he proceeds to show how much worthier of solicitude is a rebel city (3.46.5-6).

These differences notwithstanding, the intention of Diodotos in propounding the thesis is formally the same as that of the others who do so. He seeks to extenuate alleged transgression as so deeply rooted in the character of the actor that the usual categories are inapplicable. All offenders are owed the benefit of a kind of insanity defense. This defense, however, as appears from its extension to all, rests neither on individual pathology nor (as so often in apologies for criminals today) on allegations concerning environment. It points the finger not at the aberrations of this or that individual or society, but rather at human nature itself. It thus casts transgression not as aberration, but as the natural norm. Diodotos' argument thus foreshadows Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Nietzsche: if transgression is the natural norm, we can no longer view it as transgression.

There may, then, after all be some truth in Diodotos' assertion that the present case admits of no reconciliation of justice and interest. And it is not only that the Mytilenaian *demos*, even if involved in the revolt, ought for reasons of expediency not be punished. It is also that expediency demands the punishment of the oligarchs, although they acted on the same principles, and were enthralled by the same natural compulsions, as their erstwhile punishers.

It is true, of course, that Diodotos could not reasonably have hoped to do more than save the *demos*. Even that proves a near thing. He salvages as much of ordinary justice as circumstances permit. The question remains, however, whether he would have wished to salvage more of it.

The difficulty may be stated as follows. Diodotos urges Athens to seek her own good without anger and so without inflicting gratuitous harm; the debate suggests that it is from anger above all that such harm arises. The insight on which all turns, however, remains that of the "Athenian thesis" affirming the primacy of one's own good. It offers no apparent basis for a principle of action superseding one's good. For the same reason that you might come not to blame other societies for preferring their good to yours, so you can hardly blame yourself for preferring yours to theirs. The first insight entails the second.

Yet Diodotos' speech is nothing if not a plea for an enlightened view of one's good. This it is not only in obvious respects, but in a deeper one. If Diodotos shares a common outlook on life with other exponents of the "Athenian thesis," he carries it a step further than they, and that proves to make a very great difference. For what is elsewhere an assertion of the priority of one's own good to justice becomes in his mouth a general teaching of human weakness or irrationality. The compulsions to which human nature is subject here figure as its undoing: they are that from which we would wish ourselves free. And from which we should strive to free ourselves? It is notable that Diodotos declares that individuals enjoy a tighter grip over themselves than cities; that individual is best advised who does not lose his head to the city (3.45.6; cf. 1.70.6).

In Diodotos we see at least a glimmer of that negative orientation that Hobbes thought he discerned in Thucydides. While he speaks of freedom and rule over others as the "greatest things," these figure in context less as the greatest goods than as tending to the greatest evils. They madden men and plunge them into incurable folly; it is hard not to regard this as diminishing their goodness. A certain wisdom, rare among individuals and unknown among cities, looms as in practice the greatest political good.

Diodotos' speech confirms the primacy of the good of one's own city even as it lifts us far above the city's perspective on its good. His own intervention in Athenian affairs (which is his only one) seems compatible with both these aspects of his understanding. It is tempting, as well as plausible otherwise (cf. 4.108.4), to speculate on the kinship of the thought of this otherwise unknown figure to that of Thucydides himself.

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Communications

Comment on Wagner
(Vol. 77, June 1983, pp. 330-346)

Habent sua fata termini. The term "security dilemma" is used by R. Harrison Wagner (1983) in a games-theoretical context and in such a fashion that its "common" or "proper" definition to which Wagner refers becomes difficult to understand. At any rate, in his usage it is far removed from its original meaning, which was established in the early 1950s when the concept became of fundamental importance for a general theory of conflict, especially in the area of international politics.

As I first defined it (Herz, 1951) and subsequently applied it to the field of international relations (Herz, 1959, see especially chap. 10, "The Security Dilemma in the Atomic Age"), the security dilemma is a "dilemma," i.e., a situation or a predicament in which groups like nations find themselves when they confront other groups (or, at least, one other group) whose intentions they cannot fathom. There then arises a fundamental social constellation of mutual fear or mutual suspicion, in short, a mutual dilemma of "kill or perish" that accounts for ensuing competition for power, arms races, wars. I gave this condition such prominence in my writings because I considered this predicament, that is, a sociopsychological phenomenon, as basic for understanding power politics (and therewith political realism), rather than the concepts that other political realists thought fundamental (e.g., Hans Morgenthau's *animus dominandi* or Reinhold Niebuhr's "sin of pride"—that is, anthropological or theological concepts). That the term was, so to speak, in the air can be seen from the fact that, when I first used it, another author, the British historian Herbert Butterfield, had referred to it as the "Hobbesian dilemma," an "absoute predicament" that lies "in the very geometry of human conflict' (Butterfield, 1950, 1952). The nuclear age (with its "two skorpions in the bottle") has given the concept and the situation their ultimate and tragic poignancy. Only if one understands the security dilemma in its starkest form can one try to discuss possible mitigations, such as policies of peaceful coexistence, arms control, detente.

It would be foolish to insist on authorship when a term or concept has become so well known that it is now used generally without reference to a first (or first) user(s). What should be opposed is its use in a context and fashion alien to its original use and meaning.

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JOHN HERZ

City University of New York

Comment on Wagner
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Referring to a model of the superpower arms race we developed (Brams, Davis, & Straffin, 1979), R. Harrison Wagner says (p. 334) we "denied [the] players the opportunity simply to cheat (by assuming they will cooperate conditionally)."

We denied them nothing. Rather, we assumed conditional cooperation (CC) to ascertain when this was better for the players than always defecting in the second stage of a two-stage Prisoners' Dilemma. (The second stage, in effect, tells the players, as in Wagner's model, that they cannot count on having the last say.)

It turned out that, in the main case we analyzed (players had the same detection probability), CC was always better than defecting in three out of four geometric regions—and sometimes better in the fourth, depending on the detection probability. In other words, we did not assume away the strategy of defection; instead, we derived the result that CC was better than defection for the players under specified conditions.

Wagner, using a different model, reaches a similar conclusion when the players can respond to each other. We are sorry he did not understand that our model and conclusions are in the same spirit as his.

STEVEN J. BRAMS

New York University

MORTON D. DAVIS

City College of New York

PHILIP D. STRAFFIN, JR.

Beloit College

Reference

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Comment on van de Kragt, Orbell, and Dawes (Vol. 77, March 1983, pp. 112-122)

Van de Kragt, Orbell, and Dawes's article, "The Minimal Contributing Set as a Solution to Public Goods Problems," claims to present a new, spontaneously arising solution to the problem of efficient provision of a public good. Unfortunately, although there are potential points of interest in the reported experimental results, this solution concept is neither new, nor does it arise spontaneously, nor is this a "public goods problem" in the most important sense.

Let us consider these problems in reverse order. The central, defining feature of the public goods problem is that each individual's contribution provides a net gain to the group, but a net *loss* to the contributor. Thus, it is individually rational not to contribute, but "socially rational" for everyone to contribute (see, for example, Olson, 1965, pp. 9-16). The problem presented by van de Kragt et al. is a game with a contribution *threshold,* above which a prize is awarded to all and below which no prize is awarded. There, the contribution may provide a net *gain* to the individual contributor, although there is a potentially larger net gain to be had by not contributing, depending on how many others contribute. The two concepts are compared in Table 1. In the published experiments, it is in a player's interest to try to avoid making any contribution, but ultimately he or she can be put in a position in which there is a gain from contributing, and perhaps even a *loss* from not doing so. Although this can provide a sticky negotiating problem, it is not the public goods problem. In the true public goods problem, there is an inefficient, dominant-strategy outcome. In the authors' game, there is an equilibrium that is inefficient (no contributors), others that are efficient (those where the minimal number contribute), and no dominant strategy.

The Minimal Contributing Set (MCS) is not a "solution" in the sense of being sufficient, merely by its existence, to drive participants to provide public goods optimally. First, as Table 2 in van de Kragt et al. indicates, communication among participants is crucial to optimal provision. It is only when they are allowed to communicate that participants can arrive at an *ex ante* agreement about who will provide the public good. Second, the structure of the experiment, as imposed by the experimenters, facilitates the *enforcement* of such an agreement. Following the communication period, all players are required to write down separately whether they choose to contribute or not. If they have previously designated a minimal contributing set, that set of contributors is certainly a Schelling point (Schelling, 1960) in exactly the sense surmised by the authors. More precisely, it is a built-in way to cut off negotiations, a technique whose importance is also discussed by Schelling, leaving the now-silent players to choose between 1) fulfilling their assigned roles as contributors or noncontributors; or 2) cheating, and foregoing the prize that would have been a net gain for every player. The particular structure of this experiment, not the underlying nature of the game, makes the MCS occur.

Finally, the MCS suggested by the authors as a new solution concept is nothing other than good old Nash equilibrium: when the minimal number are contributing, any defectors will cause forfeiture of the prize, and any extra contributor would just be wasting his money. This is illustrated in Table 1 (Threshold game), column 4, if

Table 1. True Public Good Problem versus Van de Kragt et al. Threshold Game

	Number of other players contributing $5						
	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Public good game[a]							
Player *i* contributes							
$5	$14	12	10	8	6	4	2
$0	17	15	13	11	9	7	5
Threshold game[b]							
Player *i* contributes							
$5	$10	10	10	0	0	0	0
$0	15	15	5	5	5	5	5

[a] A symmetric, *n*-player Prisoner's Dilemma. Entries show total payoffs to a representative player, *i.*

[b] The five-contributor game played by Van de Kragt et al's experimental subjects. "Risk" version.

player *i* is already a contributor, and column 5 if player *i* is not a contributor. Now there are, to be sure, two kinds of Nash equilibria in this game; the outcomes designated as MCS outcomes are distinguished by being the only Pareto-efficient Nash equilibria. In a game with extensive communication, it is quite reasonable to predict a Pareto-efficient equilibrium, if one exists.

As a final point, there is an important epistemological issue here, relating to whether or not we should alter the well-known model of human behavior peculiar to these models. Considerable work has been undertaken by economists and political scientists on public goods problems using a utility-maximizing model of participants. Does their theory require the addition of extra features, such as "role" and "reasonable behavior," in order to describe the observed behavior? This is precisely what the authors are suggesting.

The authors claim that the MCS does not require any assumption "that subjects are interested in any utility beyond that contained in the definition of the game" (p. 116). Yet the MCS does incorporate a number of confounding concepts pertaining to "role," "criticalness," and "reasonable behavior." All of these notions lie outside the analysis of choices made by utility-maximizing individuals. If these components were necessary for predicting the outcomes of the experiments, then the MCS would constitute a theoretical advance. But these concepts are in fact superfluous.

Although "role" is well defined within the experiment (as an assignment of contribution duties to an individual), it really only describes the endogenous process by which, in *this* experiment's structure, the standard equilibrium process is allowed to operate. "Criticalness" is presented as a means for specifying the pivotal role played by designated investors. Yet this is part of the equilibrium property built into the game—once an agreement is reached, no one has any incentive to withdraw. Finally, "reasonable behavior" is viewed as a means of foreclosing the consideration of alternative strategies—the problem of infinite regress in games of pure strategy. Purportedly, "reasonable behavior" eliminates such a regress. However, expectations of reasonable behavior in these experiments are unnecessary, since unilaterally departing from the agreement represents a self-defeating move for any participant. Consequently, these additional concepts peculiar to the MCS are extraneous, given the equilibrium properties built into the game.

Although we are not subscribing to the position that implausible assumptions ought to be retained if predictions can be derived, neither are we suggesting that assumptions can be freely manipulated without regard for antecedent work. An extensive body of work on public goods problems does exist, with well-established results (see, for example, Frohlich & Oppenheimer, 1978; Laver, 1981; Olson, 1965). If the experiment faithfully replicates that problem and yields compelling evidence that individual strategic behavior is at variance with expected behavior, then there may exist grounds for rejecting or modifying previous theoretical formulations. However, the authors provide an institutional setting at variance with public goods formulations. Further, their results correspond nicely with expected behavior by utility-maximizing participants. The secret here lies in the structural solution provided to the game by the experimenters, not in a new solution to the public goods problem.

RANDALL L. CALVERT

Washington University, St. Louis

RICK K. WILSON

Rice University and Washington University

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Comment on Maddox
(Vol. 76, December 1982, pp. 805-809)

It was a most gratifying surprise for me to read an article that still considers worthy of attention—exactly twenty years later—my article in this *Review* on "Constitutionalism" (Sartori, 1962). Maddox's discussion surely enriches the debate. But is his disagreement with me as fundamental as it appears to him? I wonder. I certainly agree with Maddox's basic tenet that constitutionalism seeks to balance *gubernaculum* with *jurisdictio,* that is, an efficient exercise of power with its control. A constitution in which the controls "overpower power" simply leads to impotent government and simply attests, in my view no less than in Maddox's, to poor constitutional engineering. How about, however, a constitution that is all *gubernaculum* and no *jurisdictio*? This was and remains my point; namely, that *power without control* does not add up to a "constitution" in the meaning intended by the theory of constitutionalism and of constitutional government. Hence my argument was centrally aimed at dispelling the ambiguities or the deceptions or both resulting from two very different definitions of the term constitution, namely, i) a constitution is "any state form," and, ii) a constitution is "the *garantiste* state form." Does Maddox seek to legitimize as a constitution the one of the Third Reich (certainly a state form), or the one of Stalin (a facade constitution that remains dead letter)? I do not have that impression at all. So, which is the bone of contention?

Although I doubt that we are all that far apart in substance, certainly Maddox objects to my historical reconstruction of the concept of constitution. Over more than two thousand years he perceives a continuity where I perceive a discontinuity. I asserted that when the word constitution was picked up by the American and French 18th century constitution-makers it had become a "vacant term" that was employable for the specific *garantiste* meaning that it obtained (on that I insist) during the 18th and 19th centuries. Instead Maddox holds that we use today the word constitution very much in the sense in which Cicero used *constitutio:* "the establishment of the state order" (p. 806).

The beginning, we both agree, is in the verb *constituere* which basically means "to establish," to institute, whose corresponding noun forms are *constitutio* and, in the plural, *constitutiones*. The verb was frequently used and was part and parcel of the ordinary language. Its noun forms, however, were used far less frequently and largely acquired, when used, a technical meaning. Therefore, it is essential to separate the "casual," ordinary language meaning of *constitutio* (which is nothing but the noun form of the verb *constituere*) from the "special" meaning given to *constitutio* and to *constitutiones* in the Roman legal terminology and, from there onwards, in the political theory that debated matters of government and law. Instead Maddox's counter-evidence draws in three instances (Livy, Apuleius, and Boethius) on extra-legal sources; in two instances on authors (Tacitus and St. Augustine) that use the verb, not the noun form; and is thus left to rest on the sole witnessing of Cicero.

Here Maddox is quite right. I did dismiss Cicero too sweepingly, and my including Cicero in the "casual" usage was indeed a sloppy way of putting it. In order to reinforce Maddox's point that Cicero was quite "deliberate" (not casual) in his usage, let me place his *constitutio* in context, that is, in relation to the two crucial occasions in which the verb-form *constituere* signaled the wane of the Republic. Let it thus be recalled that in 82 B.C. Silla became *dictator reipublicae constituendae,* dictator for instituting/reconstituting the republic; and that in 27 B.C. Augustus was in turn empowered *rei publicae constituendae.* The dates tell that Cicero's *De Republica* (54-51 B.C.) represented the major and last attempt to save the Roman republic. He was indeed swimming against an inexorable tide; but precisely for this reason Cicero was prompted to use *constitutio* not only as a way of translating the Greek *politeia* ("the total composition, the shape or form of the state"), but also in a narrower and, I would say, garantiste-like meaning. The passages of *Rep.* 1.41 and 1.70 that Maddox quotes (p. 806, nn. 7, 8) and translates with some forcing (*descriptione aut disciplina* hardly mean "division of powers") are suggestive of a republican-specific meaning of *constitutio.* If so, however, Maddox's case is enfeebled rather than strengthened. Assuming that "every mention of the word in English follows in some sense from this [Cicero's] original usage" (p. 806), why should it not follow from his republican-garantiste rather than generic connotation? I note this for the sake of the argument. In fact Maddox does not demonstrate the continuity that he is assuming, and the fact remains that Cicero was both the first and last author to use *constitutio* as he did. In the subsequent legal and political theory literature one finds no trace of Cicero's meanings. As regards *constitutio* as a rendering of *politeia,* the latter was the Greek title of the work of Plato that we know as *The Republic*—and *respublica* indeed remained, Cicero notwithstanding, the standard Latin equivalent of the Greek notion. And Cicero's narrower meaning was neglected even more. In their technical usages *constitutio* and *constitutiones* importantly applied to *edicta* (edicts) or to *decreta* (decrees). They were, thus, "decisions" (not *leges*) taken and enacted by the Emperor. The underlying rationale is this: When something is established by the deciding of a magistracy, then it is a *constitutio* (what is established by it).

Along this track Maddox does not contradict me. He is left to quote McIlwain, who "argued the most cogent case for Roman imperial *constitutionalism*" (p. 806). But, on the point, "constitutionalism" is besides the point. On the point McIlwain wrote (in the same work cited by Maddox) that still at the time of Bracton (1225 circa) "and for centuries after, 'constitution' *always means* a particular administrative enactment much as it had meant to the Roman lawyers" (1958, p. 24, my emphasis). Thus McIlwain exactly confirms my thesis. For how many "centuries after"? I am not sure, but the sure thing is that at the time of Cromwell several attempts were made at establishing a written constitution, and that none of the documents in question was called by the English "constitution"; they were variously called, instead, covenant, instrument, agreement, fundamental law. The compelling conclusion thus is that Cicero's meaning was and had been a "dead meaning" for some seventeen centuries.

I still may be asked by Maddox how I dispose of "Roman constitutionalism." Let me simply reply that the constitutionalism in question is largely a matter of *fictio iuris,* and that although "legal fictions" are indeed essential to legal logic, nonetheless I very much doubt that the empire did in fact establish "a system of law which protected the rights of citizens" (Maddox, p. 806). I would rather say that to the extent that the Roman citizen was protected, he was protected by *leges* (not by *constitutiones*) and, basically, by the Roman private (not public) common law system. The problem with retrodictions—and "constitutionalism" applied to Rome or Greece is a retrodiction—is that they do "inevitably project a modern frame of reference into a very distant and different world" (as I argued in this *Review* in 1965, p. 442). Thus, with reference to Rome we speak of a constitutionalism that did not impede the extensive killings and the arbitrariness that our constitutionalism (the one for which we have coined the word) impedes.

Fine points aside, the central one is that Maddox faults me with privileging a "Whig version of constitutionalism" that he declares a "narrow and somewhat dogmatic stipulation" (p. 809). But I cannot recognize myself in the above. To begin with, was Benjamin Constant a Whig? The question is of consequence, for Constant's monumental *Cours de Politique Constitutionelle* (1817-1820) was the single most influential source of the constitutions that were in fact enacted across Europe in the wake of the 1830 and 1848 revolutions. And the answer is no. Constant's constitutionalism had no Whig paternity: it essentially came from direct experience, from the constitution-making of the French revolutionaries and of the Napoleonic era. Now, I am a Whig (so to speak) just about as little as Constant. Throughout my 1962 article I was strongly critical of the English constitutional theorizing, and it is in fact the case that my underpinning of the modern notion of constitution is derived from, and sustained by, the actual texts of all the written constitutions enacted in Europe during the 19th century and up until the 1920s. If so, and turning to the next point, how can my definition be a "stipulation"? Stipulative definitions stand in contrast to lexical definitions, that is, the definitions that enter dictionaries precisely on account of widespread acceptance. This being so, my definition of constitution cannot be assigned to the stipulative variety: take any dictionary, and there it is (alongside other definitions, to be sure). Much to the detriment of my originality, my 1962 article represented a vindication of the standard *lexical definition* for some 150 years at least. Finally, and moreover, since my case is abundantly discussed and supported by abundant evidence, I do wonder what "dogmatic" means to Maddox. Perhaps Maddox has in mind a definition (a stipulation) of the word dogmatism that I cannot find in my dictionaries.

Despite all the foregoing bickerings, in the end I still ask myself: which is the bone of contention? If Maddox reads me as implying that constitutions are required to limit government at the detriment of the governing function, let me assure him that he misreads me. I do believe that constitutions are required to balance, if always uneasily, the control over power with the exercise of power. In the end, then, are we not both saying that *gubernaculum* alone is a mockery of constitutionalism?

GIOVANNI SARTORI

Columbia University

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Comment on Hibbs
(Vol. 77, March, 1983, pp. 135-138)

Douglas Hibbs (1983) claims that I (Beck, 1982) have seriously underestimated the long-run impact of party on unemployment, and that administration-oriented explanations of economic outcomes are both statistically and conceptually inferior to party-oriented explanations. As to the first claim, we shall see that Hibbs's own new (1982) results about the impact of party on unemployment are now closer to my results than they were to his original (1977) results, and that, correctly interpreted, there is nothing in his Comment that is inconsistent with my conclusion. Moreover, we shall see that there are serious technical problems with the procedure recommended by Hibbs. The second difference between us, relating to whether one prefers party or administration types of explanations, is more complicated, more fundamental and not resolvable in the Communications Section of the *Review*;[1] we shall see that Hibbs's dismissal of the explanatory power of the administration model is based primarily on sleight of hand. It may appear that the differences between Hibbs and myself are of a statistical nature; this is not the case. Thus, before embarking on a technical journey, it would seem useful to set out what is a stake in our dispute.

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[1] A more technical discussion of these issues is available from the author.

What Difference Does It All Make?

Why does it matter whether the eight-year party impact on unemployment is 2.4% or 1%? It matters because, if Hibbs is correct, parties must differ significantly in their programs, and they must have the capability of implementing those programs. Indeed, Hibbs's findings suggest both immense differences in program and an enormous degree of governmental capability; his 2.4% party impact on unemployment is very close to the change in unemployment from trough to peak in the typical postwar business cycle.

In making his claim, Hibbs conflicts with two widely shared assumptions about American politics: large programmatic differences conflict with the Downsian notion of electorally induced party convergence, whereas the government capability requirements conflict with the view that the American state is weak vis-à-vis civil society and the private economy. My more modest estimates for party impact leave room for party differentiation without contradicting other accepted views of American politics.

More is at stake in deciding between the party and administration explanations. In the Hibbs view, outcomes are sociologically determined; working-class people vote for working-class parties who reduce unemployment so as to make the working class better off. In this view, there is no room for political leadership, no room for coalition dynamics, and precious little room for economic constraints on what the state can do. Unfortunately, this means that the economic policies of the latter halves of both the Nixon and Carter presidencies, to say nothing of the current deflationary policies of Mitterrand, must simply be anomalies. Hibbs is correct in noting that my article does not contain a theory that explains those anomalies, but the administration approach may start us down a path that can yield a more satisfying model of electoral politics than the Hibbs party-class linkage model.

How Large Is the Party Impact on Unemployment?

Originally, based on the period 1948-1976, Hibbs (1977, p. 1436) found an eight-year party impact on unemployment of 2.36 percentage points; he now finds that figure should have been reported as 2.08 points (1982, p. 14). In my article, I found about a one-point difference. The difference between us becomes even smaller if we look at his new estimates based on the somewhat longer period of 1948-1980 (1982, p. 2). For that period he estimated a value for *b* (short-run party impact) of .086 and for *d* (speed of adjustment) of .88. Given those figures, the eight-year impact of party on unemployment would be only 1.4 percentage points. Hibbs's own new estimate is now closer to my estimate than it is to his own earlier estimate. Moreover, the null hypothesis that party has no impact on unemployment could not even be rejected with his new estimates.

What about Hibbs's claim that I underestimated the eight-year impact of party by factors of either four or eight. Since my conclusion (1982, p. 90) was that party had an eight-year impact of about one percentage point (not .13%), I am quite happy to accept Hibbs's calculation based on my simple dummy variable model; his calculation shows an eight-year impact of 1.08%. I chose to derive that conclusion from my models 7 and 8 (the trend models) rather than using Hibbs's procedure, because his procedure requires great faith in 32 period forecasts, a faith that the models simply do not warrant.

Hibbs obtained his estimated eight-year impact by putting a small quarterly impact through a difference equation 32 times; this yields a large impact. Unfortunately, Hibbs does not tell us that as we forecast farther and farther into the future, the standard errors of those forecasts become larger and larger (see Box & Jenkins, 1976, p. 128). This is not surprising; a model that captures so few of the structural features of the economy would not be expected to be very good at long-range forecasting. Even if we assume that Hibbs's model is correct, and even if we assume that we know the coefficients of that model with certainty, a confidence interval for the eight-year Democratic influence on unemployment ranges from an increase of 1% to a decrease of 2%. Moreover, this confidence interval is unduly optimistic, given the large standard error of his party impact variable, *b*. Thus, given the inherent large errors associated with 32-quarter forecasts, it is impossible for the Hibbs procedure to tell us very much about the world; in particular, it cannot exclude the hypothesis that party has no long-run impact on unemployment.

To avoid this problem, I estimated my models 7 and 8, which included trend terms for how long a party had been in office. These models allow assessment of the impact of eight years of party rule without making forecasts for a longer time period than any sensible person would make. (There is a cost to this procedure; it forces us to estimate differential party impacts conditioned on unemployment when a party took office.) Based on those models, I estimated an eight-year party impact of 1%.

The important point is that if one wants to use the Hibbs procedure, model 4 is the appropriate model, and the estimated eight-year impact of party is 1.08% (plus or minus a huge error); if one wants to avoid that huge error, then model 7 or 8 is appropriate, and the estimated eight-year impact of party is either .75 (model 7) or 1.25 (model 8). It would be a mistake to apply the Hibbs procedure to models 7 or 8, unless one believed that a president's quarterly impact on unemployment increased linearly over his administration. In particular, applying the Hibbs procedure to my model 8 is tantamount to assuming that in the final quarter of his administration, a president can increase or decrease unemployment by over one percentage point; if that were the case, both Ford and Carter should have been able to have won reelection.

In short, correct application of Hibbs's method yields conclusions consistent with my own. Party surely does have an impact on unemployment, but it is not nearly as dramatic as Hibbs originally claimed.

Party or Administration

Hibbs's second major objection to my article rests on the claim that using the administration variable complicates the model without adding significantly to its explanatory power. He fails to note that administration improves the party model to the same extent that party improves the simple autoregressive model. Hibbs argues that the increase in adjusted R^2 of .005 (really .008) and the reduction in error variance of .01 owing to the inclusion of the administration variables is unimpressive. Let me put those figures in context.

The simple autoregressive (AR2) model for unemployment (with no political terms at all) has an R^2 of .94; there is little variance left to explain. Adding Hibbs's party variable to the AR2 model reduces error variance by .013; breaking up the party dummy variable into administration dummy variables reduces it further by .012. Similarly, adding party to the AR2 model increases corrected R^2 by .009; adding administration to party further increases that figure by .007. Thus, administration outperforms party roughly to the same extent that party outperforms the simple AR2 model. If "readers may judge for themselves the importance of [the former] difference" (1983, p. 138), then I suppose that they may equally judge for themselves the importance of using the party variable.

An additional objection of Hibbs to the administration model (vis-à-vis the party model) depends upon his use of rank ordering of the administrations. My results indicate three clusterings of administrations: Hibbsean Democrats (Truman and Johnson); Hibbsean Republicans (Eisenhower and Ford), and centrists (Kennedy, Nixon, and Carter). The latter group far more resemble one another than they do their party counterparts. The important point is not that party does not matter (it does), but rather that there are substantial differences between some Republican presidents, substantial differences between some Democratic presidents, and substantial similarities between some Republican and Democratic presidents.

More generally, the important difference between Hibbs and myself is not over adjusted R^2's, but rather over the implications of the party explanation. Thus, for example, Hibbs would have left labor parties always adopting positions favored by trade unionists. Yet as Gourevitch (in press) has shown, although trade unionists in the early 1930s favored demand stimulus policies, not all labor parties adopted such policies; in particular, both the British and German labor parties rejected demand stimulus, whereas the Swedish Social Democrats (and to a lesser extent the American Democrats) accepted it. In Gourevitch's view, different social groupings have interests, but how those interests come together into coalitions and eventually determine policy is a complicated question. The crucial question of why trade union preferences get translated into a variety of different labor party policies has no place on the Hibbs agenda.

Finally, let us turn to the experience of the 1980s. Hibbs's final two paragraphs are pious indeed, but they also illustrate some of the pitfalls of the party-class linkage model. Hibbs wishes to blame the high level of U.S. unemployment on Reagan's Republican policies. Although no one would deny some relationship between the recent recession and Republicanism, the Hibbs explanation is overly simple. First, it cannot account for the fact that Volcker was appointed by a Democratic president, and that Draconian monetary policy dates to October 1979. Second, in the Hibbs view, it is irrelevant that the Republican president is Ronald Reagan, rather than George Bush, Charles Percy, or Howard Baker, and that Reagan represents a somewhat different set of interests from either Bush, Percy, or Baker. Finally, in 1983, France, like the United States, is also suffering from its highest level of post-Depression unemployment. The Socialist Mitterrand's shift from traditional left-wing demand stimulus policies to traditional right-wing deflationary policies, with increasing rather than decreasing unemployment rates, must be embarrassing to proponents of the party-class linkage model.

Finally, the juxtaposition of Hibbs's compassion with my "nihilism" is unwarranted. Hibbs sees the battle as between class-based parties; I see it as among social coalitions seeking control of administration and political leaders seeking the support of social groupings. Both of us are interested in the political sources of unemployment and other forms of human suffering.

NATHANIEL BECK

University of California, San Diego

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Comment on Goodin
(Vol. 77, June 1983, pp. 420-434)

In a recent article, Robert E. Goodin (1983) argues that "rational voters should occasionally vote perversely. If they want left-wing outcomes, they should vote for right-wing candidates, and vice-versa. That is where the logic of instrumental rationality inexorably leads" (p. 433). In this note, I correct some technical and conceptual errors in Goodin's analysis. Contrary to his claims, I show that the result is not robust against slight changes in his model. "Perverse voting" is neither plausible nor rational.

Goodin's Model

Candidate platforms are represented by normal probability distributions over some dimension of choice. Voters prefer the candidate whose mean position is closest (in Euclidean norm) to their own most preferred point on this dimension. The candidates, denoted L and R, have mean positions l and r $(l < r)$ with standard deviations σ_l and σ_r, respectively. The candidates are prohibited from taking extreme positions; e.g., if L is elected he must adopt a position to the right of s_l $(L \geqslant s_l)$, or if R is elected, he must adopt a position to the left of s_r $(R \leqslant s_r)$. Goodin implicitly assumes in his hypothetical calculations that less than half the probability mass for each candidate is truncated (i.e., $s_l < l$ and $s_r > r$), and I will also make this assumption.

Truncation

The discussion on p. 424 of Goodin's article clearly states that voters calculate the expected value of the candidates' platforms as if these distributions were truncated from the left (below) at s_l and from the right (above) at s_r. Goodin's formulas on the same page, however, are for the median of the truncated distribution rather than its mean. I will argue below that in the situation described by Goodin neither the mean or the median of the truncated distribution is particularly relevant, but, in any event, Goodin's calculations in the tables and figures on pp. 425-431 do not have the expected utility interpretation that he desires.

To calculate the mean of a truncated normal density, the following well-known formulas can be used (Johnson & Kotz, 1970, p. 81).

$$l^* = E(L|L \geqslant s_l)$$
$$= l + \sigma_l \frac{\phi(s_l - l)/\sigma_l]}{1 - \Phi[(s_l - l)/\sigma_l]}$$
$$r^* = E(R|R \leqslant s_r)$$
$$= r - \sigma_r \frac{\phi[(s_r - r)/\sigma_r]}{\Phi[(s_r - r)/\sigma_r]}$$

where $\phi(\cdot)$ and $\Phi(\cdot)$ denote the unit normal density and distribution functions, respectively.

The median of the truncated distribution can also be calculated.

$$\text{med}(L|L \geqslant s_l) = l +$$
$$+ \sigma_l \Phi^{-1}(\tfrac{1}{2} + \tfrac{1}{2}\Phi[(s_l - l)/\sigma_l])$$
$$\text{med}(R|R \leqslant r_l) = r$$
$$+ \sigma_r \Phi^{-1}(\tfrac{1}{2}\Phi[(s_r - r)/\sigma_r])$$

These formulas can be used to produce the entries in Table 1 of Goodin (1983), which is reproduced below with the (correct) truncated mean calculations. As can be seen, Goodin's miscalculations actually understate his case relative to the mean of the truncated distribution.

Constraints on Candidate Positions

The most serious weakness in Goodin's model is his formulation of constraints on candidate positions. As Goodin would have it, if a candidate is prohibited from taking an extreme position, he is no more likely to take a position similar to the one he is prohibited from taking than a very dissimilar one. For example, if McGovern had won the 1972 presidential election and had been unable to persuade Congress to pass his welfare plan, it seems plausible that he would have settled for the most generous plan to which Congress would have consented. Formally, it seems reasonable to assume that when candidates are prohibited from taking an extreme position, they adopt the most similar (i.e., closest) feasible position, so voters assign the probability mass attached to infeasible extreme positions to the point of truncation. Then the expected candidate positions are given by:

$$l_c = l^* + (s_l - l^*)\,\Phi[(s_l - l)/\sigma_l]$$

$$r_c = s_r + (r^* - s_r)\,\Phi[(s_r - r)/\sigma_r]$$

The result below establishes an ordering over the location parameters of the various truncated distributions.

Proposition 1. $l \leqslant l_c \leqslant \text{med}(L|L \leqslant s_l) \leqslant l^*$ and $r \geqslant r_c \geqslant \text{med}(R|R \leqslant s_r) \geqslant r^*$.

Proof. To show $l^* \geqslant \text{med}(L|L \geqslant s_l)$, let $z = (s_l - l)/\sigma_l$ and note that:

$$l^* - \text{med}(L|L \geqslant s_l)$$

$$= \sigma_l\left\{\frac{\phi(z)}{1 - \Phi(z)} - \Phi^{-1}[\tfrac{1}{2} + \tfrac{1}{2}\Phi(z)]\right\}$$

For $l > s_l$, $z < 0$ and $\phi(z)/[1 - \Phi(z)]$ is increasing in z and $0 < \Phi^{-1}[\tfrac{1}{2} + \tfrac{1}{2}\Phi(z)] < \Phi^{-1}(\tfrac{3}{4})$ with $\Phi^{-1}(z)$ strictly convex and increasing on the interval $[\tfrac{1}{2}, 1]$. It follows that:

$$\Phi^{-1}(\tfrac{1}{2} + \tfrac{1}{2}\Phi(z)) \leqslant 2\Phi(z)\Phi^{-1}(\tfrac{3}{4})$$

so it suffices to prove:

$$\frac{\phi(z)}{\Phi(z)\,[1 - \Phi(z)]} \geqslant 2\Phi^{-1}(\tfrac{3}{4})$$

for $z < 0$, which can be shown by observing that $\phi(z)/\Phi(z)\,[1 - \Phi(z)]$ is decreasing on $(-\infty, 0]$ with the above condition satisfied for $z = 0$.

Next, to show $\text{med}(L|L \geqslant s_l) \geqslant l_c$, we need to show that:

$$\Phi^{-1}[\tfrac{1}{2} + \tfrac{1}{2}\Phi(z)] \geqslant \phi(z) + z\Phi(z)$$

for $z < 0$, which is easily demonstrated by an argument similar to the previous paragraph.

For $l_c \geqslant l$, we use:

$$l_c - l = \sigma_l\{(\phi(z) + z\Phi(z))\}\,.$$

The expression in brackets is increasing in z with $\lim_{z \to -\infty} z\Phi(z) = 0$.

Table 1. Sample Calculations of Effects of Truncation

Degree of Truncation	Truncated Median σ	Truncated Mean σ	Truncated Mean (Modified) σ
0.023 (2σ)	± 0.02	± 0.06	± 0.01
0.067 (1.5σ)	± 0.08	± 0.14	± 0.03
0.169 (σ)	± 0.22	± 0.29	± 0.07
0.308 (0.5σ)	± 0.39	± 0.51	± 0.20
0.461 (0.1σ)	± 0.61	± 0.74	± 0.35

The second portion of the proof is similar to the first.

QED

As shown in Table 1, with this modified treatment of candidate constraints, severe truncation is required to affect the candidate's mean position. The corresponding condition for "perverse voting" is much more stringent than in the case of the truncated median or (unmodified) mean. Only when the candidates take very similar positions (i.e., $r - l$ is small) and the degree of truncation is severe can l_c be to the right of r_c. But it is in this situation that the asymmetry of candidate constraints makes the least sense. Even without this more plausible treatment of candidate constraints, Goodin's "perverse" result vanishes if candidate constraints are treated symmetrically. It is this feature of Goodin's model that generates his peculiar findings. Despite his claims to the contrary, this assumption cannot be relaxed.

Finally, one might question the relevance of any analysis of this type as anything more than an amusing play on words. If a supposedly left-wing candidate cannot really take left-wing positions, then his platform should not be characterized as left wing.

Conclusion

Goodin's article contains an error that I have corrected here. Its central defect, however, is more fundamental. Silly assumptions will produce silly results. Very plausible and minor changes to his model contradict his conclusion that "rational voters should occasionally vote perversely."

DOUGLAS RIVERS

California Institute of Technology

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BOOK REVIEWS

American Government and Politics

Aging and Public Policy: The Politics of Growing Old in America. Edited by William P. Browne and Laura Katz Olson. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 266. $35.00.)

William P. Browne and Laura Katz Olson have edited an excellent collection of articles on the politics of aging in America. As the editors note, there have been a great number of studies on the physical, psychological, and social problems of aging, but few on the political problems of aging.

An obvious relationship between aging policy and politics can be made given the size of the national budget—more than 25% for aging programs and services—however as a political force, the elderly do not have a coherent set of policies backed by a consensus among aging groups. Instead, diverse and fragmented interests struggle for government attention and concern. In addition, some of the elderly do not identify with these aging groups or with other older people.

Despite this diversity, the elderly do represent a significant force in American politics. This force, along with cooperative government officials who initiate programs and help expand benefits for the elderly, provide a unique form of political action. As a result of the large number of diverse programs, there is a growing network of national, state, and local agencies and service providers who maintain a forum for aging policy advocacy. This is buttressed by a general impression that aging groups are active and retain sufficient political strength that has resulted in the transfer of a disproportionately large share of government resources to the elderly.

This expansion of national expenditures for the elderly has not produced economic security for all of the aging population. Many of the articles in this volume explore this problem. Jennifer L. Warlick notes the way in which government transfers have tended to reduce poverty in aged families headed by males but not females. Jacquelyne Johnson Jackson reviews the economic problems of the elderly black. Paul K. H. Kim discusses the policy problems of the rural elderly. Not only do the elderly in rural areas have the same problems as urban dwellers, but they also face problems of geographical isolation and the dispersion of limited and often inadequate aging programs and services. In addition to these specific studies, Robert H. Binstock provides a survey of the diverse economic conditions of the elderly.

Significant political issues are given in-depth coverage. Douglas Dobson, analyzing the voting behavior of the elderly, finds that the elderly do not vote as a bloc: the aging process has little significant impact upon voting behavior. Henry J. Pratt discusses the background of the various national interest groups representing the elderly. Dale Vinyard argues that the executive branch is not as supportive of aging policies as Congress, yet remains an important arena for policymaking for the elderly. Problems of the administration of aging programs and services in a federal system are explored by David K. Brown. In his thoughtful conclusion, David Brodsky notes the problems of expanding aging programs and expenditures versus declining social program support in an era of economic decline.

While it may be true that political support for social welfare programs has declined, it is not clear that future political support will decline significantly for aging programs. One might speculate that the so-called "baby boom" that will retire in the early part of the twenty-first century will provide more than ample political support. Instead, major problems remain in the area of financing aging programs. Since social security represents the bulk of national expenditures on aging, it may be necessary to consider a public-private solution through a revision of the pension system.

Overall, this is a useful volume that will be of interest to specialists and students of aging policy.

JOHN W. CRITZER

Mount Saint Mary's College

Education Policy and Evaluation: A Context for Change. By Louise K. Comfort. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982. Pp. xiii + 199. $22.50.)

Comfort begins with the almost universally accepted notion that the stated goal of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA)—"equality of educational opportunity"—has not been met. Rather than extensively document and rehash what we already know (that is, the failure of ESEA and national public education policy in the United States), Comfort focuses on enhancing our understanding of the reasons for these failures. With congressional passage of ESEA, the federal government set out on a course designed to bring about an enormous innovation in educational policies and practices, for as Comfort notes: "It is clear that ESEA was intended as an instrument for planned educational and social change" (p. 36). Yet, for all the efforts of the federal government, the policy simply failed (that is, it proved ineffective). But, why? Comfort is able to identify and then thoroughly discuss several significant barriers to the development of a national educational policy. This discussion (chaps. 3-6) amply illustrates the conflicts created when federal political and administrative officials assumed the role of "change agent" in the development and implementation of educational policy, and hence enables one to gain tremendous insight into those factors that contributed to the failure of ESEA. Herein lies the major contribution of this book to the rapidly developing field of policy analysis and the study of specific education policies.

Comfort's review of the evaluation reports of programs funded under ESEA, Titles I and III (IV-C) for selected school districts in California over a 12-year period revealed four major barriers to education innovation. First, failure of ESEA was attributable to unresolved conflicts in policy goals. Passage of ESEA "was accomplished by blurring the conflicting issues and stating the goals of the program in terms sufficiently general that few people could disagree" (p. 52). Yet, the very vagueness of the goals of ESEA, which intended to soft-pedal real conflicts of interests, led only to open controversy as the policy moved into the implementation phase. Second, the sheer scope of the administrative jurisdiction and the complexity of the administrative procedures involved in translating national education policy into school district practice also proved to be a barrier. In short, the fragmented nature of the American governmental system proved to be a hindrance to educational change. Third, difficulty was encountered in the actual implementation of the policy because of the lack of planning. In retrospect, it appears that few attempts were made to clearly and accurately assess the interactive conditions at multiple levels involved in putting the national policy into practice. Moreover, the difficulties in the implementation process were exacerbated because of the lingering existence of unresolved conflicts in policy goals and problems that derived from the broad scope and complexity of administrative structure. Finally, the difficulties encountered in establishing a functional evaluation process constituted a fourth obstacle to innovation in educational practices through the ESEA.

Although these are some of the same obstacles to effective public policy that have been suggested by George Edwards and Ira Sharkansky in *The Policy Predicament* (W.H. Freeman, 1978) and George Edwards in *Implementing Public Policy* (Congressional Quarterly Press, 1980), Comfort's treatment of them in an in-depth case study is a noteworthy contribution to the literature in policy analysis. By examining the unique manifestation of what many consider to be common barriers to policy effectiveness, Comfort underscores a point repeatedly made by Charles O. Jones in *An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy* (Duxbury Press, 1977)—each public policy is characterized by its own distinct policy process.

J. EDWIN BENTON

University of South Florida

Voting in Revolutionary America: A Study of Elections in the Original Thirteen States, 1776-1789. By Robert J. Dinkin. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. Pp. x + 184. $27.50.)

If this book would be available in a less expensive paperback version, it would make an interesting supplementary assignment in American politics, American history, and voting and elections courses. In its present edition it is likely to make its way only into the collections of graduate institutions, scholars in the field, and specialized undergraduate institutions.

The book ably carries forward the study Dinkin began in 1977 with *Voting in Provincial America* (Greenwood Press) and covers the entire electoral process, not just "voting," as the title suggests. There are chapters devoted to "Revolutionary Era Elections," "The Electorate," "The Candidates," "Nominations," "Electioneering," "Voting Procedures," "Turnout," and "Voting Behavior." Notes, all at the back of the book, a preface, epilogue, bibliographic essay, and index complete the work.

Dinkin has attempted to deal with his subject in a way that will be useful to both historians and political scientists. While historians may not be used to some of the political science categories and terminology, and political scientists may be surprised not to encounter any tables until the penultimate chapter, the monograph does contain a wealth of material that each may find useful. In discussing each topic, Dinkin tries, within the limitations imposed by uneven availability of material, to cover each of the 13 states separately as well as offering generalizations about the new nation.

Dinkin believes that most historians have neglected the Revolutionary era, seeing the 1790s when national parties emerged as the period of major transformation, and he seeks in this work "to provide the first comprehensive analysis of the subject" (p. ix). Indeed, he has gathered reference items from many sources.

As to the explanation of the voting behavior that Dinkin chronicles, he says:

> All in all, it seems impossible to advance any single theory of voting behavior for the Revolutionary era. While some voted out of a sense of duty or attended for social reasons, most voters came out because they thought they would have an impact. There were many factors influencing the size of the turnout: the restrictiveness of the suffrage qualifications, the types of officials to be selected, the proximity of the bulk of voters to the polls, the age and location of the community, the degree of political maturity and factionalism present, and the relative importance of the issues. A person's inclination to vote was also affected by certain personal characteristics, such as his overall attitude toward government, his ethnic or religious ties, and especially his economic status. (pp. 146-147)

One can hardly fault Dinkin for the lack of a more definitive result, when recent studies of voting behavior have reached remarkably similar conclusions that a person's decision about whether or not to vote, and for whom, is the result of a complex interaction of numerous factors.

Based on his scholarship, Dinkin reaches the conclusion that "from looking at the voting process in the Revolutionary era, it is clear that the American election system had begun to take on many modern, democratic characteristics" (p. 148). More generally, he provides additional support for those who, contrary to Charles Beard, assert that the U.S. Constitution is a democratic document: "Thus, by the close of the Revolutionary era, most adult white males and even a few others had obtained the elective franchise. Property qualifications had been reduced, religious requirements practically abandoned, and racial restrictions removed in some cases" (p. 43). To obtain the many illustrative examples that underlie this assertion, one can do no better than to read *Voting in Revolutionary America* and its predecessor, *Voting in Provincial America*. I hope that Dinkin will continue the series with a study of the further democratization of electoral processes in America through the Jacksonian period and beyond.

DON RACHETER

Central College

The Public Presidency: The Pursuit of Popular Support. By George C. Edwards III. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. Pp. x + 276. $16.95, cloth; $8.95 paper.)

Studies of the American presidency have remained largely untouched by the behavioralist methods that have so influenced related areas such as electoral or legislative behavior. Moreover, books that focus entirely on the president's relationship with the public are rare despite the pertinency of public standing to presidential leadership. *The Public Presidency* addresses both of these points in providing a thoroughly researched examination of the president's relationship to the American public while grounding several of its most important findings in quantitative methods.

According to Edwards, American public opinion is neither crystalized nor coherent. Moreover, interpretations of public opinion through election results and White House mail are often misleading. Even with modern polling, such factors as intensity, response bias, and issue complexity remain problems. Thus, the nature and means of ascertaining public opinion continue to complicate the president's understanding of what the public wants.

Presidential efforts to lead public opinion through direct appeals or simplifying themes vary in success with the president's skills and public's predispositions. More problematic are presidential attempts to manipulate the economy, public relations, or the truth itself. Still another form of presidential leadership of public opinion involves presidential coattails. Through regression analysis Edwards finds that coattails were responsible for only 76 House victories since 1952 (that is, 2%), although small margins have been critical at times. Presidential efforts to influence public opinion remain worthwhile, therefore, but they must be qualified by means and limits.

The president finds himself in an adversarial role relative to the press, although not without the means to exert considerable influence. As chief newsmaker he has unmatched access to the press. He may control the size and number of press conferences, thereby affecting the superficiality of the questions he faces. Prepared by elaborate dry runs, he may learn to relate large portions of his press conferences to lengthy opening addresses, call on predictable reporters, solicit questions, and provide some articulate responses while intentionally obfuscating others. In addition, he may selectively leak news items, court the sympathetic local press, or even harass critical members of the press. For its part, the press capitalizes on personality, "horse race," and electoral consequences while abbreviating and simplifying stories via themes, symbols, and stereotypes. The resulting trivialization is what distorts the news rather than any systematic ideological or partisan bias.

In examining the basis for public approval of the president's job performance, Edwards employs cross-sectional and multivariate analysis using data from the Gallup and University of Michigan surveys. Unlike public expectations, which are often unrealistic and contradictory, public evaluations of the way the president is handling his job were found to be fairly reasonable. Citizens demonstrate some personal detachment in evaluating the president on the basis of his management of national concerns. They do not expect immediate success in realizing policy goals, but do demand personal competency in a president along with some degree of policy success in the long term. Edwards concludes in an epilogue that the American political context requires the Chief Executive to seek public support, but provides no guarantees he will find it.

One hesitates to suggest that flaws exist in this important work, but there are a few minor ones. Although lucid in its organization and expression, the book's framework is used more as a clothes tree for information than a set of developmental themes leading to a full summary ending. Also, more of the methodological discussions could be appendixed. Finally, there is a disapproving tone that runs to sarcasm in a case study of press coverage found in chapter 4.

The overwhelming strength of this book is its scholastic leadership. Its thoroughness provides an authoritative standard to challenge other authors. The book is crammed with interesting and little-known information and is exhaustive in its documentation. The quantitative methods lead to some of the most important conclusions yet provided in research on public support and may help pioneer a stronger behavioralist direction in presidential scholarship. Although that order is quite tall, what is certain is that *The Public Presidency* will become indispensable reading in understanding the popular basis for presidential leadership.

James A. Davis

Oklahoma State University

Political Parties in American Society. By Samuel J. Eldersveld. (New York: Basic Books, 1982. Pp. xii + 477. $18.95.)

The Future of American Political Parties: The Challenge of Governance. Edited by Joel L. Fleishman. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1982. Pp. vii + 174. $6.95, paper.)

A common theme of students of political parties in recent years is that the American party system is in a state of decline. Although there is not a consensus on why parties in this country have fallen on such hard times, many observers would agree with David Broder that "the party is over" (or at least about to wind down). *Political Parties in American Society* by Samuel J. Eldersveld and *The Future of American Political Parties* edited by Joel L. Fleishman are both more optimistic about the direction of party development. While not ignoring the very real problems that beset parties, both volumes essentially argue, in Fleishman's words, "that the party system is not in a permanent spiral of decline" (p. 2).

Clearly Eldersveld's textbook is an impressive work. Not only does it deal with every major aspect of the American party system, but also Eldersveld has accomplished what all good textbook authors strive for. He has drawn upon the large number of studies in the field and has gracefully integrated the findings of many scholars into the text. Eldersveld has accomplished much more, but the limitations of a short review do not allow a complete summary of the book. However, there are several points that should be highlighted.

One of the strongest chapters concerns the campaign process and strategy in America. Eldersveld argues that the image many people have of the political process is formed during campaigns—the only time that a large number of citizens are attentive to what is happening in the world of politics. In fact, it may be such exposure to the political system, particularly when viewed through the often-cynical prism of television news programs, that has contributed to the increase in nonvoting. This decline in voting is a serious problem for Eldersveld, who believes that "the basic public support for parties and party leaders atrophies during a period of low turnout and the dynamism of an active and participative system may be replaced by withdrawal, low interest, and above all a politics less responsive to the public" (p. 352).

As noted, Eldersveld does not believe that the party system is in a terminal state of decline. He argues that organizational activity at the grassroots level is as high or higher than it has ever been, and that the state and national parties are newly revitalized and showing signs of increased activity. Both of these developments are signs of a healthy party system. Still, these can be no gainsaying that the political system is undergoing a degree of demobilization and dealignment. What seems to have changed is the public's attitude toward parties. Eldersveld argues that "what is new and significant is the declining relevance in public cognitions of parties combined with an increased neutralism and indifference to parties" (p. 419). Still, Eldersveld remains optimistic that the parties will continue to play a central role in the American political system.

Eldersveld has written a fine text that is impressive in terms of the breadth and depth of its coverage. The book does suffer somewhat because it devotes only a few pages to the historical development of parties and the growth of an antiparty culture in the United States. It is important for understanding the current state of parties in America that there is an ambivalence, even a hostility, to parties that has deep roots in our history and our political culture. Nevertheless, the book will help any student of American government gain a better understanding and appreciation of the party system.

The Future of American Political Parties is a collection of five essays that attempt to assess American political parties and to offer reform proposals that will lead to strengthened parties. Some of the ideas have already become reality, such as the proposal to involve more party officials and officeholders in the presidential nominating process, and others, such as attempts to discourage split-ticket voting, are part of a reformers' wish-list that is unlikely ever be achieved.

In addition to pointing out the problems that face the party system, the essays are useful because they indicate areas of party regeneration. "State Parties in an Era of Political Change" by Robert J. Huckshorn and John Bibby canvasses the shape of state parties and finds that they are better organized, better financed, and better staffed than in previous years. F. Christopher Arterton, in "Political Money and Party Strength," argues that the GOP has gained strength through its extraordinarily successful fund-raising and campaign efforts. Arterton does point out that the national committees of the Republican party now more closely resemble a PAC than "a revitalized and nationalized version of traditional parties" (p. 131). Gary Orren offers a discussion of the antiorganizational spirit that is an integral part of American political culture and examines the differing styles of American party politics. He argues that coalitional, pragmatic parties are better suited to "the institutional and attitudinal properties of the American political system" and to the "antipartisanship" that is prevalent in the country (pp. 29, 31). Overall, the essays in *The Future of American Political Parties* offer valuable discussions of the current state of parties in America and suggest a number of ways we can strengthen the party system.

Indeed, both books can help students of American government gain a greater understanding and appreciation of the importance and centrality of the party system. As Eldersveld reminds us, "the great policy decisions are those that parties, and the leaders produced by parties, have had a major role in. . ." (p. 408).

JOHN W. EPPERSON

Simpson College

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Anatomy of a Statute. By George C. Greanias and Duane Windsor. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1982. Pp. ix + 187. $23.95.)

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was adopted in 1977, the product of Watergate-era revelations of widespread secret payments to foreign officials by American corporations doing business abroad. The authors of this study, both teachers of administrative science at Rice University, regard the law as an inappropriate effort by the Carter administration to export American ethical standards by treating the corporation as "a proconsular instrument of United States foreign policy" (p. 133). Characterizing the FCPA as "the Volstead Act of international trade" (p. 133), both for its idealism and its ineffectiveness, Greanias and Windsor conclude that the law should be substantially amended to achieve a more realistic set of objectives.

An earlier version of the FCPA proposed by the Ford administration would simply have required corporations to disclose the details of all foreign payments to the United States government and to their own stockholders. When Jimmy Carter took office, however, he advocated combining the disclosure requirement with an outright prohibition of bribery itself. The FCPA was enacted with overwhelming support from both parties and became an important part of Carter's avowedly moralistic foreign policy. In the authors' view, therefore, American corporations have been beset by vague statutory language and onerous reporting requirements that they are institutionally ill-equipped to handle.

Greanias and Windsor have produced a solid case study, rich in detail though somewhat repetitive. The book's most serious weakness is the authors' failure to demonstrate that the FCPA has not done what it was intended to do: to deter overseas corporate bribery. And while the authors report much confusion in corporate offices over exactly what the law proscribes, their prediction that American businesses faced with inscrutable commands and intimidating penalties will simply retreat from the international marketplace is just that—a prediction. They can marshall no evidence to show that this has yet occurred.

Such evidence, however, would be beside the authors' point. Their real complaint is less with the actual impact of the FCPA than with the premises that underlie it. The most useful part of this book is its analysis of the contemporary business-government relationship. Taking the FCPA as an example of the increasingly politicized environment in which businesses must operate, Greanias and Windsor argue, in effect, that such politicization ought to stop at the water's edge. They prefer the Ford administration's "marketplace" approach to the foreign payments problem: requiring disclosure of all payments and—except when foreign officials discover violations of their own bribery laws—leaving it to American stockholders and consumers to judge the efficacy and morality of such practices.

This book makes a thoughtful contribution to current debates about the proper scope and nature of government regulation. Its limitations are largely those of any case study that rests a broad theoretical argument on a narrow empirical base. To what extent can the reader—or even the authors—generalize from the case at hand to other similar ones? One wonders how far Greanias and Windsor are prepared to extend their argument for limiting the role of the United States government in the overseas operations of American businesses. After all, the corporation-as-government-proconsul role did not originate with the FCPA, nor will it end even if the authors' proposed amendments are adopted. As Greanias and Windsor acknowledge, Ronald Reagan is no less committed than his predecessor was to the use of American economic power to achieve moralistic foreign policy objectives. One wishes that the authors, instead of concluding as they do by comparing the FCPA to the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, had looked at the FCPA alongside other statutes that subordinate corporate interests to American foreign policy objectives.

RICHARD J. MAIMAN

University of Southern Maine

Undeclared War: Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power. By Edward Keynes. (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982. Pp. ix + 236. $17.95.)

Keynes, through the use of historical examples and constitutional analysis, argues that a compliant Congress and acquiescent federal judiciary have granted the president sufficient discretion to mold a prerogative national war-making power. While Keynes claims no originality introducing readers to both the concurrent and prerogative war-making theories, he does add an intriguing judicial perspective to the problem. The book's thesis asserts that federal judges, save those in *Youngstown Sheet and Rubs* vs. *Sawyer,* in adjudicating individual constitutional challenges, have imposed their values to legitimize an executive prerogative war power. In so doing, the federal courts have intruded into the constitutionally defined separation of powers between Congress and the president. He contends that the courts have neither the authority nor the necessary information to decide individual issues raised from concurrent war powers questions. At best, the courts ought to only cautiously resolve the most fundamental disagreements between Congress and the president when actions fall in that "Twilight Zone" of concurrent power. Except for the most extreme cases of interdepartmental friction, the courts ought to tread carefully when refusing to invoke the political question doctrine.

The early chapters trace the substance and theory of the Constitution to English war practices and John Locke's treatises. Noting that the Constitution explicitly rejects both federative and prerogative war power theories, Keynes points out that both Locke and Montesquieu implicitly recognize that complete separation of powers is both impossible and undesirable. While Keynes explains different theories that may justify joint action under unique circumstances, it is the offensive/defensive war theory that commands paramount interest. The Constitution grants Congress offensive, and the president defensive, war capabilities. Only when repelling an invasion, or an imminent threat of one, may the president pursue his war powers. In all other circumstances Congress, through grants contained in Article 1, Section 8, clauses 11, 14, and 18, has complete war-making power.

The middle chapters of *Undeclared War* trace historical examples, such as President Lincoln's naval blockade, and federal court decisions to demonstrate how the offensive/defensive theory has given way to a national, prerogative war power housed with the president. While this transformation can be blamed in part on congressional acquiescence, Keynes places considerable blame on the Supreme Court's ruling in the *Prize* cases, which legitimized Lincoln's fusing the commander-in-chief clause with the take-care clause into a prerogative war power. This, Keynes asserts, laid the foundation for twentieth-century executive prerogative war power and ultimately presidential constitutional transgressions in pursuing the Vietnam conflict.

Keynes's major contribution is his analysis of several federal court decisions tracing the court's increasing reluctance to invoke the political question doctrine when determining individual's constitutional challenges of war powers legislation. The federal courts rationalized their ability to do so when Congress and the president disagree on military conduct, as happened when President Nixon continued his aggression in Southeast Asia after Congress repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.

Keynes does not object to judicial adjudication in war powers cases, however he cautions the judiciary to tread carefully when deciding these issues. Federal courts have neither the information regarding issues with sensitive international consequences nor the constitutional authority to alter the traditional separation of powers in ways that shift the offensive war powers from Congress to the president. This right belongs to the people by utilizing democratic means. In other words, such action is a political question not open to judicial interference. Ultimately, Keynes warns the federal courts not to intervene except in those issues where fundamental questions exist between the separation of legislative/executive war powers.

This book is clearly written, conceptually tight, and a worthy addition to constitutional literature. It adds a valuable and useful perspective to the concurrent war powers question. Towards that end, Keynes should be commended for a solid, scholarly effort.

KENNETH PAUL NUGER

Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

The Battle for Public Opinion: The President, the Press, and the Polls during Watergate. By Gladys Engel Lang and Kurt Lang. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983. Pp. xiv + 353. $32.00, cloth; $12.50, paper.)

In the decade since the American political system took the shocks of Watergate scores of books have covered the event from almost every possible angle. Since Watergate became a codeword to generally refer to wrongdoing within the Nixon administration, and since there were many participants, the numerous Watergate books with their purported lessons and explanations of the event became somewhat of a cottage industry. So why another Watergate book now, and what have the Langs to offer a decade after the events? Quite simply, *The Battle for Public Opinion* is the definitive social science book on Watergate.

The Langs survey how the national media covered Watergate before the 1972 election. Many scholars have maintained that coverage in the national media was deficient to the point that Watergate was hindered from becoming a campaign issue. The Langs, noted social scientists, argue persuasively that the national coverage was certainly adequate. Citizens knew the basic facts of the break-in and the Woodward-Bernstein stories as passed on by the national media before the election, yet these did not translate into any relevant political responses from the electorate. It was only after the media began covering official events like trials and Senate hearings that Watergate began to generate political responses from the citizenry. According to the Langs, Watergate made the public agenda because it had made the official agenda, and it had begun to receive institutional responses to clear patterns of wrongdoing. The media was not covering "pseudo-events," but they were reporting details from institutional clashes.

The battle then evolved into a battle for public opinion between a coalition of anti-Nixon forces and the president, who tried to influence citizens to believe that he was not involved in an obstruction of justice. The Langs indicate that the mass audience never was an active force in the drama, but rather that citizens responded to events. Yet they also make it clear that the accumulative effect of how the media covered Watergate in terms of quantity and intensity helped shape perceptions for citizens as well as for the major actors in the political battle.

By using some original data and scores of empirical work done on almost every aspect of Watergate, from "decline in trust" studies to political socialization studies and network polls, this book is able to present a broad overview of the Watergate story. Among the many items in Watergate folklore that the Langs dismiss is the notion that "the system inevitably worked." Although this seems to be an important myth that the media helps perpetuate some 10 years after the incidents, it is not clear to the Langs that the system will always work. In many instances during Watergate the whole series of investigations could have ended if certain lucky breaks did not continue to happen.

The Langs, pioneers in the study of television and politics, cover the interplay between public opinion and televised coverage of the Ervin Committee, the Saturday Night Massacre, the Rodino Committee, Nixon's press conferences and addresses, the new rituals of resignation transition, and the Ford pardon.

The book is well written, with excellent research and documentation. It shows what two skilled people can do with a good idea—to chart the interaction between events, news media coverage, and public opinion during the constitutional crisis called Watergate.

The Battle for Public Opinion could be used in courses on the presidency, public opinion, media, and politics, and even in some introduction to American government courses. Because of the book's comprehensiveness and focus, it is the best book from social scientists about Watergate.

John Orman

Fairfield University

Workplace Democracy and Social Change. Edited by Frank Lindenfeld and Joyce Rothschild-Whitt. (Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, 1982. Pp. vii + 447. $20.00 cloth; $12.00 paper.)

Faced with high levels of employee dissatisfaction and low levels of worker productivity within an economy that is shifting rapidly from industrial production to service and information related activities, American management has undertaken an expansive search for techniques designed to improve labor-management relations and increase the quantity and quality of organizational output. Today's better educated, predominantly white-collar work force does not respond well to the authoritarian and hierarchical management practices designed for industrial drones. The clear trend is toward a more democratic workplace, with a greater degree of worker participation in decision making. Interest appears very high in many public and private sector organizations (even the U.S. military) in techniques such as quality circles, labor-management committees, and other forms of worker participation that democratize the workplace. Of course, there are different degrees of worker "participation," ranging from employer manipulation and cooptation of employees to real worker involvement in important organizational decisions.

Workplace democracy, as discussed by Lindenfeld, Rothschild-Whitt, and the other contributors to this volume, lies at the far left on the spectrum of participative management. It goes beyond the Human Relations School's focus on changing how the employee experiences the work situation, and further than the reversals in extreme task specialization and division of labor sought through "job enlargement," to an attempt to alter actual power relations between management and workers. Workplace democracy in its purest sense means that all employees are both workers *and* managers; the traditional organizational power structure represented by the pyramid is completely abolished and replaced with collective authority. Workplace democracy violates the treasured principles of bureaucratic organization described by Max Weber, including hierarchical authority, specialization of labor, rule-bound administration, and impersonality of decision making. It also treads firmly on the principles of scientific management and "Taylorism."

The book is organized into five parts, each preceded by a brief introduction that helps integrate the diverse subject matter. Part 1 examines definitional issues and the organizational characteristics of workplace democracy. Part 2 considers the impacts on individual workers, which include positive factors like reduced grievances, lower turnover and absenteeism, and fewer strikes, along with negative psychological costs such as increased interpersonal friction and conflict. Part 3 contains case studies of large-scale workers cooperatives; Part 4, small, self-managed collectives. The last section treats the relevance of workplace democracy for social change in the larger society. A fascinating array of experiments in organizational democracy are examined including strawberry growers' coops, "New Wave" food coops, worker-owned refuse collection companies, a "Feminist Illegal Abortion Collective," producers' coops in the plywood industry in the Pacific Northwest, the Mondragon system of workers' cooperatives developed by Jose Maria Arizmendi in the Basque region of Spain, and a worker-managed insurance corporation with 340 employees (IGP) in Washington, D.C.

Despite some recent successes, the movement for a democratic workplace faces serious obstacles, including achieving efficiency in small organizations, avoiding what seems to be an inevitable drift towards bureaucratization and oligarchy, making decisions within an environment of organizational democracy, and developing an institutional support system, not to mention formidable legal problems. However, the tone of the readings is optimistic. Several authors identify two promising channels for future workplace democracy: reopening closed plants through worker ownership and management and developing participative management processes within existing bureaucratic organizations. Ultimately, however, the success of workplace democracy depends upon the development of an accompanying political movement to thrust the concept into the mainstream of the American workplace.

The contributors to this book are unabashedly supportive of the principles of workplace democracy without being unduly polemical (with a couple of exceptions). The articles are about equally divided between original contributions and previously published manuscripts in publications running the gamut from *American Sociological Review* to the *Coop Newsletter.* The authors represent a smorgasbord of academic disciplines and occupations, although sociologists are predominant.

Workplace Democracy and Social Change does not represent a major contribution to social science—very little theoretical or data-based work is included. It is, however, an important contribution to the literature on worker participation because of the broad range of applications of workplace democracy that are examined and the preliminary efforts by Rothschild-Whitt and Paul Bernstein (chaps. 1-2) to define the parameters of this area of investigation. Enough practical advice is included to make the book required reading for those participating in experiments in organizational democracy or interested in doing so. The book is well-written and, with the exception of the last section which contains two questionable entries, quite cohesive for an edited work. Finally, *Workplace Democracy and Social Change* makes very interesting and stimulating reading for anyone interested in democratizing the American workplace.

RICHARD C. KEARNEY

University of South Carolina

From Obscurity to Oblivion: Running in the Congressional Primary. By Louis Sandy Maisel. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1982. Pp. 173. $12.50 cloth; $6.95 paper.)

Congressional election research has often bypassed one of the first steps in the recruitment process—party primaries. *From Obscurity to Oblivion* provides an insightful and unique addition to the understanding of this initial phase of congressional elections. Maisel focuses on the 1978 congressional primaries, using three rich and complementary sets of material: personal reminiscences from his own unsuccessful bid for the Democratic nomination in Maine's First District, results of a mail questionnaire to 251 other primary candidates (largely nonincumbents), and comments drawn from in-depth interviews with 39 of the candidates. Using these three sources, Maisel constructs a well-organized account of why and how candidates attempt to run for Congress, considering in successive chapters their decisions to run, campaign organizations, the money raised and the money spent, strategies, and tactics.

Emerging from the book is an intriguing theme that candidates' decisions to run, while partly analytic or rational, are more profoundly emotional choices (pp. 16, 35). The candidates questioned often made decisions in 1976 and 1977 for their bids in 1978. At such early junctures, they lacked adequate information on who else might run, where support might lie, and how to discern the vulnerability of incumbents. Instead, the candidates based their decisions largely on political intuition. Ultimately, the candidates ran because they genuinely wanted to do so, regardless of limited chances for success. This theme of emotionally based candidacies provides a needed contrast to other work in the field that too often presumes the rationality of candidates and the strategic character of their decisions.

As revealed by Maisel's findings, campaigns never fully surmounted these emotional and often ill-planned origins. Many organizations were all but stillborn. They encountered difficulties in finding campaign managers, leading many candidates to play the role themselves. Largely volunteer staffs were severely overtaxed, and efforts at recognition-building were seriously underfinanced. Interestingly, Maisel observes a clear gap between financial expectations and reality. Many candidates anticipated raising far more money than they were actually able to obtain. Maisel sums up a typical primary campaign:

> [Candidates] might plan a basic tactical approach to implement a rather sketchy strategy; they might draw up a tentative budget, based on inaccurate income and cost projections; they might decide what they want to have done in the field by the candidate and the workers, though the number and ability of those workers is totally unknown. Frequently, they cannot think about their opponents because they do not even know who those opponents will be. They cannot set contingency plans because they cannot foresee most situations that might arise. . . .a congressional primary tends to be one long 'ad hoc' experience. (p. 95)

The book is not without problems. Personal anecdotes often supplant more rigorous analysis of the questionnaire results and more extensive use of the interviews. While the chronology of Maisel's campaign is interesting, certain items from the questionnaire receive only cursory attention in the text; others receive no attention at all. Events unique to Maisel's own experience are detailed at the expense of more generally applicable hypotheses from the questionnaire-interview data.

Despite these problems of balance, the book is a contribution to the study of the congressional nomination process. Maisel rightly concludes the work by noting the difficulties surrounding congressional primaries as mechanisms for choice. With low voter turnout and inadequate candidacies, primaries may be offering caricatures of choice, rather than meaningful choice. The book provides a solid assessment of how caricature disguised as choice may emerge and subsequently shape competition in general elections for Congress.

Lyn Ragsdale

University of Arizona

Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security Disability Claims. By Jerry L. Mashaw. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983. Pp. x + 238. $25.00.)

The Social Security Administration (SSA) operates the largest system of administrative adjudication in democratic societies: more than 1.3 million disability claims are filed annually. SSA's model of bureaucratic rationality which seeks accuracy, efficiency, and fairness, of necessity must practice compromise, consistency, and fiscal restraint. Bureaucratic rationality consists of searching for the good within the constraints of the possible. Since the present disability claims process is a zero-sum game, Mashaw uses it to explore how much "good" decisions are worth in government. Since the claims examiners making disability determinations are employed by 50 state agencies ranging in function and outlook from general welfare assistance to vocational rehabilitation programs, there is the additional operational dimension of federalism.

Should we declare bureaucratic rationality "permanently disabled"? "An administrator faced with these problems—value indeterminancy, factual ambiguity, and organizational stress—might respond in many ways (suicide perhaps)," says Mashaw (p. 74). Actually, bureaucratic routine, decisional practice, unpublished written instructions, and interpretations have generated an internal administrative rule of law. Given recent media attention to disability recipients cut from the rolls whose appeal was successfully adjudicated only after their deaths, some may disagree with Mashaw: "My conclusion is that bureaucratic rationality—at least as practiced by SSA in the disability program—is a promising form of bureaucratic justice" (p. 222).

Despite its high price to length ratio, this book is strongly recommended for use in graduate seminars in public policy or law. From the opening statement "the history of American administrative law is a history of failed ideas" (p. 1), Mashaw raises all the right questions. He displays a wide-ranging knowledge of the regulatory literature with adroit references that augment the comparative value of this book for class discussion.

When governments make bad decisions, we are prone to say, depending upon our philosophic outlook, "That's because bureaucrats don't act like courts (or are not following their advice), or because the legislature left too much policy choice to the agency," or else, "Aha! That just goes to show that anything *worth* doing by way of regulation or social welfare can be done via the common law in a minimal state" (p. 225). If we are to develop a positive model of bureaucratic competence, we must answer the insightful questions raised in this cogent book. Rather than the particular program, Mashaw explores the disabilities of how government treats us.

David L. Martin

Auburn University

Market Reforms in Health Care: Current Issues, New Directions, and Strategic Decisions. Edited by Jack A. Meyer. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1983. Pp. xv + 331. $19.95, cloth; $10.95 paper.)

Adequate health care for all Americans was and is a noble social goal. We began by funding health care for older Americans (Medicare) and for the impoverished (Medicaid). Government also systemically encouraged employers to provide health insurance for the rest of us.

With approximately 90% of all Americans covered under some form of health insurance, this text offers an unspoken tribute to the relative success of American health policies. The workings of Medicaid for the elderly and the provision of extensive medical insurance by most large employers permitted many Americans to consume health care and hospital services with little regard to the cost of those services. These fortunate Americans had access to health care based on need alone—and the increased demand for these services has pushed up the price of health care for the rest of us and has drained public resources from other programs to support publicly funded health care programs.

Market Reforms in Health Care is somewhat more narrow in focus than the title suggests. Citing a need for greater efficiency and deregulation of the health care industry, the chief substantive proposals discussed in the book are (1) increased cost sharing by the individual for a portion of his health care needs, (2) federal aid to low income people that increases with need, (3) fixed dollar subsidies for specific health care services, and (4) increased competition among providers and private insurers (p. 4). The proposals are examined in detail, often in the context of specific health care reform bills introduced in the 97th Congress. Attention is given to the likely impact of making employer contributions to health insurance costs fully taxable to the individual worker as ordinary income. Also, giving the insured more choices as to level of health insurance and wider utilization of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) is discussed.

Most contributors seemed to be in sympathy with the pro-competition ideological bias of the American Enterprise Institute, although Barton Weisbrod correctly warns that a pro-competition strategy may not work because health care consumers are ill-informed, and much of the demand for services is generated by doctors. It comes as a surprise that little attention is given to the potential for cost containment by deregulating the provision of health care services, and none of the authors seems aware the changes in existing entitlement programs may increase the utilization rate among those eligible. Less surprising is the absence of any survey research data in the book or any articles that examine public health care policy in other nations. Also lacking is any discussion of the cost and public policy implications of the increasing number of citizens in advanced old age who become passive consumers of public health care resources.

With one or two exceptions, contributors to *Market Reforms in Health Care* accept the status quo of partial federal responsibility for health care. In this volume, they carefully examine the limited number and variety the pro-competition proposals that might limit the rate of cost increases in existing programs.

GAYLE R. AVANT

Baylor University

The Nine American Lifestyles. By Arnold Mitchell. (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1983. Pp. xii + 302. $19.95.)

Academics, like other people, have stereotyped notions about how different sorts of lifestyles imply different political attitudes. Yet with only isolated exceptions, we never have bothered to try finding out whether our stereotypes have any basis in fact, and if they do, what it means.

Arnold Mitchell, Director of the Values and Lifestyles Program at SRI International, is not a political scientist, and the ostensible purpose of this volume is to help people in marketing and advertising make money by correctly predicting changes in consumption habits. Never mind; political scientists will find this book both informative and provocative. What Mitchell has done is to isolate several lifestyles that are distinctive both in terms of their consumption habits and in terms of their political outlooks. Admittedly, his two poor "need-driven" groups, survivors and sustainers, do not have the resources (either psychic or economic) to be very important in the political arena. The same cannot be said of the three politically conservative "outer-directed" groups: belongers (the traditional lower middle class), achievers (affluent persons likely to be business managers), and emulators (young people who seem to want to be achievers).

Set against these latter three groups are the liberal "inner-directed" persons, whom other commentators have labelled "the New Class," and who include "experientials" (living more or less the Marin County hot-tub lifestyle), the "societally conscious" (representing the mainstream of liberal academics, bureaucrats, and political activists), and "I-Am-Mes" (young people who will become experientials or the societally conscious). Mitchell claims the existence of a ninth group, "integrateds," but doesn't have any data to support their existence.

The fastidious will find plenty to quarrel with, both methodologically and theoretically, in this book. Mitchell and his colleagues identified the eight groups through a sort of eyeball cluster analysis of a large body of survey data, which analysis was supposedly theoretically guided. Perhaps the researchers simply imposed their own preconceptions on the completed interview schedules.

Theoretically, the distinction between conformist "outer directedness" and supposedly autonomous "inner-directedness" is suspect. It has become merely jejune to point out that self-consciously nonconformist groups are in fact intensely conformist. Such jejuneness somehow does not deter psychologists from labelling as "inner-directed" or "self-actualizing" people who act in highly predictable (indeed stereotypical) ways, which usually are the ways their friends (or some identifiable reference group) act. Somehow, the groups so labelled tend to share the values and lifestyle of psychologists. Never mind; Mitchell lays out his data with such admirable clarity, and writes so well (this is, after all, a trade book), that one can easily supply an interpretation different from his.

The clear correlation between consumption habits and political attitudes strongly suggests that lifestyle is, in fact, an indicator of class identification. The fact that such expressions may be unconscious or half-conscious, or rationalized in plausible terms, does not make them less important.

Not surprisingly, these groups have rather distinctive places in the economic structure. Experientials and (especially) the societally conscious are likely to be professionals, and the achievers (although including many professionals) are disproportionately business managers or self-employed. It would seem that lifestyle is not some ephemeral matter of mere fashion, but rather part of a structure of attitudes linking peoples' position in the economy to their political views.

It seems to me that political scientists should have started to explore these issues long before Arnold Mitchell.

JOHN MCADAMS

Marquette University

The Political Economy of Deregulation: Interest Groups in the Deregulatory Process. Edited by Roger G. Noll and Bruce M. Owen. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1983. Pp. ii + 164. $15.95, cloth; $7.95, paper.)

Federal deregulation of the American economy has been one of the most significant political undertakings of the last decade, and its consequences will be monitored closely in the years ahead. Noll and Owen, with five colleagues contributing case studies, have produced this book too early to soundly assess deregulation's effects, and thus must focus on the process of deciding to deregulate. Readers will get a review of arguments for and against deregulation and a compilation of examples frankly supporting the pro-deregulation stance.

The book's key theme is that economic regulation, when substituted for competition, strongly benefits some special interests, seriously harms others, and ultimately does the public interest no good. By applying an interest group model of analysis, the authors seek to demonstrate how interests benefited by regulation do prosper, how they become more dependent on regulation and more influential in impeding its reform, and how their prosperity under regulation is at the cost of the public's general prosperity. Noll and Owen begin by outlining the framework of deregulation and the interest group model to be applied to this framework, and they introduce the "predictable" arguments that interest groups make in debating deregulation. Their associates follow with case studies in financial regulation, pollution control, oil price policy, surface transportation, and airline regulation. Noll and Owen return in their conclusion to state: "Viewed through the lens of economic analysis, much of regulation appears to be a peculiarly cruel hoax" carried out to protect "well-organized interests against [the] public interest" (p. 155).

As this quotation implies, although interest group analysis is the ostensible methodology being brought to bear, economics provides the real criteria for judgment. In fact, interest group analysis of the deregulation process proves less useful to Noll and Owen than they apparently wished. Early in the book they remark that "the interest group model does not fully explain events—why, for example, airline or trucking deregulation eventually took place despite interest group pressures. We do not understand this political process as well as we understand the essentially economic model of interest group formation" (p. 7). Political scientists reading the case studies will probably agree with this confession. Important interest groups are identified, but a free-market-inspired cost critique of regulatory policy generally takes the place of substantial political analysis of interest group behavior. The notable exception is Marcus Alexis's chapter on surface transportation regulation, a neat and concise history of ICC politics leading to the deregulating Motor Carrier and Staggers Rail Acts of 1980.

The economic criteria being applied deserve some comment. Although the authors cannot demonstrate deregulation's success conclusively, they adhere to their claim that competition must be presumed superior to regulation in all areas of the economy. This has some startling results in argument. For example, Alfred E. Kahn, writing on airline deregulation, asserts that pointing to regulatory policy's success in creating a "strong integrated national system" of airline service is irrelevant to judging the wisdom of deregulation. "The pertinent question was not whether the performance of the airline industry as of the middle 1970's was 'satisfactory,' in some absolute sense. It was, rather, how that performance . . . compared with the results that might have been or would be achieved if the industry were instead open to competition" (p. 139). For those wanting preliminary indication of what results were anticipated, Kahn's reply would have been—and presumably still is—that "the essence of the case for competition is the impossibility of predicting most of its consequences" (p. 140). For air travelers, that could also be the essence of the case against it.

Cost analysis of the kind that informs this book rarely supports the case for regulation, but that is insufficient proof of competition's superiority. Noll and Owen start by equating competition to the public's economic interest, yet can only say at the end that "the benefits to the public of competition are theoretical and diffuse, but no less real than the benefits of regulation to particular interests" (p. 161). In relation to an economy as complex and interdependent as the United States', that is a weak guarantee for both economic interests and disinterested scholars.

DAVID MENNINGER

University of California, Los Angeles

Who Gets What from Government. By Benjamin I. Page. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. Pp. xiii + 264. $15.95.)

Page has two purposes: "(1) to discuss how U.S. government policies affect people's income and the overall income distribution, and (2) to explore what political factors make government policies take the shape they do" (p. xi). He accomplishes these objectives admirably, but goes far beyond mere discussion and exploration by concluding that our present political processes and policies need overhaul or revision.

In his opening chapter, Page informs his readers that substantial equality—including economic equality—is both desirable and required to a higher degree than prevails in the contemporary United States. He presents data supporting his conclusion that the private economy generates very unequal incomes and that government actions do not produce a substantial degree of equality (p. 19).

Determining accurately who actually bears the burden of taxes is difficult, but Page is convinced that federal taxes "have some moderately redistributive effects" (p. 35), while state and local taxes are "regressive or proportional over the range of most Americans' incomes" (p. 40). Following his analysis of taxes including personal and corporate income, payroll, property, and sales, he concludes that "the net effect of all U.S. taxes, federal, state, and local, is not very progressive, if progressive at all" (p. 21).

The next three chapters consider social welfare programs, public goods (for example, defense, science and technology, administration of justice), and law and regulation. Page examines the political processes that determine policies in these areas and argues persuasively that organized interest groups, political parties, and public opinion play a major role largely for the benefit of the wealthy. Thus, he finds that the United States is pushed toward "social welfare policies that are not very egalitarian" (p. 100); that "public goods spending is not helpful" in lessening income inequality" (p. 155); and that capitalism "does almost certainly impose serious limits upon the degree of equality that can be attained. The U.S. Constitution and the legal system, in that sense, significantly contribute to inequality" (p. 203).

These three central chapters are difficult to read since the subject matter is indeed complex. Page works valiantly to review and evaluate the relevant work of others including W. Irwin Gillespie, Richard A. Musgrave, and Morgan Reynolds and Eugene Smolensky; to make such terms as tax incidence, equilibrium effects of regulation, and relative poverty understandable; and to show the relevance, if any, of such measures as the Gini coefficient, Lindahl equilibrium, and the Laffer curve.

Page also offers some cross-national comparison and finds that other capitalist economies (for example, Japan, Canada, Australia) as well as socialist economies (for example, Sweden, Norway) manage to maintain vigorous economies over time with a higher degree of income equality than prevails in the United States. These nations, he believes, also take better care of their poor, aged, and jobless than we do.

Page is not sanguine that the problem of income inequality will be alleviated adequately in the United States unless and until we "face up to the prospect of working toward an alternative economic and social system" (p. 219). His strong belief that the United States' economy would actually be strengthened by more equitable distribution of the country's wealth is easier to accept than his proposals for achieving that goal. Conservatives will laud his refutation of the welfare state as an adequate solution, while liberals will appreciate his faulting of supply-side economics.

Many political scientists will not adequately appreciate Page's work because of its heavy economic emphasis. Similarly, many economists will fault the book as too political. Such criticism, however, is high praise, since the book makes a major contribution to our understanding of the close and continuing interrelatedness of political and economic systems. The book deserves a wide audience, and its message should spur dialogue around the question raised in its provocative title.

GEORGE S. BLAIR

Claremont Graduate School

Consequences of Party Reform. By Nelson W. Polsby. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. Pp. xvi + 267. $24.95, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

Curtis Gans is quoted early in this book as claiming that it has become "fashionable" for certain political scientists "to blame the reforms undertaken by the Democratic Party after its 1968 convention for all manner of political ills" (p. v). So it has. This is because appraising the impacts of changes in presidential nomination procedures is a large analytical task. Success at it requires subtle discernment of interrelationships between electoral and governmental institutions and behavior. Nelson Polsby provides such discernment in this volume.

Polsby defines two sorts of party reforms of the 1968 to 1975 period: (1) alterations in Democratic delegate selection procedures that encouraged a proliferation of primaries, thus increasing the interpretative role of the mass media in the nomination process; and (2) regulation of campaign finance practices that made immediate success upon entering the primary process a survival imperative for presidential candidates. Polsby explains first the genesis of the reforms, and then their impacts upon parties, presidential governance, and the broader processes of political intermediation and mobilization. A final section assesses the reforms in reference to normative criteria of participation, peer review, and deliberation, and also discusses possible reforms of the reforms.

Polsby does not address these topics in a polemical manner. His primary argument is that the reforms were "partially responsible, and facilitative in character, that they were necessary but not sufficient pre-conditions of a particular set of institutional problems toward which the American political system evolved in the wake of the turmoil of the late 1960's" (pp. 4-5). His analysis of specific reform effects remains consistent with this carefully analytical premise; never are overly simple causal claims asserted. For example, although Polsby indicates that Jimmy Carter's disinclination toward a coalitional style of governing as president was consistent with his experience mobilizing a narrowly based faction as a candidate for the nomination in 1976, he quite readily admits that a host of other reasons exist for Carter's presidential behavior.

Perhaps the most pointed references in the book are to certain harsh statements, replete with righteousness and heated idealism, from members of the literati in 1968 about coalitional politicians such as Hubert Humphrey. It is out of the anger of liberal upper-middle-class professionals and intellectuals that the post-1968 party reforms were born. Upon reading Polsby's account of these troubled times and the rules changes they produced, one is struck by how indicative the reforms are of the potential failings of traditional political liberalism. They attempt a uniformly national solution to certain problems best solved at state and local levels, such as how parties should allocate delegates according to candidate support in caucuses and primaries, and they are urged on the basis of the honorable intentions of the reformers rather than upon a careful understanding of the actual effects of the rules changes themselves.

A few questions of authorial emphasis do arise. The genesis and operation of new campaign finance rules are given less attention than are the delegate selection rules changes. More detail on finance reforms would appropriately balance Polsby's analysis, since each of the two new sets of rules are essential components of the new nomination environment. One wonders if Jimmy Carter will prove to be all that representative of postreform presidents. The reforms may make it easier for a candidate unappreciative of coalitional politics to win the nomination and White House, but this alone seems unlikely to portend major alterations in the conduct of the presidency.

The best parts of this book are very good indeed. Polsby's sections on the possible pattern of a "politics without parties" and the appropriateness of the criteria of deliberation, peer review, and participation in evaluating the nomination process provide important subjects for classroom discussions and lectures. This is an excellent title for adoption in both graduate and undergraduate parties courses. It should be read carefully by all concerned with the specific operations and broader systemic effects of the current presidential nomination system. Polsby's prose style is consistently lucid and lively; the notes to the text are quite thorough.

STEVEN E. SCHIER

Carleton College

Regional Conflict and National Policy. Edited by Kent A. Price. (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1982. Pp. xviii + 142. $18.00 cloth; $6.95 paper.)

Much of the discussion concerning the New Federalism has centered around governmental fiscal policy and expenditure techniques, or the issue of realignment of patterns of governmental interaction. This book takes a somewhat different approach. Here, the primary focus is on issues relating to energy policy and natural resources. In the introductory chapter, Kent Price describes his view of regionalism in the United States and how opposing forces within different sections are counterbalanced. The recent trend emphasizing movement of population and resources from the Frostbelt to the Sunbelt is explored and analyzed in some depth. The impact of politics, economic decisions, and cultural factors relating to the preservation of natural resources and production of energy are also discussed.

Each of the following chapters deals with one or more aspects of energy or resource policy taken within a regional framework and perspective. The first chapter, by Nathan Rosenberg, describes the historical dimensions of regionalism and suggests that, despite seemingly broad changes, the new trends that are emerging are actually a continuation of those previously developed and can be reconciled with Turner's frontier thesis suggested several decades ago. In the next chapter, Hans Landsberg examines the energy crisis of 1973 and

1974. There is also a discussion of the Clear Air Act of 1977 and of conflicts between producers of Eastern and Western coal. Allen Kneese presents three case studies dealing with energy/resource policy: a discussion of the water quality in the Colorado River, the coal tax imposed by Montana, and a legal challenge filed by the State of New Mexico against the U.S. Department of Energy regarding a nuclear waste disposal site in the state. Richard Stewart presents a discussion of the legal framework surrounding interstate resource policies. Included in this essay are a description of the commerce power (as outlined in the Constitution), regulation and taxation of natural resources, congressional powers, the concept of "judicial deference," and a series of examples of situations related to what Stewart terms "transboundary nonmarket impacts." Next, there is mention of the concept of externalities by Clifford Russell, who suggests that three classes can be identified: pecuniary, real, and political externalities. The implications for regional development and federalism of each of these types are explored, and the essay concludes with mention of new approaches being developed. In the Epilogue Gilbert White summarizes some of the issues raised previously and tries to suggest areas for further exploration. For example, White again asks, What is regionalism and regional conflict? How has this type of conflict been handled? and What are the prospects for future national policy in the energy and resource fields?

Taken as a whole, this collection of essays is quite impressive and adds a useful dimension to the dialogue surrounding federalism and regional conflict. Some of the chapters are quite short and therefore superficial in spots, and one might wish that some of the theoretical contents presented could be carried forward and applied in greater detail. Nevertheless, *Regional Conflict and National Policy* can be recommended to scholars of federalism, as well as those concerned with the impact of regionalism on public policy in the fields of energy and resource.

RICHARD D. FELD

University of South Florida and Eckerd College

The Political Integration of Women: Roles, Socialization and Politics. By Virginia Sapiro. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983. Pp. vii + 205. $16.95.)

Virginia Sapiro poses her central question thus:

> Does the character of the connections between women's private and public life disconnect women from politics? If women do not simply 'have' private lives but, rather, are privatized, it must. Privatization breeds political marginality. (pp. 32-33)

She tests this assumption about disconnecting connections by operationalizing privatization with the by now familiar Michigan indicator "women and men should have equal roles" versus "women's place is in the home." The battery of Michigan feminism indicators from which this is drawn arouse some justified criticism, but this one evinces face validity for Sapiro's purposes. She places her measure of privatization in harness with the role statuses of education, marriage, motherhood, and homemaking and uses multiple regression techniques to assess their import in shaping women's political roles, or the lack thereof.

The women for whom these interactions are to be specified are the youth generation of the massive parent-child Survey Research Center Socialization Panel Study; Sapiro uses responses from the 1965 and 1973 waves. This group was chosen because they were one of the first generations of women to come of age contiguously with the most recent reappearance of the women's movement. They are, as she points out, taking up their adult roles and responsibilities "during one of the most important eras in the history of women" (p. 63). As justifiable as this choice is, it is lamentable that the maternal generation was excluded from analysis. We will remain ignorant of the degree to which they, too, could respond to changes in the culture's view of women's status. Sapiro argues, and rightly I believe, that studies showing *increased* gender role differentiation in young adulthood over that found earlier in life reveal the power of a largely conscious gender role *structuring* (in contrast to assumptions that the child is simply mother to the woman via role *adoption*). But it is for this reason that I would like to see whether restructuring of roles might occur after young adulthood, as seen in the maternal generation.

Sapiro's findings, a bit slim at times, nonetheless paint a picture of privatization associated with views of citizenship dependent on trust and passive support rather than active participation and psychological involvement. Privatization depresses the resources—efficacy, sophistication, knowledge, attempts to communicate and influence—upon which we draw in our political lives. She finds that marriage, motherhood, and, especially, homemaking can variously interact with privatization to further marginalize women, even these children of the women's movement era.

Accompanying, and at times overshadowing, Sapiro's empirical analysis are excellent treatments of the history of women's emergence as a new political group and interpretations of her findings, which would stand alone as contributions to feminist and socialization theory-building. Chapters 2 and 7 especially provide brief but imaginative and provocative immersions in the dilemmas of women and politics that will be valuable pedagogical tools. The chapter endnotes and the bibliographic essay are fine interdisciplinary resources. There are occasional editorial errors, as with citing 1898 rather than 1915 as the original publication date of Charlotte Gilman's *Herland* (Pantheon, 1979). These can be easily corrected when the book comes out in paperback, as it should if it is to have the classroom exposure it deserves.

Sapiro's book is "not, strictly speaking, an analysis of the effects of feminism on women's political roles" (p. 79). Nor is it; for some it may be an illumination of the *need* for feminism instead. In any case it stands alongside Rita M. Kelly and Mary A. Boutilier's *The Making of Political Women* (Nelson-Hall, 1978) as a vitally needed study of the crossroads of political socialization and gender roles. It is manifestly to be hoped that Sapiro or someone of her caliber will continue the research on the 1980 wave and maternal generation of the Socialization Panel Study.

SUE TOLLESON RINEHART

University of South Carolina

Turned-On TV/Turned-Off Voters: Policy Options for Election Projections. By Percy H. Tannenbaum and Leslie J. Kostrich. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1983. Pp. 240. $25.00.)

Once every four years, network projections of the outcome of the presidential election before the polls close have the potential for influencing voters who have yet to cast their ballots. The 1980 election was a case in point, since Reagan won in an unexpected landslide, leading the networks to call the election early. But the extent, and even the existence, of the impact of the projections, whether on partisan choice, or turnout, or on voting for local races, is difficult for social science to specify. Survey methods are too crude to measure the relatively subtle effects on what is at best a small segment of the electorate.

Despite the lack of firm evidence of the magnitude of the impact of early network projections, concern with their potentially disruptive influence led Percy Tannenbaum to consider possible policy alternatives to deal with the problem. The result is this volume, the product of collaboration among Tannenbaum, Leslie Kostrich, and members of a Berkeley communications policy seminar. After considering the evidence on the extent of the problem and presenting the criteria by which he expects to evaluate possible solutions, Tannenbaum analyzes proposals to provide for uniform poll closings, to control the use of exit polls, and to limit the dissemination of network projections. A separate chapter considers what individual states can do, an important consideration since many alternatives require states relatively unaffected to bear many of the disadvantages incurred by the solutions. Tannenbaum ultimately suggests that Western states close their polls an hour earlier, that they delay reverting from Daylight Savings to Standard Time until after the election in leap years, and that networks voluntarily delay their election coverage by one hour in the West.

The value of this book, it seems to me, lies in the careful, craftsmanlike manner in which Tannenbaum proceeds. He explicitly acknowledges the lack of firm evidence, but he recognizes that policies must be considered even without clear information. He is aware of the various interests involved and the points at which they have their greatest impact, and he is realistic in treating the chances various proposals have of adoption. The product is a balanced treatment of the alternatives by one who obviously wants something done but who has no particular axe to grind.

The drawback of the book is that the subject is relatively minor. Tannenbaum concludes that many of the proposed alternatives stand little chance because the perceived need is not great enough. As long as policymakers do not see early network projections as "an unacceptable blot on the [electoral] system" (p. 104), evaluating policy proposals seems a sterile exercise, since few policy entrepreneurs would be willing to risk their political capital to work for their adoption. What redeems this book is the quality of its work; it can serve as an example for others involved in policy analysis and a standard against which we can compare those efforts.

JAN P. VERMEER

Nebraska Wesleyan University

The Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Planning, Implementation, and Analysis. By David Leo Weimer. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. Pp. xvi + 229. $29.95.)

Students and practitioners of energy policy, public policy, and national security, joined by a sizable community of lay followers, are justifiably concerned about, and puzzled by, the infamous history of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve

(SPR)—the centerpiece of U.S. energy and security policy. Why, for example, were there still only about 400 million barrels of crude oil in the SPR by the end of 1983? Why has it been so incredibly difficult to implement a policy measure with very wide acceptance and no major opponents? A careful, comprehensive, and well-documented answer to these questions is now available. *The Strategic Petroleum Reserve* is an excellent contribution to economic and energy policy history and a useful example of solid public policy analysis.

The work is tightly organized into two major sections. The first relatively short four chapters lay out the background and history of the SPR. Weimer is able to blend the elements from bureaucratic politics, energy policy, and economic analysis necessary to explain what happened to the SPR on the way to implementation. He also sets the history in a rather thin, but still serviceable analytical framework consisting of a four-stage evolutionary process of policy implementation.

The principal analytical issues of SPR implementation, especially establishing the optimal final size, are explained and put into historical context in the second set of four chapters. Weimer perceptively delineates the central questions, their implications, and their policy history. These chapters combine an important sense of objectivity (except perhaps occasionally letting the Department of Energy off a bit easy) on a controversial topic and superbly clear explanation of the technical decisions, including the pro and con arguments at each major programmatic step.

The work is also timely for at least two reasons. First, both analysts and officials agree that the SPR is finally large enough to be usable in an energy emergency. Yet the nation now finds itself without an effective and credible policy for getting the SPR's crude oil out into the market. Furthermore, there has never been a physical test of the system's ability to actually distribute crude into our national network of pipelines and refineries. This book should lend weight to the ongoing attempts in Congress and the research community (see, for example, reports from the continuing workshops on Energy Emergency Preparedness, Keystone, Colorado) to have the federal government fully test the physical system and make detailed preparations for using the SPR.

Equally important and timely is the book's repeated warning that without full preparations now for the final two stages of site work, which will bring the SPR's salt dome storage capacity to the 750 million barrel, and eventually 1 billion barrel, levels, we will exceed by years even our currently planned completion schedule. As long as the administration is totally occupied with reducing the federal budget deficit, there will be continuing feuding with Congress (which has been a consistent defender of the SPR) over reductions in the fill rate and new delays in the final two storage phases.

The subtitle of the book could well have been "Failure in Policy Implementation," since this is the emphasis and primary public policy contribution of the work. Although heavier by far on the substance of the SPR and the associated bureaucratic politics than on original analysis of public policy implications, Weimer's case on the SPR does demonstrate well the strengths and limitations of analysis in influencing policy formulation and implementation. It also serves as a vivid reminder of how a program of obvious importance to national security (but with no clear political constituency) can be subjected to numerous, often extraneous, delays, even when there is strong congressional support.

DAVID A. DEESE

Boston College

Crime and Public Policy. Edited by James Q. Wilson. (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 334. $22.95, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

Aside from the introduction and conclusion written by Wilson, this volume contains three substantive sections: "Crime Rates and Criminals," "The Social Milieu of Crime," and "The Criminal Justice System." Given the breadth of this work, one would expect a corresponding lack of sophistication and insight in its essays. This is not the case, and the work as a whole is more integrated around a central set of concerns than is common in most edited works.

To a great extent, credit for this must go to Wilson, who not only put this work together but who also prepared the grounds for making its writing possible. "It would have been difficult, if not impossible, to produce this book fifteen years ago," he notes at the outset of this collection. "Not only were scholars and practitioners in an adversarial relationship, but there were precious few scholars who had an interest in systematically examining the consequences of current policies or in trying to design and test better approaches" (p. 5). Wilson fails to note the formative role that he himself has played over the past 15 years in establishing the context within which the essays contained in the volume could be written. In a sense, this new work represents an emerging consensus about how the problem of crime and policies developed to address crime are to be understood, a consensus that has emerged since the 1960s and to which Wilson has lent his voice.

In every essay in this book, the author either presents material supporting the idea that there is little that can be done to change "human nature" or suggests policy innovations for lowering crime rates that involve the expansion of policing and the more systematic use of incarceration to concentrate the impact of punishment policies on those seen as the prime contributors to crime. Little credence is given to the alternative views that once formed part of debate in criminal policy circles; that is, to the suggestions that the problems of crime are rooted in poverty, exploitation, or are attributable to other systematic social causes.

Hence, Jan M. Chaiken and Marcia R. Chaiken's "Crime Rates and the Active Criminal" discusses the major methodological barriers to establishing causal links between crime rates and specific behaviors, and then establishes a particular statistical measure—the violent predator (pp. 24-27)—whose activity is identifiable with large amounts of crime. Richard J. Herrnstein, in "Some Criminological Traits of Offenders," is at once cautionary about specifying a criminal type and profoundly radical in considering the role that physiognomical (pp. 33-34) and physiological factors (pp. 44-46) play as indicators of the potential criminality of individuals.

The studies that focus on the social milieu of crime analyze the family, schools, and employment in a uniformly clear and theoretically coherent manner. There is little that public policies can do to effect change in the kinds of family structure, school problems, or employment problems that have a bearing on crime. The presentation of the various studies, of course, varies somewhat in quality from author to author. Perhaps the best is that presented by Charles A. Murray, "The Physical Environment and Community Control of Crime," which is both clear and interesting, analyzing as it does the severe limits of the "defensive space" theory as an instrument for crime prevention.

The provocative third section begins with an essay by Mark H. Moore evaluating to what extent the control of what he labels "criminogenic commodities" (guns, alcohol and drugs) is related to crime, and concludes that such control usually fails to reduce crime and sometimes increases it (pp. 125-144). Another essay, by Laurence W. Sherman, concerning the role of the police in deterring crime argues for a more aggressive approach to crime control by the police through increased surveillance of crime areas and more use of studies devoted to identifying those most likely to commit crimes.

This volume ceases to be cautionary and becomes most enthusiastic concerning the positive impact that policies can have when it turns to the question of prosecution and sentencing procedures. Brian Forst recommends that prosecutors use computers to summarize information about the crime histories of suspects and convicts in determining which cases to pursue (pp. 170-171) and to assist judges in determining, in a systematic manner, how to sentence convicted criminals. Steven R. Schlesinger suggests bail reform, reduction of the use of habeas corpus appeals, as well as an abolition of the exclusionary rule (all actions which could be taken exclusively by the courts) in order to prevent the escape of the criminal from the bonds of justice through administrative technicalities and the too-liberal use of bail.

These policy suggestions would require a substantial reinterpretation of the Constitutional protections now afforded criminal suspects and convicts. Yet the authors of this work do not seem to be very concerned about the protection of such rights, preferring instead to emphasize the other sets of rights with which they feel these ones conflict—the rights of citizens to be protected from crime. An explicit analysis of this conflict is missing; one wonders if the conflict is as great as is largely assumed throughout this work.

Crime and Public Policy is likely to become a standard work in the rapidly changing field of criminal justice as the expression of the consensus that exists in the early 1980s concerning policies devoted to the control of crime. Wilson and his colleagues provide few comments on the meaning of this change, on the relationship between punishment and how U.S. society understands itself, but the volume is impressive enough as it stands.

THOMAS L. DUMM

University of Houston, Downtown

Schools in Conflict: The Politics of Education. By Frederick M. Wirt and Michael W. Kirst. (Berkeley, Calif.: McCutchan Publishing, 1982. Pp. vii + 322. $22.50.)

This volume is a revision of Wirt and Kirst's *The Political Web of American Schools* (Little, Brown, 1972), one of the first books to bridge the gap between educational administrators and political scientists by providing an overview of the political characteristics of school policymaking. Like its predecessor, it concentrates on the policy process, using David Easton's systems theory as a framework for analytically separating and categorizing experiential items.

It would be a mistake, however, to view the new book as simply an updated version of the old. A major difference in tone can be gauged by the difference in titles. *Schools in Conflict* emphasizes the political turbulence of the late sixties and seventies. The earlier book depicted a system in which a few headquarters professionals determine most policies in "their" school districts. The current book labels the period from 1960 to 1980 as an era of "nobody in charge," with the local superintendent having lost the ability to control outcomes. Multiple constituencies (for example, parents, taxpayers, minorities, and teachers) posit demands relating to shared control, finance, teacher power, and other concerns central to educational functioning. These groups and state and federal actors have strong influence on the shape of the local school district's agenda. Local school politics has become "more complex and less malleable" (p. 23). Wirt and Kirst now argue that in some states the issue has become "how much change and agitation a public institution can take and still continue to function effectively" (p. 22).

The purpose of *Schools in Conflict* is to proffer an analytical framework, and hence meaning, to the vast and sometimes confusing array of actors and conversion forums currently involved in educational politics. While explicating the generation and disposition of educational demands, the authors give an eminently readable overview of research on political socialization; access channels to school policymaking; the significance of referenda; and the local, state, and federal conversion processes. The lion's share of the attention goes to politics at the state level, partly because Wirt and Kirst think the current slashing of federal aid is likely to reinforce state activism. Special attention is also paid to the role of courts, particularly in desegregation and school finance reform.

When Harmon Zeigler reviewed the earlier book in the September, 1976, *American Political Science Review* (*70*, 987), he praised the exhaustive literature survey. The present volume cannot hope to cover the field as completely, if only because the political science community now generates so much more research on school politics. However, I regret the absence of a chapter on school politics in an age of retrenchment, particularly discussion of how property tax cutbacks and teacher layoffs affect educational turbulence. Wirt and Kirst's own emphasis makes it almost mandatory that they attempt to analyze how various interest groups respond to the new zero-sum politics. Are demands generated and converted in novel ways when they relate to "who loses, who gets fired" rather than "who wins, who gains control of the new federal program"? Political scientists need to know because retrenchment politics may well be at the heart of local and state school agendas through most of the eighties.

The chief use for this book is likely to be as a text in school administration and politics of education courses. Despite the lack of coverage afforded retrenchment and several other current educational issues (for example, merit pay), the book is highly recommended as a graduate text because of its broad range of concerns, logical structure, clear prose, and use of systems theory to link disparate research studies and create a whole greater than the sum of the research cited.

HINDY LAUER SCHACHTER

New Jersey Institute of Technology

When Government Speaks: Politics, Law, and Government Expression in America. By Mark G. Yudoff. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. Pp. xvi + 326. $28.50.)

Mark Yudoff's subject is one that for the most part has escaped scholarly examination. His concern is that government's ability to control the flow of ideas and information constitutes a substantial threat to democratic government that escapes review under traditional First Amendment analysis. Literature on the First Amendment typically centers on the government as a censor disrupting the ideal of a marketplace of ideas. Within this context, freedom of expression is valued as a means of protecting minority interests against overreaching majorities. For Yudoff, this static, eighteenth-century understanding of freedom of expression ignores the reality of twentieth-century communications systems. Today the state need not resort to the heavy-handed technique of censorship to ensure that its message is heard to the exclusion of others. As government's power to communicate has expanded, so has the danger that the citizen will be manipulated to accede to government policies and goals.

The task of accommodating the First Amendment to a world in which government dominates the communications network is complicated by the state's legitimate role in educating the citizenry and furthering policy choices. To unduly limit government's ability to communicate would itself be a serious blow to democratic government. Yudoff seeks a middle ground through a model of free expression designed to further "mutually affecting communications" between the people and their leaders. Drawing upon Charles Black's theory of judicial review in which constitutional adjudication is keyed to enforcing the conditions necessary for a functioning political system, Yudoff seeks to free First Amendment jurisprudence from a preoccupation with minority rights and the intent of the Framers to one grounded in the broader norms of majority rule, consent, and the realities of the modern industrial state. The result is a concept of freedom of expression in which minority rights constitute only one part of a larger First Amendment whole designed to ensure that majority rule rests on individual choice and not government manipulation.

A substantial portion of *When Government Speaks* is devoted to the role of the judiciary in enforcing an expanded First Amendment. Not surprisingly, cases in which individuals seek to redress traditional First Amendment rights pose little difficulty. Given the judiciary's propensity for considering First Amendment claims in terms of a balancing of interests, courts need only weigh the virtue of pluralism as an additional factor to be measured against the state's justification for suppressing speech. Substantial difficulties arise, however, when private parties petition courts to place restraints on government speech. Because few plaintiffs would be able to show an individualized interest in government speech apart from that of all citizens, the standing requirements of the federal courts might prove a particularly burdensome threshold issue. As Yudoff makes abundantly clear, the difficulty of fashioning appropriate judicial remedies in cases that survive preliminary challenge should give pause to even the most enthusiastic proponent of judicial activism. Moreover there is the inescapable problem of linedrawing. Is there a principled way for the judiciary to distinguish propaganda from information? What standards might courts employ to measure the worth and impact of government expression? To begin to ask such questions is to suggest the complexity of the problem of government speech in a system of free expression.

Doubtful of the wisdom of placing in the judiciary complete control of government speech, Yudoff recommends joint judicial and legislative responsibility through the *ultra vires* doctrine. Legislative authorization would be necessary to justify government speech, and the task of the judiciary would be to enjoin any speech lacking such justification. Such an approach frees courts from the constraints of constitutional analysis while placing final and ultimate control in the legislature. As Yudoff notes, the primary benefit of this approach is that it seeks to compel and focus legislative attention on the government speech issue.

This is a fine book. It is a carefully constructed, meticulously researched examination of a problem many citizens may vaguely sense but few have investigated in a systematic and scholarly fashion. *When Government Speaks* warrants careful consideration.

MARK SILVERSTEIN

Boston University

Comparative and Other Area Studies

Bolivia: Past, Present, and Future of Its Politics. By Robert J. Alexander. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. Pp. v + 159. $21.95.)

As part of the Hoover Institution-Praeger Latin American series, this volume provides a general introduction to Bolivian politics. Following a brief discussion of the Bolivian population, geography, and economy, Alexander devotes the bulk of the volume to the nation's historical development with chapters on the pre-Columbian and colonial era, the early years of independence, the Chaco War, the 1952 to 1964 revolutionary era, and postrevolutionary Bolivia. A concise overview of the principal political groups, a survey of Bolivia's foreign relations, and Alexander's brief prognosis for the future complete the book.

The book is strongest in its treatment of the revolutionary period; in comparison, the contemporary era is treated only sketchily. As a basic introduction to Bolivian politics, some simplification is inevitable and indeed necessary. Unfortunately, given Alexander's emphasis on straight political history, the book fails to provide an analysis of the economic and social determinants of contemporary Bolivian politics. His assertion that Bolivia's political future depends on the continued economic development of the country is not explored. What is the relationship between economic development and political stability in Bolivia? Indeed, what does Alexander mean by economic development? The relationship between economic growth and equitable distribution of wealth is particularly interesting in the Bolivian case. As Jonathan Kelley and Herbert S. Klein demonstrate in their study, *Revolution and the Rebirth of Inequality* (University of California Press, 1982), the 1952 Revolution served to redistribute wealth in the short term but to create a new elite class in the long term. While Alexander describes some of the economic and social causes of the Bolivian Revolution, he devotes little attention to the Revolution's effects on social and economic inequality.

Similarly, his discussion of contemporary political actors is much too brief, leaving the reader with many questions: What is the relative power of the various groups such as peasants, unions, and students? Where do they get their power, and what do they want? While Alexander is certainly correct in deemphasizing the formal structures of the government (covering them in less than two pages), he does not devote sufficient attention to the informal relationships between the principal political actors in contemporary politics. For example, the relationships between the Church, the military, the miners' unions, and the peasants, fascinating in their dynamic complexity, are barely addressed in this study.

The relationship between Bolivian politics and the international system is not addressed adequately. U.S.-Bolivian relations are only briefly touched on (indeed, almost as much attention is devoted to Soviet-Bolivian relations as to U.S.-Bolivian ties). Given Bolivia's historic dependence on international markets for its mining and agricultural exports, international factors are particularly important in Bolivian political and economic development.

The main shortcoming of this volume is that Alexander does not place the Bolivian experience in a broader context. The reader is given no sense of why Bolivia has been so unstable or even whether such instability is unusual in Latin American nations. Nor does Alexander provide a theoretical context for understanding Bolivian politics. The dominant paradigms in the field of Latin American politics—dependency theory, corporatist approaches, even development theories—are largely ignored by Alexander in his concentration on political history. The lack of an explicit theoretical or geographic context limits the usefulness of the study for Latin American area experts.

Bolivia: Past, Present, and Future of Its Politics is best suited for the undergraduate classroom, where its coverage of basic background details and its relatively clear writing style provide a readable introduction to Bolivian politics.

ELIZABETH G. FERRIS

Lafayette College

Political Terrorism and Energy: The Threat and Response. Edited by Yonah Alexander and Charles K. Ebinger. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. Pp. xiii + 258. $29.95.)

This book is an important addition to the growing literature on political terrorism. Its focus is the historical and potential effect of terrorism on energy supply, a topic rarely discussed in a systematic, comprehensive, and empirical fashion in other publications dealing with terrorism. In this regard the book is a significant contribution. It constitutes a convincing response to those who argue that terrorism is, comparatively, an unimportant phenomenon.

The book attempts to go beyond the simple proposition that a modern, industrialized country is highly vulnerable to a terrorist attack. It does it in two major ways: by focusing, sometimes in great detail, on potential targets for such attacks, and by dealing with strategies, methods, and techniques for responding to attacks (or even to potential attacks).

The volume adds little to what we already know in general about terrorism in the contemporary world. Yet, the general chapters by John M. Collins (theoretical in nature) and Yonah Alexander (mainly empirical) give a good background to the uninitiated reader. Collins emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between different types of terrorism with the most relevant, from the point-of-view of this volume, being probably "radical" terrorism (of the "revolutionary" type), while Alexander focuses on the support given to terrorists by some states and the mode of international links among terrorist groups.

One of the truly fascinating studies in the volume is the one by David Ronfeldt and William Sater that compares the "high-technology terrorists" of the past with those we may have to confront in the future. The authors try to penetrate the psychological mindset of terrorists who, during the latter part of the nineteenth century, used dynamite, often in order to destroy completely (so they believed) the existing order. The analogy to what might be the psychological makeup of nuclear terrorists in the future is quite clear and rather disturbing, and it seems that this type of analysis could give us some useful insights. Yet, the authors could have used more sophisticated psychological methods. Hopefully other scholars will take up the task of analyzing with more rigor "dynamite terrorists" in order to enable us better to understand potential "nuclear terrorists." Of particular significance is the question of the conditions under which a conventional terrorist group could become, out of desperation, a nuclear terrorist group, a possibility that seems quite real.

The rest of the chapters in the volume deal more specifically with the link between energy supply and contemporary terrorism. Less attention is given to the larger political questions, possibly one of the book's most serious shortcomings. The analysis, by and large, is based on the available relevant data, and in most cases the data base is truly useful. Thus, the volume includes a list of incidents of public utility and petroleum company facilities (1974 to 1977), a list of oil loading terminals in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean supplied to the author, Lisa Maechling, by "an international oil company that prefers to remain anonymous" (p. 120), and a list of cases of sabotage to energy-related targets such as powerlines, oil storage facilities, refineries, and oil tankers.

Almost all authors call attention to the extreme vulnerability of the world's energy-related facilities and operations. The book includes a detailed discussion of these components of the oil logistics systems that are most vulnerable to an attack, with the conclusion being that the Middle Eastern oil loading terminals are particularly vulnerable, somewhat of an Achilles' heel of the whole system. The analysis suggests that a relatively small effort on the part of determined terrorists could easily lead to a complete shutdown of the system for a long period of time (a minimum of 18 to 24 months). One of the authors is extremely dubious about the ability of the Rapid Deployment Force to protect the Middle Eastern oil facilities or to repair them quickly in the case of a major act of sabotage.

The book gives serious attention to the danger of nuclear terrorism, mentioning hundreds of nuclear-related incidents. Of particular value is a discussion of important policy questions regarding nuclear terrorism. This analysis makes the book useful not only for students of international affairs but also to students of public policy in general.

ILAN PELEG

Lafayette College

Industrial Innovation in the Soviet Union. Edited by Ronald Amann and Julian Cooper. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982. Pp. xxix + 526. $60.00.)

The Modernization of Soviet Industrial Management. By William J. Conyngham. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Pp. xi + 332. $34.50.)

The "hairbrained schemes" for which Khrushchev was overthrown in 1964 included attempts to reform the economy by political changes from above. Neither the theoretical nor political groundwork had been well prepared. In the Brezhnev period there ensued a vigorous if confined discussion in the Soviet specialist press on the theory and practice of economic reform. Drawing upon historical Soviet experience as well as foreign-developed theories and practices, a number of reforms were devised, tried, and critically evaluated in the 1960s and 1970s. They included changes in pricing, planning, horizontal and vertical linkages, success-indicators, and others. Attempts were made by the political leadership to use the social sciences, broadly defined, both to develop (politically) realistic reform measures and to mobilize specialist support for them. Among the social sciences so used was Soviet "management science" whose practitioners, like their Western counterparts, are far from unanimity on concepts, hypotheses, theories, and models. In *The Modernization of Soviet Industrial Management,* William J. Conyngham has performed the valuable service of making available to Western readers the Soviet discussions and controversies about how to alter Soviet economic management to improve the economy's performance. This work is a veritable *tour de force* of the subject.

Wasting little time on preliminaries, Conyngham sets the reader down in the midst of the ongoing Soviet discussions on management reform. The focus is on one hand upon contributions from theorists of management rather than from line officials, on the other hand by *apparatchiki* and other political officials. Conyngham presents a large number of Soviet contributions in such a way that almost every piece of work is seen to critically analyze its intellectual predecessors and is, in turn, critically analyzed by its successors. If the flow of the discussion is not always smooth, it is because scholarly discussions do not always proceed in neat precise moves. If the discussions sometimes appear baroque and opaque, it is due to the extremely complex and abstract terminology in which organization theorists the world over talk to each other.

The consequences of the economic problems afflicting the Soviet economy include declining secular growth rates, technological backwardness, and low labor productivity. Conyngham sees reform proposals falling generally within three categories: cybernetic-based systems analysis, greater use of market mechanisms, and behavioral (human relations) changes in the relationship of formal to informal organization. While Conyngham discusses the political and institutional constraints upon reform, his more important contribution lies in discussing the problems inherent in conceptualizing and implementing realistic reform proposals. A full-scale cybernetic control system, for example, would be as grandiose as any of Stalin's nature transformation schemes. Before a cybernetically controlled economy can be developed, there must be an enormous quantity of high-quality compatible computer hardware. But the backwardness of many sectors of the Soviet economy hampers things. For example, hardware development is beset by many of the same problems—poor quality control, hardware and software incompatibilities, unreliability of supply—for which the cybernetic solution is sought. In this catch-22 situation, it is difficult to play catch-up.

Is micromanagement generic in all firms, or is it situation-specific? Might the management structure of a defense industry in the Soviet Union, because it is relatively well-supplied (or for other reasons), differ from management in a civilian goods plant? Conyngham's discussion of Soviet management theory does not raise this question, leaving the impression that both he and they accept the generic approach to management. Much Soviet management theory is borrowed from, or at least related to, Western theory. It would have been helpful if Conyngham had included more discussion of Western, specifically American, management experience so that the reader could have had the benefit of a comparative perspective.

Whereas Conyngham looks at the Soviet management modernization problem as a whole, the authors in the Amann and Cooper volume, *Industrial Innovation in the Soviet Union*, present a disaggregated analysis of the difficulty of institutionalizing innovation in the Soviet economy. In 10 chapters, some of which are nearly of monographic length, the contributors, a multidisciplinary team of engineers and economists at the University of Birmingham, England, examine innovation in the machine tool, chemical, and defense industries, and in the processes of group technology, management automation, control instrumentation, and absorption of foreign technology. One theme that reoccurs in many of the chapters is the difficulty of playing technological catch-up. The authors document, for example, how reliance upon importing foreign models or plans weakens innovative capacity of the domestic design bureau so that backwardness is institutionalized. This conclusion complements Conyngham's observations. The wealth of detail that enlivens each chapter's analysis makes this book an outstanding contribution and worthy sequel to Amann and Cooper's earlier endeavor, *The Technological Level of Soviet Industry* (Yale University Press, 1977).

Is a Soviet-type centrally planned economy inherently unworkable and inefficient? Both Conyngham and the authors in the Amann and Cooper volume decline the opportunity to make such a sweeping pronouncement. They acknowledge that the weakness of market relationships creates difficulties. While expressing guarded pessimism about finding solutions, they do not rule it out altogether. Whether the coordinating and innovating functions of the marketplace can be gotten around by other mechanisms is a task which is perhaps the truest test, not of economic or managerial but of political innovation.

ARON G. TANNENBAUM

Lander College

The Politics of Canadian Public Policy. Edited by Michael M. Atkinson and Marsha A. Chandler. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983. Pp. 283. $30.00, cloth; $12.50, paper.)

"The object of this collection of essays is to explore the roles of the state in a variety of policy settings, and to provide an overview of different approaches to the analysis of the policy process. To this end, these studies describe the substance and processes of policy-making as well as the forces that give rise to public policy" (p. 15).

Eleven substantive chapters by 15 authors appraise topics including language policy in Quebec, the politics of provincial resource policy, legal aid in Canada, technological innovation and industrial policy, Atlantic Canada fisheries policy, health policy in Canada, and policy consequences of northern development.

Americans might be interested in the discussion by J. Robert S. Prichard and Michael J. Trebilcock, who assess why a government might resort to public ownership rather than such alternatives as taxation, expenditure policy, and regulation to attain a particular interventionist objective. They note that the puzzle of public enterprises (that is, those wherein a government provides goods or services to the public on a commercial or quasi-commercial basis) is the patchwork pattern of its trans-Canada manifestations.

Prichard and Trebilcock examine why crown corporations—public enterprises that are Canadian corporations in which the government has a de facto controlling interest—are chosen by politicians in particular settings. They distinguish the characteristics of public ownership from private-sector regulation and also distinguish departmental bureaucracies from crown corporations.

To determine appropriate subsidies, a government needs a great deal of information about a firm's costs. The concept of monitoring is the core explanation of why a government might favor public ownership over private-sector regulation. The presence or absence of a relevant competitive market is influential because this affects monitoring costs.

Moreover, the limitations of direct regulation become apparent where regulatory objectives are evolving or uncertain. In railways, airlines, and utilities, a firm's policies must adapt to a constantly changing environment; it will be difficult to issue a stream of orders to dictate behavior of the private firm.

Crown corporations might, on the other hand, also be favored over departmental bureaucracies in that public concerns engaged in market-type activities in competition with private-sector concerns should be sufficiently removed from the political process to compete without excessive political intrusion. "In particular cases, politicians will find it advantageous to be able to claim credit for positive activities of government or government agencies, but at the same time will want to be able to establish some distance from these activities where there are zero or negative political returns. The crown corporation structure facilitates this distancing strategy to a greater extent than a departmental bureaucracy, where the principle of ministerial responsibility severely circumscribes its utilization" (p. 214).

Overall, the editors of this well-balanced collection of essays of moderate depth are correct: "A tidy, consistent view of the state and policy-making would be more satisfying, but these essays suggest that no such view is readily available. There are, instead, multiple avenues of analysis, and the challenge is to combine these for a wide and cumulative understanding of Canadian politics and policy-making" (p. 16).

GEORGE STEVEN SWAN

Widener University

The Structure of the Defense Industry. Edited by Nicole Ball and Milton Leitenberg. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. Pp. xi + 372. $27.50.)

The purpose of this excellent volume is to describe and analyze the role of defense industries in the economic and industrial structures of modern states since World War II. The book is well worth reading for its scholarship and analysis. Both developed and developing nations are considered, irrespective of their political economic organization. To this end, 10 case studies examine the economic aspects of defense industries in nine states, with a general chapter on developing countries.

The case studies include, "The United States," by Judith Reppy; "The Soviet Union," by David Holloway; "France," by Edward A. Kolodziej; "The Federal Republic of Germany," by Michael Brzoska; "Sweden," by Per Holmstrom and Ulf Olsson; "Czechoslovakia," by Stephen Tiedtke; "Italy," by Sergio Rossi; "China," by Sydney Jammes; "Israel," by Gerald Steinberg; and "Developing Countries," by Herman Wulf. Frank Blackaby has written an introductory chapter, "The Military Sector and the Economy." Editors Nicole Ball and Milton Leitenberg have supplied the Preface and two appendixes, Ball's on British defense industry, and Leitenberg's on the military uses of raw materials.

Frank Blackaby introduces the case studies with a useful discussion of the impact of defense expenditure on three economic variables: growth, employment, and inflation. Appropriately, he restates the old point that military expenditures impose opportunity costs on societies in the form of foregone private or public goods and services. However, he concludes that barring major changes in defense spending trends, "it is a mistake to consider that the military sector is responsible for such macro-economic developments as upswings in prices or unemployment" (p. 20). He does not rule out a relationship between military spending and economic performance but, to the contrary, suggests a number of possible relationships, especially industrial and structural consequences in developed and developing countries.

Blackaby provides a good beginning for the following case studies. The editors require each case study author to address a set of core topics designed to establish the economic parameters of national defense industries. These topics, as set forth in the Preface, include the historical context of the defense industry, defense industry employment, measures of defense sector output, comparisons to national totals and other sectors, the capital value of the defense industry, the types and amounts of government inputs, comparisons of civilian and defense research and development, labor inputs and internal organization of major producers, competition in the defense industry, arms exports, regional employment concentration in defense production, the importance of defense contracting for particular industrial firms or sectors, defense industry raw material consumption, the use of highly trained labor, and finally the defense industry's role as a "leading edge" in maintaining national technological development. Each case study has been organized around these topics, thus producing a highly integrated set of chapters and greatly facilitating comparisons among the cases.

In their preface, Ball and Leitenberg contend that while political considerations are the main determinant of arms policy, economic arguments are employed frequently by opponents of arms reduction. Cuts in procurement, it is alleged, will impose hardships upon important firms, workers, trade balances, research, and development. Based upon the case studies in this volume, the editors write that reductions in defense production "would cause relatively minor economic dislocations in nearly all cases and that even this could be mitigated by the ability of economies to adapt to changing patterns of production" (p. 3). In general, the case studies support this conclusion.

All the case studies are of high quality, and the book is a valuable contribution to a growing literature concerning the political economy of defense. Some studies treat certain topics better than others, but generally the differences balance one another out. At certain points, government policies regarding data collection and publication undermine precision, but the authors show great skill in using the available information. The issue of conversion of defense production to civilian production is implied in the Preface, and some but not all authors discuss it. It would have been helpful had this issue been discussed more extensively, but this is a minor point. A case study of the United Kingdom would have been useful, especially given the conversion research produced there. However, Ball and Leitenberg indicate that efforts to obtain a British chapter failed. A statistical appendix on Britain is provided instead.

Finally, *The Structure of the Defense Industry* is a superb book for professional audiences, graduate students, and advanced undergraduates. It is appropriate for students of international relations, comparative politics, the political economy of defense, or peace studies.

M. STEPHEN PENDLETON

State University College at Buffalo

El Salvador in Transition. By Enrique Baloyra. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982. Pp. xviii + 236. $19.95, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

Revolution in El Salvador: Origins and Evolution. By Tommie Sue Montgomery. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. Pp. xiv + 252. $22.50, cloth; $10.95, paper.)

With the recent political instability, revolution, and U.S. government involvement in Central America has come a veritable flood of writings about the region. Although these two excellent studies of the historical and contemporary crisis in El Salvador cover relatively the same terrain, their approaches and conclusions are somewhat distinct.

Baloyra clearly approaches the current and historical crisis in El Salvador as a political problem. Although he briefly discusses the economic and social conditions that have led to the present crisis, he believes that the crisis was primarily brought on by a lack of will and creative political management on the part of the military, which has controlled the state since 1931. He feels that the military, which had removed the coffee oligarchy from direct control of the state during the crisis of the Depression, failed to create an "active state" or embrace a philosophy of "positive government" that would have reordered the balance of social forces. Rather, "the Salvadorean capitalist state remained basically *unreformed*" (p. 11). In 1948, when another opportunity for basic reform presented itself, the military failed again. Baloyra writes (p. 17):

> Instead, during the next three decades in El Salvador, the military controlled but did not dominate the society. It failed to become the hegemonic actor that could replace the oligarchy; it missed a number of opportunities to form a dominant coalition, and it prevented others from doing so.

The theme of the failure of the military to institute needed economic and social reforms, build a new political coalition, and destroy the oligarchy permeates Baloyra's work, but although accurate, the analysis leads him to almost ignore other social forces and organizations that present an alternative. While Baloyra acknowledges the rise of student groups, peasant and industrial unions, and other popular organizations, his approach, which focuses primarily on the government and elections, leads to an undue concentration on the military and the Christian Democratic party (PDC).

Baloyra's partisanship toward the PDC tends to ruin an astute political analysis of the events since the 1979 overthrow of the reactionary Romero regime by the relatively progressive "young military" officers. Although all of the evidence presented leads to the conclusion that the attempt by the PDC and the "young military" to reform the system has failed, Baloyra continues to act as an apologist for both, even as they move to the right. Although he is highly critical of the Reagan administration's attempt to force the PDC into an alliance with the "loyal" Right, Baloyra's preferred solution—an alliance of the PDC, the progressives in the military, and the noninsurrectionary left—had its opportunity and is now impossible. By Baloyra's own account, the progressives in the military have been routed by right-wing officers allied to the oligarchy, and the left-wing of the PDC, along with the balance of the noninsurrectionary left, has gone over to the guerrillas after experiencing violent repression by the military, the security forces, and their associated right-wing death squads.

Montgomery's book, *Revolution in El Sal-*

vador, is the more complete of the two. Whereas Baloyra gives scant attention to El Salvador's pre-1931 coup history, Montgomery begins with a compressed, although complete, chronicle of Salvadoran history since the Spanish conquest. While she concentrates on the same political developments as Baloyra, Montgomery focuses more closely on the socioeconomic roots of the present crisis.

Montgomery recounts the history of one-crop production in El Salvador—cocoa in the sixteenth century, indigo in the eighteenth century, and coffee in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—and the progressive expropriation of the peasantry these developments entailed. Montgomery argues that until the Depression, the coffee oligarchy, which directly controlled the state, controlled the peasantry through the brute repression of its own private armies and, later, the Rural Police and Mounted Police. The breakdown of the oligarchic state and its social control apparatuses during the Depression opened the way for direct military control of the state and military repression of the peasantry, whose attempt to revolt in 1932 was brutally crushed. While the military has been instrumental in modernizing the economy, according to Montgomery it has protected the coffee oligarchy's monopoly over the land and economy of El Salvador.

She feels that the balance of forces was changed dramatically by the efforts of progressives within the Catholic church who took up the call in 1965 from the Second Episcopal Conference of Latin American Bishops "to defend the rights of the oppressed" and make a "preferential option for the poor" (p. 99). These progressive churchmen and women set up Christian Base Communities which, while not outwardly political themselves, created the leadership and the basis for the Popular Organizations which, in alliance with the Left parties and guerrillas, today effectively challenge the military and the Right. Montgomery rightly focuses her attention on these groups because, unlike Baloyra, she has no illusions about the PDC or the military. Although from time to time the military has thrown up a reformist wing, the close alliance between the military and the oligarchy which, according to Montgomery, is solidified through graft and favors, has not waned. By her account, the PDC has moved to the Right with Duarte in charge and with the defection of more than 60% of its membership to the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), the political wing of the rebels.

Although both authors are highly critical of the past and present role of the U.S. in Salvadoran crises and favor negotiations with the opposition, Montgomery argues for negotiations with the participation of the guerrillas as well as the FDR, while Baloyra rejects negotiations with the guerrillas and continues to hope for a "center-left" solution.

DOUGLAS FRIEDMAN

The College of Charleston

The New Bourgeoisie and the Limits of Dependency: Mining, Class and Power in "Revolutionary" Peru. By David G. Becker. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983. Pp. xxviii + 419. $35.00, cloth; $9.95, paper.)

Like a number of other mineral-rich countries, Peru has taken a more assertive role in the expansion of its mining industry over the past decade and a half. David Becker's analysis of this transformation is principally concerned with the character of the "new bourgeoisie" that has taken shape in and around the mining sector, and with what this portends for economic and political development in Peru. The book rests upon impressive fieldwork and bristles with provocative ideas that intrude into a host of ongoing debates including those over class structures, corporatism, and prospects for democracy in Latin America.

"Bonanza development" is Becker's term for the overall strategy that Peru has been following: the use of its mineral riches (copper, tin, zinc, silver) "for financial support of the state and purposes of cooptation, . . . but coupling these to greatly expanded state activity oriented toward industrial promotion" (p. 64). He focuses his attention on the mining sector as the centerpiece of this strategy. He begins with institutional analysis of three components of the sector: large-scale transnational firms (the *gran mineria*), domestically owned medium-sized firms (the *mediana mineria*), and parastatal enterprises. He supplements this with a class analysis of bourgeoisie, middle class, and labor in the mining sector.

Becker argues that the world non-ferrous metals industry is an oligopoly controlled by a bourgeoisie now *international* in character, and that "certain bourgeois elites of the less developed countries are incorporated into this class element on a somewhat equal basis" (pp. 91-92). The more mature transnational firms have learned to pursue their own interests in developing countries while conforming to the policies of host country governments (the "doctrine of domicile"). Peru's major parastatal mining enterprise, MineroPeru (whose "class character . . . is indubitably capitalist" [p. 229]), has itself become a member of the oligopoly. The domestic bourgeoisie of the *mediana mineria* neither has been displaced by, nor seeks to exclude, foreign investment. Moreover, it "does appear to exhibit a good deal of entrepreneurial dynamism in business affairs and has proven that it can define its interests on the basis of national realities, independently of the concerns of foreign capital" (p. 199).

Becker intends several chapters as tests of propositions drawn from dependency theory. On each count he finds dependency theory wanting. More adequate, he argues, is a "post dependency hypothesis" drawn from the work of his thesis advisor Richard Sklar. This is the least satisfactory facet of a very substantial work. There is no coherent presentation of what Becker considers dependency theory to be, and the propositions he ascribes to dependency theory are coarse and mechanistic—dependency theory at its worst. In some regards, Becker's analysis does part company from even the most sophisticated versions of dependency theory. As a number of recent studies have shown, however, dependency theory cannot just accommodate, but should illuminate, third-world states capable of bargaining successfully with transnational firms or national bourgeoisies that can both forge links with transnational capital and exercise entrepreneurial leadership.

More interesting and more compelling is Becker's argument that the Peruvian bourgeoisie, "despite its international linkages, . . . is nothing other than a true dominant class" (p. 275). Viewing the mining fraction as both a reference group and a leading stratum, the Peruvian bourgeoisie has, Becker contends, both the ideological and the structural requisites to exercise hegemony over the working class, not through superexploitation and repression but through institutionalized incorporation. While still "tentative" at the present moment, he concludes "there are many indications that this hegemony can be strengthened in the years to come" (p. 319).

The New Bourgeoisie and the Limits of Dependency has an abundance of riches, both empirical and theoretical. It deserves wide and careful reading.

DOUGLAS C. BENNETT

Temple University

Conflict, Politics and the Urban Scene. Edited by Kevin R. Cox and R. J. Johnston. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. Pp. V + 265. $27.50.)

In a recent review essay appearing in this journal (1982, *76*, 883) Bernard Grofman alerted us to the fact that a "renaissance" of sorts has been occurring in political geography, and he strongly advised political scientists to pay more attention to the scholarly work being produced in that field. I believe Grofman's suggestion is most appropriate, but unfortunately few political scientists interested in urban politics are likely to find *Conflict, Politics and the Urban Scene*, edited by geographers Kevin R. Cox and R. J. Johnston, to be especially useful. Although the contributions to this volume are uniformly well-written and clearly conceptualized, specialists in urban politics are not likely to find many of them very enlightening, either theoretically or empirically.

Cox and Johnston, in their introductory essay, note that urban conflict is a phenomenon that has caught the attention of geographers only recently, and that it is widely recognized as something not adequately accounted for by the locational theory and analysis that had been dominating inquiry in human geography. The response, they argue, has resulted in two competitive theoretical postures. One involves internal revisions in locational analysis, adding factors such as externality effects, turf-based interest groups, and public institutional involvement to the previous focus on competitive market forces. The other is a more Marxist-influenced effort to place urban locational conflict in the context of more fundamental, and presumably more explanatory, class-based conflicts. The 11 chapters that follow, almost all of which are case studies, illustrate these different theoretical postures.

The bulk of the volume, the first eight contributions, reflect the influence of the first, revisionist posture. Overall, these eight selections demonstrate that the externality effects (positive and negative) associated with land use choices create conflict, and therefore often involve public institutions as well as market forces in the locational decision-making process. The chapters are primarily case studies of particular conflicts. Most of these are placed clearly within a useful conceptual framework, but the studies themselves are usually time- and place-specific descriptive accounts designed to illustrate the role of particular actors and/or the use of particular strategies in these conflicts. While as noted above these are invariably well done, political scientists concentrating on urban politics are not likely to gain new insights or understanding as a consequence of reading them.

J. Paul Herr's contribution is a good example of what these case studies have to offer. He does a fine job of briefly identifying the implications for both central cities and suburbs of the suburban relocation of retail business establishments. He then illustrates the fact that local governmental units (well aware of these implications) attempt to influence the locational choices of such commercial enterprises by recounting the competitive efforts of South Bend, Indiana, and the adjacent municipality of Mishawaka, to entice a major retail outlet (Sears and Roebuck) to serve as the magnet store for either a proposed central city downtown mall or a new suburban shopping center. The documentation of this type of intergovernmental competition, with tax incentives and special public service packages being offered in order to improve a political jurisdiction's competitive position, is well done and will undoubtedly excite those who advocate metropolitan governments, but it will be fairly familiar ground to most urban-oriented political scientists. Another example is the contribution by B. T. Robson, an illustration of a "hidden agenda" of social considerations behind the ostensibly socially neutral objections to, in this case, a proposal to reroute traffic in an English city. Even the contributions that are not traditional case studies, such as R. J. Johnston's essay treating the use of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause to challenge exclusionary zoning and inequities in the provision of public services (both intra- and interjurisdictional) as an example of a "voice strategy" (as in "exit, voice, and loyalty"), provide little that will not already be familiar to a political science audience. Perhaps the most interesting chapters for most readers will be the two accounts, one by Ronald Bordessa and James Cameron, the other by W. S. Logan, of unsuccessful efforts at implementing centralized, metropolitan-wide land use plans, in Toronto and Melbourne respectively.

The three remaining contributions, placed in a section entitled "Beyond Locational Conflict," reflect the second, Marxian theoretical posture. These selections suggest that what often appears to be locational conflict is in fact better understood as more fundamental class-based conflict. While the empirical portions of these studies are not very exciting, the theoretical arguments are quite intriguing, and therefore these chapters can be expected to find a more interested audience among political scientists. Kevin R. Cox and Jeffrey J. McCarthy, for example, argue that what appear as "turf" issues to neighborhood activists, and also to those who study neighborhood activists, are really class issues which need to be responded to, and studied, as such. Ruth Fincher contrasts the rhetoric supporting Boston's downtown redevelopment policies (the revitalization of the city's economy generally and the municipal tax base specifically) with what she perceives to be the reality of those policies (facilitating the accumulation of capital by large-scale developers without improving the public fisc). And in the final selection, Peter J. Taylor and Harry Hadfield conclude that both the tenants and the managers in Britain's council housing program are the victims of a capitalist system that foists unprofitable but necessary activities onto the state.

Conflict, Politics and the Urban Scene may be well-received among urban geographers interested in politics, but unfortunately political scientists interested in urban areas are likely to find it rather disappointing.

RICHARD L. ENGSTROM

University of New Orleans

Österreichs Parteien seit 1945: Zwischen Koalition und Konkurrenz. Edited by Peter Gerlich and Wolfgang C. Muller. (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumuller, 1983. Pp. xii + 378. 248 schillings, paper.)

This is a collection of 12 original essays by recent social science graduates, mainly in political science, and some who are still writing their dissertations at the University of Vienna. Like nearly all such works, the quality varies considerably. Peter Gerlich has provided the introductory and concluding chapters. The book is divided into three sections: political party development, party structure, and party environment.

Under the first section, the two major parties and the FPO and the KPO are covered. The treatment is straightforward and solid, with many references to the theoretical literature from Weber to Sartori. The chapter on the SPO by Franz Buchegger and Walter Stamminger is by far the longest and contains a content analysis of the party debates in the theoretical journal *Die Zukunft* and of the minutes of the party conventions. There are no new interpretations, but a lot of data are provided to support earlier, less empirically based conclusions. Herbert Gottweis's chapter on the OVP is less than half as long as the chapter on the SPO, an unfortunate development given the general propensity of scholars to concentrate on the socialist parties and neglect the bourgeois ones. Even the small Communist Party of Austria receives more coverage by Albert Lichtblau and Michael Winter than does the OVP. Noticeably missing in these chapters, as well as in the book as a whole, is any significant indication that an increasing voter dissatisfaction with the two major parties, especially the SPO, has been developing. By the end of 1982 there were at least 15 environmental parties. They merged and formed two parties for the 1983 *Nationalrat* election, receiving 3.29% of the votes. This was mainly at the expense of the SPO, which lost its absolute majority.

The party structure section is misnamed; a chapter on this would have been beneficial. The chapter by Christian Haerpfer on the electoral system and its consequences is one of the best ones in the book, providing a good theoretical basis and a wealth of data. Walter Urban and Eva

Zeidner have done much interesting exploratory work on party membership figures. Party programs are analyzed by Erwin Riess and Norbert Winkler. Especially noteworthy is their treatment of the FPO programs, which contain many terms similar to those used by the National Socialists in the Third Reich. Their analysis is somewhat marred, however, by employing the term Fascism when National Socialism is really meant (pp. 203, 204).

Party finances come under the section on party environment. Muller and Martin Hartmann have collected extensive, difficult to obtain income and expenditure data and compared the SPO, OVP, and the FPO on a number of indicators. Muller has also provided a chapter on the parties' relations with the mass media. While Austrian parties are not quite as conscious of mass media as their European counterparts, they increasingly pay attention to it. Gerlich also notes this in his introductory chapter.

All in all, this is a good survey of the Austrian party system, although theoretically and methodologically cautious and conservative. The book is also not without a number of stylistic errors, and contains no subject index.

JOHN DREIJMANIS

Wentworth Institute of Technology

The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico. By Nora Hamilton. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982. Pp. xii + 391. $36.00, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

This historical treatment of Mexican government begins with pre-1910 conditions of public life, before the continuing Revolution (capitalized in Mexico to denote an ongoing program) became legitimatized with the Constitution of 1917. It emphasizes the presidency of Lazaro Cardenas (1934 to 1940) as the archtype of Revolutionary politics. Nora Hamilton contends that after this period of emphasis on social welfare, the Revolution began to put its reforms within the framework of a capitalist society. Yet she acknowledges that Mexico actually has evolved an economy in which the state's role often overshadows that of the private sector.

Hamilton draws on Marxist theory to investigate Mexico's development. Early in the study she points out her orientation and perspectives: the Marxist theory of dependency. Her definitions come from Engels, Weber, and Wallerstein, as well as lesser-known (among those who are not social scientists) theorists such as Maurice Zeitlin. James Petras, James Cockcroft, Ronald Chilcote, Andre Frank, and Pablo Gonzalez Casanova can be discerned indirectly in the composite backgrounding.

In historical stages, Hamilton interprets Mexican public policies in recent decades as being limited to protect a dominant class. Marxian contentions of ongoing class warfare became blended into less ideological chronicling of post-Cardenas programs.

The numerous expropriations do not mollify Hamilton in her quest to apply the dependency theory to Mexico. In 1960 President Adolfo Lopez Mateos expropriated the entire electric power industry, matching or paralleling with another basic fuel supply the action of Cardenas in expropriating the oil industry in 1938 and the railroads in 1937, considering utilities and fuel sources to be parts of the lifeblood of any industrializing nation. Later the government would expropriate the telephone company, tobacco plantations, sugar plantations, sugar refineries, motion picture studios, motion picture theater chains, one of the television networks, both national airlines, luxury tourist hotels, automobile and truck assembly plants, steel and iron complexes, pulp and paper plants, and more recently the private banks and savings and loan system of Mexico.

Private enterprise became caught up in the growing socialization of the means of production, as the Mexican government pushed slowly but steadily deeper into ownership of Mexico's productive means.

Acknowledging this more obliquely than directly, Hamilton counters that the private-sector leaders have pushed a short-run policy of sacrificing income redistribution to the prospect of the long-range benefits from industrialization. She discerns a growing middle class but finds that out of line with the goals of Marxist theory. Not stated in the book, but observed in recent decades by many veteran researchers concerned with Mexico, is the increase in the number of middle-class consumers, whether employees of the state or of private entities.

This study amasses data from the National Archives in Washington and private and official archives in Mexico. Hamilton has invested time and effort in assembling considerable information, unfavorable and favorable, about state autonomy in Mexico, and her empirical descriptions are phrased competently. She sincerely strives to understand political power in modern Mexico, but her vision remains a bit narrowed by her adherence to the dependency theory.

Hamilton claims that while the state has continued to perform the functions of accumulation to further industrialization and modernization, it has "abdicated its social control function" (p. 277). She cites dependence on trade with the U.S., including taxes from that trade, and dependence on loans from foreign sources. She refrains from crediting those "foreign sources" in much detail, but Mexico's economic expansion has certainly been underwritten in part by non-repaid loans from Chase Manhattan, Bank of America, Western Interstate Corporation banks in 13 Western states including Arizona, and American taxpayers indirectly through the Inter-American Development Bank, gifts and loans during the 1961 to 1971 Alliance for Progress period, the Export-Import Bank, and more recently through American-subsidized International Monetary Loan Fund credits.

Hamilton concludes with the suggestion that organization of "subordinate groups and classes (separate from the state)" can bring about a total social transformation, a polysyllabic rephrasing of a call for radical confrontation with the Mexican Revolutionary establishment to "expand its progressive orientation" (p. 286). Yet despite the orchestrated student riots of 1968 and the sporadic guerrilla violence and kidnappings of the 1970s, the state's continuing expansion of its activities led to the very brink of foreign debt bankruptcy in 1982. A pullback has begun only through politically unpopular austerity actions.

MARVIN ALISKY

Arizona State University

From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism. Edited by John H. Herz. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. Pp. xii + 311. $35.00.)

Regime changes are complex and important and worthwhile studying. This volume is particularly intriguing because it deals with the painstakingly difficult transformation of non-democracies (be they totalitarian or authoritarian) into democracies.

However, studying this proves to be no easy task, since even a limited number of cases exhibit a great variety of experiences. Regime changes occur under different conditions, in uneven tempo, and with varying success. To study this transformation systematically, Herz establishes conceptual and operational parameters. The case studies should focus on the early period of democratization in eight countries. Their scope ought to be limited to the public policies that cope with the legacy left by the antecedent regimes. The contributors are to discuss the legal attitudes vis-à-vis the previous regime, and policies regarding not only the leaders of the old regime and their sympathizers in and outside the party but also the regime's victims. The media and education, deemed responsible for the transformation of nondemocratic values, are also to be included in each study.

Although this is a good book, some problems must be noted. Its Germano-centric nature is problematic. A disproportionate one-third is devoted to West Germany; Italy, Austria, France, and Japan constitute a "semiperiphery"; and Spain, Portugal, and Greece are the Mediterranean peripheries. Consequently, only Germany receives an all-encompassing analysis. The other cases are condensed in single, short chapters that do not, and cannot, cover the agenda.

The authors differ in what they understand by democratization. While some are more concerned with institutional aspects, others stress societal attitudes, and two imply that a political system that favors capitalism is not really democratic. A clearer sense of what democracy is should have been shared and conveyed to the reader.

Consequently, the length of time that it takes for democratization to occur is also disputed. While most of the analysis of Germany is limited to the early years, the chapter by Frederick C. Engelmann on "Felix Austria" entails more recent developments like the "social partnership" of *proporz* democracy. While France is primarily treated from the point of view of the legal and illegal treatment of Vichy collaborators *during* the last stages of the war, the chapters on Spain, Portugal, and Greece necessarily discuss the democratization process as open and ongoing.

The authors also find it difficult to evaluate how successful the process of democratization was. We find Herz, Karlheinz Niclauss, Michael Fichter, and Jutta-B. Lange-Quassowski deploring the *Beamtenstaat,* the lack of success of decartelization, and the absence of democratic values in Germany. Yet, some would argue that the postwar transition of Germany was a success story. As is reviewed by Giuseppe Di Palma, the antecedent and the successor regimes usually combine properties: Italy before 1945 was neither purely authoritarian nor completely totalitarian. After the war it developed into a system whose legacy is not purely or fully democratic. Since the available alternatives (rule by the monarchy or by the Left) were non-options, what emerged was a system that disillusioned many. Similarly, France, dealt with in a chapter by Roy C. Macridis, was faced after the war by a no-option situation since the resistance was split amongst Gaullists and Communists. The unwanted constitution that developed resembled that of the Third Republic. It would not last. However, there were success stories, too. Austria preferred to waltz to *proporz demokratie.* Japan (Arthur E. Teidmann) disposed of its militaristic adventurism in favor of Japan Inc. And in Greece (Harry J. Psomiades), Portugal (Kenneth Maxwell), and Spain (Edward Malefakis) the authoritarian regimes failed (lost their nerve) as the societies were ready to demand capitalism, Europeanization, and democratization.

The authors correctly stress the role of certain individuals like Adenauer, Suzuki, or Karamanlis in coping with nondemocratic legacies and allowing for the stable transition to a more democratic system. Also important is the role of the occupation (particularly the American, and in Germany and Japan). In fomenting democracy they were sensitive to the needs of the occupied (as with the framing of the Japanese constitution).

In summary, this is a valuable contribution to the relevant literature. The authors show sensitivity, provide interesting facts, and answer interesting questions. They also raise important issues which should be tackled next in the context of contemporary less-developed countries.

MICHAEL RANIS

Swarthmore College

The Political Education of Soldiers. Edited by Morris Janowitz and Stephen D. Wesbrook. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1983. Pp. 328. $28.00.)

The central theme of this very useful book is the role of indoctrination and civic education in ensuring a high level of combat motivation and civilian control in contemporary armed forces. It takes its point of departure from the work of Morris Janowitz who, together with Stephen Wesbrook, has written articles in the first section that outline the theoretical and practical relevance of civic education. Janowitz argues that in the American military in particular, because of the change in the type of personnel being recruited, an "understanding of military purpose and national political goals is a more important 'morale' factor in the contemporary All-Volunteer Force than in the case of our former twentieth century conscript military" (p. 57). The primary vehicle for explaining the goals and purposes of military strategy is civic education, which is distinguished from indoctrination by its emphasis on imparting "knowledge and capabilities" rather than on controlling "attitudes, opinions, and behavior" (p. 16). In short, if the American military hopes to be an effective fighting force, it must begin to pay increased attention to raising the civic consciousness of its military personnel.

The second part of the book deals with the question of civic education/indoctrination in a number of countries including the U.K., Israel, Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and West Germany. All of the articles in this section are well written and will be of considerable interest to those interested in the overall question of civic consciousness in a variety of political systems. The third section, which deals with the American military, contains an exceptionally interesting and valuable article by Wesbrook on the historical development of political/civic training in the U.S. armed forces. It is a must for anyone interested in this question. Two other articles on the all-voluntary military in the U.S. complete the section.

Despite its overall utility—each chapter contains a useful bibliography for those interested in pursuing the matter further—there are some problems with the book. First, it would have been significantly improved by a conclusion that would put all of the articles into perspective. Second, and more important, while Janowitz and Wesbrook may be right in their call for more civic education in the American military (a debatable proposition to be sure), from a conceptual standpoint their attempt to make the book comparative is largely unsuccessful. In setting the stage for the various country studies, Wesbrook draws on Janowitz and Eric Nordlinger's works and argues that there are basically three models for analyzing civil-military relations: the aristocratic, in which there is a similarity in values between military and civilian elites; the democratic, in which civilian and democratic sectors are sharply differentiated in terms of expertise; and the penetration model with its emphasis on civilian control of the military. While the aristocratic model has largely disappeared, the democratic—which, Janowitz argues, calls for increased civic consciousness—is very much alive as is the penetration model with its primary emphasis on control, the major concern in communist countries. The articles in Section 2 raise questions about the validity of these assertions.

The articles by George Harris-Jenkins on the U.K. and Victor Azarya on Israel show that the situation in these "democratic" countries is far different from that in the United States. In fact, in the former case there is little interest in civic education, and in the latter it appears to serve a quite different function. Furthermore, the situation in communist countries is far more complex than the penetration model suggests. While William Darryl Henderson's excellent article on the Vietnamese army shows clearly the importance of control during combat situations, it is not always the key factor in civil-military relations in communist countries. In fact, I would argue that it is of prime concern during periods when there is an absence of a value consensus between the elite and the masses (e.g., in the immediate aftermath of a communist seizure of power) or when the system is under extreme threat (e.g., the Soviet

Union during World War II). As Michael Deane notes, the Soviet political officer, and the entire political apparatus, has been concerned with a multitude of problems, many of which would appear to have little to do with "political indoctrination." For example, the company political officer spends a considerable amount of his time on problems such as alcoholism, discipline, and technical training.

Janowitz and Wesbrook are to be commended for producing this book. Its problems are less a reflection of the editors' shortcomings than they are indicative of the state of comparative studies in the field of military sociology, especially when communist systems are involved. There are certainly differences between civic education in communist and noncommunist countries. However, I suspect there may be more similarities than the Janowitz-Wesbrook model suggests.

DALE R. HERSPRING

Washington, D.C.

The Politics of Aristocratic Empires. By John H. Kautsky. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982. Pp. xvi + 416. $28.00.)

The understanding of political change, John Kautsky suggests, can be enhanced by a consideration of the character of politics in contexts unaffected by the processes of change. Probing the intricacies of political life in such contexts, we might arrive at a more substantive knowledge of the nature of politics through the expansion of our analytical purview beyond the conventional preoccupation with politics in changing and modern societies. The context in which the analysis of the politics of "non-change" is attempted is that of "aristocratic empires." This concept, which Kautsky tries to establish as a new category of political analysis, designates political entities unaffected by commercialization, where power is wielded exclusively by a group of settled conquerors who live off the labor of an exploited peasantry. This exploitative relationship is the fundamental social nexus in aristocratic empires. Besides exploited peasants and aristocrats organized in their various hierarchies, an aristocratic empire also comprises townspeople, who form a parasitic appendage of the aristocracy. One of the book's most useful contributions is the analysis of the political impotence of the peasantry and the marginality of the townspeople as a distinctive feature of politics in aristocratic empires.

The concept of the aristocracy is programmatically posed against that of feudalism, which is bound in context to the West European experience. Feudalism is only one regional case of the world-wide phenomenon of aristocratic empires, which are distinguished both from primitive societies and from the vague category of traditional societies. Kautsky argues that most of these are characterized by commercialization, which sets in motion the processes of change that obliterate pure aristocratic politics. The absolute diachronic dichotomy between aristocratic politics and the political effects of commercialization is fundamental to the understanding of the whole argument. However, the fact that aristocratic empires as an ideal type are located in the continuum that ranges from primitive society to aristocratic empire to commercializing traditional society indicates that the aristocratic empire itself is not independent of some form of political change, even if that change involves the violent activity of conquest and settlement by bellicose nomadic tribes. Although the politics of change might be arrested in the new equilibrium of the aristocratic empire, the facts of conquest, settlement, and transformation of the nomadic tribe into an exploiting aristocracy inscribe a fundamental element of sociopolitical change in the very definition of aristocratic empires.

The argument proceeds by assertive generalizations supported by historical evidence drawn from a broad range of aristocratic empires on all continents over a period of five thousand years. The inescapable problems of this mode of analysis are threefold. First, the evidence derives from secondary sources, usually standard works but also occasionally from dated or debatable contributions, as it happens here with most of the sources on the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, the argument is *ab initio* cut off from original research. Second, the broad sweep of the subject precludes a fuller exploration of some important insights such as the interconnection between conquest, commerce, and language and the distinctly ethnocentric nature of nationalism as a byproduct of recent European history. Third, one might note a more fundamental methodological issue. The great disparity of the evidence and the diverse examples and cases on which generalizations are based raise serious problems, at least in my mind, concerning criteria of comparability and the limits set to meaningful comparative analysis by the frequent lack of substantive and contextual affinities in the objects of comparison.

These reservations are not meant to belittle the essential contribution of *The Politics of Aristocratic Empires.* Its discussion of the behavioral patterns, values, and conflicts characteristic of aristocratic politics covers a neglected subject of political analysis and places in perspective the aristocratic legacies of modern societies.

Paschalis M. Kitromilides

University of Athens

The Sources of Law. Edited by Chantal Kourilsky, Attila Razs, and Heinz Schaffer. (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1982. Pp. xiv + 375. $28.80.)

In this book, the "Vienna Centre" (the European Coordination Centre for Research and Documentation in Social Sciences) presents partial results of its first investigation in the field of law. The Centre was created by UNESCO with the purpose of "stimulating international comparative research projects carried out by researchers from Eastern and Western Europe" (p. 3). In pursuit of this goal, Erwin Melichar, president of the Austrian Constitutional Court, and Imre Szabo, director of the Institute of Legal and Political Science at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, codirected the work of leading law theoreticians from 10 European countries investigating sources of law as conceived in the respective legal systems.

The study encompasses Austria (H. Schaffer and E. Melichar), the FRG (D. Merten), France (C. Delage and D. Tallon), the GDR (K. A. Mollnau), Hungary (A. Racz and I. Szabo), Norway (M. Aarbakke and J. Helgesen), Poland (A. Lopatka), the USSR (S. L. Zivs), and Yugoslavia (B. T. Blagojevic and B. Kosutic). The French, Swiss, and Polish contributions are presented in French, the rest in English. A supplement provides a list of original denominations of individual legal enactments, the corresponding translation, and the enacting authority (pp. 369-375). All chapters include a concise "national" bibliography or notes with bibliographical references.

Each treatise deals with four questions: "a. definition of the concept of 'sources of law' in the national system; b. historical evolution of the national system of sources of law; c. elements of the current system; d. development trends in the national system of sources of law" (p. 4). "Sources of law" are conceived as formal sources of law, that is, not as social conditions and values determining the creation of law, but—to quote the Austrian definition—as "those types of forms of legal rules, in the shape of which law appears" (p. 17). The "empirical" part of the research should follow in the form of a "dynamic analysis" concerned "with the quantitative occurrence of the various sources of law within a given period of time" (p. 9).

With the prevailing attention paid to the elements of the current legal systems, the presented studies create instructive pictures of the pertinent structures of legal norms and of the underlying theories. For a case-law-educated lawyer they provide a rare insight into the general mechanism of the "written law system," as well as into national factual and methodological peculiarities, for example, the conceptual difference existing between the rather deductive West European and more empirical Scandinavian approaches. They also demonstrate the ways in which national legal systems cope with the norms of international origin.

The reports from the socialist countries seemingly exhibit the same qualities as the others. However, in a monolithic political regime the governing power resides outside of the official lawmaking and administrative organs that are mostly restricted to a formal declaration of the decisions taken by the ruling party. Consequently, the account of the formal legal sources does not disclose the factual process of their creation, their exclusivity, or regularity of application.

The unavoidable discrepancy between law in books and law in action, found in every legal system and necessarily also reflected in its descriptions, assumes in the case of monolithic political systems a new dimension of discrepancy between reality and fiction. The fictions offered in this book are at least rationally conceived and logically presented. Only the Soviet contribution tries to derive facts from political utterances, is poorly organized and, moreover, impaired by an uneven translation.

In general, the work constitutes a scholarly achievement highly useful for the understanding of legal systems existing in the participating West European countries and of some theoretical concepts advanced in the East European states.

Zdenek Krystufek

University of Colorado, Boulder

Mexico: Paradoxes of Stability and Change. By Daniel Levy and Gabriel Szekely. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. Pp. xv + 286. $27.50, cloth; $12.95, paper.)

This book by a U.S. political scientist, Levy, and a Mexican political scientist trained in the United States, Szekely, is a limited treatment of the highly complex Mexican political system aimed at both the general reader and the student in the classroom. Although a joint authorship effort, the chapters were written separately by the two authors. Levy wrote chapters 1, 2, 4, and 6; Szekely, 3, 5, 7, and 8. The major theme of the book, as suggested by the subtitle, is that the

Mexican political system is remarkably stable for a Latin American country, but that it has been able to incorporate change into that stability. After an introduction that briefly discusses the land and the peoples of Mexico, the second chapter presents an overview of Mexico's political evolution. The institutionalization of the revolution, especially of the military and the church, are analyzed. It is noted that the business community remains as an important autonomous center of power.

Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the political actors and institutions in Mexico. The discussion focuses on the role of the president as the center of power, the PRI, organized labor and the campesinos, as well as business groups and opposition parties. In an analysis of the role of personal freedom and democracy there is a superb discussion of the role of the press in Mexico. It is recognized that political power is highly unequal within Mexico. The general conclusion is that "the Mexican political system is neither authoritarian nor pluralist—because it is both" (p. 118). The following chapter on social and economic policy will prove hard reading for the average undergraduate. The next two chapters are excellent discussions of U.S.-Mexico relations and the importance of the new oil discoveries for Mexican politics. The conclusion assesses the Mexican developmental model from four different perspectives, the regime, the business community, and both the national Left and the Marxist Left. The conclusion, which should surprise no one, is that Mexico has achieved a remarkable degree of stability by being flexible and by incorporating change into the system.

While a welcome contribution to the growing literature on Mexico, the book is somewhat of a disappointment, especially for those who have been looking for a satisfactory text for courses on Mexican politics. The basic problem is the organization of the book. The authors appear to have chosen topics on the basis of special knowledge they already had (for example, Szekely wrote his dissertation on oil policy), and they apparently decided to write their chapters on that basis. The result is that there is no analytical framework to make the book hang together. Stability may be the end result of the Mexican political system, but it is not a very good analytical tool. There does not appear to be a logical consistency to the way in which points are developed or phenomenon examined. For example, the president as an institution is discussed in chapter 3, his election in chapter 4, and then a very brief mention is made of the recruitment process for political elites. The role of the business community is discussed in several places. The chapter on economic and social policy would logically make more sense before a discussion of demands from business, labor, and farmer groups. A critical problem is the introduction of major analytical concepts with little or no prior mention. For example, in chapter 3 the concept of corporatism is introduced briefly, then never mentioned again. In the succeeding chapter the terms democracy, pluralism, and authoritarianism are introduced and discussed with little effort to systematically define them. One minor irritating point: Numerous citations—and very good ones at that—are found in the chapter endnotes but are not found in either the Bibliography or the Index.

C. Richard Bath

University of Texas at El Paso

Socialism, Liberalism, and Dictatorship in Paraguay. By Paul H. Lewis. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. Pp. xii + 154. $18.95.)

This slim, highly readable volume sets out a limited goal and fulfills it well. It is the third in a Hoover Institution-Praeger series on Latin American politics intended to have "minimal theoretical analysis" and to reach a general audience including students, academics, and journalists (p. vii). Students and general readers should find the book informative and lively. Specialists will find the work of less value, although given the lack of attention generally paid to Paraguay, many specialists may find it useful.

The book consists of a history of postcolonial Paraguay and an analysis of the regime of Alfredo Stroessner, the military dictator who has dominated the nation since 1954. The title of the work is reflective of Paraguay's history:

> Paraguay has experienced four rather well-defined stages of development since independence: the socialist state, the liberal era, the period of nationalist revival initiated by the February [1936] Revolution, and the *stronato* [Stroessner's dictatorship]. Each of these had its origins in violence; each gave rise to dictatorial regimes whose arbitrary acts created lasting resentments that continue to polarize politics. In fact, Paraguay's politics might be characterized as the clash of inherited resentments accumulated over generations. (p. 126)

The bulk of the book is composed of chapters on the structure of Stroessner's government, the base of his support, his policies, and the opposition.

Lewis sees Paraguay as an authoritarian society which has never experienced democracy, but which has had a long tradition of police state tactics and government use of terror. Nevertheless, Stroessner is sufficiently secure and adept that terror is used in moderation and generally without caprice as far as ordinary citizens are concerned. There is a limited pluralism, particularly for the elites, although independent organization of peasants or urban labor is suppressed quickly. Nonthreatening opposition is permitted and even institutionalized with representation in the Congress. However, opponents are carefully kept weak and divided and are subject to quick repression when they exceed narrow bounds. While Paraguay's already great economic inequality has increased significantly under Stroessner, Lewis sees few current signs of substantial social unrest. Although land is maldistributed, "the ratio of population to land is very low, and without land hunger there is no pressure from below for change" (p. 5). In fact, Lewis sees the peasants as "the bulwark of a highly conservative political system" (p. 4). In the urban areas, the sustained high growth rate has trickled down sufficiently to avoid working-class unrest, and a wide range of elites have prospered economically.

Stroessner has based his long period of rule on personal control of the military from which he came and a disciplined mass party which draws heavily on inherited loyalties. Lewis does not focus on the future, but he does argue that the regime is personalist and not institutionalized. It is held together by one very capable and hard-working individual. Traditional patterns and the demands induced by the process of modernization do not bode well for a smooth secession after Stroessner.

This work may be faulted by some as on balance a conservative critique, overly simplistic and lacking in theoretical concern. One certainly might have preferred a more sophisticated approach in the concluding chapter, which is somewhat conceptual in examining parallels between Paraguay and other Latin American regimes. It should be received successfully, however, by the student and informed lay audience at which it is aimed, while maintaining some value for professionals.

Although they are not extensive, the book contains endnotes, a bibliography of English and Spanish sources, and an index.

ROBERT E. BILES

Sam Houston State University

Chinese Medical Modernization: Comparative Policy Continuities, 1930s-1980s. By AnElissa Lucas. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. Pp. xiii + 189. $24.95.)

For those of us who have followed the pendulum-like swings of the Chinese political system over the last three decades, AnElissa Lucas's *Chinese Medical Modernization* takes a positive step forward in helping us better understand the underlying factors that have informed policy debates within post-1949 China. The book moves well beyond the often-simplistic "two-line" struggle mode of analysis that has frequently characterized contemporary political analysis of Chinese affairs. And, because of the continuing importance of the topic in the overall list of Chinese development priorities, the book helps us gain a deeper appreciation for how the political variabilities of the Chinese system have interacted with the demands of medical science to yield a set of public policies that have gone a long way toward eradicating the health problems of over one billion people.

Lucas's main argument is that there are strong continuities in the substance and orientation of post-1949 policies in the medical area with those of the 1920s and 1930s. In particular, Lucas cites the commitment to a state-sponsored and supported medical system as the key element that has continued to be the core of medical modernization in China since the Republican period. She is critical of what she calls the "historical amnesia" of students of China who "suffer from a myopic focus on post-1949 changes in Chinese health care, as if China were an isolated nation influenced only by the postrevolutionary period of the modern present" (p. 9). In order to avoid this trap, Lucas examines the impact that the transnational diffusion of medical technology and organizational concepts have had on China, noting that the Chinese have "both benefitted from and contributed to the accumulated international knowledge of modern medical science, technology, and administration" (p. 1).

According to Lucas's analysis, the politics of medical modernization in China have centered on a series of policy oscillations that have fluctuated between emphasis on stressing quality to meet urban needs and emphasizing quantity to accommodate rural needs. These shifts have been a reflection of varying economic development policies and objectives throughout the post-1949 period. However, for Lucas, the pulling and tugging engendered by these shifts are really a manifestation of short-term adjustments rather than an integral characteristic of medical modernization efforts. Lucas makes a convincing argument that most, if not all, of the political jockeying has been part of a long-term program designed to develop both urban and rural sectors while beginning to integrate a truly national organizational network for state medicine. When looked at from the perspective of the various medical development policies begun during the Guomintang period, Lucas's argument regarding the distinct policy continuities takes on added salience.

On the whole, the book is well-documented, well-written, and well-organized. At the same time, however, the book would have benefited from a broader comparative perspective in which Chinese policies for medical modernization were compared with policies regarding some other sector, for example, steel development or scientific research. We never really come to learn whether the medical sector is idiosyncratic, or whether we might find similar important points of continuity in other areas. On a more normative level, in focusing on the public policy dimensions of medical modernization, the book appears to downplay the political radicalism of the Maoist period by suggesting that Maoist policies were merely part of a broader development strategy. While there is some merit in making this point, one cannot take it too far. One merely has to listen to the stories of highly skilled doctors and medical personnel who experienced serious disruptions in their training and work during the Cultural Revolution to recognize that the Chinese medical community, along with the community of scientists and technical personnel, suffered tremendously and at great cost to China. The present regime is making a serious effort to improve the environment for delivering both rural and urban medical care. This task, in view of continued shortages of funds, personnel, and know-how, constitutes a major challenge for Chinese leaders in the years ahead. Lucas has given us a solid foundation for understanding what to expect in the future as China attempts to modernize medical care along with its economy, national defense, and science and technology system.

DENIS FRED SIMON

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Law and Economic Development in the Soviet Union. Edited by Peter B. Maggs, Gordan B. Smith, and George Ginsburgs. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. Pp. xi + 293. $21.50, paper.)

This book is the second volume or report of a research project funded by the National Council on Soviet and East European Research on law, the scientific-technical revolution (STR), and economic modernization in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It deals with the effects of the STR on legal and political institutions; the publisher's abstract on page iii states that the book's emphasis is on effects of law on the STR. Despite the title, the articles in the book often deal generally or specifically with Eastern Europe. The book was published in late 1982, yet contains research completed by early to mid-1981. This means that, for example, events such as the 26th Congress of the CPSU, the declaration of martial law in Poland, and post-Brezhnev pronouncements on STR and ideology are not analyzed. As with much recent research, events have outraced analysis, but the articles do faithfully represent the state of Soviet and East European law existing in the early 1980s.

The book consists of three articles dealing with general or theoretical issues of law and the STR in the USSR and Eastern Europe: the effects of law on economic development, law as a regulatory instrument, and constitutional rights and the STR. These are followed by seven case studies dealing with various aspects of the STR: professional training, interregional coordination, computerization of management, nuclear power, environmental law, currency credits, and East-West trade. Although the focus of the book is on law, it is unfortunate that the impact of the STR on political structures and processes is not addressed in greater detail. Examples of articles that deal with political factors include Zigurds Zile's discussion of the rampant violation and lax enforcement of environmental law; Gordan Smith's brief statement that regional party organizations have a great impact on the implementation and success of territorial-production complexes; Yuri Luryi's discussion of contradictions in the law and reality of professional training, which, in effect, turn the "right to a free education" into a costly obligation; and Stanislaw Pomorski's acknowledgement, in a postscript written after the declaration of martial law in Poland, that political systems organized according to the machine [read totalitarian] model "are incapable of any basic self-correction by way of peaceful change" (p. 50).

The case studies contain much revealing information about the nature of the STR in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Peter Maggs states that nearly all major advances in computer hardware and software in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are due to the copying of American products, and that this copying has not necessarily violated international or domestic law. Donald Barry discusses the cavalier attitude of the Soviets toward the dangers of a nuclear reactor accident. According to the Soviet view, Zigurds Zile relates, socialist society is inherently protective toward the environment, with "violations [being] an annoying exception" (p. 194). Hence, the need for law is minimal. George Ginsburgs examines how the Soviets increasingly gain control over economic processes in the CMEA countries because of the necessity of granting aid to cover these countries' hard currency debts with the West. However, this aid presents an increasing drain on the Soviet Union's hard currency resources. Erik Hoffman and Robbin Laird discuss the controversy between the moderates and conservatives in the 1970s over the degree of centralization of the Soviet foreign trade system. They see the conservatives as rebutting the efforts to give foreign trade organizations and large enterprises relative independence in planning and carrying out their own export and import programs.

Although the book suffers from minor editorial problems, it ably contributes to the analysis of Soviet and East European institutions. It should, however, be read in conjunction with the superior first volume, *Soviet and East European Law and the Scientific-Technical Revolution* (Pergamon Press, 1981).

James P. Nichol

Library of Congress

The Transition to Democracy in Spain. By Jose Maravall. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. Pp. 213. $30.00.)

Communism and Political Change in Spain. By Eusebio Mujal-León. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983. Pp. vii + 274. $22.50.)

An analysis of the rise and fall in the fortunes of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) is the task undertaken by Eusebio Mujal-León in *Communism and Political Change in Spain.* Jose Maravall, in *The Transition to Democracy in Spain,* attempts the broader project of interpreting Spain's evolution to parliamentary democracy.

Overall, Mujal-León has met the challenge of interpreting the PCE in a valuable and long-overdue study. By far the largest portion of the book is concerned with the evolution of the PCE during the Franco period and its immediate aftermath. Only in the final chapters does the author attempt to draw a balance sheet on the PCE's contemporary performance.

Mujal-León traces the evolution of the PCE's strategy from its guerrilla war position of the 1940s to its policy of National Reconciliation in the 1950s and 60s. Crucial to the evolution of the Party's stance were its overtures to the Catholic Church. The connections with the Church were crucial to the success of the workers commissions, the first successful renewal of trade union activity in the post-Franco era and the heart of the PCE's influence in Spanish society. Mujal-León's analysis is less satisfying when he tries briefly to explain why the PCE did not reap further benefits from its overtures to progressive Catholics in the post-Franco era. That support has apparently gone to the Spanish Workers Socialist Party (PSOE), but an adequate explanation has not been given.

Mujal-León traces with considerable clarity the process by which the PCE developed its Eurocommunist politics. In the 1960s and 70s the Party developed a position that embraced parliamentary democracy, civil liberties, and a mixed economy with little emphasis on nationalizations. The Party also down-played its "vanguard" role and eventually in 1978 dropped the reference to Leninism in the Party statutes. Beginning with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Party took its distance from Moscow.

While many other commentators have noted these transformations of the PCE, Mujal-León goes somewhat deeper to lay bare some of the contradictions in this transformation. For example, while Santiago Carrillo, the Party's Secretary General, criticized the Soviets harshly, there was never a complete break in relations, and Soviet subsidies to the PCE treasury continued to flow. Mujal-León points out that Carrillo had used anti-Stalinism as early as 1956 to consolidate his power in the Party's organization. The limitation in the PCE's anti-Stalinism is demonstrated by the continued presence of considerable pro-Soviet forces within the ranks of the Party.

The PCE appeared to be on the verge of considerable political power in 1976, but as Mujal-León points out, the PCE's strength was based more on the weakness at that time of other forces on the Left than on its own vitality. The Party was largely bypassed during Spain's rapid transition to democracy, gaining less than 10% of the votes in the 1977 elections. The PCE had expected that the Francoist state would be liquidated through mass mobilizations giving them a share of the power, as had happened in Portugal in 1974, but instead the Francoist leaders under Adolfo Suarez engineered a smooth transition to parliamentary democracy without ever loosing hold of economic or political power. In analyzing the transition the author does not place enough emphasis on the class factors that were at work. Spain's large industrialists and other powerful sectors wanted to integrate Spain into the European community, and they threw their considerable weight behind the political transition. The weight of the Leftist forces during the transition has often been exaggerated.

Since its 1977 electoral defeat the PCE has undergone numerous identity crises. As its profound moderation did not yield the political space it desired, the Party has often turned its frustrations inward with numerous splits and purges. Membership has dropped sharply, and the Party's already meager vote totals were further eroded in the Socialists' 1982 landslide. Although inevitable dissatisfaction with the moderate Socialist government could be fertile ground for a PCE comeback, such a prospect does not appear likely given the current disarray in the Party.

If there is any overall weakness in the analysis of the decline of the PCE in *Communism and Political Change in Spain* it is that there is not enough discussion of how the PSOE was able to succeed where the PCE failed. A companion study of the rise of the fortunes of the PSOE is long overdue.

Although a smaller volume, Jose Maravall's *The Transition to Democracy in Spain* seeks a broader focus than Mujal-León's monograph. Maravall, a Spanish political sociologist and activist in the PSOE, seeks to analyze the period from 1975 to 1981, when the Spanish parliamentary system was consolidated following nearly 40 years of Francoist rule. The work was completed prior to the Socialists' landslide victory in the fall 1982. Drawing heavily on extensive quantitative data on the Spanish population, Maravall makes several important hypotheses about the direction of the Spanish political system and also draws lessons for students of comparative politics interested in the question of transition from authoritarian to parliamentary democratic rule.

Maravall's basic thesis is that the transformation of the Spanish political system came about from interaction of "forces from above" and pressures and demands "from below." Following the death of Franco in 1975, the authoritarian system did not have the continued societal support necessary to continue as it had before, but neither did the "forces from below," the Leftist parties and the labor unions, have the sufficient power to force a clean and immediate break with the past. According to Maravall, this stalemate laid the basis for a fairly unique transition to parliamentary democratic rule. Other transitions had come after military defeat, the collapse of colonial rule, or internal rupture, but Spain was different. Carried out under the guidance of the old, Francoist political elite, the transition was not a mere liberalization of an authoritarian system, but rather the creation of a new political order that laid the basis for a real alternation of power. While the old forces did hold an inordinate amount of political power well into the transition period, their continued ability to rule without democratic and popular checks was ending by 1981.

Maravall demonstrates that while the political Left and the labor movement remained somewhat weak, their mobilizations, particularly in the 1976 to 1977 period, forced the Francoists into concessions that they otherwise would not have made.

While Maravall's analysis of the phenomenon of transition is reasonably sound, the work occasionally suffers from a blurring of the author's role as political sociologist and his role as a leader of the PSOE. This problem is particularly evident in the opening chapter, where Maravall seeks to explain the demobilization of the Spanish working class after the 1977 elections.

Through an analysis of considerable data that has been gathered on political attitudes in post-Franco Spain, Maravall concludes as others have done, that apart from the sectors of Spanish society that were mobilized against the dictatorship, Spanish society, including the majority of the working class, is remarkably moderate. While committed to basic democratic values and sympathetic toward socialism, the working class was not extreme in its commitment to these values. Such analysis is clearly at the roots of the political direction of the PSOE, which officially abandoned Marxism in 1979 and went to the 1982 elections mainly stressing democratic reforms. Maravall seems to focus primarily on explaining why the PSOE did not attempt to counter the demobilization, which is a legitimate exercise for a politician but not for a political sociologist.

A major weakness of the book is that several key aspects of the transition (e.g., nationalist demands, economic crisis, and terrorism) are dealt with in a serious manner only in a short concluding chapter and then are not integrated directly into the major hypothesis of the book. Any fully adequate book on contemporary Spanish politics could not have less than a page on the nationalist movements in the Basque region and Catalonia and their effect on the overall political life of Spain. This omission is not adequately explained by Maravall. The Spanish tradition to parliamentary democratic rule is an important issue for all students of comparative politics. Maravall has contributed an important piece to our understanding, but more integration of the extensive data available on the national and economic questions is necessary.

GARY PREVOST

Saint John's University

Racism and Migrant Labour. By Robert Miles. (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982. Pp. ix + 202. $9.95, paper.)

Robert Miles, a lecturer in sociology at the University of Glasgow, has written an often confusing and irritating book on the role of race and culture in one of Britain's most persistent post-World War II problems: (mostly colored) immigration. To be sure, Miles sets a straightforward enough task for himself: to show how the intellectual roots of the sociology of "race relations" has misspecified, rather than helped focus, the entire question of the place and role of migrant labor in advanced industrial societies.

Having somewhat defined the problem, Miles then proceeds with a tortuous exposition of the numerous errors of omission and commission of a number of British authors who, over the course of the past 15 years, have been often unwitting protagonists in confusing the debate. After a brief overview of the nineteenth-century literature on race and genetics, Miles concludes that there are "no scientific grounds for developing a typology of the world's population based on phenotypical variation" (p. 15). This overview, and the conclusions drawn from it, are rather elementary, and the reader is not shown the relevance that this discussion will have for Miles's thesis about migrant labor. In any event, both the critical review and the place of this literature on the immigration question have already been explored in John Higham's classic work, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925* (Rutgers University Press, 1955).

The next two chapters continue to focus on race and race and ethnic relations. In them, Miles scrutinizes a number of leading sociologists of race and ethnic relations and finds them to have contributed to the scientific and empirical confusion that surrounds the sociology of race (chap. 2). The work of J. Rex, for instance, is found wanting on both theoretical and methodological grounds, as are the works of P. L. Van den Berghe, O. Cox, and a number of Marxist scholars in that they necessarily result in "misleading and ultimately false conclusions" (p. 35) and "refract" the real problematic with migrant labor by placing undue emphasis on the primacy of racism and discrimination. For Miles, the task at hand is "to identify the conditions of the generation and reproduction of the idea of 'race,' which is to explain why certain sorts of situation and relations appear (i.e., are socially constructed) as 'race relations' " (p. 43). Similarly, for ethnic relations the problem is one of an undue emphasis on cultural idiosyncracies and on the ethnics' distinct set of interests, needs, and *weltanschauungen* (chap. 3). This discussion culminates with a reaffirmation of the need to view racism as merely an ideology (chap. 4) and with a prelude to what is to occupy the attention of the remaining half of the volume: that in order to gain insights on the current British problem with race relations, one has to utilize the tools of historical analysis and look at the political economy of migration in the nineteenth century.

It is here that the promise of the book begins to materialize with a good discussion of the ideological legacy of British capitalism and colonialism (chap. 5). Here, Miles makes a persuasive case for analyzing the "generation and reproduction of racism as a process" (p. 120) and for seeing racism as a consequence of the confluence of economic, political, and ideological relations (with the economic ones often playing a subordinate role). Miles then proceeds to look at Irish immigration to England and Scotland in the nineteenth century in a manner that is in fundamental accord with the most theoretically informed analyses on the place of international migration in the international division of labor and at the complex network of circumstances which, at specific historical junctures, coalesce into powerful agents for reallocating human resources across space.

There is no denying that what Miles discusses has been said elsewhere (especially in the many writings of Alejandro Portes; see especially *Labor, Class and the International System* by A. Portes and J. Walton, Academic Press, 1981). Miles's effectiveness here, however, and what finally ties this often disorganized volume together, is his ability to demonstrate how the Irish were "racialized" via the vehicle of migration. Although an important factor in how indigenous people view immigrants (and the U.S. experience attesting to this is by no means unique), race is but ancillary to the main question, which concerns the place of migrant labor in the labor market and, consequently, in the class structure of host societies.

DEMETRIOS G. PAPADEMETRIOU

Population Associates International

Capitalist Democracy in Britain. By Ralph Miliband. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Pp. 165. $19.95.)

What accounts for political stability in Britain? This is the question that Ralph Miliband asks in this stimulating application of his theory that the state acts as an "instrument" of the capitalist "ruling class." Miliband uses the conception of capitalist democracy that he developed in *The State in Capitalist Society* (London, 1969) to argue that Britain's ruling class has successfully contained popular influence. The reconciliation of capitalism and popular pressure has been uniquely harmonious and effective in Britain. The ruling class—those who control the means of production, persuasion, and coercion—has maintained dominance, recognizing that reform often blunts class conflict.

The ability of Britain's ruling class to contain popular pressure operates through parliamentarism, incorporation, indoctrination, and the "relative autonomy" of the state. Miliband's theme is that representative or parliamentary government has been, at successive stages of labor's growing "inclusion" in the governing process, an effective instrument of domination. Parliamentarism permits the ruling class to govern without troublesome pressures from below because it prescribes popular participation yet limits its scope and impact, focusing political life in the House of Commons. The effect is to moderate M.P.'s behavior through isolation from radical influences and to limit the ideological and practical possibilities of radical—right or left—politics.

Parliament would not be effective in containing popular pressure if it were not for the ability of the labor movement to constrain its most militant members and for the indoctrination processes of diverse institutions to undermine the credibility of those espousing radical changes. Unions, defensive organizations incapable of revolutionary activity except perhaps in times of crisis, are agencies of containment. Similarly, the Labour party, while losing some control in recent years to militants, effectively restrains radicals. This incorporation is complemented by a daily dose of persuasion on the part of schools, churches, the media, and most intellectuals, which successfully convey the message of the "menace" of the Left.

Finally, the state itself plays a role in containing pressure and managing conflict. Elected officials must respond to the pressures of popular insurrection, union lobbying, and the electorate if they are to successfully remain in office. What this means is that elected officers need autonomy in deciding how to protect the long-term interests of capital. This "relative autonomy" is both essential to capitalist democracy's defense of capital and threatening to it. To assure that popularly elected governments are not pushed too far, other conservative elements of the state apparatus—top civil servants, the police, the military, and judges —promote the status quo.

Since the Reform Act of 1867, the ruling class has had to make increasing use of the mechanisms of containment in order to curb the growing influence of the underclass. In response to economic and political decline and a "state of desubordination" among the working class, condemnation of democracy coincides with an increase in repressive state power, portending a conservative authoritarian state. Only a strong and united socialist force can achieve progressive change and stem the tide of authoritarianism.

Miliband's analysis of the containment of popular pressure and the drift toward a strong state is cogent and insightful, particularly in delineating the ways in which the ruling class guards its advantages. Yet, does it really exercise disproportionate power? Should capitalist class dominance be measured by form (privilege and position) or by results (economic growth and political stability)? The British ruling class in this latter sense has surely failed itself and the nation, as manifest in ideological polarization, intensitication of conflict, ineffective government, and national decline. By his focus on institutions and personnel rather than policy and consequence, Miliband cannot adequately assess the power of the ruling class. At the same time, Miliband's argument neglects to explain the development of challenges from below. His "iron law of containment" presupposes an undeveloped "iron law of democracy." Consequently, his analysis permits only one structure of power—elitism—and fails to appreciate the sources and consequences of challenges that limit and destabilize ruling class authority and power. Nonetheless, this work provides insight into the British political system and helps in the assessment of Miliband's analysis of the capitalist state.

JOEL D. WOLFE

Five Colleges, Inc.

The Political Economy of Growth. Edited by Dennis C. Mueller. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983. Pp. vii + 285. $23.50.)

This volume is organized around Mancur Olson's provocative theses about why some modern nation-states have a tendency to increase economic output more slowly than others. The first essay outlines the theory, presented in more detail in Olson's *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities* (Yale University Press, 1982). The remainder constitutes a collection of theoretical and empirical evaluations of some propositions that flow from Olson's characteristically succinct and tightly woven argument that *Homo politicus* gets in the way of *Homo economicus.* Barring major social disruptions such as war, the number and scope of special interest organizations increase over time. Distributional coalitions emerge that tend to slow decision making and restrict a nation-state's ability to respond and adapt in a Pareto optimally growth promoting way.

Kwang Choi offers a statistical test in which the buildup of growth inhibiting groups and coalitions is hypothesized to bring about lower rates of growth. Cross-sectional regressions of growth on a logistic measure of the sum of the number of years since political consolidation, controlling for disruptions, are supportive but not very powerful tests. The data are weak proxies for the complex social and political evolution that undergirds Olson's model. However justified, "time" is an unconvincing explanatory variable. Static tests of dynamic processes are rarely illuminating, particularly where 10 or 11 cases are involved.

Moses Abramovitz illustrates some of these flaws and notes a number of others in highlighting the point that "the operational form in which Olson has cast his ideas makes it hard to distinguish clearly between "his theory and . . . the catch-up hypothesis" (p. 83). Frederic L. Pryor's "quasi-test" again points to data problems but does employ regressions of various measures of economic growth on quantitative measures of development, population size, political domination by a communist party, and ethnic and religious heterogeneity. While Choi notes "the model is clearly satisfactory" (p. 78), Pryor states "the results do not appear very favorable" to Olson's hypotheses (p. 101).

Five case studies empirically examine Olson's model via West German, British, Italian, French, and Swiss experience over the period after World War II. The support for Olson is mixed at best. Peter Murrell's study is tautological due to the assumption that industry growth rates are a measure of industry age (p. 115). Ursula K. Hicks and Jean-Francois Hennart both illustrate "Okun's razor," that there is a tradeoff between redistribution and efficiency. J.-C. Asselain and C. Morrisson indicate that in France's case the interest group → no growth link may go in both directions. Franz Lehner's study points out that Switzerland may be an outlier with regard to Olson's model. He points to the utility of Ulrich Widmaier's extension of Olson's earlier work for the current effort (*Politische Gewaltanwendung als Problem der Organisation von Interessen,* Hain, 1978) and feels that it should offer some testable insights regarding societal conflict.

Samuel Bowles and John Eatwell provide a Marxist critique of the nonclass nature of Olson's notions, pointing out that classes have different abilities to influence outcomes as well as different interests regarding the preservation, or destruction, or both of societal institutions. James W. Dean offers a similar analysis, which hinges in part on Olson's failure to consider business interest groups. The final essay is an interesting synthesis by Mueller.

Overall, this is a fascinating book that will become the companion classic to Olson's. As Pryor points out, even if most of the evidence is damaging to the theory (as it is), its adherents are unlikely to give up the faith. Three major queries have to be answered, however, before the faith is likely to spread, at least among political scientists. Some careful thought must be given to the notion of growth and how it is measured. This should be oriented not only to What is growth? but also to Why growth? Someone must accept the challenge of conceptualizing interest groups and distributional coalitions in a way that can be measured empirically. The passage of time is simply an unsatisfactory proxy. A number of data sets are available through the ICPSR and the *Zentral Archiv* which should aid this task (e.g., the third edition of *The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators,* 2 vols., edited by C. Taylor and D. Jodice, Yale University Press, 1983). Nowhere in the book is there a dynamic formulation of the model. If Olson is correct, it should be possible to construct a theoretical model that maps changes in interest group activity aimed at redistribution into (non)growth in a single set of nation-states over a long period of time.

MICHAEL D. WARD

University of Colorado

State and Society in Contemporary China. Edited by Victor Nee and David Mozingo. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983. Pp. 303. $29.50, cloth; $14.95, paper.)

From 1949 to the present, the brief history of China is punctuated by repeated campaigns, movements, antimovements, and rectifications. How do the Chinese and their economy adjust to these constant changes, some of which have been violent and turbulent? The 10 contributors to this volume endeavor, from either political science or sociological viewpoints, to look at such political developments from 1949 on.

Gordon White's analysis of how the state has attempted to bring the "privileged" state cadres in line with the masses is useful. He reckons that three approaches have been used: (1) the conservative approach, that is, sending the bureaucrats to do manual work with the masses; (2) the liberal alternative of permitting non-Party citizens, particularly intellectuals, to criticize the system; and (3) the radical approach, the notorious and extreme example of which must be the Cultural Revolution. Each of these approaches, as attested by past events, has been unsuccessful.

If Tang Tsou's task is to raise questions and not to answer them (pp. 81-82), he has succeeded. Tang observes that, notwithstanding the many indications of positive improvements in China's political structure, he is unsure whether such changes will be sustained. There are strictures imposed by the crisis of leadership (p. 80), the incompatibility of the rural orientation of the populace with the urban sectors (p. 81), the weakness of the intellectuals and the professional classes (p. 82), and the continuing influence of the ultraleftists (p. 83).

David Mozingo's analysis of the People's Liberation Army in relation to the state, in particular the Chinese Communist party, is stimulating and, by and large, accurate. What Mozingo regrettably fails to describe precisely is the reason for China's difference from other developing countries in which the military could dominate politics effortlessly.

"Dictatorship of the proletariat" has been written into China's constitution. Has that expression any meaning? asks Maurice Meisner. The answer is that " 'dictatorship of the proletariat' has appeared less prominently in Chinese theoretical pronouncements than it did during the preceding two decades" (p. 131). Meisner's view is not shared by Tang Tsou, who believes that the expression "may pave the way to a return to dogmatism and fundamentalism in the future" (p. 79).

Richard Kraus discusses the cadres, whom he sees as "the most problematic social group in the class analysis of contemporary China" (p. 146). The first-generation cadres were recruited from the peasant-worker classes, but the second and third generations are more likely to be drawn from the cadres themselves. The present Chinese administration will, sooner or later, be confronted with problems brought about by and associated with such changes.

Despite China's professed commitment to socialism, according to Edward Friedman many institutional impediments still exist, the most important of which is the "feudal restoration of fascism" (p. 168) rather than capitalism—which the Chinese communists erroneously conceive as their archenemy—because "China never was capitalist." Friedman's arguments are cogent.

Benedict Stavis's description of the dilemma of state power is journalistic and superficial rather than analytical. For example, his optimism that the rule of law will develop (p. 189) seems lacking concrete evidence.

Victor Nee's and Richard Madsen's essays overlap. Both deal with the local militia, and Nee "seeks to analyze the militia system in China in order to explore the intersection of control and autonomy as a structural feature of local government" (p. 224). His observations of the local elite in Xiamen and Fujian seem to confirm other studies. However, he quotes no historical antecedents to support one bold statement: "For the first time in history, a Chinese state succeeded in creating strong local government capable of mobilizing society" (p. 236).

Dorothy Solinger's essay, "Marxism and the Market in Socialist China," should interest both academicians and those Western businessmen interested in marketing goods and services in China. I found the best part of her essay to be the description of the "second economy" (pp. 203-206), that is, how connections (*quanxi*) and barter operate where no money changes hands.

Madsen contributes an astute ethnographic study of two generations of peasant youths (between the age of 15 and marriage) in Chen Village that borders Hong Kong. He concludes that the village youths who do not emigrate become "passive, dispirited . . . the result of frustrated rising expectations and a breakdown in the credibility of government ideology" (p. 263).

One distinguishing feature of the reference notes (pp. 265-296) is the use of Chinese magazines of independent views, for example, *Ming Bao* and *Qishi Niandai*, published in Hong Kong and reportedly read as "*nebu*" documents by high-ranking cadres in China.

FRANKIE FOOK-LUN LEUNG

Hong Kong

Iraq: The Contemporary State. Edited by Tim Niblock. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. Pp. 283. $27.50.)

This is the third volume of essays culled from the annual symposia of the Centre for Arab Gulf Studies at the University of Exeter (previous ones dealt with the Arab Gulf states and Saudi Arabia). The conference on Iraq, held in July, 1981, was cosponsored by the Centre for Arab Gulf Studies of the University of Basra, as was the following year's symposium on the Iran-Iraq War. As usual, the symposium's organizers have sought to strike a broad balance, as represented by the diversity of topics and international mix of participants. Several chapters deal with the state's role in social change, including class formation, the role of women, and the campaign against illiteracy. Others are concerned with Iraq's Arab and foreign policies: Iraq's role in Fertile Crescent unification schemes, relations with other Arab Gulf states, and the uncertain connection between Baghdad and Washington, as well as a comparison of the ideologies of Nasserism and "Saddamism." Those chapters that deal with economics seem to be the most substantial, though. They provide analysis of the agricultural, oil, industrial, and human resource sectors of the economy, as well as an examination of external influences on Iraqi development planning.

One of the more intriguing questions about modern Iraq is why this apparently abundantly blessed country, with all its resources in agriculture, water, population, and of course oil, has failed to live up to its high development expectations. The only attempts in this volume to answer the question lie in the economics chapters, which point out such problems as inefficient management of the oil industry, an agricultural population which has become "peasantized" only within the last hundred years, the flight of agricultural labor to urban areas, the lack of skilled manpower in industry, planning difficulties due to frequent swings in goals and orientation, and the inevitable inefficiency associated with industrial decision making by committee. At least partly because the authors of these chapters make the attempt to address this central question, their contributions tend to be the most interesting. Appropriately, they can only hint at associated difficulties in political instability, ideological inflexibility, intercommunal tensions and strife, and Iraq's entanglement in international and regional disputes.

The volume's failure to address these issues directly (except in some aspects of foreign policy) produces an obvious imbalance. There is a notable reluctance to dwell on subjects presumably sensitive to the Iraqi government, and consequently the nature and exercise of Iraqi politics is studiously ignored. There is no mention of the central role that Tikritis (from the small central Iraqi town of Tikrit) play in the government, nor of how Saddam Husayn (and the ruling Ba'th party) have managed to monopolize political power for much of the past 15 years. The Shi'a of Iraq, who comprise a narrow majority of the total population but enjoy less than their proportionate share of political, economic, and social power and benefits, are mentioned only twice. The long-running battle between Baghdad and the Iraqi Kurds, at present quiescent but by no means concluded, receives delicate attention in but one chapter, and the evolution of Soviet-Iraqi relations is discussed only in relation to development planning.

Not surprisingly, self-censorship weakens the collective effort. There is also the inherent problem of maintaining uniform quality in a conference-generated, multiauthor work. Too many weak contributions hiding among those of better quality and the omission of any discussion of domestic politics ultimately combine to make this book largely disappointing.

J. E. PETERSON

Foreign Policy Research Institute

Social Democratic Parties in Europe. Edited by Anton Pelinka. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. xvi + 190. $26.95.)

This book is an updated English translation of the original German version published in 1980 under the title *Sozialdemokratie in Europa: Macht ohne Grundsätze oder Grundsätze ohne Macht?* The author, the translator, and the publisher all deserve praise for producing this excellent and readable work of scholarship that belongs in every library collection on political parties.

Pelinka focuses not on individual countries or parties but on common patterns and properties. He traces the historical origins of European social democracy from the latter half of the nineteenth century to about 1982, noting both similarities and differences from one party to another and the pressures today, for example, through the European Parliament, toward increasing transnational cooperation and coordination. Pelinka describes in some detail the differences between social democracy and communism and the ideological, political, and historical reasons for the split between these two branches of socialism during the First World War. He makes it quite clear that of the various distinctions that can be made, the most important is the social democratic insistence on pluralist democracy.

In spite of their many common features, Pelinka divides social democratic parties between government socialism, represented by the British Labour party and the Social Democratic party of Germany; and opposition socialism, represented at first by the Austrian and then by the French socialists. In fact, though, both strains can be found in each social democratic party, examples of which again are the British Labour party and the German SPD in the 1980s. The book was published too soon to note the possible change in 1982 and 1983 in the German SPD from a pragmatic government to a more militant opposition posture.

Pelinka describes the transition of social democratic parties from mass, class, and integration parties to modern catchall, or peoples', parties that pay less attention to ideology and members and more attention to personalities and the general public, including business interests. The absence of a strong communist party to its left and a decline in the number of parties encourages the trend toward catchall government socialism.

Membership structure and strength; the role of women as members and voters; the influence of religion; the importance of workers as voters and, increasingly, of white-collar employees as members; and, in particular in the SPD, the academization of the party, are described and explained skillfully with the usual effort to generalize across Europe. Party financing, the mass media, intraparty democracy, and contradictions between theory and practice are also dealt with in a manner that seeks common patterns.

In a chapter that was translated as "Position in the Political System," Pelinka looks again at government and opposition socialism and describes the interlocking effects of each type of party role on party structure, social structure, and policy impact. He concludes that "even without social democracy there is democracy [in Europe]; even without social democracy there is social balance, social security, and social welfare. Social democracy is not a political force that can or wants to act fundamentally differently from the other important forces of Europe; it is a force that makes policy somewhat differently and that changes society a little" (pp. 90-91). One reason why change under social democrats is usually less than dramatic is because most social democratic parties must join alliances in order to govern. Alliance policies vary, of course, among social democratic parties, but it is interesting to see that while there are four models of alliance policy, "an unequivocal preference for a left-oriented alliance policy can be detected only in France" (p. 93). Relations with trade unions, various grass-roots organizations, and with international federations as well as social democratic foreign policy orientations are also discussed in this chapter.

In spite of the trend toward pragmatism and modern catchall parties, Pelinka asserts that "of all the party groupings of Europe, Social Democracy is the one that has succumbed least to [the] temptation to operate without theory" (p. 128). The two "methodological traditions" in social democracy, i.e., socialism as an all-embracing, mainly Marxist-inspired macrotheory, and socialism as a moral protest which demands reforms "are not in opposition but rather are points of emphasis that complement one another" (p. 130). The common bond of socialist theory was anticapitalism, to which has been added during the twentieth century an opposition to fascism and communism. This threefold opposition is a common denominator of social democratic theory; however, it is joined by a proposition toward political democracy and a collective economy. Nevertheless, social democracy is criticized from the Right as being too close to the communists, with whom it sometimes seeks arrangements and may appear at times to share "the totalitarian temptation."

The tension between theory and practice, between principled opposition and pragmatic governance, between dogma and tolerance of conflicting views, are common themes that run through this book as challenges that social democracy has had to meet in the past and will continue to meet in the future. Pelinka's contribution lies in having described the many contradictions, pressures, and dilemmas with a remarkable lack of passion but also with sympathy and understanding.

ARTHUR B. GUNLICKS

University of Richmond

The Wasting of the British Economy: British Economic Policy 1945 to the Present. By Sidney Pollard. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. Pp. 197. $27.50.)

This is a well-written account of the unique and unrelenting decline of the British economy over the last 30 years. An inability to grow as fast as other comparable advanced economies has resulted in Britain slipping from a position as one of the richest and most technologically advanced nations to one of the most backward. Pollard's account of this failure is intended primarily for the nonspecialist audience, and his strongly argued narrative is clear and coherent.

The book's central tenet is that the failure of the British economy is a failure of economic policy. Successive governments have inhibited investment and productive capacity deliberately in a misguided belief that short-term economic crises called for the restriction of public and private expenditure. The "stop-go" cycle of expansion and recession, so harmful to business confidence, reflects an overriding concern in British economic policy with the symbols of prices and other monetary indicators and a neglect of the "real economy," that is, goods and services produced and traded. Inflation and balance of payments difficulties have been regarded as the highest priorities for action, while investment and productive capacity—the efficiency of the supply side—are secondary. Yet actual experience confounds the assumptions of the policymakers. Prices rise most in period of stagnation, and rise least in periods of high activity. Similarly, the cure for inflation by "squeezing" production and reducing public expenditure is self-defeating, for rising unemployment places an added drain on the state in the form of benefits that need to be paid. Restrictions on capital goods investment, politically easier to cut than revenue expenditure, simply result in a loss of quality production and competitive efficiency, triggering further calls for dampening demand. The result is a vicious cycle of foreign exchange and inflationary crises which generate investment reducing strategies that dig deeper troughs for each succeeding crisis.

The tight monetary discipline of the Thatcher administration is thus seen not as a radical new departure but as continuing the destructive policies of recent decades. An underlying assumption in Pollard's account is that politicians are in thrall to the mistaken financial orthodoxies of the Treasury and a civil service whose contempt for production stems from an effete, amateurish ignorance of productive industry. In contrast, constant care and attention is paid to the interests of finance and the banks.

The lucidity of Pollard's account is unfortunately not accompanied by sufficient substantiation of his propositions to come to firm conclusions about their validity as opposed to their plausibility. Alternative theses are particularly scantily considered. In an analysis that relies so heavily on attitudes as the explanatory variable ("hostility to manufacture," "ignorance of the real economy"), detailed consideration of the processes by which professional and other ideologies influence decision-makers is specially important. How do these processes differ from, for example, organized interest group pressure? Does the increasingly formal organization of British financial interests suggest their declining influence and the increased unreliability of informal and ideological influences, as others have suggested?

Despite the absence of detailed analysis, Pollard has written a clearly argued, coherent account of Britain's economic malaise that should be particularly useful for those wanting an initial guide to the area.

ROGER KING

Huddersfield Polytechnic, England

Transformation and Resiliency in Africa: As Seen by Afro-American Scholars. Edited by Pearl T. Robinson and Elliott P. Skinner. (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1983. Pp. ix + 277. $14.95.)

This is a collection of nine case studies of contemporary African societal, political, and cultural life as seen through the eyes of Afro-American scholars. These essays are, in theory, integrated by introductory and concluding chapters. Topics addressed include "Rural-Urban Labor Migration in Kenya"; "Public Corporation Expansion in Nigeria"; "Clientage and Political Change in Niger"; "Revolutionary Transformation in Ethiopia," and essays on selected aspects of African art, education, literature, and music. Given the wide-ranging nature of these topics, this review will focus on the methodological and theoretical perspectives that the case studies purport to hold in common. I take these perspectives to be twofold. First, borrowing from the justifiably acclaimed work of C.S. Whittaker, Jr. on dysrythmic change and the conflict between tradition and modernity in Nigeria, it is asserted that *both* transformation *and* resiliency exist in African political and social change. (Appropriately, Whittaker also wrote the Foreword to the volume.) Second, the essays are written from what the editors call an "Afro-American" perspective. Both themes are obviously important, and it is a great pity that the only way in which the reader could be made systematically aware of their centrality to the case studies is to read the Conclusion first.

In the Conclusion, "Looking to the Future with an Eye to the Past," Pearl Robinson suggests how transformation in Africa is comprised of both continuity and adaptation. While neither a profound nor an original statement, it has, as she correctly points out, all too often been overlooked by many scholars intent on theorizing the study of Africa from either end of the ideological spectrum. Robinson argues this theorizing has been Eurocentric irrespective of which of her two schools—developmental or dependency—one chooses to examine. In contrast, we are offered an Afrocentric view stressing first, the interplay of indigenous African institutions with colonial and postcolonial phenomena; second, a "pragmatic pluralist" approach to theory to offset the determinist nature of Eurocentrism; and finally, a "wide ranging concern with the issue of equity." The acceptance of this alternative perspective at face value raises many other questions.

Neither development nor dependency theory can be dismissed in cavalier fashion. They are not as discrete, teleological, determinist, or generally as simplistic as the Afrocentric critique would, both implicitly and explicitly, have us believe. Further, the Afrocentric/Eurocentric distinction is not, I think, as sharp as Robinson suggests. The essays in the volume are not purely Afrocentric, just as development theory and dependency theory are not purely Eurocentric. Similarly, Robinson offers us an analysis that demonstrates a place for utility-maximizing rational choice theory within her Afrocentric scheme. Further evidence is to be found in Ed Keller's excellent discussion of the historical transformation of Ethiopia, where revolution is shown to have arisen out of tensions generated in the conflict between the modernizing and centralizing tendencies of the Empire (especially under Selassie) on the one hand and the residual strength of traditional institutions and relationships such as the church, aristocracy, and system of land tenure on the other. These conflicting elements would surely find a central role in the analysis of revolutionary transformation the world over, not simply or exclusively in Africa. The value of Keller's work, as with that of several of the other case studies—especially Robinson's analysis of institutional convergence in a rural Hausa community—is not its Afrocentric approach, but rather that it is a combination of sound and restrained generalization (the essence of theory building) grounded in detailed empirical analysis.

The other major problem I have with the Afrocentric approach, or at least as set out here, is its similar inability to incorporate significant exogenous variables in a manner comparable to that in which the more dogmatic streams of dependency or development theory were unable to incorporate the possibility of indigenous African institutions resisting these exogenous influences. If the Afrocentric approach takes its plea for pragmatic pluralism seriously, it will need to think positively about adopting the best aspects of all contemporary theorizing, irrespective of intellectual origin. Otherwise it will be guilty of behaving little differently to the early scholarship on Africa, the intransigence of which receives fairly savage treatment in Elliott Skinner's introductory chapter, "Afro-American's in Search of Africa: The Scholar's Dilemma." Skinner demonstrates how it was long impossible for the Afrocentric perspective to gain legitimacy within the African Studies community. In context, Skinner's chapter—a historiography of the Afro-American study of Africa—bears little relationship to the other case studies in the volume, and as such plays no role in integrating them. It is, however, a perfect illustration of transformation and resiliency in its ironic exposure of the inability of the first generation of U.S. scholars of African nationalism to recognize and respond to the emerging nationalistic sentiments of the younger generation of black scholars within their own ranks.

Skinner's essay is but one of several interesting and insightful essays. Yet as an attempt to create a homogeneous collection, *Transformation and Resiliency in Africa* unfortunately falls somewhat short of the mark. Further, the essays represent a specifically "Afro-American perspective" in name only. Perhaps more seriously, however, Afrocentrism as a "mode of analysis as well as a world view" (p. 252) raises as many epistemological questions as the Eurocentric perspectives that it seeks to replace.

RICHARD A. HIGGOTT

Murdoch University, Western Australia

Red Guard Factionalism and the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou (Canton). By Stanley Rosen. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. Pp. xv + 320. $32.50.)

Rosen's impressively researched social history of Red Guard factionalism in Canton middle schools is a valuable contribution to our understanding of Cultural Revolution politics. The focus is on the structure of educational opportunities for students of different political class backgrounds—"good," "ordinary," and "bad"—and how this structure affected such students' political behavior during the Cultural Revolution. His thesis is that the "pattern of factional formation and factional participation grew directly out of the contradictions and conflicts—some manifest, some latent—which had already divided the students before the GPCR" (p. 2).

The study is divided into two parts. Part 1 provides an account of the hierarchy of secondary schools in Canton prior to the Cultural Revolution and the shifts in the kinds of class backgrounds of students that were accepted in these schools during the years from 1960 to 1966, as the pendulum swung from an emphasis on academic achievement to political class origin. Part 2 details the formation of Red Guard factions and subfactions, outlines intra and interfactional disputes, profiles various Red Guard leaders and followers at different types of schools, their behavior during "radical" and "conservative" phases of the Cultural Revolution, and describes the fate of these groups as the Cultural Revolution wound down. The book ends with a brief description of recent changes in the educational system and the type of students that are likely to benefit from these changes.

Rosen's achievement is his ability, as a result of in-depth interviews in Hong Kong with more than 100 major participants of the events he chronicles, to detail with precision the many variations and complexities of Red Guard activity at different schools and by different groups of students within the same schools at different periods during the crucial years from 1966 to 1968. The findings confirm earlier, more general studies that pointed to the importance of class background as a determinant of Red Guard behavior, but Rosen's work refines and provides greater precision to our understanding. The major antagonists were not all those with "good" versus "bad" class backgrounds such as workers or peasants against the children of former landlords or capitalists. Rosen pinpoints the major factional split as that between those of cadre origin and those of middle-class (specifically intellectual) origin—precisely those two groups that were most affected by the pre-Cultural Revolution shifts in educational policy. Moreover, the extent and type of factional behavior was dependent on a student's immediate environment, that is, type of school. In fact, "patterns of factional formation . . . varied in largest part on the basis of whether a school was true elite, good, ordinary, or poor" (p. 194). Further differences could be found depending on the year of matriculation in a school—because shifting national policies during the early 1960s resulted in year cohorts with different class backgrounds predominant.

Rosen, unfortunately, is so engrossed with the rich detail yielded by his research that he rarely, if ever, attempts to stand above his intricate explication of concrete behavior and events to draw even slightly broader conclusions or generalizations. Not only does he neglect to ask the question of what his study tells us about communist political systems in general, but he also neglects even to generalize about the *Chinese* political system. Certainly there is much material here relevant to questions about social stratification and mobility, class conflict, and interest group politics in socialist states; yet Rosen appears unaware that there is a rich literature on these topics to which his study speaks directly. And the implications of the central theme of the book—that commitments in this most ideological of mass movements were determined fundamentally by students' concerns for their future career chances—are left relatively unexplored. Rosen demonstrates this, but does not reflect on it. What, for example, does this say about ideological commitment in general in China or other communist systems? Is Rosen suggesting that ideological commitment, as demonstrated in the Cultural Revolution, is basically a mask for individual self-interest? All but the most obsessive of China specialists will finish this book frustrated that its author did not view his rich and important findings more broadly.

JEAN C. OI

Lehigh University

Developed Socialism in the Soviet Bloc: Political Theory and Political Reality. Edited by Jim Seroka and Maurice D. Simon. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. Pp. x + 198. $18.00.)

The theme of this symposium is "developed socialism" in the Soviet bloc countries. The theory was first announced in 1967 by Leonid Brezhnev. The then-First Secretary of the Communist party of the Soviet Union suggested that it was a new stage on the road toward achieving a communist society. Six of the essays deal with "national perspectives" of this Brezhnev-formulated doctrine, and the last two with its "cross-national perspectives." There are 28 tables and two figures in the essays written by nine specialists in Soviet bloc area studies. The book also contains an index.

Although one finds useful information in the book, much of it is repetitive, dated, and some of it is available in previously published secondary sources as, for example, the data on "Growth of Real Per Capita Disposable Income in the Soviet Union" (up to 1975 through 1977) and "Annual Growth Rate in Real Income per Capita" (up to 1970 through 1975) (pp. 159, 161). A table on "Soviet Welfare Expenditure" gives data between 1950 and 1974 only (p. 175), and "Public Expenditures as a Percentage of Factor Price GNP" merely for 1956 and 1962—that is, for the period *before* the announced arrival of "developed socialism." The latter table is based on a source published in 1969 (p. 181).

Data contained in Table 7.1, "Communist Party Memberships," (p. 130) and Table 7.3, "Social Composition of the Communist Parties (%)," (p. 134) are based on "Official figures as reported by the East European and Soviet Press." Since information from these unidentified publications, and referred to in the text, is not current, one might suggest that the authors should have researched and clearly identified the more recently published East European and Soviet periodicals that deal with these subjects.

In his essay "Is Developed Socialism a Soviet Version of Convergence?" Jeffrey W. Hahn resurrects the convergence theory put to rest many years ago. Maurice D. Simon writes that his essay "Developed Socialism and the Polish Crisis" was completed in December, 1981 "shortly after the declaration of martial law in Poland," and that "an earlier version of the chapter" had been published previously (p. 114).

JOSEF KALVODA

Saint Joseph College

Food Policy Analysis. By C. Peter Timmer, Walter P. Falcon, and Scott R. Pearson. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. Pp. x + 301. $25.00, cloth; $12.95, paper.)

Here is some of the best current thinking on the food problems of third-world countries. A product of the authors' teaching experiences in American universities and in national food agencies in the developing world, this book is a thoughtfully constructed manual of techniques to assist governmental decision making in an issue area of critical importance. Food policy, for Timmer, Falcon, and Pearson, "encompasses the collective efforts of governments to influence the decisionmaking environment of food producers, food consumers, and food marketing agents in order to further social objectives" (p. 9). It follows that the analysis is broad (addressing issues in agriculture, nutrition, trade, labor relations, and finance) and necessarily cognizant of the complexity of policy choice.

In this "macro food policy framework," the basic nutritional needs of individuals are not neglected; at the same time, the emphasis is placed on the macroeconomic levers available to government for the achievement of adequate and sustainable nutrition. The authors aptly note that the effects of macroeconomic policies on third-world food systems typically are "accidental fallout," taking place with little or no *ex ante* government intention (p. 221). *Food Policy Analysis* makes its contribution to the literature of development by clearly demonstrating the means by which such artifacts as exchange rates, interest rates, land rental rates, and the rural-urban terms of trade can influence the nutritional status of a population. The many piecemeal solutions to the world hunger problem offered in various forums are addressed here in what is perhaps politically the most relevant setting for dealing with hunger: the national level of economic planning. Difficult choices need to be made, between the interests of consumers and those of producers, between short-term and long-term objectives, and between domestic and international viability of the economy. At the crux of these matters, more often than not, is food pricing policy.

The preferred policy strategy suggested here, stripped to its bare bones and requiring adaptation to particular circumstances, is as follows: Carefully raise price incentives for farmers and stimulate productive employment, but accompany this with targeted consumer food subsidies to protect the nutritional status of the poor. At the same time, consider and diligently monitor the impacts of these interventions on food markets, the government budget, and the balance of payments.

After the Introduction, the analytical tools (often microeconomic models) and programmatic options are presented in discussions of food consumption and nutrition (chap. 2), food production (chap. 3), and marketing and food price formation (chap. 4). Chapters 5, "Macroeconomic Policies and the Food System," and 6, "Macro Food Policy," address most directly the variety of interconnected choices faced by national planners. Chapter 6 also provides a succinct summary of the normative issues, categorized in terms of "ideal answers," "nonanswers," and "elements of a workable food policy." Annotated bibliographies at the end of each chapter are useful keys to further reading, although the entries are drawn almost exclusively from various specialties within economics.

This book is likely to disappoint some readers due to problems of ideological implication as well as content. The analysis implicitly fits into a theoretical mold acceptable to a Bretton Woods institution (this is a World Bank publication). The food policy analyst is placed above the political fray of bureaucratic disputes and international economic negotiations; food policy decisions, it appears, take place in the sanitized neo-Keynesian atmosphere of planning agencies. The normative viewpoint favors the improvement of food markets through minimum necessary public intervention. It complements much of the *laissez faire* thinking that enjoys new prominence in some development agencies. The analysis, consequently, is more meaningful for capitalist societies than for "command" systems, despite a claim that the methodology is equally applicable to both (p. 13).

The politics of food, taken broadly to include such phenomena as class pressures for policy restraint or reform, symbolic exploitation of food issues by political leaders, and the sensitivities of policy dialogues with aid donors, are not included in this book's coverage. This extraction of food policy analysis from its political environment is not unrecognized by the authors (p. viii). Nevertheless, there is irony in it: While the book promotes conscientious, well-informed policy choices, the political elements of such decisions effectively are left to intuition and guesswork.

JAMES FREMMING

Northwestern University

Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter-Measures. By Grant Wardlaw. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Pp. xii + 218. $29.50, cloth; $9.95, paper.)

Since the Munich Massacre, terrorism has become a major concern for law enforcement personnel and policymakers who must respond to the threat. Furthermore, social scientists have increasingly sought to understand a particularly vicious form of political violence.

In contrast to the early studies, there now is an extensive body of knowledge on the topic of terrorism. Yet few works exist that concisely integrate the material that has been generated by the shock waves of continuing terrorist incidents.

In his *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter-Measures*, Grant Wardlaw has authored a splendid text that will be of equal value to those in the station house or in the seminar room. Through fine writing and insightful observations, he has surveyed the major areas in the study of terrorism.

As a result of the fact that he studied the academic and operational aspects of terrorism long before the topic became fashionable, Wardlaw has the confidence to deal with the vexing problem of defining terrorism—a task which many other social scientists have avoided given the frustration that often accompanies such an endeavor. Wardlaw provides a balanced treatment of the definitional issue and also presents different classifications that can be helpful in analyzing terrorism. He makes a particularly telling point that the public often ignores when traumatized by a horrible act of carnage, that is, "terrorism is not mindless. It is a deliberate means to an end" (p. 17).

Wardlaw then proceeds to give an excellent summary of the historical development of terrorism and notes current differences. He makes an effective case for the view that "the dividing line between terrorism and criminality has become less and less distinct with time" (p. 32). In effect, authorities will have to adjust to the fact that the motivation of individuals and groups will become more clouded in the future, therefore making prediction of, and responses to, incidents more difficult.

Wardlaw also explores how terrorists skillfully employ fear to maximize their impact by seeking "to isolate the citizen from his or her social context" (p. 34). He has successfully applied the classic writings of such individuals as Hannah Arendt in dealing with the sociological impact of terrorism.

In his chapter on future trends, Wardlaw deals with the subjective aspects of terrorism when he suggests that there is an "ecstasy factor" that has meant that "the exercise of terror may become an almost religious experience for the terrorist . . ." (p. 54). As events in the Mideast indicate, there are now those who may seek religious martyrdom by their acts and not political goals.

In the second part of the book, Wardlaw grapples with the fundamental problems associated with how a democratic government must reconcile the need for security with the maintenance of the rule of law. His list of policy options that should be considered in any antiterrorist campaign provides a fine basis for discussion of how open societies can copy with the challenge.

Chapter 10 is particularly interesting. While the public is fascinated with the exploits of such elite groups as the Special Air Service, Wardlaw explores the more serious matters of public policy associated with the dangers inherent in the potential militarization of the police that may be a byproduct of the implementation of antiterrorism tactical programs. His discussion of the issues related to forming a "third force" or paramilitary units is cogent, and he makes a strong case for the position that "the containment of terrorism should as far as possible be a police matter dealt with by existing police forces" (p. 101).

The sections on the convoluted United Nations' response to the threat and the British and German experience underscore the complexities surrounding the application of international and domestic law in dealing with the problem of terrorism.

Chapter 12 aptly stresses the crucial role intelligence plays in any counterterrorism policy and also provides a useful summary of the techniques authorities can apply in meeting the unique problems associated with the dangers poised by the activities of clandestine groups. In chapter 15, Wardlaw also gives a fine summary of the role behavioral scientists can play in assisting authorities to avoid the pitfall of placing "excessive reliance on technological solutions" (p. 161).

In his conclusion, Wardlaw suggests that terrorism will threaten in the next decades as a result of a number of factors including the proliferation of private security forces that might engage in counterterrorist vigilantism for their clients.

Political Terrorism is an outstanding book, one that should be assigned as a required text for classes on the topic.

STEPHEN SLOAN

University of Oklahoma

New International Communism: The Foreign and Defense Policies of the Latin European Communist Parties. By Lawrence L. Whetten. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1982. Pp. xx + 262. $26.95.)

American scholarly interest in the West European communist parties has varied considerably since the end of World War II, when these parties first emerged as important political forces. That interest has been high during brief periods of communist participation in governments and when the Western communist parties displayed marked independence from Moscow; at other times, academic concern for these parties has waned. But the persistence of strong communist parties in four Latin countries—Portugal, Spain, France, and Italy—is perhaps the feature that most clearly distinguishes these political systems from the politics of northwestern Europe, and this phenomenon clearly deserves more consistent attention than it has been given.

As the domestic strength of these communist parties has been stabilized or reduced, their impact upon Western governmental policies has been largely a function of the degree of their cooperation with noncommunist parties and collaboration with other communist parties. When the Eurocommunist movement faltered in the 1970s, an attempt was made to substitute an ambiguous "New Internationalism" as a means for maximizing the parties' domestic and international influence. This ambitious and somewhat erratic enterprise is examined by Lawrence L. Whetten in his latest book.

Whetten, professor of international relations at the University of Southern California, assembled a battery of researchers for this project and organized a remarkably systematic study, the thoroughness of which is reflected in two appendixes detailing lines of inquiry. This team made exhaustive use of a variety of research materials, including interviews, scholarly articles, and press reports, as the bases for a wide-ranging profile of the Latin communist parties' policies and problems.

The main focus of the study is the parties' attitudes toward national and regional security policy and questions of European integration. The central hypothesis of the book is that of the "two key features of internationalism—Communist identity and high policy—it is the latter, foreign and defense matters, that plays the dominant role in the legitimation of nonruling Community parties." If the hypothesis is not proved, Whetten certainly makes a strong case. He clearly details the relationships between external policy and domestic political imperatives; since the domestic contexts are so varied, severe constraints are imposed upon the quest for a common approach to regional and world policy.

One common feature among these parties, Whetten notes, is lack of an adequate appreciation of the Soviet threat. Only the Italian Community party has developed the research support required for an independent, theoretically sophisticated approach to international problems, and that party has taken the lead in "New Internationalism," a flexible attitude toward relations among the Latin communist parties and collaboration with noncommunist parties and ruling communist parties. Prospects for the "New Internationalism" do not appear bright: The dynamic initiatives of the Italian Communist party confront the generally ineffective performance of the Spanish Communist party, the strong tilt of the French Communist party toward Moscow, and the continuing commitment of the Portuguese Communist party to "Proletarian Internationalism."

The most important product of this study is the demonstration that both the domestic political variables in security policy formation and policy outcomes among these parties are far more complex than is generally realized. Whetten's study is somewhat more sympathetic to the Latin communist parties than are most other Western scholarly works, and he seems to think that fears about the consequences of Communist participation in NATO governments have been overblown. Still, the presentation is generally well-balanced and objective, and Whetten does not allow personal preferences to intrude upon this rigorous, well-organized investigation of the questions raised at the outset. The overall result is a book of exceptional merit, a valuable contribution to the literature on communism in Western Europe.

R. JUDSON MITCHELL

University of New Orleans

Iran since the Revolution. By Sepehr Zabih. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. Pp. 247. $21.50.)

This book is a refreshing attempt to keep Iran's revolution in perspective. The book's message can be quickly stated: In 1978 and 1979 Iran erupted into a cataclysmic revolution leading to the overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of an Islamic republic under the Ayatollah Khomeini. Since then Iran has been going through an unseemly crisis of leadership precipitated by the continued failure of revolutionary leaders to establish their credibility.

The book contains 10 chapters, a postscript, a selected bibliography, and an index. The chapters examine chronologically what Zabih calls "the American connection" with the Revolution and the disintegration of the armed forces, the process of institutionalization of the revolutionary regime, the hostage crisis and its ramifications, the presidency and parliament, the resurgence of opposition that challenges the legitimacy of the Republic, the role of the parties supporting and opposing Khomeini, the rift between secular and fundamentalist forces, the outbreak of insurrections by the ethnic minorities, Iran's foreign policy, and a summary prognosis.

Zabih notes that Islam played a major role in events in Iran before and during the Revolution. What is not clear from his analysis is the nature and significance of that role. No doubt the Iranian Revolution was an upsurge of religious revivalism against materialism. Still, many saw the Revolution as a rejection of modernization and Western influence. It was also a reaction against tyranny. The success of the Revolution is attributed to Khomeini, a man of messianic power. But nobody, including Zabih, has offered a clear explanation of a situation in which a country that had been following a path of modernization on secular lines for a long time unhesitatingly squandered the achievements of several decades.

It is difficult to discover from the book whether Zabih prefers the late Shah or his rival, Khomeini. He treats the present regime somewhat kindly when he says, "the Islamic Republic . . . identified itself with the captors of diplomatic, military and civilian personnel of a foreign embassy" (p. 49). It was not just a question of identifying with the militants; it was through the encouragement and support given by the regime that the militants were able to occupy the American Embassy. The Khomeini regime needed an outburst of anti-Americanism to maintain its hold on the people and thus claim legitimacy, a fact which explains the takeover of the embassy and the inordinate delay in releasing the hostages.

Zabih considers the work of Khomeini in the Revolution to have succeeded so far. But he warns that Khomeini's "insistence on creating a monolithic Shia theocracy may prove the undoing of the Islamic Republic, in the same way that the late Shah's perseverance in establishing a one-party state contributed to his ultimate downfall" (p. 232). In this case, Zabih may prove to be right.

Zabih exhibits a solid knowledge of Iranian politics, although he hesitates to probe behind the public record—that is, to consider the covert aspects of past and present Iranian politics. In sum, the book's greatest utility lies in the attention it gives to the personalities and politics in contemporary Iran, a critical area of our troubled world.

SHEIKH R. ALI

North Carolina Central University

International Relations

Allies in a Turbulent World: Challenges to U.S. and Western European Cooperation. Edited by Frans A.M. Alting von Geusau. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1982. Pp. ix + 174. $24.95.)

Allies in a Turbulent World is a collection of papers prepared for a colloquium convened under the auspices of the John F. Kennedy Institute, located in Tilburg, The Netherlands. As such, it both suffers from the usual drawbacks of conference and colloquium proceedings, and also garners the usual advantages. Although all of the authors are well-recognized in their respective fields, the chapters are uneven in quality and scope, and the totality of the chapters does not add up as the sum of all the parts. Furthermore, the book suffers from the common problem of colloquia that discuss contemporary issues in that the participants draw their observations from the more or less commonly held expectations of that particular moment—in this case November, 1981 to January, 1982—and once again subsequent history has proven its unpredictability, especially in economic matters.

The book's strength is that the contributors nevertheless try as much as possible to weave a larger context into their otherwise rather short-run observations without burdening the reader with historical summaries that should be well-known, thus getting to the heart of the matter in each case. Furthermore, the book successfully relates the political and security dimension of European-Atlantic relations with the political and economic—a crucial necessity in these days of increasingly complex interactions among states. As David Calleo puts it in his chapter on the Atlantic Alliance:

> Four general trends have slowly been undermining the benevolent circumstances within which NATO has evolved:
> 1. The growing reality of strategic parity.
> 2. The deterioration of economic conditions.
> 3. The erosion of the transatlantic cultural identity.
> 4. The growing significance of security problems in the Third World. (p. 8)

S.I.P. van Campen's chapter, "NATO Political Consultation and European Political Cooperation," draws attention to the essentially divergent courses that the member-states of the European Communities and the United States have taken as regards consultation of foreign policy issues that transcend as well as include the Atlantic area. He offers a trenchant comment, which is not particularly reassuring: "If EPC has not substantially damaged NATO, this is in particular due to the fact that EPC has not become what it should have become" (p. 67).

Pierre Hassner's chapter is the book's most analytical, discussing "Pluralist Democracies in a World of Repression." As usual, Hassner leaves us with uncertainties because, as in much of his writings, he does not attempt to explain or justify particular national attitudes or foreign policies, a topic with which much of the book is concerned. As Hassner comments:

> It belongs to the essence of pluralist democracies that some forces within them see them as more repressive than pluralist. It belongs to the essence of the world of repression that its results may be strikingly uniform (nothing is more similar to right-wing torture than left-wing torture) but that its sources are strikingly diverse (terrorism and repression, conservative tyrannies or oligarchies, revolutionary totalitarian systems, revivalist fanaticism, and so forth).(p. 142)

Issues that divide Europe and America are discussed in separate chapters: détente (Eberhard Schulz), crisis management outside the NATO area (Lincoln P. Bloomfield), arms-control negotiations (Lawrence Freedman), trade (William Diebold, Jr.), monetary affairs (Susan Strange), and energy (Wilfrid L. Kohl). Frans Alting von Geusau's chapter, "Allied Strategy and Atlantic Security," reinforces a common theme of the book, that America is viewed by its European allies to be as much of a problem—and even a threat—to them as is the Soviet Union. He deplores this condition, as do many of the other contributors, but by making the point so strongly and consistently, he underscores for American readers the gulf in perceptions of security and national well-being that is causing the Atlantic to become a barrier rather than a bridge. How to restore a greater degree of mutuality in Atlantic relationships is thus a major theme, and rightly so in most of the contributors' views because of their concern that the current administration in Washington has not been helping matters much.

In his conclusions as the editor of the volume, Frans Alting von Geusau has, in my opinion, identified the major problem:

> With respect to the need to maintain allied cohesion, national governments have failed in at least two areas. They have failed in many instances in their task to inform their electorates adequately about the reality of the international situation and the dilemmas of allied security. They have equally failed in their understanding of the psychology of mutual confidence in allied relations. (p. 163)

ROBERT S. JORDAN

University of New Orleans

The World Tin Market: Political Pricing and Economic Competition. By William L. Baldwin. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 273. $45.00.)

The central theme of this book, that "the performance of the world tin industry can best be understood as a process of political price determination imposed on a market that is structurally conducive to effective competitive processes" (p. 3), is pursued in nine well-written chapters. Baldwin, who is an economist, provides an authoritative analysis of the politics of tin in this study of commodity pricing in the context of international trade. Chapter 1 introduces the basics of tin as a metal. Then, after reviewing the role of tin in the economies of both producing and consuming countries (chaps. 2-3), Baldwin goes on to examine supply and demand for tin (chap. 5), price and output of tin (chap. 6), the patterns of mine ownership (chap. 7), and mining costs (chap. 8). Through all of this runs the history of the industry from the early classic cartel effort, the Bandoeng Pool of 1921, to the post-World War II International Tin Council and the current Sixth International Tin Agreement (ITA). Baldwin's discussion of the evolving and conflicting concerns of producing countries provides insight into the broad international commodity debates underlying the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the New International Economic Order (NIEO).

For scholars interested in the national politics of Bolivia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, or Zaire, this book is worth consulting. These are the major tin producing countries, and the political pressures exerted by their tin exports are placed in an interactive and comparative context. The international politics of tin are interpreted through an exposition on the productive advantages of each tin producing country. The expensive mining of hard rock tin veins in Bolivia creates a very different set of policy constraints than the inexpensive mining of alluvial tin deposits in Southeast Asia. Baldwin makes clear the serious competitive difficulties facing Bolivia's tin industry. In that Andean country, the need for employment and the revolutionary potential of the tin mine laborers combine to create a great incentive for all Bolivian governments to press for a high floor price for tin. The Malaysian government, with abundant low-cost tin, has a greater interest in market arrangements emphasizing volume.

Baldwin concludes by observing that the history of the modern tin industry is characterized by "a succession of attempts by interested governments to counteract the effect of global competition that persistently frustrated private efforts to restrict production and raise prices. The international tin agreements are only the latest of these efforts" (p. 234). This conclusion is the basis for his interpretation of commodity politics. For instance, the government of Bolivia favors price raising export controls, while that of the United States, representing a consumer interest, favors price stabilizing buffer stocks. Baldwin finds that the United States' position of seeking stable free markets for tin may be unrealistic; that the alternate to the ITA is some other form of political pricing, although he does argue that an explicit tin cartel is unlikely.

Baldwin is to be complimented for going beyond a single discipline and region in trying to illuminate a major practical and theoretical problem: trade relationships between commodity producing countries and industrial country consumers. In addition to the interest it holds for economists, the book has much to offer scholars of the politics of development who may not have a direct interest in tin, Bolivia, or Malaysia.

WILLIAM CULVER

State University of New York of Plattsburgh

Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning. By Richard K. Betts. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982. Pp. xiii + 318. $24.55, cloth; $9.95, paper.)

The absence of a theory of surprise in the international relations literature has long been noted. With *Surprise Attack*, Richard Betts has made a major contribution to increasing our understanding of the dynamics of surprise. Coupled with Michael Handel's *Diplomacy of Surprise* (Harvard University Press, 1981), the foundation finally seems to have been laid for developing such a theory. *Surprise Attack*, however, is more than just a study of surprise. This question takes up only the first half of the book. The second half is devoted to the question of how does one design a system of defense to cope with the onset of surprise. NATO's central front and nuclear surprise are the principal focal points. The arguments put forward by Betts will also make *Surprise Attack* must reading for those interested in deterrence and defense planning.

After surveying nine surprise attacks which started wars or brought in additional states, Betts arrives at two conclusions shared by most observers of surprise: very little learning occurs as the same mistakes are repeatedly made, and not all of the potential dangers of surprise can be avoided. What is significant about these conclusions is how they were arrived at (through the use of comparative case studies) and their points of emphasis (the response pattern of policymakers).

Political, military, and financial considerations make it impossible and imprudent for policymakers to hedge against all possible instances of surprise. Surprise is a problem primarily when it possesses the ability to invalidate the assumptions on which a state's defense plans rest and to lessen the effectiveness of its military capabilities. Surprise is also relative and operates at many levels. Bolts from the blue are rare, as some warning is almost always present. Given these considerations, Betts argues that a response to warning is not automatic. Policymakers must evaluate the situation and make a judgment about how much warning must exist before there occurs a response.

Betts feels that answering this question is especially important for NATO defense planners. Conventional Western defense plans count more on being able to avoid surprise than on being able to prevail against it (p. 8). Yet, if the Soviets are to have a reasonable degree of confidence in victory, they must rely upon surprise as a force multiplier (p. 156). A hesitancy on the part of Western leaders to respond to warning threatens NATO's capacity to resist.

Because response to warning is not automatic, Betts holds that much of the deterrence literature is of little relevance because of its mechanistic, ahistorical, and apolitical nature. The principal challenge facing NATO is to contract the period of debate within and between governments (p. 296). The impossibility of completely anticipating the dimensions of the policy debate makes some type of delay inevitable. It also makes "the military capacity to recover from short warning . . . extremely dependent on *political* processes" (pp. 11-12). Military planners, therefore, must be prepared for situations in which indicators of Warsaw Pact activity are not countered. Betts asserts that the objective must be the development of strategies that "facilitate defense despite surprise, without compromising crisis stability" (p. 22).

If one were to find fault with Betts's treatment of his subjects, it is that not all of the material in *Surprise Attack* is original. Four of the 10 chapters have previously appeared in abridged and altered form as journal articles. It should also be stressed that the case studies are narrow in focus. Only enough is presented to establish a basis for generalization. Readers unfamiliar with the case may find it necessary to go back to lengthier treatments of them.

GLENN P. HASTEDT

James Madison University

Rethinking the U.S. Strategic Posture. Edited by Barry M. Blechman. (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1982. Pp. xii + 308. $14.95, paper.)

Rethinking the U.S. Strategic Posture is the collective effort and conference report of the Aspen Consortium on Arms Control and Security Issues. Organized in 1980, the consortium worked for two years reconsidering the U.S. strategic environment and analyzing U.S. strategic policies.

The consortium established a special working group of academicians and policymakers "to devise an integrated policy for strategic nuclear forces—one that embraced not only the weapons programs necessary to maintain an adequate military and political balance but that also considered whether and, if so, how negotiations could enhance U.S. security" (p. viii).

The resulting anthology is not a position paper from any fringe element but reflects instead a middle-road view of current strategic issues as they appear from the perspectives both of U.S. security management and of arms control. Although the moderate position will not satisfy some readers, the text presents a balanced, straightforward analysis by competent professionals with differing perspectives and disagreements within the middle ground.

Ten chapters address the major military, political, and technological issues and represent the individual efforts of the authors together with major input from the consortium meetings. Unlike many books of readings, which are loose collections of thoughts along a central theme, this text defines clearly the issues and provides a logical progression of analysis, with each chapter serving as a building block for later chapters. Blechman's introductory chapter makes no apologies for the world nor for the United States' nuclear arsenal, which to him reflects its status as a great power. Walter Slocombe's essay traces the development of U.S. nuclear weapons strategies and the resultant problems for each period since 1945. His is perhaps the most succinct conceptualization of the major nuclear policies and of the subtle shifts in policy experienced during the past 15 years.

The chapters by William Hyland and Marshall Schulman focus primarily on Soviet strategic policies with serious concerns, even foreboding, in evidence. Both agree that the Soviets have matched U.S. strategic capabilities in recent years, and this strategic confidence subsequently has led to more assertive Soviet behavior in international politics. Chapters by Christoph Bertram, William Perry, Alan Platt, Michael Nacht, and Michael May address the technical issues of specific strategic policies, all very pertinent in today's nuclear debate.

Joseph Nye's essay on the future of arms control is followed by the study group's collective summary, with opposing minority positions attached. Noting the shift of nuclear policy toward a greater reliance on nuclear weapons by the Reagan administration, the group opposes policies of strategic superiority by either superpower. Instead, the group seeks to restore the strategic nuclear balance and to give top weapons priority to the improved survivability of C^3I capabilities. Modernization of U.S. strategic systems is encouraged, together with significant arms control efforts.

Although not a book for beginners, this is a useful text for the academically oriented layman because of its straightforward, nontechnical analysis. There is little jargon here, but the book would benefit from a good lexicon. In short, this is a very useful and understandable text on a critical but complicated subject.

Abbott A. Brayton

East Tennessee State University

The Future of European Alliance Systems: NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Edited by Arlene Idol Broadhurst. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. Pp. xx + 316. $22.50.)

NATO and the Atlantic Defense: Perceptions and Illusions. By Werner J. Feld and John K. Wildgren. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. Pp. xi + 171. $19.95.)

Probably few topics have received as close attention over the past 35 years as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. With the 1979 NATO two-track decision to modernize its intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and to pursue arms control negotiations with the Soviets, NATO has once again come under intense public scrutiny and, in some cases, its continued viability has been seriously questioned. Both the "crisis" in the 1950s over German rearmament and the one in the 1960s over French withdrawal from the alliance subsided; the 1980s INF "crisis" will also. In the meantime, the alliance is being subjected to close analysis and reassessment on both sides of the Atlantic by officials as well as by the academic world and public.

The Future of European Alliance Systems is an important contribution to the literature on NATO and, contrary to a number of recent analyses, a constructive and sober assessment. NATO and the Warsaw Pact are treated only infrequently in such detail within the same volume. The book's comparative NATO/Warsaw Pact (WTO) approach is interesting because of the observations it permits the reader with regard to the prevailing alliance systems in Europe. To Broadhurst's credit, the book gains added credibility from its 12 authors who represent five of the NATO members and collectively have spent many years in positions dealing with European alliance issues. With the frequent references to the past, present, and future problem of Germany for both NATO and WTO, Broadhurst might also have solicited a German contribution to one of the sections on alliances.

The concept of alliance systems is discussed in three introductory chapters on "European Security Perspectives" which form the theoretical framework for the book. Broadhurst reviews the traditional rationales for alliance formation and alliance disintegration and concludes that no single rationale or combination of them describes alliances adequately. This conclusion would appear to substantiate Hedley Bull's rejection of any real theory of alliances and his contention that theories are at most helpful in defining alliances. Martin Edmonds's chapter examines the strengths and weaknesses of NATO in its political, military, and economic dimensions and rejects the concept of an alliance based on military necessity in favor of a much broader and political definition. While the conclusion of all three authors underlines the need for expanded European initiatives, Bull forecasts a future European balance to the USSR without the United States.

The four chapters on NATO by Kenneth Hunt (U.K.), Pierre Lellouche (France), Marten van Heuven (U.S.), and Derek Arnould (Canada) offer the diversity of views suggested by their four nationalities. Arnould deals with the issue of how to extend the consultative mechanism to non-NATO countries, while van Heuven examines the role of the press and public opinion for the Atlantic Alliance. Hunt and Lellouche are refreshingly open in their comments, and—although Lellouche's arguments have also been made elsewhere—their arguments either are heard too infrequently in the United States or are couched in such diplomatic terms as to be ineffective. Hunt's assessment of the U.S. approach to threats outside NATO is unusually frank, and he accords the Europeans even, if perhaps more tempered, treatment. The Atlantic Alliance continues to be, he concludes, "a symbiotic one in which each side depends upon the other" (p. 84).

The four chapters dealing with the Warsaw Pact offer an in-depth and complementary treatment of the pact. Both Malcolm Mackintosh and Ivan Volgyes offer fairly basic overviews of the organization and structure of the Warsaw Pact and underline the importance of the alliance to the Soviets in terms of allied control. Particularly interesting in this respect is the Volgyes discussion of stresses, tensions, and vulnerabilities of the pact. R. Ned Lebow and Lawrence Whetten address the issues of alliances and East European legitimacy within the present system. Both discussions avoid the easy generalizations in favor of very specific comments on the Warsaw Pact members and assessment of their impact on pact cohesion. While all four authors agree that nationalism and assertions of independence in certain policy areas are increasing, there is less agreement on the extent to which the East Europeans will vent those feelings and the probable Soviet reaction to East European unrest. Will the Soviets ultimately invade Poland, as Lebow suggests, because of an exaggerated concern for any sign of weakness? Or is the interdependency outlined by Whetten actually so strong that the unrest with the prevailing system stirred by Solidarity will not survive the pressures against it?

The chapters in *The Future of European Alliance Systems* represent solid analysis and will more than satisfy the reader looking for material on the subject. One could say that the chapters may have even whetted the appetite. For instance, it would have been interesting for the WTO authors to have discussed more directly the topics addressed in the NATO section, such as the INF debate or the out-of-area issue. Furthermore, the reader trying to discern the potential future of alliance systems is left with questions. A concluding chapter of educated forecasting by Broadhurst based on the various scenarios proposed by the authors, even if couched in appropriately tentative terms, could have been instructive. The book is an important contribution to students of the European alliance system.

The Feld-Wildgren book, *NATO and the Atlantic Defense*, is more limited in scope and approach. It deals exclusively with NATO and looks specifically at the link between public opinion and policy. Its conclusions are based primarily on data from an extensive review of public opinion polling and surveys of media sources, with chapters covering public and NATO coverage, NATO-produced films, and public opinion.

After general comments on U.S. economic and military decline in the 1970s, Feld concludes that the perception of the *defi Americain* (American challenge) has not been replaced in West European eyes by a perception of *defi Sovietique* despite the increasing challenge posed by the Soviets. Suggestions for the future in his final chapter, "Policy Implications," warn of the need to "halt NATO's spreading cancer." The U.S. should become more responsive to the European desire for arms control and better economic management, while Europeans must become more sensitive to American public opinion and especially the necessity of a military force buildup.

While the compilation of polling data and newspaper analysis is interesting for the student of NATO affairs, it is unfortunate that Feld and Wildgren frequently are limited in their analysis by their dependence on external data sources. For example, data on the public image of NATO in the U.S. print media and television were based on a survey of the years 1977 and 1978 and three months in 1979 during NATO's anniversary, before the later-controversial INF decision. The value of the particular set of data was thereby uncertain for the concluding observations that deal primarily with the period subsequent to the December, 1979 decision. The scope of the data is often equally frustrating; for example, an in-depth April, 1978 analysis was limited to only

CBS and the *New York Times*, media sources reputedly with similar political orientations.

NATO and the Atlantic Defense is a good source book for the NATO analyst. Its strength lies more in its collection of data from a wide range of sources than in its analysis based on those sources. It is interesting that in many respects its interpretation of the "perceptional gaps that separate many West Europeans from Americans regarding security matters and East-West relations" (p. 123) resemble the conclusions reached by several of the authors in the Broadhurst book. Clearly, the alliance does not lack for analysis or critics.

GALE A. MATTOX

U.S. Naval Academy

Canada and the Reagan Challenge: Crisis in the Canadian-American Relationship. By Stephen Clarkson. (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1982. Pp. xv + 383. $19.95, cloth; $12.95, paper.)

This list of issues dividing Canada and the United States grows ever longer; the stakes involved in their resolution larger. This is not surprising. Conflict is a predictable consequence of a close, intense relationship. The protectionist revival of recent years has created many of the disputes between the United States and Canada, our largest and most important trading partner. Bilateral relations have also been strained by deregulation of transportation, telecommunications, energy, and financial markets in the United States, as spillovers from increased competition have subjected regulated industries in Canada to great pressure. And, of course, misuse of shared common property resources such as airsheds and the Great Lakes is an important source of conflict. At the same time, both countries are committed to case-by-case negotiation of disputes, and this approach has never worked very well.

In response to the growing list of divisive issues, continentalists have called for greater integration: free trade, freer factor movement, further deregulation of price and entry controls, and the assignment of legally enforceable rights to common property resources. However, Clarkson is an economic nationalist. He would like to reduce conflict between the two countries by distancing Canada from the United States, repealing the logic of comparative advantage, and restricting consumer sovereignity. He is also a realist. He recognizes that the fantasies of both the continentalists and the nationalists will likely never be realized, that the current ad hoc approach to conflict resolution will remain the order of the day, and that the best one can hope for is to influence outcomes on a case-by-case basis. Like many Canadians, Clarkson has also recently discovered the relative weakness of the American executive branch and the power of Congress. Consequently, he has concluded that if disputes are to be resolved in Canada's favor, Canada must increase its capacity to influence Congress. He also concludes that to influence Congress, Canada must show that what it wants is actually in the interest of the United States. These conclusions likely also apply to U.S. attempts to influence Canadian policy, although the targets of U.S. representation would be somewhat different. The United States simply cannot threaten Canadian values without shooting itself in the foot.

This book is especially valuable as an antidote to the perception widespread in the United States that protectionism is found only in other countries. Clarkson outlines clearly the dimensions of American protectionism, the recent proliferation of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, and the role of interest groups in the elaboration of these policies. He is especially effective in showing how exclusive, special interests use reciprocity to justify further protectionism.

The one thing I don't understand is how Clarkson can be so discerning about American interest group politics and at the same time defend nearly identical policies and practices, with similar or worse outcomes, when they are found in Canada as "vital elements of a strategy of national development." I also cannot see how he can hold the Reagan administration responsible for the issues dividing Canada and the United States. Nor does Clarkson make any serious attempt to demonstrate its responsibility; he seems content to assert that Reagan is a dangerous conservative, promoting aggressive policies at home and abroad, and to leave it to the reader to make the connection.

FRED THOMPSON

Columbia University

Sadat and Begin: The Domestic Politics of Peacemaking. By Melvin A. Friedlander. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. Pp. ix + 338. $25.00, paper.)

Few matters pertaining to Middle Eastern politics are as surprising and fascinating than those periods when "peace" breaks out. Because peace happens so seldom, even when minimally defined, one almost begins to think that it is not supposed to happen.

Melvin Friedlander's book promises to help us understand how peace arrived in its most dramatic moment and colorful package. He sets out to describe and explain essentially how Sadat and Begin maneuvered their respective ways to Camp David. I suspect that his hope is that by showing us how these individuals were able to arrive at a peace settlement, others could translate a past success into a future one.

Sadat and Begin is not without certain positive qualities. Friedlander's discussion of the day-to-day events and manipulations that transpired before and during the Camp David peace process is useful for recalling details. It is an adequately documented work with a helpful bibliography.

Unfortunately, in a number of ways I found Friedlander's efforts to be more flawed than useful. There is neither a discernible systematic organizational scheme nor an analytical framework, and the narrative style, combined with an extreme fascination with the importance of Sadat and Begin, results in a thin analysis that ends by presenting politics as only melodrama. Although almost any analytical scheme has advantages and disadvantages, it seems to me that the choice apparently made by Friedlander to employ no systematic framework whatsoever is the least desirable one.

One might expect from the subtitle to find Friedlander making the case that Sadat's and Begin's policy choices were made and pursued within the context of their respective polities. And in this sense I additionally expected to be presented either directly or indirectly with an argument that the policymakers' international choices were substantially prefigured domestically. Had Friedlander fully developed such an argument, it would certainly be plausible and possibly compelling. He leaves the impression that Sadat and Begin were historical characters considerably larger than the contexts within which they had to operate. But a consequence of having nothing to evaluate with, or hold on to, is one of simply dangling or becoming mystical about "great people" and "leadership."

This lack of a useful organizational and analytical scheme also hinders Friedlander's account of the larger international setting of Camp David. Here again, one is presented with a picture of characters stepping out of, and quite beyond, existing structures and processes.

Finally, Friedlander's analysis contributes to an extension of what I see as dysfunctional Camp David mythology. According to Friedlander, Camp David, and by only a little extrapolation the entire Middle East peace process, can be accomplished only through the dedicated actions of "heroes on horseback." The "heroic" rendition of this chapter in history is wrapped in the following rhetoric: "Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin succeeded in March 1979 to lay the cornerstone for peace in the Middle East. Sadat lost his life in that effort . . . the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty bears testimony to what can be achieved with political will, courage, and determination" (p. 315). Testimonials such as this fail to help one usefully grapple with the many complexities of Middle Eastern international affairs.

CARL F. PINKELE

Ohio Wesleyan University

Ground Rules: Soviet and American Involvement in Regional Conflicts. By Joanne Gowa and Nils H. Wessell. (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1982. Pp. xi + 104. $3.95, paper.)

This book, a part of Philadelphia Policy Papers series, seeks to develop theory on the applicability of explicit, agreed, mutual restraints on the superpower competition. The purpose of such ground rules would be to reduce the chances of confrontations that could escalate to nuclear war. Such rules are needed because of the weaknesses of other mechanisms: Tacit rules of the game are too ambiguous, crisis management carries with it too high of a risk of disaster should it fail, and linkage strategies depend on levers that are too weak and too incompletely controlled by the president to be greatly effective. Compliance with ground rules would be made likely by the norm of reciprocity, mutual interest in preserving the agreed upon regime of restraint, bureaucratic inertia, and the like.

The strongest part of the book is the discussion of types of agreed limitations and the conditions under which they are likely to be effective. Gowa and Wessell focus specifically on various limits on conventional arms transfers; confidence building measures, especially restraints on troop deployments and movements; naval deployments limitations; and consultative mechanisms.

Having discussed ground rules in the abstract, Gowa and Wessell turn to their potential applicability in specific situations. They examine three cases—the Horn of Africa, South Africa, and Yugoslavia—chosen to represent varying ripeness of U.S. competition with the Soviets. Their narratives of the historical backgrounds of each situation are all solidly done. When Gowa and Wessell speculate about the future and analyze American interests, though, their treatment becomes more suspect. For instance, they write: "The danger of a Soviet-American confrontation in another Somali-Ethiopian war lies in the heavy Soviet commitment to Ethiopia and the potential entanglement of the United States in any renewal of large-scale fighting" (p. 45). But the nature of both superpowers' policies in this region has been to preserve the territorial status quo. Such policies are the strongest safeguard against a serious clash in the area. Similarly, they write:

"The advent of a black government in the republic . . . would probably deny the West the strategic military resources of South Africa, while creating at least the potential for Soviet access to the country's well-developed naval facilities" (p. 67). Why would a nationalist black government do such a thing? It would certainly be harmful to its economy. As the examples of Angola and Zimbabwe demonstrate, revolutionary governments do set out to protect their ties to the capitalist trade and capital markets, not to destroy them.

The net impact of *Ground Rules* is to call into question the value of ground rules as an approach to conflict regulation. Sometimes, as in the Horn of Africa and South Africa, confidence building measures presume close superpower control over clients. In other instances, the approach seems to require superpower duopoly, so that third and fourth parties cannot challenge the interests of the superpowers and cause the regime to collapse.

The use of ground rules requires exceptionally clear thinking about the nature of American interests. In a number of places, Gowa and Wessell argue against particular hypothetical restraints because they would deny the U.S. some geopolitical advantage. But if the danger of nuclear war is indeed unacceptably high, one must ask whether any geopolitical advantage is worth the risk. On the other hand, if the risk is quite low, then how valuable are the ground rules?

More importantly, *Ground Rules* seems to fall victim to the tyranny of method. The authors note that, "One might also conjecture that agreement on the exclusion of external military personnel, particularly combat troops, from a region is not likely to be negotiable if either superpower is plainly not going to introduce its own forces or those of a proxy into the area. . . . Once either superpower has introduced forces under its control into the region in the absence of a countervailing response by the other, as is true in the Horn, prospects for an accord would seem to dim" (pp. 101-102). But such asymmetry of action reflects asymmetry of interests. Such situations do not contain the seeds of major crisis. To escalate a conflict in order to gain bargaining strength makes the ground rules an end in themselves. The original end, superpower stability, becomes sacrificed to the means.

PATRICK CALLAHAN

DePaul University

Friends in Conflict: The Anglo-Icelandic Cod Wars and the Law of the Sea. By Hannes Jónsson. (Hamden, Conn.: Shoestring Press, 1982. Pp. xi + 240. $34.00.)

I had greatly anticipated reviewing this book—after all, political science analyses of direct interest to Iceland aficionados are uncommon—and, in fact, the subject matter proved fascinating. Hannes Jónsson clearly delineates many of the arguments and processes that underlay Iceland's four extensions of fisheries jurisdiction between 1952 and 1975, as that country moved from a 3-mile limit that followed the sinuosities of the coast to 4, 12, 50 and ultimately 200-mile limits measured from straight base lines. The author, an Icelandic civil servant and diplomat who played a facilitative role in these increasing claims, treats his topic from a predominately international law perspective. However, since he construes international law in a realistic manner, giving due weight to political, economic, scientific, and military considerations, and since each extension provoked a hostile British reaction, with three of the occasions featuring the prolonged interposition of British warships in avowedly Icelandic waters, the study could easily be relevant to readers with a variety of disciplinary concerns.

Hannes Jónsson demonstrates a much more thorough and sympathetic comprehension of Icelandic than British decision making. For Iceland, he draws upon many studies by other Icelandic authors, a large number of government publications (some of which he himself had composed), and extensive personal knowledge. Surprisingly, though, he deliberately omits, even from an 9-page bibliography, detailed studies of Icelandic politics by outsiders that seem indisputably germaine to his task (e.g., Donald Nuechterlein's *Iceland: Reluctant Ally,* Cornell University Press, 1961). Apart from references to parties and elections, Hannes Jónsson is also chary about providing information on Iceland's domestic political scene: In particular, he completely ignores his country's interest group structure, much of which is embedded in the fishing industry.

Data on British politics are more narrowly derived. Aside from official documents and correspondence and some material produced by the British Trawlers' Federation, the only written source explicitly cited is a 4-page account of "Britain-Iceland 1958-62" in M.D. Donelan and M.J. Grieve's *International Disputes: Case Histories 1945-1970* (St. Martin's Press, 1973, pp. 164-167). Moreover, like many another Icelander, Hannes Jónsson vastly overrates the political influence of the British distant water fishing industry. He speaks, for example, of "the powerful political lobby at work in London [in 1958], constantly demanding protection of the British trawlers in Icelandic waters"; of the marginality of the parliamentary seats at Grimsby and Hull probably providing "one of the main reasons why the British Government yielded to pressure from the fishing industry and sent the British warships to Icelandic waters"; and of the British government, 15 years later, having again "yielded to political pressure groups from Humberside and sent several British frigates into Icelandic waters . . ." (pp. 91, 95, 138). In actuality, Britain's distant water trawling interests possessed little political clout or savvy, especially in 1958. They scarcely knew their way around Whitehall. They certainly were not telling the Foreign Office and Admiralty what to do: They were being told. Lord Home, then Foreign Secretary, may have claimed otherwise in a December, 1960 letter to his Icelandic opposite number—"Your Government is fully aware of the difficulties which we face with our fishing industry . . . [especially given] the approach of the Spring fishing season" (p. 102)—but that is hardly persuasive evidence. Government officials often seek refuge in the plea that their hands are tied by constituent opinion.

Throughout his book, Hannes Jónsson completely rejects the British legal position, which he dubs "colonial," and, except for feeling that Iceland acted too slowly on a couple of occasions, consistently applauds the Icelandic approach, which he labels "progressive." He believes that Iceland in 1972 was legally justified in renouncing the 12-mile agreement that it had reached with Britain just 11 years earlier and unilaterally moving on to 50 miles, and he cites such elastic doctrines as *rebus sic stantibus* and prior duress to support his position. My own impression, and that of the International Court of Justice, is that Britain occupied sounder legal grounds at the time. Law per se, though, was not going to be determinative, and neither was power politics. Even as a middle-sized nation, Britain was far mightier than Iceland, but the disparity would scarcely help. As Walter Lippmann observed long ago, the exercise of power politics is often like trying to thread a needle while wearing boxing gloves. Iceland, in short, won all four of the fisheries disputes and Britain lost all four, not because of legal right and wrong, nor even because of tactical brilliance and foolishness, but because no counteraction was available to Britain that would not look clumsy and disproportionate.

MORRIS DAVIS

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

The Third World in Soviet Military Thought. By Mark N. Katz. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. Pp. 188. $18.50.)

Soviet military intervention in the Third World is a relatively new phenomenon. As the Soviets demonstrated their capability to intervene, not only did third-world conflicts assume a greater significance in international politics, but the implications of Soviet military involvement also became a more central—and more disruptive—aspect of East-West relations. Mark Katz addresses a neglected but significant facet of this subject.

On the basis of a survey of Soviet sources, primarily periodical literature, Katz traces the evolution of Soviet military thinking about conflict in the Third World through several phases including that of the Stalin and Khruschev eras, but the focus of the monograph is on three somewhat arbitrarily defined phases of the Brezhnev era. Katz distinguishes six aspects of primary concern to Soviet military—and incidentally also of academic and Party—writers: the link between local and general war, the typology of third-world conflicts, the effect of peaceful coexistence on local wars, the role of indigenous radical forces in the Third World, the interpretation of American thinking and involvement in local wars, and the role of the Soviet Union in third-world conflicts. Katz notes significant shifts in Soviet writing on each of these issues, reflecting changes in the Soviets' own capabilities as well as in American policies and in the nature of third-world conflicts and international political alignments.

Following a series of conservative military coups against radical leaders in the mid-1960s, the Soviets were obliged to reassess the assumptions of the Khruschev era. It had been thought that socialist regimes would proliferate and Soviet influence grow in the Third World without any significant effort on the part of the Soviet Union. In the Brezhnev era Soviet military writers expressed doubts about the ability of either radical political leaders or military regimes to establish socialism or become reliable allies of the Soviet Union. It was concluded that without greater military commitment, Soviet gains in the Third World would be eroded. At the same time, the military had become convinced that peaceful coexistence allowed greater Soviet involvement in third-world conflicts at less risk of direct Soviet-American confrontation. By the mid-1970s, they were not only confident of Soviet ability to effectively intervene in third-world conflicts, but also to deter the West from intervention. However, they had not begun to advocate military intervention until it had already proved to be successful.

That leads to the question, What is the relationship between Soviet military writing and Soviet policy? Katz's answer is that while changes in military thinking about the Soviet role in third-world conflicts have not preceded policy shifts—changing events are a more reliable guide to change in policy—discussion of a particular policy indicates that it has been judged successful and therefore likely to be pursued in the future. He also suggests that "Soviet military thinking sheds light on the changing expectations that the Soviets have *vis à vis* the Third World" (p. 11). No doubt but the conclusion that the changing expectations "shape" Soviet policy neglects the fact that any set of expectations can lead to more than one policy. The policymaking difficulties and the ideological issues raised by contemporary wars are indicated by the variety of formulations and typologies that Soviet writers have applied to defining third-world conflicts. How is the "just" side to be identified in a war that has no discernible class basis—territorial and ethnic conflicts as well as wars between socialist states?

The conclusions of the study are previewed in the Introduction, summed up at the end of each chapter, and grouped together and restated in the concluding chapter of the monograph. But this repetitiveness is a minor criticism of an important scholarly work. There is also a very useful and comprehensive 15-page bibliography consisting mainly of Soviet periodical sources.

In an epilogue Katz makes a number of policy suggestions for the United States. For instance, he argues that radical third-world regimes maintain a degree of independence from the Soviet Union which the United States should encourage—"refusing to deal" with them is self-defeating. Although not specifically derived from his conclusions, the observations on policy together with the conclusions of the study make a valuable contribution to the current debate over the implications of Soviet military intervention in third-world conflicts. Among other things, the monograph offers more data on which to base arguments over Soviet perceptions of détente and the relative "success" and "failure" of Soviet as well as American policies in the Third World.

RITA PUTINS PETERS

University of Massachusetts-Boston

Will Europe Fight for Oil? Energy Relations in the Atlantic Area. Edited by Robert J. Lieber. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. x + 230. $23.95.)

This collection of papers is based on the Committee on Atlantic Studies' Conference on Energy and the Atlantic Alliance held in October, 1981 in Italy. The primary topic is a fascinating and underexplored one—recent tensions in the relations between the United States and Western Europe due to the oil shocks of 1973 and 1974 and 1979 and 1980—but the quality of the contributions is decidedly uneven.

The best chapters do provide penetrating analyses of a couple of central themes. One such theme is that recent American oil policies have consistently emphasized containing the Soviet Union more than have European policies. For example, Robert Lieber underscores European skepticism about the American desire for an increased military presence in the Persian Gulf to protect oil fields from Soviet control (pp. 4-6). Bruce Jentleson contrasts the recent European resentment and defiance of American sanctions on the Soviet natural gas pipeline with the somewhat more effective American pressure on Germany in the early 1960s regarding Soviet oil pipeline construction (pp. 49, 53-55). Edward Wonder shows how the Reagan administration's anxiety over Soviet influence in Central America and the Caribbean relates to the large deposits of oil in Mexico, and how the Europeans have generally neither shared this anxiety nor the strategies accompanying it (p. 157). A second major theme is how the international economic downturn precipitated by the oil shocks has increased competitive tensions between the United States and Europe. Lieber reveals that these tensions are based on slowed growth, inflation, and unemployment in members of the Atlantic Alliance (p. 7), while Walter Goldstein indicates that a "third oil shock"—the appreciation of the American dollar in 1981 and 1982—has exacerbated tensions by causing Europeans to pay even higher prices for oil (pp. 173-174).

But many of the remaining chapters seem problematic. Contributions by Guy de Carmoy and Reimund Seidelmann seem deficient in that they are parochial expressions of French and German government positions on oil issues and do not take into sufficient account flaws or possible negative implications of official arguments. Frederick Gorbet's chapter presents a future energy outlook that, at least in the short term, has been inaccurate. For example, he predicts that the oil market would reach "balance" in 1982 (p. 20), whereas in reality the glut has continued and increased through 1983. Finally, Ronald Inglehart contributes an essay on domestic opposition within Western nations to nuclear power that seems to have little to do with the oil/gas focus of the rest of the book.

Most of the chapters do not address each other's arguments, and so controversial contentions often remain untouched (except perhaps in the editor's introduction). The analyses presented are not placed enough in the context of either American-European relations outside of the energy arena or international oil developments outside of the Atlantic Alliance. For instance, there is inadequate exploration in the first case of the interrelationship between friction concerning American missiles in Europe and that concerning oil security, and in the second case of the implications of the growing debt crisis in developing countries (partially precipitated by declining oil prices) and the declining cohesion within OPEC. Despite these difficulties, this book continues and expands an important dialogue on key transatlantic energy tensions facing the West.

ROBERT MANDEL

Lewis and Clark College

Soviet Style in War. By Nathan Leites. (New York: Crane, Russak, 1982. Pp. xxvi + 398. $22.50.)

For this Rand Corporation Research Study, Nathan Leites examined a large number of Soviet military publications in an attempt to derive from them the major elements of the operational code of the Soviet military authorities and some insights into how Soviet forces, especially their ground forces, could be expected to behave in a future war. After an introductory summary of his findings, Leites proceeds by mean of vast numbers of quotations to demonstrate the Soviet High Command's concern with: (1) warding off a pervasive penchant for inaction at all levels and promoting the use of all-out, simultaneous, uninterrupted, and crushing actions against the enemy; (2) eliminating a tendency toward slowness and procrastination and fostering rapid and decisive actions; (3) countering various forms of lack of realism in regard to the diverse kinds of obstacles that are likely to confront Soviet forces in a war situation; (4) resisting a perceived penchant for passivity and timidity and instilling a strong offensive orientation and an understanding of the value of preemptive strikes; (5) enhancing the cohesion within the Soviet forces and splitting the enemy's forces and destroying their internal cohesion; and (6) combatting a disinclination among their subordinates to proceed in a rational and calculating manner under pressure and finding ways to disrupt the enemy's capacity to calculate, particularly through the use of surprise.

Then, in a short final chapter, Leites attempts to draw whatever inferences he can from his analysis of Soviet military attitudes at the tactical level for their rarely discussed views about strategic nuclear war. Here he argues that the strong Soviet emphasis on rapid, massive, preemptive counterforce attacks applies primarily to the fighting of a possible conventional or tactical nuclear war. While this orientation would also be applicable to a strategic nuclear war situation, Leites believes that it, as well as the Soviet argument that any use of nuclear weapons will inevitably escalate to the use of strategic weapons, is primarily designed to deter an all-out nuclear exchange since the Soviet authorities recognize that such an exchange would raise Soviet losses to an unacceptable level.

Leites's research will undoubtedly be of some value to those who wish to gain a fuller understanding of the major emphases in Soviet military science and military art. The discussion throughout of the Soviet stress on offensive operations and on the value of surprise will be of particular interest. With its many citations from military memoirs, *Soviet Style in War* makes it very clear how much the lessons of World War II continue to dominate Soviet military thought. In addition, the book effectively highlights what the military authorities perceive to be the negative tendencies among their own personnel and within Soviet society generally.

On the other hand, it seems doubtful that many readers will want to wade through what is essentially a massive collage of quotations. Most of the book consists not of Leites's own writing, but rather of snippets of varying length taken from Soviet publications and arranged under various headings and subheadings. Leites's method of content analysis appears to be one of a computer-assisted word search in which certain key words are found, and then all cases in which they appear, regardless of the context, time-frame, the service involved, or the size of the unit, are presented. The resulting work is extremely redundant and would certainly profit from being edited to perhaps a quarter of its present length.

Other problems with Leites's study include the fact that except for some works by Germans about their experiences fighting against Soviet troops in World War II, very few Western analyses of the Soviet military appear to have been consulted, and almost no comparisons are made between Soviet military thinking and that of their potential opponents. With his stress on continuity of Soviet military attitudes, Leites devotes little attention to changes in Soviet military thought since World War II and none to Soviet reactions to the type of operations carried out in Vietnam or Afghanistan. Although the "Bolshevik attitude" is referred to on numerous occasions, there is no discussion of political-military relations and very little on the broader aspects of

Soviet military doctrine. These and other drawbacks severely limit the book's value.

DAVID L. WILLIAMS

Ohio University

A History of the United Nations: Vol. 1, **The Years of Western Domination, 1945-1955.** By Evan Luard. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. Pp. viii + 404. $27.50.)

This study, the first volume of a projected history of the United Nations, describes the creation of the organization in Part 1 and the major events it dealt with during its first decade of existence in Part 2. Among the topics specifically analyzed in the much larger second section are: the negotiations for a Security Council force; Azerbaijan (Iran) and the Levant; Greece; Indonesia; Palestine; trouble spots in Europe such as Trieste, Berlin, and the human rights issue in Eastern Europe; the Korean War; Kashmir; Guatemala; some Far Eastern affairs such as the offshore islands, the captured United States' airmen in China, Chinese representation, and the Temple of Preah Vihear; disarmament; the Secretary-General and Secretariat; and membership disputes.

Luard's analysis is free from needless jargon and is, for the most part, factually accurate. It fails, however, to break any significant new ground, since it simply recapitulates facts which, for the most part, have been recited elsewhere. In addition, I found the inconsistency regarding documentation unsatisfactory. Without any discernible reason, Luard chooses to document an occasional fact or quotation (for example, p. 387, n. 1 on chap. 9) rather than all of his sources. Such paucity of documentation will limit this study's usefulness for serious academic scholars. Luard also fails to mention the existence of the 22 volumes of the records of the San Francisco Conference contained in the *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organizations* and the existence of such essential analyses of the world organization as those by Inis Claude or Leland Goodrich among numerous others. A bibliography would also have been in order.

Luard does offer a useful analysis of the causes for the United Nation's failure to make more headway towards achieving peaceful settlements. "There was one reason above all others why the UN failed. . . . It was seen . . . rather as a battleground than as a peace chamber: as a means of scoring points rather than of securing settlements; as an instrument for confrontation rather than for conciliation" (pp. 381-382). In the negotiations leading up to the end of the mandate in Palestine, for example, there was a "determination to resolve problems by counting heads and voting victories, rather than by any serious effort at conciliation and compromise between the parties mainly concerned" (p. 184). As Luard points out, "ironically enough, this was precisely the method which was later to be so often denounced and decried by Israel" (p. 185), and by the United States it might be added, as "the tyranny of the majority." In conclusion, Luard declares only a little too strongly: "If, throughout this period, the UN failed to become a forum for effective negotiation on world problems, or to find the means to solve them by consensus, and if it therefore failed to reach any decisions at all on many questions, it is the Western majority who must take the main share of the blame for it" (p. 375). The communist states would have probably acted in a similar manner if they had controlled the majority, Luard adds.

The U.N. was not without some achievements during its first decade, however. Luard sees Indonesia, Azerbaijan (Iran), the Greek Civil War, the Berlin Blockade, the captured U.S. airmen in China, and the Thai-Cambodian dispute over the Temple of Preah Vihear as some specific examples. The common thread here was that "the customary methods were abandoned and confidential negotiations were effectively instituted" (p. 380).

Although, as Luard himself admits, this is not going to be the "definitive . . . history of the United Nations" (p. vii), it will serve as an introductory text.

MICHAEL M. GUNTER

Tennessee Technological University

Ideology of a Superpower: Contemporary Soviet Doctrine on International Relations. By R. Judson Mitchell. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1982. Pp. xiv + 159. $10.95, paper.)

This text analyzes revisions in Soviet doctrine on international politics since the mid-1960s. Mitchell argues that the result of these revisions has been the development of an "ideology of a superpower." His analysis is based exclusively on a review of Soviet sources. Most of the sources analyzed were intended for the domestic audience, but Mitchell has also reviewed materials directed at foreign audiences.

In Mitchell's view, recent doctrinal revisions can be summarized into four categories: "reevaluation of factors in the correlation of forces," "identification of a qualitative change in the correlation and its consequences," "predictions concerning the restructuring of world politics," and "explicit revisions of previously accepted doctrines, particularly those of the Khrushchev era." Each of these revisions is related to Soviet foreign policy, and several have had an impact on domestic affairs as well.

Soviet theorists on international affairs have long emphasized the correlation of forces and the two-camp doctrine. In recent years, Soviet theorists have spoken of the importance of the subjective factor in this correlation. The growing importance of the subjective factor, an element of the superstructure, is related to objective changes in the correlation of forces, that is, the emergence of the USSR as a world power. Given the shift in the correlation of forces, Soviet spokesmen see continued gains for the socialist camp. One implication of this new emphasis on the subjective factor in world politics is that the socialist camp could be undermined by the imperialist camp. Such a possibility was developed in the articulation of the Brezhnev Doctrine.

One aspect of the restructuring of global politics has relevance for domestic politics as well. Soviet theorists now argue that there will be a division of labor in society even after the achievement of communism. Such a doctrinal revision serves to legitimize continued party control within the USSR and the world revolutionary movement. Continued elite rule is necessary precisely because of the importance of the subjective factor in the correlation of forces and the need to defend the ideology.

Several doctrines enunciated during the Khrushchev era have been revised. Khrushchev denied the possibility of bourgeois restoration in socialist states. Contemporary Soviet spokesmen, in the Brezhnev Doctrine and elsewhere, acknowledge that bourgeois restoration is possible. In addition, Khrushchev argued that the period of capitalist encirclement had ended. Contemporary Soviet theorists agree, but contemporary analyses focus on the growth of Soviet military power as the reason for the end of capitalist encirclement. Given the growth of Soviet military power and shifts in the correlation of forces, Soviet spokesmen now implicitly hint at a socialist encirclement of capitalism.

Ideology of a Superpower can be criticized only on the basis of what it fails to include. In a sense, it is unfortunate that it was published in April, 1982. Much has changed in Soviet politics since that time, and these changes might have had an impact on doctrinal revision. No mention could be made of the impact, if any, of doctrinal revisions since Brezhnev's death. In addition, little is said about Soviet doctrine and doctrinal revisions on the subject of nuclear weapons and nuclear war. This is unfortunate given the importance of such weapons to the correlation of forces and to Soviet-American relations.

Despite these omissions, *Ideology of a Superpower* is an important text that should be considered by scholars and policymakers. Mitchell has documented the assertion that Soviet doctrine and Soviet policy are related, and thus Soviet doctrine must be analyzed.

DAVID T. JERVIS

Temple University

The Soviet First Strike Threat: The U.S. Perspective. By Jack H. Nunn. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. Pp. xii + 292. $31.95.)

In the parlance of national security analysts, "the threat" is a phrase applied in a variety of contexts. Above all others, however, this phrase has become a shorthand reference for the capabilities of Soviet strategic forces and the intentions of the leaders who control them. As with many other works, Jack Nunn's book is concerned with this understanding of "the threat." Specifically, Nunn focuses on "the threat of a disarming first strike . . . one that essentially eliminates the ability of the victim to strike back at the attacker" (p. 10). Nunn is interested in the evolution and accuracy of U.S. perceptions of the possibility of a Soviet disarming first strike. On balance, Nunn's work examines these issues competently and thoroughly.

Nunn takes an historical approach to his subject matter. Before examining the threat of a disarming first strike in the nuclear age, he devotes two chapters to an analysis of the preoccupation of past officials with earlier manifestations of a disarming first strike, namely, sea and air attack. This discussion, somewhat inappropriate for a book which purports to examine the U.S. perspective of the Soviet first strike threat, should have been reserved for a dissertation.

The core of Nunn's analysis is contained in chapters 5 through 7, which examine the possibility of a disarming Soviet strike through the eyes of officials from the Eisenhower era to the Reagan administration. These chapters benefit from thorough knowledge and extensive citation of government studies on Soviet first strike capabilities as well as a willingness to examine dissenting (largely military) viewpoints. They are concisely, clearly written, although it is a bit surprising that Nunn devotes relatively little effort therein to the Minuteman vulnerability problem that has generated such concern and controversy over the past decade. Also, while not critical to Nunn's analysis, it would have been beneficial had he included even a limited review of Soviet perceptions of U.S. first strike capabilities or an informed discussion of the role of surprise in Soviet military strategy.

Chapter 8 contains Nunn's overall assessment of the validity of the disarming first strike threat. While his conclusions will engender disagreement from some quarters, they are presented forcefully and manifest thorough understanding of the issues. Nunn argues that in fact "there is no single disarming first strike threat. Not only is the concept itself dynamic . . . but also, the threat is highly dependent upon the strategy chosen to achieve the nation's security objectives . . ." (p. 249). From this foundation Nunn extends his argument to state that the U.S. perception of the disarming threat "has been derived then as much from how the country has viewed itself as from its view of the Soviets" (p. 253).

The consequences of the U.S. preoccupation on surprise and attendant force vulnerability have far-reaching ramifications for U.S. national security policy. As Nunn correctly observes, the "bolt from the blue" is a threat that has little validity today. However, the continuing focus on the first strike threat obscures the character of other threats confronting U.S. leaders. Nunn concludes that although a massive nuclear attack cannot be discounted, "the long-term military and political threat of expanding Soviet influence appears a more reasonable matter for concern" (p. 258). In the wake of this assessment Nunn's resulting prescription is for a security policy oriented for a long, steady struggle rather than sprints of concern generated by Soviet strategic capabilities. While not original, such advice never seems gratuitous.

JOHN M. CARAVELLI

Georgetown University

Imperialism and Dependency: Obstacles to African Development. By Daniel A. Offiong. (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1982. Pp. xii + 304. $12.95, cloth; $6.95, paper.)

In recent years radical critiques of contemporary North-South relations have achieved a certain respectability in Western academic circles: It is generally conceded, even among those who disagree with them, that the work of such authors as Cardoso, Sunkel, Wallerstein, or dos Santos adheres to the accepted norms of academic scholarship. Offiong's book derives from another, angrier and more polemical tradition: This is a book whose intention is not so much to investigate dispassionately as to convince. As such, it makes for lively and stimulating reading, but it also falls prey to many of the pitfalls to which works of its genre are prone.

The main theme of the book is clearly and emphatically stated. In Offiong's view, "African underdevelopment is the result of economic imperialism and the consequent dependency" (p. 53), and the continent's "primary and most crucial problem is [its] position in the world economy and stratification of power" (p. 33). The process of African underdevelopment began, in his view, during the colonial period when "by exporting the profits created by African labour to Europe, the development of Europe was assured while dialectically this meant the underdevelopment of Africa" (p. 110), and is maintained today by American multinational corporations which "plunder" and "pillage" (p. 166) the countries in which they invest. While these broad themes are similar to those of many radical critiques, Offiong expresses them in an unusually contentious and freewheeling style. He does not, for example, hide his contempt for Western academics, whom he views as "apologists for imperialism" (p. 16), the "arch-priests" (p. 20) of an outmoded ideology whose work he variously styles "ignorant" (p. 49) and "nonsensical" (p. 24), marked by "egregious errors" (p. 24) and the "*bias* (polite term for racism) which generally characterizes white analysis of blacks the world over" (p. 258).

In many ways the book, although it was first published in 1980 (the American edition under review was published in 1982), seems curiously dated. The works cited, for example, are primarily of the 1960s or the early 1970s, with extensive attention to the early work of such modernization theorists as McClelland, Hagen, and Rostow and the 1960s writings of Frank, Fanon, and Nkrumah. The emphasis is on critiques of modernization theory, Western dependence on third-world minerals, and the misdeeds of the CIA, and there is little sense of more contemporary debates over corporatism, "associated-dependent development," and the autonomy of the state in underdeveloped countries. Even factual discussions are often outdated: for example, Offiong spends several pages (pp. 66-72) criticizing the European Community's Yaounde Convention, commenting that Guinea and Algeria cannot become members because "socialist countries that are former colonies cannot join" (p. 71), even though the Yaounde Convention was superseded by the Lome Convention nearly a decade ago, and both Guinea and Algeria are now associated with the Community. Moreover, the economic statistics cited seldom extend beyond the late 1960s or the early 1970s, which seriously undermines discussion of such problems as the third-world debt crisis.

In addition, the book is prone to casual over-statement: Idi Amin's coup in Uganda was "masterminded" by the Israelis (p. 142); Mobutu's Zaire is a "puppet" of NATO (p. 49); the United States and its NATO allies "remove[d]" Nkrumah from office (p. 243); Richard Nixon was "put in office by business giants" (p. 79); NATO was formed "not to fight the Soviet Union and its allies but to facilitate the domination and exploitation of the underdeveloped countries" (p. 245). Part of the reason for this may be that the sources cited have been rather indiscriminately chosen, ranging from mainstream academic works and official reports to the writings of Gus Hall, to Nigerian newspaper articles, to the "typical racist commentary" (p. 92) on American television of John Chancellor and David Brinkley, to class lecture notes.

Finally, the book is poorly written: it is repetitive and poorly organized, relies heavily on very long block quotations, and is marked by numerous stylistic and spelling errors, and incorrect references.

Offiong's book does have some features that might recommend it to those within the broad mainstream of development studies. He is, for example, effective in attacking the cultural bias of the early psychological theories of modernization (*n*-achievement and the like) and the application of what he calls the "Calvinist cult" to the Third World (p. 14). And few would deny that there exist within most underdeveloped countries groups that have "connived with foreign interests to rob their countries of their much needed foreign exchange and have been involved in all sorts of unpatriotic activities that fail to aid economic development" (p. 75), or that "what poor countries need may not be expensive Euro-American four-wheel tractors which very few can buy, operate and repair, but better hoes and ox plows" (p. 135).

In sum, Offiong has written a lively, provocative, and at times illuminating analysis of third-world underdevelopment. Whatever their ideological persuasion, students of contemporary North-South relations will find it interesting reading.

VINCENT A. MAHLER

Loyola University of Chicago

The World Bank: A Critical Analysis. By Cheryl Payer. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982. Pp. 414. $20.00, cloth; $12.00, paper.)

The influence of the World Bank through the deployment of its resources over the strategies and possibilities of third-world development is enormous. How this influence is brought to bear, the interests that it serves, and the ultimate impact on development prospects remain critical and knotty questions. Cheryl Payer's answers to these questions in this wide-ranging, even encyclopedic, book are unequivocal. Although the World Bank's mission has been to attack the sources of poverty, it has served to perpetuate and extend the sinews of world capitalism that sustain that poverty. The indictment made by Payer could not be more fundamental. The World Bank and the rhetoric of its most prominent president, Robert S. McNamara, assume that "the poor are poor because they have been 'left behind' or 'ignored' by their country's progress, when in fact most are poor because they are the victims of that so-called progress" (pp. 57-58). The purpose of the analysis, organized by the type of sectors—industrial, agricultural, mining, etc.—that the World Bank targets, is to reveal the systematic class bias of its activity. This bias is toward the interests of international capital, forging links with their domestic counterparts and creating the conditions for the secure and prosperous introduction of foreign investment. The World Bank, in this analysis, becomes an agent for the extension and incorporation of the international system of markets and capital, working at the edges through its myriad of lending programs and development projects.

Payer finds the class bias of World Bank programs in all the various development categories. Infrastructure investments serve the national bureaucratic and commercial classes. Structural adjustment financing diminishes domestic control over national economic choices and encourages the dismantling of protectionist barriers. Agricultural programs destroy subsistence farming and integrate it into larger markets. Investments in oil and gas industries are carefully delimited to avoid encroaching on the domain of the multinationals.

The strength of the book lies in its analysis of the World Bank as an institution that has developed an ideology of development and sought to advance it systematically through a structured agenda and set of programs. Quite apart from judgments concerning the Bank's impact on poverty, one cannot fail to be convinced of its emergence as an active, entrepreneurial organization working on the periphery to selectively foster productive enterprise and (indirectly) the social groups and classes disposed to support it.

But for those who find the interesting questions to be not only whether the World Bank serves to strengthen the international capitalist system but also how the Bank influences the changing position and resources of actors within that system, the book will not be entirely satisfactory. If foreign investment and enhanced industrial productivity are completely inimical to the economic and welfare opportunities of the Third World poor, Payer will have provided the definitive brief for World Bank complicity. But if the returns on World Bank development and investment programs are more mixed, Payer will have only raised vexing questions. For example, as Payer notes, the World Bank has sought to enhance the analytic capacities of host governments in raw materials foreign investment ventures through such projects as geological surveys (pp. 199-203). More attention to these cases, where the Bank has explicitly attempted to alter international bargaining patterns, might reveal how the international institution has exercised its influence at the margin or has been used as a resource by domestic governmental and commercial elites.

These issues that seek to draw out the variable impact of World Bank activities and the contingent relationship between international capital and domestic structures do not command much attention in this book. Rather, Payer is concerned with drawing out the midwife relationship of the Bank to international capital. From this it is a simple step for Payer to argue that the World Bank has a regressive impact on world poverty. This is because in some sense the conclusion is built into the premises—namely that the international system of capital and markets is inimical to the Third World poor. For the reader who shares this premise, the empirical analysis is effective exposition. For the reader who does not share this premise, the empirical analysis will not be sufficient to make a convincing case.

Nonetheless, this book provides an important and provocative interpretation of the political economy of a powerful international organization. Payer advances our understanding of how that organization buttresses foreign investment behavior and impinges on domestic development opportunities. Debate will continue on whether the World Bank has helped perpetuate or abate Third World poverty and unemployment. What is increasingly clear, and well-argued in this book, is that the World Bank has become a forceful and programmatic presence within the capitalist system for a particular style of development. For good or ill, that presence is substantial.

JOHN IKENBERRY

The University of Chicago

American Foreign Policy: The Lost Consensus. By George H. Quester. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. Pp. 276. $27.95, cloth; $12.95, paper.)

Without ever using the term Vietnam syndrome George Quester has evaluated the history of U.S. foreign policy and its current confusion in an effort to restore faith in U.S. foreign policy exceptionalism and in the value of U.S. "altruistic interventionism." The book adds significantly to current debates over U.S. foreign policy by arguing that the old consensus was valuable and sensible, and that its present decline is not a simple swing of the pendulum away from interventionism toward isolationism, but rather represents a fundamental confusion among Americans about the proper objectives of the United States in the international arena. The Vietnam syndrome, by inference, is as inappropriate as current reactions to it. Neither revisionist nor realpolitik interpretations of U.S. involvement in the world at large are adequate, and both ignore the crucial thread of liberal U.S. aims in the world: the creation or support of political democracy.

Quester's historical description of U.S. intervention as "altruistic" is uneven. At times, lacking a straightforward proof of this admittedly difficult thesis, he seeks to demonstrate by exclusion that altruism must have been an important, if not primary, U.S. motivation when compared with radical (economic) or realpolitik (balance of power) explanations. He admits that the apparent racism of both U.S. domestic and international preferences for whites and white regimes throws a monkey wrench into the altruism argument. However, in granting the point and demonstrating its problematic nature for the rest of his argument, Quester strengthens his argument with clear and insightful descriptions of the ambiguities and contradictions of U.S. preferences. The chapter on ethnic politics and racism is superb.

As the book moves into more current issues, the argument is stronger than it was in the beginning of the book. Quester shows that U.S. foreign policy consensus splintered after Vietnam. For the first time, not only the means but also the aims of the U.S. came into question. The debate, Quester asserts, comes down to a choice between political democracy or economic democracy. He argues that a preference for political democracy is no longer uniformly held among Americans, and that they are looking back at the history of U.S. foreign policy with doubt. Perhaps the aim of economic equality should have come first, at least in some instances, and perhaps it is a more appropriate goal for the developing world. In an analysis that echoes Tocqueville, Quester asserts that while both equality and liberty are desirable objectives, they are in conflict. Nonetheless, the liberty objective that the U.S. pursued through altruistic intervention in foreign countries remains a valuable one. This objective could serve as the focus of a rebuilt U.S. foreign policy consensus.

Some sections and fleeting references in the book are curiously dated. It is not clear whether the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan occurred before the book was finished. It would have been significant in the evaluation of Soviet motives and actions. A discussion of oil and OPEC politics seems to ignore the decline in demand and falling price of oil and the relative decline of OPEC. The OPEC argument in general is appropriate—signifying a decline in the strict bipolarity of the international system. The specifics of the argument, such as the role and motives of Saudi oil production and pricing, are not convincing. The book unfortunately suffers from a few editing oversights such as a mislabeled supply and demand graph in the OPEC discussion and occasional lapses in sentence continuity. But these lapses are not important. The issue that Quester addresses, the role of the United States after Vietnam as compared to its heritage of support for political democracy, is provocative and theoretically interesting. Quester's plea for a new consensus and description of the current confusion are eloquent, clear, and important.

BENJAMIN N. SCHIFF

Oberlin College

Courts and Free Markets: Perspectives from the United States and Europe, 2 vols. Edited by Terrance Sandalow and Eric Stein. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Pp. xxxix + 600. $39.50.)

This two-volume work includes a meticulous codification of the rulings of the Supreme Court and the Court of Justice that have effected economic integration inside the United States and the European Economic Community. The individual reports presented in the book are concerned exclusively with tracing both courts' attempts to define the boundaries of central and local authority in the creation of interstate markets. The documentation of legal rulings in the substantive chapters is a remarkable reference source for those interested in the contribution of law to economic union. Three aspects of economic integration are treated: the free movement of goods (chap. 3), the free movement of people and corporations (chap. 4), and court restraints on the taxation policies of individual states (chap. 5). These chapters are immediately preceded by a chapter on the growth of central legislative authority. A final chapter considers court rules that have arisen in response to attempts by central legislatures to preempt the economic authority of the constituent states.

The format followed in these chapters, however, is disconcerting. Two authors present separate compendia for each system's court rulings on the topic under consideration. The authors of the chapters do not offer either summaries and conclusions about the respective systems or comparisons between the two systems. These tasks are left for Sandalow and Stein to undertake in an introductory chapter. The two major failures of this book are found in their overview. Sandalow and Stein have not brought the compilations together for comparative analysis. Nor have they convincingly demonstrated significance in the relationship between court rulings and economic integration.

In what ways can the European Economic Community and the United States be compared? Instead of dealing with this question through use of the legal research presented in the body of the book, Sandalow and Stein have written an introductory chapter to guide the reader "from one complex legal order to another" (p. xi). Their contribution is not very instructive. Some appropriate contextual differences between the two systems are acknowledged: the historical process of creating a nation in contrast to creating an economic union, the legal distribution of central power, the functional variation across each system's central institutions, and the lack of parallel between the constituent states of both the United States and the European Community. The editors do not, however, attempt a resolution of the difficulties these differences pose for comparing the contribution of law to economics.

Is it possible to assign importance to courts in determining market conditions when courts are the only dimension of the two systems taken into consideration? Sandalow and Stein believe that economic patterns in the United States and the European Community are similar. The major characteristic with which they are concerned is the successful development of an interstate market system. The Supreme Court and the Court of Justice have contributed to this integration. Only a few references to the rest of the book are made to support this claim. The reader is told, for instance, that the free movement of goods between states has been promoted by the "principles developed by both courts" which "demonstrate steadfast opposition to 'protectionist' policies" (pp. 24-25). This has not been established in Vincent Blasi's treatment of the Court of Justice (pp. 175-218). Even if similar principles could be attributed to both courts, does this mean that the courts have overwhelmed those nonlegal forces in each system that advocate protectionism? In another vein, does similarity in the movement of goods within both systems give significance to the principles of courts? Sandalow and Stein avoid the issue by asserting, but not demonstrating, that the Court of Justice "may be approaching the role of a constitutional court in a federal system" (p. 4). What bearing do similar roles have on the tendency of both systems to integrate markets? The significance of court principles and roles is lost because the editors fail to place the courts within the larger context of each system's political economy. These two volumes contain an excellent account of the evolution of each court's rulings on economic issues. But the omission of a broader framework within which to assess the importance of courts for economic union raises more questions than the book answers.

M. MARK AMEN

University of South Florida

United States Foreign Policy at the Crossroads. Edited by George Schwab. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. Pp. ix + 268. $29.95.)

This is a useful volume of 10 essays representing various views of "political realists" about American foreign policy issues. In a memorial article about Hans J. Morgenthau, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. emphasizes that realism is a reaffirmation of the American "tradition" in international affairs.

It is obvious, however, that the realists who delivered the papers at the fourth City University of New York Conference on History and Politics do not agree on the meaning and implications of the central concepts of this book: the national interest and détente. The general public is confused about these seemingly open-ended terms; the historians and political scientists represented in this collection definitely enlighten us, but they do not clear away the confusion.

The national interest is generally defined by realists as the country's security interest in protecting its territory, population, and independence. John H. Herz, in the best essay in the volume, "Foreign Policy and Human Survival," broadens the concept. He argues that "traditional political realism will lose its realistic aspect if it fails to recognize that national interest is now merged with the interests of all in global survival" (p. 167)—since the world faces nuclear, demographic, economic, and ecological catastrophes.

Several of the authors mishandle the concept of détente. If one holds the ultra-pessimistic view that the Soviet Union has achieved, or is on the verge of achieving, military and political supremacy in international politics, then perhaps one could argue, as does George Schwab, that "détente has contributed to destabilizing the global arena of states" (p. 57). However, if one assumes that the United States and the Soviet Union have achieved military parity and that this rough equality will probably exist for decades, then détente is a system of conflict management—no more, no less.

Politicians consistently misuse the concepts of national interest and détente. Ideally, or perhaps idealistically, historians and political scientists should be able to carve out more precise meanings for such ideas, since they are such crucial factors in the politics of American foreign policy.

The basic philosophical foundations of political realism are persuasive. *United States Foreign Policy at the Crossroads* is an excellent presentation of these beliefs. For example, G.L. Ulmen insists that "understanding power as the means of avoiding war is the essence of political prudence" (p. xxi). He further argues, "power can no longer be gauged in 'purely' military terms. Indeed, the very character of the postwar world rules out the possibility of 'purely' military, 'purely' economic, or 'purely' humanitarian policies. Even human survival is a political question" (p. 230).

ROBERT H. PUCKETT

Indiana State University

The Iran-Iraq War: New Weapons, Old Conflicts. Edited by Shirin Tahir-Kheli and Shaheen Ayubi. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. xiii + 210. $25.95.)

The research produced on the Iran-Iraq War has hardly been commensurate with the conflict's importance. In part, this dearth is a product of the war's remoteness. For while scholars have generally been denied access to both countries in recent years, journalists have also been severely restricted in their ability to report on the war. Thus, any scholarly attempt to interpret and analyze this disastrous conflict is both welcome and important. Awareness of the war's origins, dangers, and possible implications is essential.

This volume is only partially successful in filling the gap. The book seems to have been hastily assembled, with little coordination and excessive overlap among some contributions. This overlap is understandable in light of the limited primary sources available and the difficulty in doing research in either country on the war. The fact that we all read the same newspapers and magazines, the authors of this volume included, explains the repetitiveness of some chapters, the lack of some contributions' apparent connection to the war, and the fact that others contradict one another in a potentially useful way that the editors have neglected to exploit. As with most "current events" books, this one, as the editors themselves note (pp. viii-ix), is already in part outdated. Such books are also characterized by a highly descriptive tenor rather than by a reliance on more systematic analysis founded on theories and concepts well-known to most social scientists. This is regrettable, as the Iran-Iraq War falls conceptually at the nexus of comparative politics and international relations. Furthermore, a variety of theories that deal with multiethnicity, international conflict, and notions of dependency could have been employed profitably. That they are not, sheds light on the volume's shallowness.

Despite these shortcomings, the book does have some useful and interesting chapters. I particularly enjoyed Nikki Keddie's chapter on the minorities question in Iran; little has been written on Iran as a multiethnic society. The linkage between such minorities and the war is barely highlighted, but Keddie does draw attention to Iran's heterogeneity so that its significance becomes unquestionable. Keddie has provided a valuable chapter that should be read by those interested in Iranian politics and society.

Perhaps the volume's strongest chapter is that by Barry Rubin, who attempts to link the Iranian Revolution with the important issue of Gulf security. Rubin's analyses of the growth and role of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the relationship between the ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its policies are excellent. Furthermore, he notes how the distribution of power in the area has changed, pointing out that a "shakey" Iran "tends to make the Gulf more unstable," while a strong Iran presents other types of challenges (p. 142).

Other noteworthy chapters include one by Tareq Ismael on the role of ideology in Iraqi foreign policy. Like Keddie's chapter, it provides an interesting treatment of an important topic but barely touches on the war. Nazih Ayubi discusses inter-Arab relations and, although he focuses on the Gulf, he considers the Palestine issue and the role of Egypt in a pragmatic and informative fashion. Finally, Claudia Wright investigates the manner in which the war has compelled Iraq to rethink and redefine its foreign relations, particularly with the superpowers.

Given the dearth of scholarship on this important and disturbing war, some contributions to *The Iran-Iraq War* are well worth reading.

JERROLD D. GREEN

University of Michigan

The Soviet Union and the Third World: An Economic Bind. By Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. xiv + 188. $21.95.)

Developing countries, or the Third World, according to the orthodoxy of post-World War II Soviet ideological writings, may be classified into four primary categories and distinguished according to respective levels of social and economic development. The first group would include the most backward nations of Tropical Africa which have a traditional economic structure based largely on so-called precapitalist production relations and a very low per capita income. The second group consists of the more developed countries of Tropical Africa and a number of Southeast Asian countries where the "transformation" of traditional economic systems has begun, and where backward social structures are gradually disappearing. The third group is made up of a number of Middle Eastern and North African countries, as well as Malaysia and Sri Lanka. Economically speaking, these nations concentrate primarily on the production of raw materials for export while simultaneously striving to establish viable processing industries. Countries in the fourth group, the Latin American nations and the Philippines, sometimes called countries of "medium-developed capitalism," have the most highly developed economies. Furthermore, the Soviets see India as an extraordinary case that includes features of the second, third, and fourth groups. Last, from this uniquely Soviet perspective all the countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Oceania are developing nations with the notable exception of the socialist countries, African countries with racist regimes (e.g., the Republic of South Africa), countries under the rhetorical political domination of imperialism, and the countries of Japan, New Zealand, and Israel.

The central thesis of Valkenier's book pertains to the modifications in Soviet theory and practice which, over the past 25 years, have resulted from various disappointments with the initial expectations of easy success for Soviet-type "socialist" policies and institutions in the Third World. Accordingly, the USSR has experienced difficulties with generating a satisfactory pattern of trade exchanges with these countries and can no longer afford the aid which these nations require. In many respects, Moscow has become disenchanted with the feasibility of speedy socialist remedies for the numerous problems associated with backwardness and, furthermore, has had to realize the incongruity between the Soviet and third-world programs for restructuring international economic relations (p. x). According to Valkenier:

> This thesis—which rests on the perception that increasingly more Soviets have a sense of the limitations on power—runs counter to prevalent interpretations in some Western quarters. Numerous commentators and analysts assume that: (1) the optimistic and competitive goals formulated by Khrushchev remain unchanged and are still the operational code in the Kremlin; (2) the USSR still intends to and is capable of gaining control over the vast raw material supplies of Asia and Africa; (3) the Soviets possess a magic systemic formula guaranteeing success for socialist revolutions in the developing countries; and (4) they command unlimited resources to buy goodwill or to prop up client regimes. (p. x)

Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier's analysis of post-World War II Soviet-third-world relations is, beyond doubt, a book that challenges many of the prevailing Western views and, in many respects, the orthodoxy of Soviet development economics previously mentioned. Valkenier is successful in her challenge and, as a result, contributes to our understanding of the problems affecting multilateral relations and the prospects for future Soviet-third-world economic cooperation. Indeed, Valkenier's study is one of the more thorough examinations of Soviet scholarly works and polemics, official statements, and statistics to have been published in recent years. Furthermore, Valkenier, sensitive to East European influences upon Soviet economic rationality, nicely isolates the key viewpoints influencing the current climate of Soviet opinion in which important decisions and revisions are under discussion at the same time as there is less normative prodding from the Party (p. 60). Valkenier is also very thorough, and thus productive, for further isolating three schools of Soviet thinking on how to deal with developing nations (pp. 148-150).

What does one learn from an examination of Soviet economic relations with the developing countries over the past 30 years? Quite simply, according to Valkenier, that an understanding of the evolving practice and ideology enables us to go beyond the simple static assertion that the USSR seeks to expand its influence in the Third World and to add a more dynamic element, that is, "how" Moscow sees its ability to pursue this goal. Over the past three decades it has become clear that Soviet economic capabilities do not match Soviet political aspirations; thus, the "economic bind" (pp. 147-148). Furthermore, the debates and disagreements outlined by Valkenier "belie the contention that the Soviets, because of the straightjacket of Marxism-Leninism, are incapable of adaptation, change or moderation" (p. 150). Finally, what are the policy implications for America? According to Valkenier:

> We should be aware that some circles in the USSR are coming to grips with the demonstrable fact that there are limits to Soviet power in the Third World, as well as to the advantages to be derived from close identification with the post-colonial grievances. Some even hold that support of Third World causes is disruptive to Soviet-American relations and threatens world peace. Should this "globalist" view come to shape concrete Soviet proposals, Washington should be ready to respond and not miss the chance to seek mutual restraint or a cooperative relationship. (p. 150)

To conclude, Valkenier's work should be mandatory reading for the serious student and scholar interested in Soviet-third-world relations. Well written, timely, and insightful, Valkenier's analysis advances Western understanding of the perceptions and policymaking processes of the Soviet Union.

JOHN M. CARFORA

University of New Haven

The Power of Power Politics: A Critique. By John A. Vasquez. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1982. Pp. xiv + 303. $27.50.)

John Vasquez makes an important contribution in clarifying much of the confusion and disagreement that has existed over the evolution and contemporary nature of the field of international relations.

Vasquez reviews and applies Thomas Kuhn's concept of paradigm for two principal purposes: to describe the way in which *realism* provides the basic assumptions about the world that serve as the foundation of international relations inquiry, and to evaluate the degree to which realism adequately explains international phenomena. Vasquez reviews the theoretical and empirical literature of the last three decades, analyzing it both qualitatively and quantitatively.

Vasquez finds that the realist paradigm has dominated the three major activities of scholars in international relations (or in any scientific discipline): theory construction, data collection, and hypothesis testing. Most of the work conducted by international relations scholars has been consistent with realism's three fundamental assumptions:

1. Nation-states are the most important actors for understanding international relations.

2. There is a sharp distinction between domestic politics and international politics.
3. International relations is the struggle for peace and power.

"The power of the realist paradigm to guide the development of the field toward normal science has been overlooked by scholars because of a preoccupation with and misunderstanding of the 'behavioral' revolt" (p. 19). Vasquez argues that the behavioral revolution did not result in a substantive change in the discipline, but a methodological one. Refinements and modifications in the power politics approach—the original foundation for realism—did occur as the field became more interdisciplinary and systematic, but the rudiments of realism nonetheless remain.

While Vasquez demonstrates that realism served as the basis for the study of international relations, he also concludes that the paradigm has been unable to provide a body of knowledge based on statistical analyses that adequately explains global interactions. In fact, the findings that have resulted from the rise of behavioralism demonstrate a number of anomalies that are beyond the reach of the realist paradigm. Therefore,

> while there is no need at this point to decide whether the realist paradigm should be rejected, it can be concluded that the research of the seventies has called that paradigm into question, that the paradigm has still failed to satisfy the criteria of accuracy and centrality, and that it has satisfied the criterion of scientific importance less well than status, social psychological, or cognitive psychological explanations of global behavior. (p. 223)

Vasquez does suggest areas of inquiry which have gone beyond the realist paradigm: transnational relations, issue politics, and Marxist approaches. However, the thrust of the book is to describe and evaluate realism, not to offer an alternative. For those in search of a paradigm that offers a more profound understanding of human interaction and behavior, the work by John Burton has been unfortunately overlooked. In *Deviance, Terrorism, and War: The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political Problems* (St. Martin's Press, 1979), Burton describes an alternative paradigm for understanding social control and evolution based on the individual's pursuit of human needs.

As in any work, *The Power of Power Politics* has flaws that affect the final product. The review of the theoretical literature could have been condensed. The data utilized for the evaluation of realism did not include qualitative studies (e.g., comparative case studies). Furthermore, the title of the book is a misnomer: *The Power of Realism* would have been more accurate, since the concepts of power politics and realism are clearly distinguished, and the former is subsumed by the latter.

Overall, this is an important book for understanding the evolution of a discipline. John Vasquez's work should be read by people who are interested in the future direction of the field of international affairs.

JEREL A. ROSATI

University of South Carolina

Brezhnev's Peace Program: A Study of Soviet Domestic Political Process and Power. By Peter M.E. Volten. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. Pp. xiv + 368. $24.50, paper.)

Volten, a staff member in the Directorate of General Policy Affairs in the Ministry of Defense, The Hague, Netherlands, has attempted in this work to analyze Soviet foreign and military policy in terms of the domestic context of decision making. The book argues for an integrated analytical approach to the analysis of Soviet politics but is not consistent in its application. The goals of the project are only partially achieved. The domestic context of foreign policymaking is largely confined to the top elite in the Politburo and in the military. The most successful chapters concern military doctrine, defense policy, and armaments, the areas of Volten's greatest expertise.

The book is divided formally into two sections: Part 1 deals with foreign policy, and Part 2 focuses on security policy. In many ways, this work impresses the reader as two separate studies linked by the first and last chapters. Nevertheless, the concluding chapter skillfully ties together the two parts of the book and succeeds in summarizing effectively Volten's key arguments.

In terms of content, Part 2 is clearly stronger than Part 1. The first chapter presents a summary of Western scholarship on Soviet foreign policy. The overview is relatively thorough, as evidenced by the profusion of footnotes (123), but less than 20% of the sources date from 1977 or later. Volten tends to focus on the classic interpretations of Soviet politics and foreign policy.

Brezhnev's speech on foreign policy to the Twenty-fourth Party Congress in 1971, later called the "peace program," is the subject of much of Part 1. The speech articulated the Brezhnev approach to foreign policy characterized in detente, which had begun a few years before. In the remainder of Part 1, Volten analyzes the domestic discussion, especially among the top leadership, which he believes followed Brezhnev's attempt to put forward a personal foreign policy. According to this work, Brezhnev, over the next few years, was forced to make concessions and to return to collective decision making in foreign policy, but the argument is neither forceful nor convincing. For example, differences of opinion on the role of foreign trade versus economic self-sufficiency between Brezhnev and Kosygin are mentioned but not thoroughly analyzed. Other differences among the leadership elite are also cited, but the hypothesis that Brezhnev was forced to retreat from unilateral policymaking is not argued persuasively, and numerous questions remain unanswered. Brezhnev was a consensus leader, and it is not at all clear that the speech to the Twenty-fourth Party Congress was an independent effort. Moreover, it is not clear why the speech was later called the "peace program" rather than the doctrine of détente. The work only partially describes the international dynamics that modified and curbed the leadership's optimism about détente and foreign trade with the United States between 1971 and 1975. Did the opposition exist from the outset or only after the policy began to falter in the mid-1970s?

Part 2 clearly demonstrates Volten's expertise on military policy. He discusses Soviet military doctrine and weapons' capability with facility, and Part 2 is much more readable. Students doing research on the Soviet military will find Volten's work a useful source book.

A weakness of the overall work is the style of presentation, which suggests a doctoral dissertation with extensive footnotes rather than a polished monograph. Tangential arguments and extensive details distract from the main theses. The abundance of notes (114 pages of notes to 239 pages of text) is not fully warranted, and some could be eliminated in a revision. The small type size and format further inhibits the readability of the work.

The book has a good bibliography but no index. Given the complexity of the subject matter, an index would be desirable. The book is a useful reference tool for undergraduate libraries and would be helpful for the student studying foreign policy or military decision making. The specialist in Soviet politics will value some of the discussions of specific issues by the Politburo and the military establishment, but the work does not make a major contribution to the methodology of studying Soviet decision making despite the goals professed at the outset.

NORMA C. NOONAN

Augsburg College

Economic Coercion and U.S. Foreign Policy: Implications of Case Studies from the Johnson Administration. Edited by Sidney Weintraub. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. Pp. xvii + 234. $23.00.)

During the Great Behavioral Revolution, in which 100 equations were to bloom, there was a tendency to dismiss the case study approach to political science as inherently ideographic, atheoretical, and ascientific. This was, to be sure, not totally without justification. Library shelves already were stacked with monographs that were more impressionistic than rigorous in their methods of analysis and which, while interesting stories in themselves, had little cumulative value. Yet as both cause and effect of the revealed limitations of quantitative analysis, the case study approach has been undergoing a major rehabilitation. Its old thick descriptive virtues are being preserved, while the introduction of such techniques of systematic analysis as cross-case comparisons and the conceptualization of discrete phenomenon in terms of measurable and recurring variables are making it possible to overcome past limitations and to test and develop theory.

Sidney Weintraub's *Economic Coercion and U.S. Foreign Policy* is in this new case study tradition. His central concern is with the general question of explaining the success, or lack thereof, of economic coercion as an instrument for influence in international relations. He begins by reviewing "Current Theory" (chap. 2), which he summarizes as the argument that "economic coercion is rarely successful" and with which he identifies such authors as Johan Galtung, Klaus Knorr, Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, Peter Wallensteen, Richard Stuart Olson, and Margaret Doxey (p. 23). He then challenges the validity of this argument on conceptual and empirical grounds. Drawing on a 1979 article in *International Affairs (London)* by James Barber ("Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument," *55*, 370), Weintraub stresses the need to disaggregate the objectives motivating a coercer state before dismissing economic sanctions as a failure just because the target state was not compelled to change its policy. Such tangible influence may be the formal objective, but in addition there are undisclosed objectives, such as settling for a smaller influence gain or playing to relevant domestic political audiences, and implicit objectives, such as maintaining international credibility by acting decisively rather than conducting business as usual (pp. 47-48). "When all objectives are determined and attention is given to them rather than solely to the objectives stated formally for the record, success is much more common than the critics of economic coercion have led us to believe" (pp. 57-58).

This contention is supported by empirical data drawn from six cases of economic coercion during the Johnson administration. These case studies (involving Indonesia, Egypt, Chile, South Africa, and two cases with India) were written by six of Weintraub's graduate students at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, who made extensive use of the archives at the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library. While in only one case did the United States achieve its formal objective, the authors find successes at the other levels of objectives in four of the five other cases. On the basis of this data, Weintraub concludes that "existing theory on economic coercion needs reformulation" (p. 57).

But while such a conclusion follows from the particular set of cases investigated herein, this is not a sufficiently representative sample to warrant such generalizations. One cannot generalize from such "low politics" issues as influencing the development policy of India or pressuring Chile not to raise its copper prices to the "high politics" of deterrence of external aggression by a major power, compellence of war termination, or destabilization of unfriendly regimes. While early on Weintraub acknowledges that all his cases are cases of unilateral coercion with foreign aid as the principal instrumentality and with the relationship involving the United States and a third-world country, he ignores such limitations when he contends that his cases provide the basis for a reformulated theory. In the end, they beg the critical question of the interrelation of politics and economics on the center stage of international relations.

On a more methodological note, the point is well taken that policy objectives, especially in foreign affairs, are much more complex than what is provided for public consumption. But there is a disturbing sense of tautology in calling coercion successful because it served implicit objectives (that is, those which cannot even be documented through archival research). At minimum some sense of net gain needs to be introduced—for example, even if one assumes that by embargoing natural gas pipeline equipment exports to the Soviet Union the United States benefited by demonstrating our will to act, how much did we lose from the intense intra-alliance dispute that we set off? Is shooting oneself in the foot any more credible than not acting at all?

These limitations notwithstanding, *Economic Coercion and U.S. Foreign Policy* is a valuable contribution to the international relations literature. It stands as an excellent example of archival-based empirical research and of a comparative case study approach, and it should continue to stimulate further debate and development of economic coercion theory.

BRUCE W. JENTLESON

University of California, Davis

Normative Theory

Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition. By Harold J. Berman. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983. Pp. viii + 657. $32.50.)

This book was written, Berman confesses, "in order to find a way out of our present predicament," an age characterized by social disintegration and the decline of unity and common purpose. Given that the cause of this bleak situation is attributable in large measure to the decline of law as an expression of the "community's vision of its future and its past" and as the object of its "passionate loyalty," Berman seeks to resuscitate the Western legal tradition by teaching us what law once was—and what it again can be. The thrust of this book is to recover the "autonomy, the integrity, and the ongoingness of our legal tradition" (p. 41). Berman's scholarly approach yields a magnificent volume, broad in scope and rich in detail; this may be the most important book on law of our generation.

One of the main defects of contemporary jurisprudence is the fragmentation of law into parts so isolated that there is no longer a *corpus juris.* What passes for law in our time is, in fact, nothing more than a "hodgepodge . . . of ad hoc decisions and conflicting rules, united only by common techniques" (p. 38). To remedy this juridical malaise, Berman encourages an "integrative jurisprudence" that combines positivism, natural law theory, and the historical school of jurisprudence. The point is simple: "Law has to be believed in or it will not work" (p. vii). Berman's project is to posit what he calls a "social theory of law, the belief that law in the Western tradition is not merely the *effect* by also the *cause* of social, economic, political, intellectual, moral, and religious developments that constitute the Western tradition. Law is much more than an instrument of political or economic domination; it is an important part of the basic structure of Western society" (p. 43).

To argue his case for this social theory of law, Berman traces the rise of the Western legal tradition and Western legal science beginning with the Papal Revolution of 1075. For it is there for the first time in Western society that "rule by law" and "rule of law" become important goals. From this point of departure on the canon law as the first modern Western legal system, Berman delves deeply into the development of the various secular legal systems: feudal law, manorial law, mercantile law, urban law, and royal law. The result is a history of Western law unlike any other.

This book demonstrates that law is more than the will of the lawmaker; it is "custom transformed." Law, to be law, has to be rooted in the "deepest beliefs and emotions of a people" (p. 558). When it ceases to be thus understood, it ceases to serve as the foundation of civilization and community. It is by reminding us of the original foundation that Berman offers a thoughtful way out of our present predicament.

Whether or not one agrees with Berman's premises or accepts his conclusions, this book will have to be taken seriously by anyone researching and writing about the Western legal tradition. Berman may very well be our Blackstone.

GARY L. MCDOWELL

Tulane University

Marx and Justice: The Radical Critique of Liberalism. By Allen E. Buchanan. (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1982. Pp. xiv + 206. $23.50.)

This book is both thorough and wide-ranging. It begins with an interpretation of some aspects of Hegel's political theory that influenced Marx. There follows an exposition of Marx's moderate and radical critiques of capitalism. It is Buchanan's argument that Marx's evaluation of both capitalism and, to some extent, communism rests jointly on his early humanism and his later materialist theory of consciousness. Marx's radical evaluative perspective on capitalism is shown to be external to the juridical conceptions of capitalist society. Marx's theory of exploitation is explained and defended against some criticisms. The chief conclusion here is that Marx's concept of exploitation is not limited to the wage-labor nexus but is rather a part of the wider theory of alienation. Buchanan then turns to what he calls Marx's theory of revolutionary motivation. Without appeals to justice and other internal, juridical principles, Buchanan argues, a revolution cannot be justified to the proletariat. And such appeals are not consistent with Marx's theory. The Marxist effort to show that revolution is a matter of proletarian self-interest is refuted from several angles, including a very original analysis of revolution as a public good.

Although there is much to learn from the preceding parts of the book, the centerpiece is a long chapter comparing Marx and Rawls on justice. It begins with a lengthy exposition of Rawl's theory. Buchanan repeatedly stresses the need to distinguish Rawls's ad hoc remarks from his theory, arguing that many of Rawls's self-styled Marxist critics misinterpret the theory. Ten points are singled out for detailed comparison. Thanks to Buchanan's very generous reading of Rawls, his theory emerges from this comparison rather well. It is, as it were, exonerated on six of the counts. On the other four, Marxist criticisms are sustained. There four are its individualism, its utopianism, its split of political equality from economic equality, and its measurement problems in assessing alternative means of favoring the least-advantaged class.

Buchanan then concludes this study by detailing objections to the radical and moderate interpretations of Marx's critique of justice.

The preceding account of the book hardly does justice to it. There is much to think about, and much with which to disagree. Considering how much there is in the book, it is disappointing to see Buchanan conclude his comparison of Marx and Rawls by writing "that Marx's thought presents a serious challenge to Rawls's System" (p. 161). Indeed, that seems little enough to conclude after a 50-page chapter. Buchanan is certainly right that Rawls and his theory are often confused by critics. Some of these critics though are bound to feel that Buchanan has sometimes followed the man and not the theory, for example, when he passes uncritically on the collapse of the distinction between the difference principle and the maximin criterion (p. 130) and ignores the essential role of income and wealth in defining the least-advantaged class (p. 123). Moreover, the space devoted to the expositions of Hegel, Marx, and Rawls is not always proportional to the use made of these expositions in subsequent argument. Finally, it must be said that Buchanan is yet another writer content to interpret Hegel as laboring to bring forth Marx (p. 9) and unwittingly sireing fascism (p. 166). It is inevitable that an ambitious and creative book like this one should leave specialists on Hegel, Marx, and Rawls unsettled, but that is as it should be on occasion.

M. W. JACKSON

Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study

Marxism and Philosophy. By Alex Callinicos. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. Pp. 177. $19.95.)

In 1923, amid the embers of the postwar revolutionary period in Germany, Karl Korsch published his famous book, *Marxism and Philosophy*. Korsch attributed some of the blame for the failure of socialist revolution in the West to the hearty and optimistic ideology of the Second (Socialist) International. This faith in an inevitable collapse of capitalism, guaranteed by the scientific laws of historical materialism, had a twofold effect on the socialist movement. First, it contributed to the ideological complacency of socialism; there was no need to be troubled by recent developments in philosophy, since the whole enterprise of philosophy had been superseded by Marxist social theory. Second, it contributed to the political complacency of socialism; confident of its ultimate victory in the social-Darwinian struggle between the classes, the socialist parties combined the rhetoric of confrontation and revolution with a reformist practice based on the achievement of steady and incremental inroads into the bastions of established power. Korsch prescribed large doses of philosophy, particularly Hegelian philosophy, as a cure for the debilitating overconfidence of Marxist socialism.

Fifty years later, in the distinctly unrevolutionary era of Reagan, Thatcher, and Kohl, Alex Callinicos assumes the title of *Marxism and Philosophy* for his diagnosis of the malaise of Marxism. Like Korsch, Callinicos detects a weakness in the philosophical foundations of Marxist social theory. Unlike Korsch, Callinicos sees Hegelianism as the problem. Callinicos agrees with the struggle of the young Marx and Engels against the metaphysical obscurantism of Hegelian philosophy and its offshoots, but disagrees with the founders about the surpassed nature of philosophy as a whole. From this perspective, Korsch and his contemporaries were correct in their call for a restoration of a philosophical dimension to Marxism but wrong in their revival of philosophical Hegelianism. Callinicos believes that Lukács, Adorno, and Althusser are the leading figures in contemporary Marxist philosophy. In his interpretation, two of these thinkers, Adorno and Althusser, have taken the necessary first step in the rehabilitation of Marxist philosophy: the critique of the Hegelian legacy. Only a deHegelianized Marxism will be able to develop a consistent approach to troublesome concepts like ideology.

Callinicos's surprising alternative to Hegelianism is rigorous to say the least. Abandoning Hegel, Callinicos turns to the schools of "post-Fregean" analytic philosophy and philosophy of science. Long existing in mutual ignorance at best, long mutual adversaries at worst, Callinicos nevertheless recommends a synthesis of Marxism with the Anglo-American analytic tradition in philosophy. If the first part of Callinicos's book reveals a Marxism too often prone to a loose and politically tendentious use of concepts like forces of production, relations of production, and ideology, the second part provides a stark contrast. Here, where the very possibility of making any meaningful statement about the external world is constantly in doubt, the canons of philosophical rigor eliminate the flaws of Marxist concepts.

But does the hermetic rigor of the analytic tradition eliminate Marxism itself? The second part of Callinicos's book is almost completely devoid of political content. One of the few exceptions occurs during the discussion of language and ideology, where Callinicos objects to Habermas's characterization of lies, threats, and racist jokes as aberrations of "'ordinary language communication.'" Among other criticisms, Callinicos finds this characterization to be "an unwarranted intrusion of Habermas's ethical and political views" (p. 144). What Callinicos never provides is any indication of how the analytic tradition can discuss deception, violence, or racism as anything but unwarranted intrusions of ethical and political views. This theoretical difficulty has practical implications. Despite his stated admiration of the theorist-activists from Marx and Engels through Luxemburg and Gramsci, Callinicos's advocacy of analytic philosophy shatters even the illusion of the unity of theory and practice that underlay the classical Marxist tradition. If it is an unwarranted intrusion to label a joke racist, how much more of an intrusion would it be to engage in actions aimed at the elimination of racism?

There can be no question of Callinicos's sincerity, still less of his competence. He is one of the few thinkers who is able to write about Marxist theory and analytic philosophy with equal facility. Despite my objections to his proposed synthesis, the two parts of Callinicos's book can be read separately with profit. But it is this sincerity and competence that provides the irony of the 1983 version of *Marxism and Philosophy*. The abyss between Marxism and the analytic tradition is never more visible than it is here in this eloquent and scholarly attempt at a synthesis. If philosophy means analytic philosophy, then the title of this book should have been *Marxism or Philosophy*.

JOHN BOKINA

Pan American University

The Left and Rights: A Conceptual Analysis of the Idea of Socialist Rights. By Tom Campbell. (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983. Pp. 253. $11.95, paper.)

T.D. Campbell is professor of jurisprudence at Glasgow University and eminently qualified to examine dispassionately the often cavalierly disregarded question with which this important book is concerned. For Campbell, much of the possibility of any dialogue between liberals and socialists hinges upon the status of "rights" within socialism. If the ideals of socialism can be expressed in the language of rights, then a continuity within the liberal tradition exists that could facilitate compromise and comparison. If not, liberals and socialists can only continue like all foreigners to shout at each other in the hopes of making their essentially alien languages understood. Campbell's approach is to try to ascertain the conceptual rather than the historical compatibility of rights and socialism, and to articulate "a philosophically acceptable theory of rights which holds for socialists as well as non-socialist systems of thought" (p. 2). Not all socialists, of course, reject the language of rights. Those whom Campbell terms revolutionaries do so because this language is seen as tied to the legal and coercive system of competitive bourgeois society, whereas socialism is assumed to create deeper, cooperative and noncoercive bonds that make rights unnecessary. "Reformist" socialists, however, seek to retain at least part of the language of rights, emphasizing in particular rights to own the means of production, to employment and welfare, and to trying to reorient the idea of rights toward that of human and social needs and away from abstract conceptions of human liberty.

Half of Campbell's book is devoted to exploring four main areas of socialist complaint against rights theories. In criticizing the "moralism" of rights, socialists attack the attempt to ground rights generally in moral rights, the latter of whose basis is rarely clearly ascertainable but which is often reduced to some presupposed moral or natural law. Here Campbell shows, however, that rights can also be seen as social rights grounded in custom and convention, hence without obscure metaphysical foundations unacceptable to historical materialism. Second, the legalism of rights is often derided by socialists as embodying a purely formal, rule-worshipping notion of justice that is intrinsically conservative. Here Campbell argues that organizational rules are required in all societies, and that such rules are a precondition to all substantive forms of justice. Third, it can be argued that all rights ultimately rest upon a threat of coerciveness that would have to be removed in a far more harmonious socialist society. Here, however, Campbell defends a concept of noncoercive sanctions drawn in part from H.L.A. Hart, while arguing that organizations to monitor rights and prevent their violation could still operate within such a definition. Finally, rights can also be seen as ineradicably connected to the tenets of philosophical individualism prevalent in Western capitalist societies, and hence as an expression of the predominance of selfishness in most areas of social interaction. What Campbell terms an interest theory of rights, however, can be contrasted to both power and contract theories to provide the idea of a potentially unselfish interest in something which the concept of a right is designed to help secure.

Campbell spends much of the latter half of his book defending and clarifying the reformist socialist notion of rights and rejecting the revolutionary critique. In part this consists of outlining how more traditional conceptions of human rights could function as a basis for political obligation in a socialist society, and why a priority of social and economic rights would not necessarily entail the rejection of the absoluteness of certain more traditional human rights. Freedom of expression as a dominant political right is given a particularly detailed treatment, and the "right to work" clearly explored, while the general concept of welfare rights is defended at length.

Campbell's book is the most important contribution to the literature on this topic ever written and merits wide circulation and discussion. Given the usual ideological hostility towards many rights notions by socialists, and the skepticism as to any meaningful future compatibility between rights and socialism expressed by many nonsocialists, not a few readers are bound to find Campbell's project modestly utopian. In particular, the problem of noncoercive sanctions is less likely to prove persuasive than might be hoped. Nonetheless, as a simple effort at clarifying one of the most important and most underestimated areas of modern political debate, this is an extremely valuable and welcome book.

GREGORY CLAEYS

University of Hanover, West Germany

Origins of Legislative Sovereignty and the Legislative State: Vol. 1, Corasius and the Renaissance Systemazation of Law; Vol. 2, Classical, Medieval, and Renaissance Foundations of Corasius' Systematic Methodology. By A. London Fell. (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1983. Pp. xx + 358 and xvi + 336. $30.00 each.)

Modern scholars of the Renaissance regard Jean Bodin's *Six Books of The Republic* (Paris,

1576) as the *locus classicus* of the emergence of the idea of the State as an autonomous and sovereign (legislative) entity. As the prodigious scholarship in these two volumes demonstrates, Bodin's conception of the State as a sovereign legislative entity was inspired by the Aristotelian conception of law advanced by Bodin's forgotten contemporary, the French jurist, Joannes Corasius (1515-1572).

Through careful, painstaking explication of Corasius' principal work, *On Reducing Civil Law to an Art* (1560) (in *Opera* [Wittenberg, 1603, 2 vols.]), Fell traces Corasius' attempt to answer his contemporaries' (for example, Christophorus Ehemius) claim that despite the fact that it can be taught by method, "jurisprudence is not an art or science, but rather a virtue and a part of prudence . . . [and] that jurisprudence cannot properly be reduced to a science" (vol. 1, p. 54).

The methodology employed by Corasius in answering his nominalist opponents is that of Aristotle's four causes (and four questions), which are found, among other places, in Aristotle's *Physics* II. The four causes are the efficient, formal, material, and final. While Aristotle never resorted to the four causes in his analyses of law, Corasius utilizes them "as an organizational device" (vol. 1, p. viii) to prove that since law has a form identical with other activities exhibiting a universal character, it is not "based on opinion or only on the whim of the more powerful men . . . but rather . . . is derived from solid and true principles of nature" (vol. 1, p. 59).

Corasius' use of Aristotle's four causes is (following Cicero) by way of their division into three categories. The first of these, the efficient cause, is embodied in the person of the lawmaker—or, more precisely—that entity's *power* to make law. It is here that Corasius sows the seed for the later emergence in early modern thought of the idea of legislative power as "the most sovereign power" (vol. 1, p. 19). The principal locus of the second or material cause of law is in the interpretations of law given by judges, whose authority and power is clearly subordinate to that of the legislature. The final cause of law, justice and the state, is in effect a legislative ideal: promotion of public good.

These two volumes are the first of four (the remaining two are to be published in late 1984 or early 1985) described by Fell as "a multi-volume study of interpretative textual problems centering on the encyclopedic art of law in Renaissance jurisprudence . . ." (vol. 1, p. viii). Of the first two, as its subtitle suggests, Volume 2 serves as something of an encyclopedia of the classical, medieval and Renaissance foundations of Corasius' systematic Aristotelian methodology. But these two books do much more than save an important historical figure from the forgotten regions of Renaissance jurisprudence. They are a stunning and architectonic rendering of the intellectual and cultural milieu that gave birth to the modern idea of the State. Their publication can only be regarded as an auspicious beginning to what will surely be a major contribution to the modern understanding of Renaissance jurisprudence and political theory.

DENNIS M. PATTERSON

Brunswick, Maine

The Limits of Obligation. By James S. Fishkin. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982. Pp. viii + 184. $18.50, cloth; $6.95, paper.)

There is obviously a great need to come to grips with the ramifications of the ever-widening gap between the rich and the poor of the world, as well as with the incontrovertible fact that our planetary existence is becoming increasingly global in scope. Certainly it would require a callous refusal to reflect if one did not find thought-provoking the spectacle of a part of the globe increasingly awash in a sea of baubles, while a still larger part suffocates under astronomical birth rates and a wretchedly tenuous grip on a mere hand-to-mouth existence. Whether the resulting spiritual decay on the one hand, or the physical suffering on the other, is more disquieting remains an open question.

In *The Limits of Obligation*, James S. Fishkin attempts to deal with the moral issues that arise from reflecting on the obligation of the rich to attend to the suffering of the poor. In the process he tries to demonstrate that there is a tension inherent in liberal thought which this issue helps make visible. Fishkin claims that two central components of the liberal faith are the commitment to impartiality, that is, the need to give equal concern and respect to all men, and the commitment to individual liberty (p. 170). Accepting the principle of impartiality allegedly forces us to accept certain "general obligations" which we have towards all men. However, to fully discharge these general obligations would in almost every circumstance require a change of lifestyle that would be truly heroic, or an intrusion into the arena of individual freedom that would be found intolerable. But liberal principles of negative freedom require the existence of what Fishkin terms a "robust sphere of indifference"; otherwise almost all trivial actions would be considered potentially moral and imply obligatory behavior.

However, in our generally accepted moral universe, we do not see heroic action as obligatory, nor do we conclude that every action represents moral behavior. But we do generally believe that a certain minimum altruism is obligatory; otherwise we would be considered callous. Fishkin tries to show that when these generally accepted first principles are raised from the level of individual action to the level of collective action, they come into such tension that to successfully meet our general obligations would require heroic action as well as an intrusion into our robust sphere of freedom.

What Fishkin seems to have accomplished is the replacement of the traditional tension between liberty and equality with the modified, albeit not altogether different, tension between liberty and universal cosmopolitan obligation. He repeatedly claims that he has no intention of proposing a resolution of this tension; he is attempting no more than to make the contours of the problem clearer. He does, however, conclude his argument by asserting that "some great revision in our assumptions or in our actions is required" (p. 171). As an example of what he has in mind, he reminds us of the difficulty political theorists once perceived about the possibility of combining a democratic regime with a large territory. This tension was resolved by the invention of the idea of representation. Fishkin intimates that a similar conceptual invention is what is presently required if we are to save the principles to which we are generally committed. But in the absence of such an invention, and despite Fishkin's repeated disclaimers, in the confrontation between "general obligations" and a "robust sphere of indifference" the general obligations seem to retain a certain sovereignty and inviolability; for to drop them would allegedly be to reject our common humanity.

While Fishkin's argument is somewhat compelling given the first principles that he choses and the way he frames the issue, one wonders if there are not several suppressed premises which if explicitly confronted might force the reformulation of the issue. For example, when confronted with the fact that a reigning moral universe leaves individuals attached to conflicting principles, one might be led to conclude that this demonstrates the insufficiency of the entire horizon and hence the need to open it for reconsideration. But Fishkin never engages in this reflection nor pushes for any deeper ground for his premises than to observe that they are generally accepted, and that to quit them would be to radically change our way of life. Yet it is clear that for Fishkin it is precisely such a radical change in our prevailing notions that is required and intended. If that is the case, we should be just as radical in questioning the inviolability of Fishkin's "general obligations" as he seems prepared to question our present understanding of an acceptable obligatory intrusion into our reigning way of life. From Fishkin's point of view, it is apparently clear that liberalism must, like Marxism, be committed in principle to a cosmopolitan approach to solving the global problems confronting contemporary humanity. That, however, would certainly seem to be a premise that must be brought out into the open, and its ramifications explored explicitly. These more substantive discussions are not enjoined. To that extent *The Limits of Obligation* tends to be a house built in midair, the foundation of which has been finessed under the guise of a claimed modesty of purpose and a reliance on generally accepted premises. Nonetheless, the problem Fishkin addresses is not one that can be made to go away by some grand xenophobic or isolationist myopia. But contrary to Fishkin, the problem could with equal justice be addressed from the perspective of the obligation those of us in the West have *to ourselves* to halt our own spiritual decay in the face of a runaway materialism, as by reflecting on our general obligations to all of humanity.

GREGORY B. SMITH

Loyola University of Chicago

Rousseau's Social Contract: The Design of the Argument. By Hilail Gildin. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983. Pp. vii + 206. $22.50.)

Within our generation and the last, Rousseau scholarship has come of age. Thinkers of the past took sides: Either Rousseau was a reckless individualist or a despot. Today, scholars take seriously Rousseau's own claim that his philosophy is not divided, but a concordant whole. Hilail Gildin's little book continues this latest endeavor well.

What does Gildin give us as Rousseau's design? It originates in an axial moral principle, which is to "avoid the situations that put our duties in opposition to our interests, and which show us our good in others' harm" (*Confessions*, Book II); in the *Social Contract* we learn the same. This principle was implanted in our instincts and made us all both equal and free. Once men lost their innocence, first their equality, then their freedom withered. Hence, "political freedom will occupy in Rousseau's thought the place that peace occupies in the thought of Hobbes" (p. 12). The manner in which Gildin examines the intimate relation between equality and freedom strikes me as the great strength of his essay.

Gildin goes on. The general will, not being a mystical whole, can come into being solely from particular wills. Whereas most scholars have been stymied by how this is possible, Gildin appeals to an explicit and concrete illustration (pp. 33-34, 54-56) in a contemporary layman's book on law: An interest common to all, but requiring everyone's cooperation, may have its dark side, for a citizen may try out of self-interest to reap the fruits of everyone else's cooperation by omitting his own. Consequently, since the general interest is almost never as palpable as one's own, even when these two interests coincide, citizens need laws.

How the general will can act in this way and do so infallibly must be "both qualified and elaborated" (p. 44). It is precisely through the general will that one's self-interest becomes more closely identified with the public interest; i.e., the citizen seeks his own interest through the general will. To do otherwise would bring harm to his compatriots. This is freedom. It is also the equality that Rousseau is concerned to protect and that is "inseparable from freedom" (p. 49). While it is always possible that a majority decision may be unfair, yet "once the majority cannot be trusted . . . there is nothing else that can be trusted" (p. 58). Hence the problem of the general will does not lie in the source of its authority; its salvation consists in "seeing to it that a legitimate sovereign exists" (p. 60). On the whole, taking men as they are, Rousseau sees that it is self-interest that "guarantees the rectitude of the general will" (p. 59), because it is out of self-interest that hope for freedom and the courage to find it arise in the first place. Civil religion apotheosizes this will and helps to ensure the sovereign's integrity. Beyond this, the tribunate safeguards the sovereign itself by making sure that its majorities are true and not collusive (pp. 165, 175).

One final note. In a very large degree scholarly endeavor is a joint enterprise. Albeit that Gildin consults several important sources at the top of the field, he excludes others that he might have taken into account. I mention only Charles Hendel's 1934 work, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Moralist* (Bobbs-Merrill) and Judith Shklar's *Men and Citizens* (Cambridge, 1969).

R. M. PETERSON

California State Polytechnic University

Political Theory and Public Policy. By Robert Goodin. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. Pp. 286. $27.50, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

For some time now the literature on public policy has been dominated on one hand by incrementalists and public choice economists, and on the other by deontologists who take rights as the basis for morally serious decision making. Robert Goodin tries to chart an alternative course in *Political Theory and Public Policy*. In the first section of the book, he examines and rejects the methods of deontologists (turning on "thought experiments" and "crazy cases") and the assumptions underlying incrementalism. Instead, he opts for an approach operating "in the shadow of utilitarianism" (p. 16). By this he means a utilitarianism unlike that of public choice economics, one that will take seriously notions of dignity and self-respect as well as choice.

The second section of the book details some of the revisions necessary to accomplish this. These include a reliance on "loose laws" to specify social goals while preserving administrative flexibility, a demythologizing of "choice" to reveal its grounding in the idea of dignity, and an examination of the ways moral principles can be enacted into policy that also respects people's self-interested motivations. This last leads Goodin to recommend market socialism as a means of separating the political (moral) determination of ends from the market (self-interested) specification of means.

The third section brings Goodin's moral sensibilities to bear on three concepts that receive wide play in public choice analyses: impossibility, risk, and uncertainty. The first, Goodin warns, often turns on manipulated perceptions, the second usually ignores the effects of maldistribution on the risk-behavior of its victims, and the last is used routinely under the rubric of discounting to justify policy biases against future generations.

In the last two chapters Goodin applies this morally sensitized utilitarianism to the questions of nuclear power and defense policy. Not only are meaningful long-term risk assessments about nuclear power impossible Goodin argues, but the technology requires measures inimical to democratic participation and freedom to bring the risks from known threats within acceptable limits. He then critiques the arguments used to exempt defense activities like chemical and biological warfare research from the public debate applied to such civilian activities as recombinant DNA research.

The work has some flaws. Those familiar with Lowi may be dismayed at the political naivete of Goodin's prescription of loose laws. The suggestion of a market socialist scheme, while intriguing, overlooks the sustained repression the Yugoslav experiment has required, an omission at odds with the concern for democratic values underlying Goodin's critique of nuclear power. Further, his dismissal of the rights approach to policy analysis because it leads to a "preoccupation with classic 'conscience issues'—most conspicuously war, discrimination and abortion" (p. 13) is misplaced. Not only are such issues of recurrent general concern (*Philosophy & Public Affairs* did not create the continuing public agonizing over abortion), but Goodin's condemnation also ignores contributions from this tradition such as Henry Shue's *Basic Rights* (Princeton University Press, 1980) that deal with larger issues such as world hunger. Finally, Goodin's passing discussion of political creativity that confines it to "playful eccentrics" like Jerry Brown (p. 135) leaves the impression that Goodin views the role of political theory in policy analysis as a negative one concerned only with setting limits to the activities of planners and politicians.

These flaws are offset by important strengths, however. Goodin's review and refutation of incrementalism's justifications is thorough and accurate. His analysis of the role of dignity in defining the limits of choice should haunt public choice economics. His discussion of risk marks a considerable advance in the literature on that concept. Finally, Goodin's examinations of nuclear power and defense policy are models of careful and perceptive criticisms of public policies. For these at least, the book certainly merits the attention of policy analysts and political theorists.

JOHN D. HARMAN

St. John Fisher College

The Politics of Utopia: A Study in Theory and Practice. By Barbara Goodwin and Keith Taylor. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. Pp. 292. $27.50.)

The authors proclaim that the book under review is the first book on utopian political theory and practice to emerge from English political science. Unlike French and American social science, which have been consistently interested in utopianism, English scholars consider utopian political thought as a form of literary fantasy. Goodwin and Taylor thus engage in an uphill battle to persuade their academic colleagues that utopianism has a legitimate place in English political theory.

Goodwin fights the theoretical skirmish in this battle in the first four chapters; Taylor fights the practical skirmish in the next four chapters. Each author contributes one more chapter at the end of the book. On the first page (p. 15) of the first chapter Goodwin asks the perennial question, "Is utopia necessarily unrealizable because of its ideal nature?" Although as the theoretician she does not answer this practical question directly, Goodwin does say that utopia is a vision which transcends conventional idealism by its integrated view of "the good society" and by its implicit criticism of existing society.

Both authors in separate chapters survey utopian political thinkers chronologically from such classics as Plato's *Republic*, Thomas More's *Utopia*, Marx's *Communist Manifesto*, and Karl Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia* to such recent works as Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization*, B.F. Skinner's *Walden Two*, E.F. Schumacher's *Small Is Beautiful*, and Robert Nozick's *Anarchy, State and Utopia*. Taylor focuses on the social and economic conditions which were responsible for translating utopian ideas into concrete movements and organizations. He begins with liberalism, moves on to socialism (both utopian and Marxist) and positivism, and concludes with communitarianism, including American communities like the Shakers and Oneida, the Israel *kibbutzim*, and town planning or what Americans call urban planning. Taylor's prose style is verbose and expansive, while Goodwin's ideas are densely packed in long, Teutonic sentences.

Goodwin's positive answer to the question, "Is utopia really necessary?" in chapter 9 is based on an economic model of rational political choice. She accepts the logic of Kenneth Arrow's paradox that individual choices cannot be aggregated to produce a single collective or social choice which is consistent with each individual choice. Therefore, in utopia the content of "the good" must be defined independently of personal preferences. Goodwin is sensitive to the work of critics of utopia like Popper and Talmon who would surely charge that her utopia is totalitarian. But she rejoins that the authoritative allocation of scarce resources in her utopia is justified "in all cases where one man's appropriation of an extra portion may detract from another man's chance of enjoying an adequate portion" (p. 224).

Goodwin undoubtedly presents her theory of utopia in terms of an economic model in order to appeal to the empirical and pragmatic bias of her English colleagues. Given the nature of her audience the form of Goodwin's argument is not surprising, but from the standpoint of continental European and American political thought, it is unfortunate.

In chapter 2, "Taxonomy and Anatomy," Goodwin asks, "does utopia only permit us to do what we ought to what to do?" (p. 65). She discusses this question briefly and alludes to other moral assumptions which various utopias make about human nature and motivation. But she makes no systematic arguments based on human nature comparable to her argument based on the economic model of rational choice. This is unfortunate because a presentation based on a more systematic concept of human motivation would have been more universally heuristic. Moreover, it would have made the book more internally consistent. In the end, as Taylor states in the last chapter, utopia and the study of politics have a common goal—the quest for the good life.

STEPHEN A. GRAHAM

Indiana Central University

The Foundations of Conservative Thought: An Anglo-American Tradition in Perspective. By William R. Harbour. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982. Pp. 220. $15.95, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

Harbour identifies and discusses the general propositions he feels represent the essence of Anglo-American conservatism in a lucid and authoritative style well-suited for undergraduate courses in political ideologies. However, there are several inconsistencies in his argument which derive from his failure to investigate fully certain political philosophies and historical analyses in his treatment of the topic.

Among the points Harbour covers are conservatism's theocentric view of the universe; its conception of man as special, in that he has a soul with which to make moral decisions, yet flawed since he often uses his extraordinary power to make evil choices; its understanding of the limitations of politics; its preference for order and tradition over revolutionary change; its belief in natural law; and its distinction between theoretical and practical reason with prudence their bridge. He stresses conservatism's recognition of the inherent religiousness of man along with his need for strong family ties and private property and its standard of community which seeks to develop a reciprocal relationship between individuals, factions, and the public interest.

Harbour delineates what he calls the "libertarian" and "traditionalist" conflict within conservatism. The former strain tends to value freedom most highly, while the latter emphasizes justice and virtue. Despite such significant differences, he concludes that the two are philosophically reconcilable. Given Harbour's rendering of the flawed view of human nature explicit in conservatism, the compatibility he ascribes to these approaches is debatable. Truly flawed persons would seem to require both spiritual and civil guidance. And while such guidance would not eliminate freedom, neither could it promote this value as an end in itself.

Harbour pays insufficient attention to the position of Aristotle in the development of conservatism. After all, it was Aristotle who introduced the standard of community to Western political thought, long before Edmund Burke, whom Harbour identifies correctly as the father of modern Anglo-American conservatism. It was Aristotle who, in opposition to Plato, presented the archetypical arguments for the maintenance of the family and private property. Indeed, Burke's definition of prudence and case against abstract theoretical reason in politics is virtually a literal reproduction of Aristotle's original thesis in the *Ethics*. Moreover, the classical statement of the dangers of revolution is found in Aristotle's *Politics*. The identification of Aristotle as the progenitor of Western conservatism is significant, because he, even more than Burke, stands firmly in what Harbour calls the "traditionalist" school. Perhaps Harbour's willingness to find ample common ground for conservative libertarians and traditionalists can be traced to his neglect of Aristotle's contribution.

Surprisingly, Harbour does not confront directly the issue of the role conservatism might play in the United States, which for 200 years has been an essentially liberal nation. Under our pluralist system of government, individuals and factions enjoy an advantage over the public interest. Consequently, a tradition of community, which once characterized English history for example, has never really dominated American public life. Thus, American conservatives are forced into the awkward posture of defending an abstract concept rather than a concrete American tradition. Harbour underestimates this problem by characterizing liberalism's emphasis on individuals and factions at the expense of community as a recent phenomenon dating from the Johnson administration's War on Poverty rather than a congenital American condition recognized by such historians as Clinton Rossiter and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

Equally puzzling is Harbour's contention that in order to be consistent with their veneration of religion, conservatives must support prayer as a daily exercise in the public schools. Roger Williams, an early American religious conservative, observed that forced worship "stinks in God's nostrils." Nor is formal public school prayer prudential from a conservative point of view. The scores of religious denominations residing currently in the United States raise the predicament of which prayer to use. If local governments choose one denomination's blessing, they violate others' First Amendment privileges. If they make up a blessing of their own, they establish a civil religion. This dilemma is ignored by Harbour. I find his coverage of the religious implications of conservatism generally weak, especially in his deletion of John H. Hallowell's influential efforts to comprehend politics from a religious perspective.

ETHAN M. FISHMAN

University of South Alabama

Modern French Marxism. By Michael Kelly. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. Pp. vi + 240. $24.50.)

This book is primarily a work of intellectual history, its subject being the development of Marxist philosophy within the French Communist Party (PCF).

Kelly identifies certain central issues in Marxist philosophical debate in France and attempts to trace the way in which they have been treated from the 1870s to the 1970s, although he gives most attention to the period since World War II. The issues treated concern the nature of dialectical materialism. They include such questions as the nature of materialism, the existence of an objective dialectic in nature, and the relation of consciousness (including philosophical thought) to the natural and social world.

Kelly attempts to work at several levels in writing his history. He wants to provide not only a survey, but also a "critical" one in which the "theoretical and practical implications, strengths and weaknesses" of different positions are discussed (p. 3). He also aims to consider issues "in their historical context, and related to the changing configuration of French politics and society, and to international relations" (p. 3).

Although these ambitious aims are not met consistently throughout the book, it is in some ways a useful work. Its focus on the PCF is what distinguishes *Modern French Marxism* from several other recent works on aspects of the subject. As Kelly correctly points out, the recent anglophone literature in the field has dealt primarily with those thinkers—existentialist, Christian, New Left, etc.—who have been critical of the PCF. Kelly is anxious to rectify what he sees as an "imbalance" in the way French Marxist philosophy has been portrayed, although he insists that his focus on party theorists "is not making any judgements of legitimacy, or suggesting that only those studied are really Marxists" (p. 98).

Kelly's book does begin to correct the "imbalance" he identifies, and in doing so it provides a useful survey that includes the work of some thinkers who are little known outside France and whose writings are often unavailable in English. However, the book also suffers from some serious problems. A major weakness is that, while Kelly does attempt to deal with the political context of some of the work he discusses, he does not really attempt to locate communist philosophy in the context of French intellectual life. His focus is so firmly on philosophy *within* the PCF that the encounter of communist philosophers with the wider world of French thought—with, for example, existential phenomenology, structural linguistics, or deconstruction—is never brought to life. When the views of those outside the PCF are mentioned, they are treated so cursorily and often unsympathetically that it is hard to have a sense that serious alternative views existed and presented a real challenge to the Party philosophers.

Unfortunately, Kelly's claim simply to be correcting an "imbalance" and not to be judging what is "really" Marxism is not accurate. The one-sidedness of his account arguably stems from a conviction that the views of mainstream communism on the key issues of "dialectical materialism" are indeed the only correct ones. This conviction becomes particularly apparent in the treatment of those such as Lefebvre and Garaudy, who had belonged to the PCF for many years and then parted company with it. Kelly simply endorses the Party view that by criticizing objective concepts of the dialectic and truth they opened the way to "eclecticism" and "pluralism," hence to serious political deviations and even (in the case of Garaudy) to "the dismemberment and liquidation of Marxism" (p. 181). That either of these thinkers might perhaps have developed a valid critique of Party philosophy or politics is not a proposition that is even considered by Kelly.

In his attempt to correct the "imbalance" in our understanding of Marxist philosophy in France, Kelly identifies himself so fully with the positions of the PCF that his critical capacity—which is at times considerable—becomes suspended at just those points in his narrative where it is most needed.

SONIA KRUKS

New School for Social Research

Eugene V. Debs: Citizen and Socialist. By Nick Salvatore. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982. Pp. xiv + 437. $24.95.)

This Bancroft Prize winner deserves the praise it has already received. On the whole it is well-written, and the scholarship is both broad and deep, although Salvatore errs in his passing remark (p. 217) referring to Judge Learned Hand as a member of the Supreme Court. Salvatore's work will be of great value to students of labor history, third-party movements, American socialism, and the political culture of the United States.

This book presents an admiring but certainly not an uncritical view of its deeply interesting subject. Debs exhibited occasional signs of neurotic behavior in personal life, although Salvatore mercifully spares us any attempt at psychobiography, and in political life there were outbursts of utopianism and moralism which may have weakened the impact of his leadership. Even so, Debs was clearly the most significant figure in the history of American socialism. Deeply committed to democracy, and despite a brief attraction to the newly successful Bolshevik Revolution, he rejected the trap of vanguardism. Eugene Debs provides, through the example of his career, a compelling illustration of both the weaknesses and strengths of the democratic socialist tradition in America.

The intellectual framework of this study, although never stated with any degree of formality, is of considerable interest. The whole of Debs's work and the values he brought to it were rooted in the preindustrial social order of the place of his birth, Terre Haute, Indiana. Periodically, Salvatore returns to this setting, portrays the changes wrought by corporate, industrial capitalism, and shows the strains imposed by these momentous developments. Against this background is set Debs's struggle to come to terms with a rapidly changing political economy. Thus the book emerges almost as a case study of an individual's reaction to the pressures of sudden modernization.

Against those who argue that socialism is an alien import into American thought and culture, Salvatore clearly shows the extent to which the ideas of Debs sprang from a long tradition of American radicalism extending back to Paine and Jefferson, through Garrison and Lincoln, and on to Bryan, with the whole influenced by the evangelical Protestantism so central to nineteenth-century reform. The key to Debs's thought was a slowly evolving notion of manhood, a concept defined publicly through the action of citizens working as part of a community. The ideal was an independent citizen-producer, a standard which Debs came increasingly to see in deep conflict with industrial capitalism.

Contrary to a myth—in part self-propagated—Debs did not experience a sudden conversion to socialism following his brief imprisonment after the Pullman strike. Not until after the defeat of Populism in 1896 did Debs make a sharp break toward an increasingly class conflict-oriented socialism. The movement he led reached its apex in 1912 and then rapidly collapsed. One could wish that Salvatore's survey of the reasons was more systematic; still, there are interesting suggestions and much useful analysis of the socialist vote. Such standard explanations as factionalism and repression will not do, although both existed. Following a suggestion of H.G. Wells, Salvatore speculates that one cause of the decline may have been the social welfare activities of the urban machines, but much more fundamental is his belief that the same political culture on which Debs drew had a too-powerful affinity for reform and that the class-conscious rhetoric of the socialists ran afoul of the individualism inherent in the prevailing culture. The Debsian critique was close enough to the mark for him to draw a large personal following, but one that was difficult to translate into votes.

And so Debs failed—but in so doing he raised issues that still persist in American democracy. As Salvatore writes (pp. xii-xiii), "the value of the individual in a corporate-dominated society; the meaning of work in a technological environment geared primarily for profits; and the importance of citizenship amid widespread malaise brought on in large part by the manipulative practices of political leaders—all these are questions of vital concern today."

JAMES P. YOUNG

State University of New York at Binghamton

Human Nature under Fire: The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt. By Gordon J. Tolle. (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982. Pp. 167. $22.00, cloth; $10.00, paper.)

Gordon Tolle's analysis and evaluation of Hannah Arendt's theoretical achievements finds her work to be defective and deficient in comparison with the accomplishments of Aristotle. Tolle writes that Arendt's reflections on human nature in *The Human Condition* are deliberately misleading and dissembling. Although he claims that Arendt's works are superior to those of most contemporary writers, Tolle concludes that her philosophy is affected by a lack of any vision of natural standards or purpose. Her work is defective because she provides no guidelines or solutions for the modern crisis of authority. Using Arendt's philosophy as a vehicle, Tolle attempts to establish a necessary theoretical relationship between views of human nature and political authority. Despite Arendt's claims to the contrary, Tolle wishes to prove that she adhered to an implied concept of human nature. Thus, Tolle seeks to establish a connection between that view of human nature and Arendt's conception of authority.

Tolle views Arendt's analysis of authority as superior to her defective analysis of human nature. In his best chapter, "Arendt's View of Authority/Legitimacy: The Dependence of the Concept on a Certain View of Human Nature," he illuminates Arendt's insight that authority consists of giving advice, of augmenting, commenting on, and representing a regime's founding fathers. Whoever can comment on the meaning of the beginning has authority, because all authority rests on opinion. Both Arendt and Tolle believe that without religious ties, authority crumbles. Thus, the modern crisis is central to Arendt's vision of politics.

Tolle all too briefly notes Arendt's unique definition of the political in contrast with the private subjective, prepolitical world of the household and life of the private individual. To be free is to be active in the public realm, to speak in the public forum with authority, and to participate in civic affairs. Arendt deplores the extension of the private, subjective realm of necessity and of the material into the public arena.

Human Nature under Fire is concluded with a comparison of Arendt's and Aristotle's views on authority and human nature. Given Aristotle's status as a master theorist, Tolle's judgment that Arendt's work does not equal Aristotle's may be anticipated by the reader. Tolle claims Arendt made more radical demands upon human nature than Aristotle did. However, in the final chapter, he first notes a secularized Christian influence upon her thinking derived from St. Augustine and Christ. Tolle asserts that because Arendt's conception of human nature was developed from a nonpolitical, Christian, and personal context, it is inapplicable to modern political life. But Tolle gives no evidence in his text to sustain this criticism. Had Arendt only taken Aristotle instead of St. Augustine as her mentor, she would have written a more adequate theory of human nature and provided clearer solutions for the modern crisis.

Tolle fails to explore and elaborate upon Arendt's distinctive contributions to modern political theory. He assesses her theoretical achievements by stressing her weakest theoretical arguments. He does not explain why Arendt's interest in St. Augustine was so dire a theoretical mistake for a Jewish philosopher to make. The introduction of this fascinating topic in the conclusion of his book is Tolle's major evaluative error. Hannah Arendt's philosophy reflects the experiences of those prevented from speaking and sharing in the public arena. Perhaps those excluded from participating in the public forum appreciate her quiet wisdom and patience more than does the author of *Human Nature under Fire*.

M. SUSAN POWER

Arkansas State University

Empirical Theory and Methodology

The Political Use of Symbols. By Charles D. Elder and Roger W. Cobb. (New York: Longman, 1983. Pp. xiv + 178. $22.50, cloth; $9.95, paper.)

One of the distinctive features of the human species is its well-developed semiotic capacity. As Kant has shown, we can never know things "in themselves." Rather we must deal with our sensory representation of things as organized by our categories of understanding. Symbolization is thus fundamental to the human experience, and therefore to students of politics.

The pervasiveness of the semiotic function, its integration into everyday life, makes it resistant to analysis. Unlike many of the things political scientists study, there are no clearly delineated boundaries limiting the scope of inquiry. It therefore takes courage to study symbols. The pioneering work, and still the standard for the field, is Murray Edelman's *Symbolic Uses of Politics* (University of Illinois Press, 1968). Elder and Cobb acknowledge an intellectual debt to Edelman (indeed, their title seems to be a play on his), and yet their work is markedly different. It is much closer to the tradition of structural-functional analysis and to the type of socialization literature spawned by that tradition.

The title of the book can imply interest in manipulation, an important focus of Edelman's work. This is not a central concern of Elder and Cobb, however. On the contrary, they tend to downplay the manipulative potential of symbols (pp. 21, 57-58, 151). The authors are more concerned with the inherent properties of symbols (their affective and cognitive components), establishing a typology for symbols, and in discussing the social functions of symbols. Chapter 4 contains an interesting discussion of symbols in relation to political culture and might profitably be read first.

The book suffers from reductionist tendencies.

Elder and Cobb acknowledge, for example, that government decisions usually have distributional as well as symbolic significance, and even that purely symbolic decisions can affect subsequent distributional decisions, but they nevertheless tend to view the political world simply as symbol propagation. Thus, an "important factor" in the shift away from environmentalism is Ronald Reagan's use of the term "environmental extremists" to describe them (p. 32). Given that popular support for environmentalism remains high, such reductionism is unconvincing. Reagan's environmental policy success is not attributable to symbolic formation.

While an appropriately broad perspective is set forth in the initial chapter, it is odd that the actual examples of symbols considered by the authors come from a sharply circumscribed political stratum. Political figures, communism, democracy, welfare, the flag, and the NRA are the sorts of things to which Elder and Cobb devote attention. If we are to understand how people come to political consciousness, however, we cannot avoid consideration of such symbols as the Super Bowl, Calvin Klein jeans, Miss America, video games, Leo Buscaglia, and the Beatles. *Precisely* because most people are inattentive to politics (p. 10), such things are important politically.

The authors' professed loyalty to what they call "modern social science" makes their propensity for ad hoc explanations curious. Thus they argue the majesty of the presidency protected Jimmy Carter from Ted Kennedy. Unfortunately for Carter, it did not protect him from Ronald Reagan. Jacobo Timmerman will be interested to learn that Jimmy Carter's human rights policy was pointless because it was ill-defined and susceptible to exploitation. There are at least a score of such breezy observations in the book. At other times Elder and Cobb are so careful that they end up not saying anything at all: "Just as symbols can serve as a basis for social solidarity, they can also provide a basis for social differentiation" (p. 121).

The summary statement at the end of chapter 3 (p. 80, emphasis added) fairly reflects this tendency and perhaps will give readers a sense for whether the book is useful to them:

> Popular expectations regarding the use of a symbol, albeit *often* diffuse and vaguely articulated, define important limits to its use. While these limits are *often* fairly broad, they do pose real constraints on those who would exploit the power of the symbol. The price of this protection lies in the restrictions it imposes on departures from the status quo. While new or novel usage *may* be accepted, considerable persuasion is *likely* to be required. Moreover, unless care is taken to assure appropriate feedback, the potency of the symbol is *likely* to be diminished.

J. Harry Wray

DePaul University

Change in Organizations: New Perspectives on Theory, Research and Practice. By Paul S. Goodman et al. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1982. Pp. xv + 446. $19.95.)

The change agent in management has been considered an advocate or one who encourages and produces alterations in society and organizations. But in this work, change is viewed as an elusive concept; it is an abstraction imputed to reality rather than an inherent attribute of reality. The concept cannot be expressed in absolute terms but only in relational or relative terms.

This study is a compendium, or edited work, of scholars in the organizational and behavioral field who offer 10 selections that explore the ways planned, accidental, and evolutionary changes occur in organizations. The purpose of the book is to design new theoretical frameworks for bringing about effective change in individuals, groups, and in organizations as a whole.

Paul Goodman opens the study with a literature review of planned organizational change and organizational adaption. Chris Argyris follows with an organizational focus on single- and double-loop learning, including strategies for change. Barry Staw further investigates entrenched but unconscious forms of behavior that inhibit adaptability at both individual and organizational levels.

Clayton Alderfer moves the discussion from the individual level to the intergroup level by presenting a case study of changing white male attitudes and beliefs regarding race relations. Next, Robert Cole examines various forms of participatory work structures in Japan, Sweden, and the United States, while Paul Goodman and James Dean are concerned with the process of institutionalization (changes that become a permanent part of organizational structure).

Edward Lawler next presents a framework for creating high-involvement work systems by examining the relationships among different design options, motivation, individual performance capability, coordination, control, and organizational effectiveness. Ken Smith's focus is more philosophical, claiming that no new theories of change are possible until we improve the accuracy of interpreting and formulating theories about change, while Karl Weick examines the meaning of change in the context of loosely coupled subsystems. Finally, Robert Kahn integrates the major themes and identifies new directions for change.

Kahn concludes that what is needed are studies of process theories of organizational change, theories that tell us how such change comes about. Also, such change should be studied over time on an ongoing basis, since organizations change by such means as merger, acquisition, managerial succession, incorporation of new technology, and other similar factors. Organizational change also should be studied in relation to environmental events because organizations respond to environmental constraints, demands, or opportunities. In addition, populations of organizations as well as single organizational units should be analyzed.

This work is highly theoretical and thought provoking and offers useful material for organizational study. One must be prepared for the theoretical and behavioral vocabulary of model building, single and double loops, escalation systems, and loose coupling systems that permeate the book. The status report that introduces the material is interesting but tedious and laborious. Nevertheless, the substance of the work is well done. The study of individuals, counterforces, attitudes toward race, and philosophical problems illustrate the inappropriate and unwanted persistencies in organizational life. In addition, the failure of organizations to maintain long-term change, the aplication of durability and diffusion at cross-national levels, and the use of loosely coupled systems presents a basis for future study. The book includes an exhaustive bibliography.

FRANK T. COLON

Lehigh University

Shifting Involvements: Private Interests and Public Action. By Albert O. Hirschman. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982. Pp. 138. $14.50, cloth; $5.95, paper.)

Why do people fluctuate between infatuations with either their private interests or public issues? Because they inevitably experience disappointment with one and shift their involvement to the other. With this thread, spun from theories of psychology, Hirschman reweaves economic theories of collective action, fashioning new insights at once disarming and provocative.

Hirschman focuses on the endogenous forces that push us to change our preferences after being disappointed, rather than on exogenous forces that pull us to satisfy our preferences, presumed by economists to be unchanged. Consumption activities yield both pleasure, the experience of traveling from discomfort to comfort, and comfort, the alleviation of a nervous system aroused by hunger, thirst, or pain. To experience pleasure, we must sacrifice comfort, at least temporarily. Food, Hirschman reasons inductively, gives us almost pure pleasure; more durable goods give mostly comfort. Durables inevitably disappoint us because we mistakenly expect them to produce continuing pleasure. In fact, we come to take for granted the comforts they provide. Services disappoint us as well, because their quality varies so much more than the quality of common durable goods and declines on average when output expands. As societies experience waves of progressive economic development where creature comforts proliferate, disaffection accompanies satisfaction.

People shift between private and public concerns when their reigning ideology, or "second-order desires" which justify their preferences, conflict with their efforts to satisfy those preferences, or "first-order desires" (p. 69). An ideology enforcing private property rights, for example, reinforces the desire to consume. When consumption produces disappointment, the conflict pushes people away from that ideology towards a public-regarding one. Consistent with our evidence on political participation, the *nouveau riche* on the rebound, according to Hirschman, lead revolutions.

To a much greater degree than for private action, the benefits of collective action inhere in striving rather than in achievements. A truly maximizing person increases the benefit accruing to him, not by shirking or free riding as Mancur Olson suggests, but by increasing his efforts on behalf of the public policy he espouses. To Hirschman, mass political actions confirm his theory and disconfirm Olson's.

Public life, in turn, inspires those who misconstrue its demands to overcommit themselves, and addicts those filled with the false euphoria of a common cause. Rules such as "one man, one vote," however valid, frustrate people trying to express the intensity of their preferences. Reality again fails expectations. Foreshadowing a withdrawal to private life, people reject ideologies that make public-regarding actions virtuous. So it goes.

Despite all that it weaves together, Hirschman's theory might unravel if we tug on its dangling threads. Impressions aside, can we really document shifting involvements, turns from private to public and back again "marked by wildly exaggerated expectations, by total infatuation, and by sudden revulsions" (p. 102)? Can we distinguish exogenous from endogenous events? Was the Vietnam War an "exogenous happening" (p. 73) or the public-regarding action of a society on the rebound? Can we distinguish private interest from public action? Is the contrast between pursuing public affairs and pursuing a better life for oneself (p. 7) more illusory than real for both second- and first-order desires? An ideology of private property rights promotes diligence in its defense and serves a public goal. Disaffection with the material prosperity of the 1960s may have pushed people towards protesting the Vietnam War, but political decisions that threatened their private lives must have pulled them, as well. If we cannot make distinctions of this sort, we cannot subject Hirschman's theory to empirical disproof and so demonstrate its superiority over the traditional economic theories that he attacks.

This may be unfair. Hirschman admits to attempting a "phenomenology" (p. 8), not a finely honed theory with generalizable and empirically testable deductions. That licenses him to be less rigorous, yielding bountiful food for thought. But readers of his *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (Harvard University Press, 1970), for example, may find this more labored and, therefore, less elegant. It may not be as durable.

STEVEN M. MASER

Willamette University

The Social Sciences: Their Nature and Uses. Edited by William H. Kruskal. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. Pp. xvi + 166. $12.00.)

A series of lectures and discussions was held in 1979 to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Social Science Research Building at the University of Chicago. The manner of celebration followed a tradition that began at the building's dedication in 1929 and was repeated at its tenth and twenty-fifth anniversaries. As on the earlier occasions, the presentations were published with the intention of providing a glimpse at the state of the social sciences.

The 12 distinguished social scientists whose contributions appear in the current volume offer an abundance of challenging insights, although most of the chapters are unrelated to each other. Mary Jean Bowman writes about time and its uses, Norman Bradburn about the difficulty of defining seemingly simple terms like urban and rural, Paul Peterson on social determinants of income, and James Coleman about the uncertain benefits of social policy research. These descriptions hardly do justice to the authors' ideas, but the subjects are so diverse as to circumscribe efforts at a collective assessment.

A few contributors address the most trenchant question of the volume, which is raised by Herbert Simon in his essay, "Are Social Problems Problems that Social Science Can Solve?" Simon's answer is no for "big problems" like war, poverty, and disease, and yes for "small problems" like organizational decision making and racial inequality. When applied to "big problems" the contribution of the social sciences seems limited to a deeper understanding of ourselves, but for other problems the social sciences can play "a significant constructive role" in their solutions (p. 18).

Lee Cronbach is more skeptical. He believes that laws are "beyond the reach" of social science and consequently, "empirical generalization is doomed as a research strategy" (p. 70). The social scientist should ask questions and supply concepts but avoid "definitive assessments of proposed actions" (p. 71-72).

Simon's categories are suspiciously tautological—he seems to be saying that if social science cannot solve a problem then by definition the problem is "big"—but his fundamental argument is more convincing than Cronbach's. Race relations, for example, have been affected by social science contributions: Sociologist's findings have influenced court decisions in favor of desegregation, and the work of political scientists has helped advance black electoral accomplishments.

Philip Converse disputes Cronbach in another dimension. He acknowledges that the social sciences are unlikely to see a Newton and attain the neatness of many of the natural sciences. But he questions Cronbach's assumption that no social science laws exist. The issue is arguable, but since the first "law" within the realm of social processes has yet to be produced, Cronbach's doubts must be respected.

Political scientists especially should appreciate Converse's chapter on "The Impact of the Polls on National Leadership." His enthusiasm for polls is tempered by the fact that wording in questionnaires is frequently confused, answers misinterpreted, and improper signals given to those who exercise "the levers of power" (p. 157). He is optimistic, however, that current research will lead to a mitigation of these problems.

William Kruskal tries admirably to find linkages among the exciting essays in this volume, but the goal is often elusive. He writes that some of the papers "are about, or relate to, the use of social science research in the formation and carrying out of broad policy decisions." Others are "primarily surveys of social science topics, or exemplary pieces of social science research, or—of course—both together" (p. x). Kruskal is correct. Once the reader comes to terms with the book's organizational gallimaufry and its overly ambitious title, he is treated to a rich intellectual experience.

LEONARD A. COLE

Ridgewood, New Jersey

Mathematical Models in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. By Anatol Rapoport. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983. Pp. xii + 507. $49.95.)

This is an introduction to applied mathematical methods in political science, anthropology, psychology, and sociology. All major types of mathematical languages which have been applied to the social sciences are clearly presented with numerous in-depth substantive examples from the literature. The book contains five parts (the fifth is the Conclusion), the first three representing the core (classical calculus-based analysis, probability, and set theory methods such as graphs and game models). Since the organization is by formal, mathematical methods, and not by areas of substantive application, the book is an excellent companion to students undergoing formal mathematical training. It assumes, in fact, a background in introductory calculus and probability. But the presentation also assists readers in exploring applications to other substantive areas. The substantive applications are so clearly organized that students following substantive courses in the social sciences can easily draw on the appropriate sections of the book in order to deepen their understanding of mathematical theories in these areas.

On the surface, the book is analogous to other modeling textbooks, such as M. L. Bittinger and J. C. Crown's *Mathematics: A Modeling Approach* (Addison-Wesley, 1982). However, the breadth and depth of applications in this book are superior and more up to date. In particular, the relationship between theory and evidence is far more complete in this book. For example, empirical evidence is shown for many models, and Part 4 is dedicated exclusively to a connoisseur's survey of quantitative and measurement techniques illustrative of the role of empirical evidence. However, mathematical methodology correctly takes precedence over measurement issues. One drawback for a book of this nature is the absence of exercises. However, the diligent reader can supplement this by using, say, Bittinger and Crown's extensive exercises.

The exposition of models is current, clear, and complete. One of the strengths of the book lies precisely in the clear demonstration that mathematics can be productively applied to the study of substantive social phenomena. This is most definitely not a survey of content-free mathematical structures. The book covers a very extensive set of applications for the analysis of power, coalitions and alliances, arms races, bargaining, individual and collective decision making, perception, crises, and war. A useful bibliography is included, although in a fast-growing area such as this many more recent references could be added.

A valuable pedagogical point stressed throughout *Mathematical Models in the Social and Behavioral Sciences* is on the importance of recognizing isomorphisms across diverse social phenomena—an indispensable skill for model-building and theoretical development in any science. For example, Part 1 illustrates similar mathematical models (calculus) applied to arms races, perception, and demography; chapter 9 provides examples of distributions of size in language, economies, alliances, etc. This emphasis on recognizing isomorphic situations is wholly consistent with the modern view of mathematics as a family or content-free formal languages. Readers taking full advantage of this orientation will find this book very valuable for developing their own innovations in mathematical social theory.

This is Rapoport's first major textbook, although it is an enlarged, English version of his *Mathematischen Methoden in den Sozialwissenschaften* (Wurzburg: Physica-Verlag, 1980). He is best known for his pioneering work in game theory, particularly among international relations specialists. The book is based on a teaching experience of more than 30 years, and particularly on a course taught by Rapoport at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna.

The book can be used at two levels. For advanced undergraduate courses, major portions can be used with undergraduates who have studied some calculus or taken a course in mathematics for social scientists. The book can also be used in graduate courses when training requires some introductory calculus. Optimally, the book should be supplemented by exercises, such as found in *UMAP* modules or in Bittinger and Crown's textbook. A significant pedagogical contribution of this text is given by the extensive set of insightful hints and practical recommendations, based on Rapoport's personal scientific experience.

CLAUDIO CIOFFI-REVILLA

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

What Role for Government? Lessons from Policy Research. Edited by Richard F. Zeckhauser and Derek Leebaert. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1983. Pp. 363. $37.75.)

The editors of this collection of former conference papers (the conference was the 1981 meeting of the Association for Public Policy and Management) attempt to marshall the forces of microeconomics to answer a macropolitical science question. It may be comforting to political scientists to see that the forces are not up to the task. Although the editors include some material relevant to issues concerning the proper role of government in society, the core of this work is a series of applications of the principles of welfare economics and cost-benefitism to specific policy topics in the areas of income maintenance and health. It is with considerable variation tht the individual authors succeed in addressing more limited questions of traditional concern to economists—estimating the distribution functions of income tax proposals, assessing the effects of the Council on Wage and Price Stability or OPEC II on inflation, reinterpreting the negative income tax experiments, or reviewing the "value of life" debates. If these provide only piecemeal answers to the broader question suggested in the title, it may be because the real issues at stake have more to do with the role of economics than the role of government.

The editors and authors spend a great deal of time fencing off various turfs—carefully defining what is social, what is political, and what is subject rational scrutiny. The process begins in this text with an unusual essay by Joel Fleishman criticizing the Moral Majority for attempting to impose their morality on a democratic society. The essence of democracy, Fleishman maintains, is that morality and legality are separate realms and that the coercive power of the state should not be applied to the former. Unfortunately, Fleishman provides no clue as to how this standard would be applied to concerns other than those of the Moral Majority.

The separate realms of the economist and politician receive greater, although less careful, attention. Arnold H. Raphaelson surveys the cost-benefit literature on the Davis-Bacon Act and finds that economists have been unable, and are not likely to be able, to arrive at unambiguous conclusions about the Act's net benefit to society. Raphaelson concludes, however, that cost-benefit analysis is not the "real problem" (p. 135). The real problem seems to be that, in the end, political and Pareto-optimal criteria will decide the issue.

Ivy E. Broder and John F. Morrall III face a related and more interesting quandary. Their detailed cost-benefit analysis fails to justify potentially life-saving OSHA and EPA carcinogen regulations when standard willingness-to-pay estimates for the value of human life are used. Their solution is that the enactment of the regulations be justified by including a consideration of the social benefits of "altruism and pecuniary externalities" in the value of life calculations. There may yet be hope for the dismal science. Because it would be difficult to quantify these benefits, however, Broder and Morrall argue that the task should be left to the politicians.

Thus Broder and Morral endorse political decision-making criteria in a situation where the economic calculus is straightforward, while Raphaelson criticizes resorting to political criteria in a situation where the calculus is uncertain.

Both the editors, in an introduction, and Fleishman, in a postscript, argue the cause of public policy analysis as if economics and management science encompassed the whole field of study. This might be of some concern to the psychologists and sociologists who study education policies and "action programs." Not all of policy analysis is informed by the tradition that progresses, as Fleishman suggests, from Aristotle to Robert S. McNamara (p. 324). And too little of it, this whole work suggests, is informed by traditional political theory.

GARY M. KLASS

Illinois State University

Annotations

Encyclopedia of Associations, 1984: Vol. 14, **International Organizations.** Edited by Denise S. Akey. (Detroit: Gale Research, 1983. Pp. 114. $130.00/3-issue subscription.)

This volume of the *Encyclopedia of Associations* extends coverage to nonprofit organizations that are international in scope and headquartered outside the United States. Sections include trade, business, and commercial organizations, agricultural organizations, legal, governmental, public administration, and military organizations, scientific, engineering, and technical ones, educational and cultural organizations, those concerned with social welfare, health, medicine, and public affairs, fraternal, nationality, and ethnic organizations, religious organizations, veteran, hereditary, and patriotic ones, hobby and avocational organizations, athletic and sports organizations, labor unions, associations, and labor federations. Entries include basic organizational information plus description of the association's work. Index includes names and key words.

Political Parties of the Americas, Canada, Latin America, and the West Indies, 2 vols.: Anguilla-Grenada and Guadeloupe-Virgin Islands of the United States. Edited by Robert J. Alexander. Pp. xix + 410 and ix + 454. $65.00/set.)

Another entry in the five-volume reference guide to significant political parties from the beginnings of party systems in eighteenth-century England through the present, this volume covers political parties in all of the Americas except the United States. Country chapters provide a brief political history of the area followed by a brief bibliography and then capsule discussions of individual parties. Text also provides cross-references for French or Spanish or Portuguese party names (except for the major French Canadian parties which are listed under the French original) and for some coalitions that essentially functioned as political parties. Appendixes provide chronology of party foundings, their geneologies, party classifications based on ideology (Christian Democratic, Communist, Fascist, National Revolutionaries, Socialists, and Trotskyists), and interest groups (agrarians, black power, feminist, and labor). Text includes index.

The United States in the World Economy: Selected Papers of C. Fred Bergsten, 1981-1982. By C. Fred Bergsten. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1983. Pp. x + 245. $23.95.)

This collection of Bergsten's recent papers examines the United States in light of international economic interdependency, assesses the international monetary system, analyzes current problems in world trade and international investment, and discusses policy toward developing countries. Text concludes with a brief introduction to the Institute for International Economics, of which Bergsten is director. Volume includes index.

Congress Off the Record: The Candid Analyses of Seven Members. Edited by John F. Bibby. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Pp. 53. $4.95, paper.)

Based on roundtable discussions held between the spring of 1979 and the fall of 1982, these edited transcripts provide the candid and anonymous views of seven congressmen first elected in 1978 and reelected in 1980. Comments from these four Republicans and three Democrats are organized into chapters on starting a career in the House, working in committees, the House floor, the congressional party, interest groups, the presidency, the electoral process, the second term, and perspectives on the Senate. Bibby provides brief organizing commentary throughout the chapters. Text includes brief introduction and postscript.

A Dictionary of Marxist Thought. Edited by Tom Bottomore. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983. Pp. xi + 587. $27.50.)

With contributions by more than 80 scholars, this guidebook provides sometimes brief, sometimes lengthy discussions of key concepts in Marxist thought, *dramatis personnae* in its evolution, and a variety of schools of Marxist interpretation and criticism. Entries include references for further reading. Text includes bibliographies of Marx and Engels's works cited and of all other works cited. An index permits some cross-referencing of concepts, *personnae,* and schools of thought.

Setting Municipal Priorities, 1983. Edited by Charles Brecher and Raymond D. Horton. (New York: New York University Press, 1982. Pp. xv + 252. $27.50.)

This volume is the fourth in an annual series on the fiscal and economic situation in New York City. Part 1 of the extant volume builds upon previous editions, reviewing such matters as the local economy and revenue, intergovernmental aid, expenditures and services, and debt and capital management. Part 2 contains a special study on foreign immigration and another on financial planning and the role of state government. Text includes index.

The Changing Politics of School Finance. Edited by Nelda H. Cambron-McCabe and Allan Odden. (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1983. Pp. xvi + 287. $29.00.)

Published as the third annual yearbook of the American Education Finance Association, this text contains nine scholarly overviews on such topics as turning-point election periods in education, the politics of federal aid, state-level politics and school financing, the courts and school finance reform, the impact of finance reform, tax and expenditure limitations, public aid to private schools, financing urban schools, and the politics of declining enrollments and school closings. Text includes index.

Readings in the Constitutional History of India, 1757-1947. Edited by S. V. Desika Char. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. Pp. xvii + 789. $53.00.)

This compilation of primary documents traces the development of the British administrative system in India from the early charters and settlements of the East India Company (1600 to 1757), through its early administrative system (1757 to 1793) and the presidency governments (1794 to 1833), to centralized administration (1833 to 1858) and then decentralization and growth of representative institutions (1858 to 1917), and finally toward responsible government (1917 to 1947). An additional part covers war, the Pakistan movement, and independence (1939 to 1947). An introductory chapter provides political and social background for the documents. Text also includes glossary, notes, bibliography, and index.

The American Presidency: A Guide to Information Sources. By Kenneth E. Davison. (Detroit: Gale Research, 1983. Pp. xvi + 467. $48.00.)

This bibliographic guide of books, articles, and documents on the American presidency focuses on materials written since 1945, giving special emphasis to those published since 1960. Part 1 includes a chapter on aids to research as well as topical chapters on the office of president, general works on the presidency, first ladies, presidential elections, functions and powers of the president, the institutionalized presidency, problems of the presidency, presidential documents, presidential libraries and museums, and private organizations and publishers. Part 2 contains a chapter on each of the American presidents from 1789 through 1982. Text includes author, title, and subject indexes.

Politics in America: Members of Congress in Washington and at Home. Edited by Alan Ehrenhalt. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1983. Pp. xix + 1,734. $29.95.)

This compendium provides biographical profiles of each member of the United States Senate and House of Representatives, their committee assignments, election data and campaign finance, their votes on key issues, scores on *CQ*'s presidential support, party unity, and conservative coalition indexes, and ratings calculated by such interest groups as the Americans for Democratic Action, Americans for Constitutional Action, the AFL-CIO, and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. Text also includes brief survey of current politics in each of the 50 states, state maps for congressional districts, listings of standing, select, and joint committees of the United States Congress including membership, address, and telephone numbers, and an index.

The Managed Economy: Essays in British Economic Policy and Performance since 1929. Edited by Charles Feinstein. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. Pp. viii + 284. $39.95, cloth; $17.95, paper.)

Covering a 50-year period of Great Britain's economic performance, the 13 essays reprinted here focus on Britain's variable economic performance and on policies designed to improve it. Three essays directly examine Keynesian theory and applications, while four others analyze the British economy from a Keynesian perspective. Three express concern over Keynesian policy, and a fourth adopts a monetarist approach. Text includes index.

Erskine May's Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament. Edited by Charles Gordon. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983. Pp. xlviii + 1,200. $131.25.)

This authoritative guide to British parliamentary practice updates the 1976 edition to include developments pursuant to the House of Commons Administrative Act of 1978 as well as other significant changes adopted over the past several years. The text's 41 chapters are contained in three major sections: (1) constitution, powers, and privileges of parliament; (2) parliamentary proceedings for public business; and (3) parliamentary proceedings for private business. An appendix reports House of Commons standing orders for public business as of March, 1983. Text includes index.

Lieber's Code and the Law of War. By Richard Shelly Hartigan. (South Holland, Ill.: Precedent Publishing, 1983. Pp. vii + 157. $17.95.)

This text reprints Lieber's tract on "Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference to the Law and Usages of War," his "General Orders No. 100" providing instructions for the government of U.S. armies in the field, and other selected correspondence and documents. Text includes an introduction by the editor, a select bibliography, and an index.

Music and Politics: Collected Writings, 1952-81. By Hans Werner Henze. Translated by Peter Labanyi. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982. Pp. 286. $24.95.)

Based on a German collection published in 1976, this translation includes some pieces not found in the original and excludes others. Selections generally focus on Henze's efforts to balance personal and artistic freedom with social and political consciousness. Essays cover most of his major compositions, many significant acquaintances, and reflections on art and politics. Text includes chronology and index.

The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers. Edited by George C. Herring. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983. Pp. xl + 873. $47.50.)

Although Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo released most of the Pentagon papers to the public in 1971, the four volumes included here were withheld because Ellsberg feared negative repercussions on a negotiated settlement for the Vietnam War. These volumes were part of the government's case against Ellsberg; during 1982, a still-unknown source released the negotiating volumes to Jack Anderson, who subsequently released them to the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times.* By 1977 all but 60 pages had entered the public domain. This text reproduces that archive copy. Topically the volumes contain a brief introduction and analysis plus lengthy event chronologies for each of 13 different negotiating initiatives or contacts. Extant text also provides an introduction, glossary of names, index, and a section of annotative notes.

The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers: Vol. 1, **1826-August 1919;** Vol. 2, **27 August 1919-31 August 1920.** Edited by Robert A. Hill. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. Pp. cxvii + 575 and lv + 710. $38.50 each.)

Volume 1 of a projected 10-volume series introduces the Garvey family through Jamaican slave records and ends with Garvey's address at Carnegie Hall before the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) and the African Communities' League of the World. Volume 2 follows the rapid growth of UNIA from the days following the Carnegie Hall address through the First International Convention of the Negro Peoples of the World a year later. The documents and manuscripts cover such topics as Garvey's personal life, the UNIA, his programs for racial nationalism, the Black Star Line, the federal investigation of Garvey, and much more. Each volume includes a chronology, introduction, informational appendixes, and index. Of the projected 10-volume set, volumes 1 through 6 are to focus on America, 7 and 8 on Africa, and 9 and 10 on the Caribbean.

The Annual Register: A Record of World Events 1982. Edited by H. V. Hodson. (Detroit: Gale Research, 1983. Pp. xiii + 549. $75.00.)

Now in its 224th volume, this register covers major events in the United Kingdom, the Americas and Caribbean, the USSR and Eastern Europe, Western, Central, and Southern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, Equatorial Africa, Central and Southern Africa, South Asia and the Indian Ocean, Southest and East Asia, and Australasia and the South Pacific. Other chapters record activities and developments in international organizations, religion, science, law, the arts, sports, and economic and social affairs. Text also includes selected documents and reference material, some obituaries, a chronicle of principal events in 1982, and an index.

Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record: Vol. 1, **1981-1982.** Edited by Jack W. Hopkins. (New York: Homes & Meier, 1983. Pp. xxxv + 892. $149.50.)

Designed as a companion to *Africa Contemporary Record* and *Middle East Contemporary Record,* this sourcebook begins a new series for Latin America and the Caribbean. Essays on current issues include the inter-American system, U.S. national security interests in Latin America, arms control in the region, the reorientation of U.S. policy, the region's economic and business outlook, its external debt, U.S. investments there, change and development, U.S.-Mexican relations and problems, and more. Part 2 presents a country-by-country review focusing on such matters as politics, defense and security, social affairs, and the economy. Part 3 contains key documents from 1981 to 1982; Part 4 provides certain social, economic, and political data; and Part 5 includes very brief abstracts of recent books relevant to the study of Latin America and the Caribbean. Text includes index.

U.S.-South Asian Relations, 1947-1982: Vol. 1, **Kashmir Question 1947-1964, India 1947-1982;** Vol. 2, **Pakistan 1947-1965, The Kutch Conflict, Indo-Pak Conflict of 1965, Pakistan 1965-1982;** Vol. 3, **Bangladesh Crisis and Indo-Pak War of 1971, Bangladesh 1972-1982, Nepal 1947-1982, Sri Lanka 1948-1982.** Edited by Rajendra K. Jain. (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1983. Pp. xlvii + 697, xlviii + 657, and xl + 495. $100.00/set.)

This three-volume set compiles some 1,500 documents regarding U.S. political, economic, and military involvement with the countries of South Asia. Materials are drawn from U.S. and South Asian documents, memoranda, telegrams, reports and resolutions, public addresses, letters, and much more. Broad topic areas include the Kashmir Question, U.S. relations with India and Pakistan, the Kutch and Indo-Pak conflicts, Bangladesh and the Indo-Pak War, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Each volume includes an index and assorted data-based appendixes.

Guerrilla and Terrorist Organisations: A World Directory and Bibliography. By Peter Janke. (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1983. Pp. xxvi + 531. $60.00.)

This text offers a broad survey of organizations throughout the world that have attempted to threaten established governments since World War II. A section is devoted to each of seven regions: Europe, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, the Far East and Oceania, North America, and Latin America. Groups are arranged alphabetically by targeted country within each region. Brief introductions provide background on the political context of violence for each region and for each country within a region. Text includes an index of groups and a list of acronyms.

International Handbook of Contemporary Developments in Criminology: Vol. 1, **General Issues and the Americas;** Vol. 2, **Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.** Edited by Elmer H. Johnson. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983. Pp. xvi + 319 and xx + 696. $95.00/set.)

A comparative survey of criminology as an occupational system, this handbook includes a typological essay by the editor, topical reviews of international organizations and criminology, the International Society for Criminology, criminology in developing nations, women and criminology, and radical criminology, and some 40 area study essays covering the Americas, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Contributors were asked to consider such questions as the meaning of criminology as a discipline, the recruitment and education of criminologists, relation to cognate disciplines, and the crime problem providing the subject matter for criminological inquiry. Each volume contains an index.

Images of Revolution: Graphic Art from 1905 Russia. By David King and Cathy Porter. (New York: Random House, 1983. Pp. 128. $30.00, cloth; $16.95, paper.)

This surprising book contains selected graphic and political art found in the satirical journals that were published during the Russian Revolution of 1905. Text includes introductory commentary by Cathy Porter and some photographs. Text also includes a brief bibliography on this form of graphic Russian political satire.

A Practitioner's Guide to Information Sources and the Literature on County Government: An Annotated Bibliography. By Cortus T. Koehler. (Sacramento: County Supervisors Association of California, 1983. Pp. 92. $6.00, paper.)

A complement to John C. Bollens's *American County Government* (Sage Publications, 1969), this bibliography emphasizes materials written in the past 15 years. Select entries include technical and academic books, theoretical, technical, and administrative periodicals, in-house county reports, and organizations preparing and distributing information of interest to counties. Text includes more than 650 entries (most with a very brief annotation), an index, and appendixes on state associations of counties, professional organizations, and additional sources of information.

Government Programs and Projects Directory: A Guide to National Programs and Projects Administration by the Executive Departments and Independent Agencies of the United States Government. Issue No. 1. Edited by Anthony T. Kruzas and Kay Gill. (Detroit: Gale Research, 1983. Pp. 141. $85.00/3-issue subscription.)

The first of three issues designed to consolidate information about federal programs, this issue references more than 400 programs of the executive department and independent agencies. Entries include the name of the program or project, its sponsoring agency's name and address, the program's legislative authorization if available, a program description, funding information if available, and the sources of information used to prepare that entry. Text presents entries hierarchically by department, agency, program, and project, with alphabetical entries within each grouping level. An index includes program name and subject keywords.

Biographical Dictionary of Internationalists. Edited by Warren F. Kuehl. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983. Pp. xvi + 934. $75.00.)

Included here are biographies of those active leaders in national or international nongovernmental organizations promoting world organization or cooperation, of those holding significant posts in functional international bodies, of those gaining public recognition as originator or exponent of ideas or proposals for international organization, of those whose lifestyle or beliefs promoted transnational cooperation, and of those who actively promoted transnationalism in nonpolitical arenas. Entries included basic information on birth, death, education, and career, a sketch of the person's work as an internationalist, and a selected bibliography. Appendixes categorize subjects by birthplace and country with which identified, career, and type of internationalist. Text includes index and notes on the contributors.

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson: Vol. 42, **April 7-June 23, 1917.** Edited by Arthur S. Link. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983. Pp. xxvi + 595. $32.50.)

Now into its second decade of publication, this series presents verbatim documents relating to Wilson's personal life, his political leadership, his efforts at economic and military mobilization, and his wartime diplomacy. The extant volume begins as the United States enters World War I and chronicles Wilson's role as commander-in-chief, the formation of a Committee on Public Information to rally public opinion and the subsequent controversy over censorship, his successful requests to Congress for selective Service Act, bond issues to aid near-bankrupt allies, the Espionage Act, his continued efforts to secure price control legislation, his encouragement of the new Russian democracy, and much more. Documents are arranged chronologically, but the table of contents lists materials under such categories as addresses, statements, press releases, correspondence, reports, memoranda, and collateral materials. Volume includes index.

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson: Vol. 43, **June 25-August 20, 1917.** Edited by Arthur S. Link. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983. Pp. xxiv + 564. $32.50.)

Another entry in this expansive series, Volume 43 covers the summer months of U.S. mobilization for the war. These materials document Wilson's effort to maintain control over the mobilization effort as well as American diplomacy while facing such issues as the demand for women's suffrage, the campaign of the Anti-Saloon League, labor unrest, violations of civil liberties, squabbles threatening the U.S. shipbuilding program, Japan's claim to a paramount interest in China, and peace proposals from German moderates and Pope Benedict XV. Materials are arranged chronologically. A table of contents arranges entries by type of document, and an index permits name and subject cross-referencing.

The Diary of Beatrice Webb: Vol. 2, **1892-1905, "All the Good Things of Life."** Edited by Norman MacKenzie and Jeanne MacKenzie. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983. Pp. xv + 376. $25.00.)

This volume of the diary begins shortly after Beatrice Webb's marriage to Sidney in 1892 and ends with her entry into public life in 1905. This time period covers the liberating transition from Britain's Victorian to Edwardian age; the floundering of British agriculture and the increased importance of factories, mines, and foreign trade; the growing strains of imperialism, jingoism, socialism; and much more. The Webb's monumental *A History of Trade Unionism* was published during this period in 1894. Text includes introductory materials by the editors, a chronology, brief bibliography, and an index.

Successful Dissertations and Theses: A Guide to Graduate Student Research from Proposal to Completion. By David Madsen. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1983. Pp. xv + 174. $12.95.)

Topics in this guidebook include a discussion of problems in starting and completing the dissertation, the role of research adviser and committee, selecting and refining the research topic, preparing the research proposal, following basic research procedures, organizing, outlining, and writing drafts, the thesis defense, adapting the thesis for publication or presentation, and using the library and locating essential resources. Text includes examples, bibliography, and index.

Scholars' Guide to Washington, D.C. for Southeast Asian Studies. By Patrick M. Mayerchak. (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1983. Pp. xiii + 409. $29.95, cloth; $12.50, paper.)

The ninth in a series of guides to the use of scholarly resources in the Washington, D.C. area, this text introduces the serious researcher to available materials on Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Resources examined include libraries, archives, and manuscript repositories; museums, galleries, and art collections; collections of music and sound recordings; map and film collections; data banks; research centers; academic programs and departments; U.S. government agencies; Southeast Asian embassies and international organizations; associations; cultural exchange, technical assistance, and religious organizations; and publications and the media. Appendixes record relevant information on many of the resources cited and provide information on housing, transportation, and other services to visiting scholars. Text also includes bibliography, name index, subject index, and more.

Political Parties of Europe, 2 vols. Edited by Vincent McHale. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983. Pp. xviii + 700 and xvii + 596. $95.00/set; $65.00/volume.)

The second of five historical reference guides to significant political parties from the eighteenth century to the present, this encyclopedia covers 34 European countries, the historical states of Estonia, pre-1945 Germany, Latvia, and Lithuania, and the European Parliament. Chapters include a brief introduction to the state's political history, a select bibliography, and an alphabetical listing plus description of the major party systems. Most chapters include cross-referenced entries and data on electoral history. Appendixes include a chronology of political events, a genealogy of parties, and a grouping of parties under ideologies and associated interest groups. Text also contains an index.

The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789. By Robert Middlekauff. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Pp. xvi + 696. $25.00.)

This volume is the second in a series consisting of nine chronological and two topical volumes summarizing scholarship on American social, political, economic, cultural, diplomatic, and military history. Written in narrative style, the extant volume focuses on government, politics, constitutionalism, and war starting with the Treaty of Paris and ending with the Seven Years' War. Text includes footnotes, a general bibliographic note on the works of other historians, and an index.

Economics for Policymaking: Selected Essays of Arthur M. Okun. Edited by Joseph A. Pechman. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 665. $25.00.)

This collection of 31 essays serves as a posthumous tribute to a leading economic policy advisor. Essays cover the causes and cures of inflation, implicit contracts, output, employment and unemployment, fiscal and monetary policy, economic performance between 1960 and 1980, economic forecasting, economic policy formulation, and equality and efficiency. Text includes a bibliography of Okun's works and an index.

World Development Report 1983. Edited by Rupert Pennant-Rea et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. Pp. x + 214. $20.00, cloth; $8.00, paper.)

The sixth in its series, this World Bank Report contains a section examining the economic recession of 1980 to 1982 and the outlook for developing countries and a second section on the role of management and institutions in development. The latter section covers such topics as the search for efficiency, the role of the state, pricing for efficiency, national economic management, managing state-owned enterprises, project and program management, managing the public service, and reorienting government. Text also includes a tabular annex of world development indicators.

Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel: Vol. 3, **Armistice Negotiations with the Arab States, December 1948-July 1949.** Edited by Yemima Rosenthal. (Jerusalem: Israel State Archives, 1983. Pp. 758 and lxxv + 229. $69.50 includes companion volume.)

The third volume of a projected annual series of documents on Israeli foreign policy, this book covers the negotiations leading to the armistice agreements between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria in 1949. Chronologically the materials overlap the time period covered in volumes 2 and 4. The text contains documents in Hebrew and English, and a companion volume provides English summaries of Hebrew materials and an English index to the main and companion volumes. The main volume is divided into four sections, one each for Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria, and its appendixes provide English and Hebrew texts of the armistice agreements. Both the main and companion volume contain lengthy introductions providing historical background for the documents.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Vol. 5, Part 1 and Part 2: **Western European Security.** Edited by William Z. Slany. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983. Pp. xxxv + 1,882. $28.00.)

This volume adds yet another contribution to the unfolding official record of U.S. foreign relations as reflected in government documents now made publicly available. Topical contents include U.S. participation in the ninth session of the North Atlantic Council, U.S. involvement in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the U.S. posture toward a European Defense Community, diplomacy regarding the Brussels Treaty Organization, and other diplomatic efforts aimed at forging defense security for Western Europe.

American Foreign Policy Basic Documents 1977-1980. Edited by Louis J. Smith et al. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983. Pp. xlix + 1,458. $27.00.)

This compilation of public documents from the Carter administration resumes a series first begun in 1950 under the title *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949,* continued with *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents,* released annually between 1956 and 1967 as *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents,* and then ending. This resumption projects a multiyear volume for 1969 to 1972 and another for 1973 to 1976, plus annual volumes beginning with 1981 documents. Topics in the extant volume include principles and objectives of American foreign policy, its organization and conduct, U.S. national security policy, arms control, foreign economic policy, the United Nations and international law, and human rights. Additional documents are arranged by region of focus: Europe and Canada, the Middle East, South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, Africa, and Latin America. Volume includes topical index for the more than 700 documents presented.

Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945: Vol. 6, **The Third Reich, First Phase, November 1, 1936-November 14, 1937.** Edited by Howard M. Smyth et al. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983. Pp. lxxxi + 1,140. $18.00.)

Following World War II, the British Foreign Office, the United States Department of State, and later the French government jointly agreed to publish English versions of selected archival documents captured from the German Foreign Ministry and Reich Chancellery. This volume is the last entry in Series C (1933 to 1937) and introduces the first five topical volumes in Series D (13 vols.). Documents in the present volume are arranged chronologically, beginning with Mussolini's proclamation of the Rome-Berlin axis (1936) and ending with the German Ambassador to Moscow reporting failure in efforts to modify the Soviet demand to close all but two German consulates in the USSR. Documents missing from the captured archives, and hence not included in this volume, include the secret files of the Legal Department, Political Department, and Economic Policy Department as well as some of the files from the Office of the Reich Foreign Minister and some open files from the Economic Policy Department. Text includes an analytic or topical list of documents, appendixes on the organization of the German Foreign Ministry, German files used, a list of principal persons, and a glossary of German terms and abbreviations.

Surveys, Polls, Censuses, and Forecasts Directory: A Guide to Sources of Statistical Studies in the Areas of Business, Social Science, Education, Science, and Technology. Issue Number 1. (Detroit: Gale Research, 1983. Pp. 92. $175.00/3-issue subscription.)

This guide provides timely information on the name of a survey or poll, its sponsoring agency, a description of its purpose or objective and the nature of the sample if relevant, its frequency, time coverage, geographic coverage, format on which the resulting research is available, and other citations regarding the survey or poll. Each issue contains about 400 entries, and three issues are scheduled for yearly publication. Each issue includes a cumulative subject and sponsors' name index.

World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators: Vol. 1, **Cross-National Attributes and Rates of Change;** Vol. 2, **Political Protest and Government Change.** By Charles Lewis Taylor and David A. Jodice. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983. Pp. xxvi + 305 and xv + 216. $25.00, vol. 1; $22.50, vol. 2.)

This edition updates and sometimes improves upon aggregate material reported in the last edition. Cross-national attribute data typically are reported for 1960 and the 1975 to 1978 period, although the machine-readable media contain considerably more data. Reported growth rates for as many as 154 countries on several variables utilize sometimes different beginning and ending time-points, and some reported values include more time-points than do others. The second volume introduces an updating and major expansion of data series on political protest and violence, state coercion, elections, and government change in the period from 1948 to 1977. Almost 90,000 events can be found on the archive tapes, although the extant volume reports only a small fraction of that information. Text includes time series profiles by country for selected variables reported in Volume 2, discussions of data reliability, archiving, operationalizations, various informational appendixes, and an index for each volume.

Annual Review of Military Research and Development: 1982. By Kosta Tsipis and Sheena Phillips. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. x + 171. $24.95.)

The first in a planned series on military research and development, this endeavor was undertaken to act as an early warning on weapons systems that could be destabilizing, unnecessary, ineffective, or technically dubious, in addition to providing objective information on ongoing military research and development. The first volume includes brief history of U.S. military research and development funding, a description of fundamental technologies with extensive military applications, and close examinations of particle-beam weapons, laser weapons, and cruise missiles.

UNCTAD 1963-1983 Bibliography. (Geneva: United Nations Library, 1983. Pp. 81. Price unknown.)

This reference guide surveys written materials on the activities of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) since it was first established. Part 1 includes entries on general bibliographies, monographs, and articles, while Part 2 covers UNCTAD Conferences 1 through 6. Part 3 catalogs entries on topics of special interest to UNCTAD. Specifically excluded from the bibliography are official UN documents and publications, newspaper articles, and articles a page or less in length. Weekly news magazines are not covered systematically.

Yearbook of International Organizations, 1983/84: Vol. 1, **Organization Descriptions and Index.** Edited by Union of International Associations. (New York: K. G. Saur/Gale Research, 1983. Pp. 1,500. $168.00.)

This twentieth edition with expanded coverage now includes some 20,000 organizations including federations of international organizations; those with universal, intercontinental, or regional membership; organizations emanating from places, persons, and other bodies; those with special forms such as foundations or funds; international organizations gounded in a particular country; international organizations now inactive or dissolved; religious orders, fraternities, and secular institutes; plus multilateral treaties and agreements. An enormous index includes recently reported, proposed, or uncomfirmed international organizations, in addition to all working language names for the organizations included, their abbreviations, subject and other keyword identifiers, sponsoring bodies, former names, and executive officers.

Government Agencies. Edited by Donald R. Whitnah. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983. Pp. xxviii + 683. $49.95.)

This text includes informational profiles on some 100 agencies of the federal government by more than 100 scholarly contributors. Several existing agencies are not covered, largely because needed information was lacking, or because they had been created in the recent past, or because their scope appeared too narrow. Some defunct agencies also have been included, particularly certain New Deal agencies and some wartime boards and commissions. Entries are alphabetical. Text includes an index and appendixes on chronology, genealogy, umbrella agencies, and categories of agency service.

Three Hundred Years of German Immigrants in North America: 1683-1983. Edited by Klaus Wust and Heinz Moos. (Baltimore: Heinz Moos Publishing, 1983. Pp. 185. $24.50.)

This bilingual edition is a pictorial history and tricentennial tribute to German immigrants to North America. Text includes essays on the motivation for emigration, immigrant expectations, and the influence of these individual and groups in the New World. Text also includes selected biographical sketches, more than 500 illustrations, a chronological appendix, an index, and a brief bibliography.



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

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

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

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
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
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
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

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
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
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
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

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